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BENGAL IN 1756-1757

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INDIAN RECORDS SERIES

BENGAL IN 1756-1757

A SELECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS DEALING WITH THE AFFAIRS OF THE BRITISH IN BENGAL DURING THE REIGN OF SIRAJ-UDDAULA

EDITED
WITH NOTES AND AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
BY S. C. HILL

LATE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
AUTHOR OF 'MAJOR-GENERAL CLAUD MARTIN'
'THREE FRENCHMEN IN BENGAL'

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ILLUSTRATION.

Plan of the Plassey Grove (ascribed to Clive) - - *To face p.* 434

CORRIGENDA.

Page 2, *delete* note 1.
Page 8, line 38, *for* Calcutta *read* Cossimbazar.
Page 60, note 3, *for* Kensall *read* Kelsall.
Page 92, line 30, *for* Beecher *read* Becher.
Page 120, line 27, *for* did not hold *read* held.
Page 174, line 24, *for* Barnagut *read* Barnagul.
Page 289, line 6, *for* 1857 *read* 1757.
Page 335, line 1, *insert* No. 341 (*a*).
Page 383, note 1, *for* June 3 *read* June 5.
Page 387, note 3, *for* 385 *read* 395.
Page 407, lines 19 and 27, *for* Amr-ulla *read* Amir-ulla.

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A SELECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS DEALING WITH THE AFFAIRS OF THE BRITISH IN BENGAL DURING THE REIGN OF SIRAJ-UDDAULA.

113. *Letter from Mr. J. Z. Holwell to the Court of Directors, dated Fulta, 30 November, 1756.*[1]

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. Immediately on my being released from my imprisonment and fetters at Muxadabad, I addressed your two Presidencys of Bombay and Fort Saint George, on the subject of the loss of your possessions in these provinces, under date the 17th July last, and again on my arrival at Hougly, under date the 3rd August, when I duely forwarded to them duplicates of those I dispatched from Muxadavad, and requested the advices I gave them might be transmitted to you by the most expeditious conveyance, and at the same time refered to a particular narrative of the causes and various accidents, which brought on the heavy loss you have sustained: this I promised to forward as soon as my health would enable me. The slow recovery of my sight, much impaired by the shock and injury my nerves suffered that fatal night in the Black Hole and from being exposed to the sun on my passage to Muxadabad, must plead my pardon for your not receiving the narrative I promised by the ship dispatched, I understand, sometime this month from your Presidency of Fort Saint George, and by which I am sensible you will receive many different narratives and accounts of the causes of our misfortunes. Leaving those to your impartial consideration, I now sit down to discharge this part of my duty, humbly intreating you will believe me determined to pay the strictest regard to the truth, to the best of my knowledge, and that I will not, by any representation, either

[1] Some additions (in square brackets) have been made from Holwell's revised edition of this letter printed in his *Indian Tracts*, p. 267.

in reasoning or facts, endeavour to mislead your judgments, or influence them either in favour of myself or to the disfavour of any one else, further than justice to myself and the state and nature of things will make it unavoidable; shuning, as much as possible, any repetition of matters already transmitted you in my letters of the 17th July and 3rd of August last, which I request may be kept in your view as I do not find any cause to retract any essential part of them.

2. Mahabut Jung (better known by the name of Ally Verdi Cawn) demising on the 9th of April last, was succeeded in the government of the *subaship* by his grandson Surajud Dowla, without opposition excepting from the young *Begum*, relict of Shaw Amet Jung[1] uncle of Surajud Dowla. This Princess, foreseeing her liberty and the immense wealth of her lately deceased husband would fall a sacrifice to the new *Suba*, had meditated for some time the raising another to the *subaship*, and with this view retired, before the death of the old *Suba*, to her pallace, (some distance from the city) named Mootee Giel, with Raagbullob, the *dewan* of her late husband, Nazzur Ally Cawn, and others the most faithfull of her officers and domesticks; where she fortifyed herself, and raised some troops to oppose the succession of her nephew. When the dispute was near coming to extremities, the old *Begum*, relict of Ally Verdy Cawn, interposed with her mediation, by which and the promises of Surajud Dowla, that the Princess should remain in full possession and security of life, liberty, and property, she was prevailed on to disband her troops, submited to the banishment from the provinces of Nazzur Ally Cawn and two other officers, and returned to the city; where she was no sooner arrived than she was made a prisoner, and her pallaces and possessions seized and confiscated to the *Suba's* use.

3. The new *Suba* having, on his succession to the government, sent a *seerpaw* and advice thereof to Shocut Jung, his cozin, the Nabob of Purranea, this latter returned the *seerpaw*, and disavowed submission to him as *Suba* of the provinces; asserting his government to be left by Ally Verdy Cawn independent of him. This occasioned the resentment of Surajud Dowla, who resolved to

[1] In other accounts she is said to be the widow of the Nawab's eldest uncle, Nawajis Muhammad Khan, but (see below) Holwell confuses the two brothers.

reduce him by force; and after he had laid the storm the young *Begum* had attempted to raise against him, he immediately marched against Shocut Jung with a strong army, which had been raised by the old *Suba*, foreseeing the difficulties his grandson would have to encounter after his death. Here I must leave the *Suba* on his march, and go back in point of time to matters no less necessary to investigate the real causes of his subsequent march to Calcutta; which is so blended with some incidents attending the late change of government at Muxadabad, that it is impossible to give a distinct view of the one, without a short recital of the other.

4. On the death of Shaw Amet Jung, (more generally known by the name of Newaris Mahomet Cawn) and during the life of the old *Suba*, Surajud Dowla, who had in effect the reins of the government in his hands long before the decease of his grandfather, seized on Raagbullob above mentioned, the chief Minister of Shaw Amet Jung, and by imprisonment and other despotic and severe methods endeavoured to force from him a confession and discovery of Shaw Amet Jung's riches; but the Minister, faithfull to his deceased master, could not be brought to any confession injurious to the interest of his surviving family, and after a few days' sufferings, obtained his liberty by the intercession of the young *Begum*, with her father and mother, Ally Verdy Cawn, and his *Begum:* but Raagbullob being sensible the resolution he had shewn for the interest of the family of his deceased master, (between whom and Surajud Dowla there had been a long hatred and animosity) would never be forgiven by Surajud Dowla, thought it incumbent on him to provide as well as he could for the safety of himself; and in resentment for the usage he had unjustly received for his integrity to the young *Begum*, readily entered into her councils to oppose the succession; and finding the death of the old *Suba* was near at hand, and recollecting his own family and greatest part of his wealth were exposed to danger at Dacca, his first care was to draw them to a place of security; in order to which he applyed to Mr. Watts, your Chief at Cossimbuzar, telling him his family were going from Dacca to worship at Jaggernaut and should take Calcutta in the way; requesting at the same time that they might there find a proper reception. Mr. Watts accordingly wrote the President, and I think to Mr. Manningham,

to much the same effect. These letters arrived during the absence of your President at Ballasore, and much about the time that Kissendass, the eldest son of Raagbullob, and the family reached Calcutta from Dacca; at least I know no otherwise, for in the evening I think of the 13th of March my people at the waterside *chowkeys* brought me intelligence that Raagbullob's family was arrived from Dacca, and that they had received orders from Mr. Manningham for their admittance, who having occasion to summon a council the next morning for the despatch of the Negrais[1] supplys, showed me Mr. Watts' letter to the President, who likewise communicated the same to me on his return to the Settlement. This letter, I now understand, the President has lost amongst the rest of his papers; though I often, since the commencement of our troubles, as he must recollect, urged to him the necessity of preserving it in his own and our vindication: however, as I had twice perused it, and had since occasion enough to retain in my memory the first impression I had received of it, I can venture to assert it was near the following purport:

"That he, Mr. Watts, had been applyed to by Raagbullob, the *Chuta Begum's dewan*, who advised him that his family had left Dacca with intention to go to worship at Jaggernaut and should take Calcutta on his way, and requested he would write to the Governour touching their reception there, and that they might be supplyed with boats, or aught else they might have occasion for on their expedition; that in compliance with Raagbullob's intimation and request, he wrote and recommended his family being received with all possible respect and regard, not only on account of his influence with the *Chuta Begum*, but as his power at Dacca might be of the utmost consequence to our Honourable Masters' affairs there."

In consequence of this recommendatory letter and the reasons urged by Mr. Watts, they were received in the Settlement, and treated with all possible regard. Whether Mr. Watts knew, or can be supposed to have judged, that Raagbullob's family going to Jaggernaut to worship, was a pretence only to facilitate their obtaining a protection in Calcutta, I cannot say; but I recollect the President's communicating to me another letter he received from Mr. Watts, about the time the death of the old *Suba* was deemed inevitable, wherein he advised it expedient,

[1] One of the Company's Settlements on the coast of Burmah.

"That Kissendass, and the rest of Raagbullob's family should have no longer protection in Calcutta, as it was very uncertain what a turn things would take after the decease of the *Suba*."

The President will, I doubt not, do me the justice of acknowledging I enforced this salutary advice, and pressed more than once the dismission of this family, foreseeing they would be demanded; and Mr. Manningham and myself had many uneasy conferences on the protection being continued to them, fearing it might be productive of troublesome consequences and possibly embroil us with the new Government, should they remain in the Settlement untill the *Suba's* decease. Why the President delayed their dismission, I am at a loss now to account for; but certain it is, had they been obliged to quit the place a handle would have been taken away from many, who have been too ready to urge and maintain the protection given to this family as the greatest, nay, the sole cause that drew on us the *Suba's* resentment; which I doubt not of convincing your Honourable Court is very distant from the truth. Their dismission would however have saved us from a most difficult situation which we presently fell into; for we no sooner received advice of the death of Ally Verdy Cawn, than we had notice also of the stand made against Surajud Dowla's succession by the young *Begum* and her party, of which Raagbullob was the chief Minister and favourite of his mistress, so that it became at that juncture a dangerous step to the Company's interest to turn his family out of the Settlement, the more especially as for some days advices from all quarters were in favour of the *Begum's* party. Notwithstanding which, as the new *Suba* had been proclaimed in the city, the President wrote the usual congratulatory letter to him, which was favourably received.

5. Here it becomes needfull to recite, that some little time before the old *Suba's* death, the President received a private letter from Mr. Watts to the following purport:

"That there was a multitude of the Government's spys at Calcutta; that the small strength of its fortifications and garrison, and the easy capture of it, were the publick discourse of the city and *Durbar;* and that it behoved Mr. Drake to be upon his guard, and by some means prevent the Government's spys bringing daily intelligence to the *Durbar* of the weak situation of the place."

This letter the President communicated to me, and gave me

orders [as *Zemindar*] to make a strict enquiry after such as might justly be suspected, and that had no real call of business in the place; and also that I would issue orders to the several *chowkeys* [or places of guard] to admit none to land or be admited into the town without his orders. These instructions I immediately obeyed, and several suspected persons were, in consequence of them, turned out of the place, and none admitted without a strict examination.

6. On Raagbullob's withdrawing himself, with the young *Begum*, to Mootie Giel, Surajud Dowla dispatched Naran Sing, brother to Rajaram, the *Fowzdaar* of Midnapore, to Calcutta, with a *perwannah*, the contents of which were to demand Kissendass and his family to be delivered up. Between 8 and 9 on the evening of, I think, the 14th of April the President being at Barasut and Mr. Manningham at his country residence, Omychund came and advised me that Naran Sing had got, in the disguize of a European dress, into the Settlement, and had the *Suba's perwannah* to demand Raagbullob's family, and was at his house, asking me whether I would admit his bringing him to visit me? As he had got entrance into the place, I thought it adviseable to see him, and Omychund brought him accordingly in about half an hour. I received him with the respect due to a brother of Rajaram, an officer in much trust and confidence with both the late and present *Suba;* he tendered me his *perwannah*, but I excused myself from receiving it, as it was addressed to the Governour, who I told him would be in town in the morning, on which he took his leave well satisfyed. In the morning early I sent for the *jemmautdaar* of the *chowkey* where Naran Sing landed, and was going to punish him for admiting any one in the Settlement without orders, when he informed me that Naran Sing came in the disguize of a common Bengall *pikar;*[1] that he opposed his landing, but that soon after Omychund's servants came to him with a message signifying that he was a relation of his house and that he might admit him. Soon after, on advice that the President was returned to town, I waited on him with the report of this transaction, and found with him Messrs. Manningham and Frankland; we were all a good deal embarrassed how to act on this occasion, [seeing] that the same reasons that before forbid the

[1] A small native broker.

family being turned out of the place after the *Suba's* death still subsisted equally strong against delivering them up, as the contest was yet undecided between Surajud Dowla and the young *Begum*. The result at last of our deliberations was, that as Naran Sing had stole like a thief and a spy into the Settlement, (and not like one in the publick character he pretended and as bearing the *Suba's* orders) the President should not receive him or his *perwannah;* which resolution was put in execution, and the President sent one of his *chubdaars* to him, with orders to quit the Settlement, which he did: and instantly letters were dispatched to Mr. Watts to advise him of the affair, with instructions to guard against any ill consequences which might arrise from it.

7. The foregoing is, Honourable Sirs, a faithfull narrative of the protection given to Kissendass the son and family of Raagbullob, which has been industrously and maliciously by some, and erroneously by others, circulated as the principal cause of the loss of your Settlements in Bengall; an event which I will soon demonstrate, had a much deeper and more remote foundation: for on your Chief at Cassimbuzar making a proper representation of this affair at the *Durbar*, it hardly occasioned any emotion or displeasure in the *Suba*, nor ever had a place in any of the subsequent complaints forwarded to us, through the channel of that subordinate.

8. The probability of a breach with France had been the subject of discourse for some time, before it was confirmed to us by the arrival of your letter on the *Delawar*, and about the same time we received news of the taking Gyria[1] by His Majesty's squadron; both became the subject of much speculation at the *Durbar* where the military and naval strength of the English in India were greatly exagerated, and no small pains taken to instill a dread of it into the Government; and if the agents for the French East India Company (whose garrison at Chandanagore did not, at this period, amount to 50 men) were not at the bottom of these reports, it is at least, I hope, no breach of charity to conclude they used every means in their power to confirm them; at least such was our information, when it was confidently asserted in the *Durbar* at Muxadabad, and gained belief, that the English had sixteen ships of war and a strong land force coming to Bengall.

[1] February 14, 1756. Surgeon Ives' Journal, p. 86.

9. On the receipt of your letter by the *Delawar*,[1] we began to put the Settlement into as good a posture of defence as we could; and as the parapet and embrazures, as well as the gun carriages of the Line to the westward of the fort, was much out of repair, they became the first object of our attention; a number of workmen were employed, and I believe the parapet and embrazures (the greatest part of which we were obliged to pull down) more than half run up, when the President was surprized with a *perwannah* from the *Suba*, to the following purport:

"That he had been informed we were building a wall and digging a large ditch round the town of Calcutta: that he did not approve of our carrying on these works without his permission: and ordered Mr. Drake to desist immediately, and destroy what he had already done."

10. The French having strengthened their fort by an additional bastion, which at this time they had compleated, received, at the same juncture we did, a *perwannah* to the like effect; both of them having been dispatched by the *Suba*, as he was on his march against the Purranea Nabob; and the answers to them reached the *Suba* on the same day at Rajamaal, a city about three days' march from Muxadabad; and the French, by the completion of their bastion, being enabled to desist immediately, answered him accordingly; assuring him at the same time, that they had built no new works, and had only repaired one of their bastions which had been injured by lightning: with which answer he appeared satisfyed.

11. The reply your President returned to the *Suba's perwannah*, was, to the best of my remembrance, as follows:—

"That the *Suba* had been misinformed in respect to our building a wall round our town, and we had dug no ditch since the invasion of the Moratters, at which time we executed such a work at the particular request of our inhabitants, and with the knowledge and approbation of Ally Verdy Cawn; that, in the late war

[1] "As the *Delaware* arrived at Madras on the 9th May, 1756, and the letter in question was dispatched to Calcutta on the 11th May, and could not have reached Calcutta until after a week or ten days, it is difficult to understand how the fortifications begun in consequence of this letter could have given rise to the quarrel with the Nawab which culminated, on the 22nd May (see paragraph 11), in the attack on Calcutta. It is, however, possible that a duplicate of this letter had arrived in Calcutta at an earlier date by the overland route."

between our nation and the French, they had attacked and taken the town of Madrass, contrary to the neutrality we expected would have been preserved in the *Mogull's* dominions; and that there being at present great appearance of another war between the two Crowns, we were under some apprehensions they would act in the same manner in Bengall; to prevent which we were only repairing our Line of guns to the water-side."

It is fruitless now to wish this answer had been debated in Council before it was sent, where I think much impropriety would have appeared in it, as the whole of it had a tendency to confirm the *Suba* in a belief of those insinuations which had been already conveyed to him, that the war between us and the French would probably be brought into Bengall, besides its carrying a tacit reflection on the *Suba's* power or will to protect us.[1] The consequence was adequate, for he was much enraged at the receipt of it, and immediately ordered your factory at Cossimbuzar to be invested; which was accordingly done on the 22nd of May by Roy Dullob, of which we received advice from the gentlemen there, the 25th and several other subsequent letters informing us of additional forces being added on the factory from time to time, and that they expected every moment to be attacked, and that the *Suba* was on his march to Muxadabad. The subject matter of complaint assigned in every letter, still regarded the new works we were carrying on in Calcutta.

12. On the first advice received from the gentlemen at Cossimbuzar, we forwarded to them a copy of President's answer to the Nabob's *perwannah*, and in our several dispatches recommended them to use every salutary means in their power to put a stop to the *Suba's* resentment, and obtain a currency to our business, (which was now obstructed at every subordinate and *aurung*). We directed them to assure the *Suba* we were carrying on no new works; that we had dug no ditch; that our enemies had misrepresented us; that if he gave no credit to our assertions, we intreated he would send any one he could confide in to inspect them, and wrote the *Suba* repeated letters to the like purpose. We likewise gave the gentlemen instructions to remonstrate and expostulate

[1] This is the only reasonable explanation that has ever been offered of the Nawab's rage when he received Drake's reply. As far as we can see, it is the correct one.

strongly against this hard treatment, and to endeavour to trace out, if possible, whether one or other of the European nations was not at the bottom of it with intent to embroil the Company's affairs and benefit those of their employers, and to use all means of knowing from his Ministers if the *Suba's* intention was to extort a sum of money from us (conformable to the unjust and unusual method of his predecessors); withall giving them positive orders to make no concession or give any promises touching the demolition of our fortification.

13. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you see us reduced to the necessity either of resisting the arbitrary orders of the *Suba*, or of abandoning and leaving open your Presidency to the mercy of the French contrary to your orders and intimation to us by the *Delawar;* for to all our remonstrances we could receive no satisfaction from the gentlemen at Cossimbuzar, but was still advised the *Suba* insisted on our demolishing our new works (when in fact we had made none) and fill up a ditch we had never dug.

14. Under date, I think, the 1st of June, we received a letter from your Chief and Council at Cossimbuzar, advising, that Roy Doolob had told Doctor Forth, that the *Suba's* resentment was caused only by the drawbridge and works we had built at Baagbuzar, and the octagon which Mr. Kelsall had rebuilt in his garden; and that if we would write the *Suba* we would demolish those works, the forces would be immediately withdrawn; and the gentlemen likewise enforcing this as a necessary and effectual expedient to put an end to the troubles, we in full Council took it into consideration; and reflecting on the heavy loss and disadvantage you would sustain in your investment, by the continuance of the stoppage of your business, and judging those works and drawbridge at Baagbuzar, so far detached, as to be of little use in the defence of the place against a European enemy, we unanimously determined and agreed to promise the demolition of them and the octagon at Mr. Kelsall's garden; and to that purport, as soothing a letter as could be indited was instantly drawn up to the *Suba* from the President, and enclosed to Mr. Watts and his Council, to whom we also wrote, advising them of our compliance and readyness to demolish those works which had given him displeasure. Triplicates of this *arassdass* and letter we dis-

patched in four hours, to arrive in thirty-six hours; and ordered a large reward to the *cossids* if they arrived in the time.

15. We received another short letter under the same date, *viz.*, the 1st of June, wherein the gentlemen informed us, the forces on their factory amounted to 12,000, with a Train of artillery, and that positive orders were arrived to attack it, requesting they might be reinforced with a hundred men, on which a Council was summoned, their request taken into consideration, and the five Captains called in and desired to give their opinion, whether it was impossible this reinforcement could be thrown into the place. They withdrew, and after debating it amongst themselves, gave us their opinion in writing, declaring the thing impracticable, and that the force the gentlemen had in the fort was, in their judgments, sufficient to defend it against the troops brought against them. This opinion we immediately dispatched to them, directed them if they were attacked, to make as good a defence as they could; and when they found they could defend the factory no longer, to make the best retreat in their power; but I believe neither this letter, nor some of our preceding ones, reached the gentlemen, the *Suba* having for some days cut off all correspondence between us, a plain indication that an accommodation was not the mark he aimed at.

16. On the 6th of June we had a rumour of Cossimbuzar being taken by the Nabob, which was confirmed to us the 7th by a letter from Mr. Matthew Collet your second at that factory; which, according to my best recollection, expressed as follows:

"That upon the Nabob's repeated orders to his generals to attack the factory, unless the Chief went in person to him, Mr. Watts, by the advice of his Council, thought it more adviseable to go to the Nabob, than risque involving the Company in a war with the Government; that he accordingly did so on the 2nd of June, and on coming in to his presence was made a prisoner, and orders sent for Mr. Collet, (and I think Mr. Batson) to attend him; likewise to sign, jointly with Mr. Watts, a *machulka*, which order they obeyed; but in place of being set at liberty upon signing the *machulka* required, Mr. Collet was sent back to the factory, with directions to deliver it up to Roy Doolob, which he was obliged to comply with, and was then giving up the account

of the cannon, ammunition, and military stores; that the factory was not plundered, and that the Nabob was determined to march to Calcutta with his whole army, estimated then at 50,000 men, besides a large Train of artillery."

The reasons which swayed Mr. Watts to quit his government at such a juncture as that, and trust himself in the hands of the *Suba*, (on whose character or principles no reasonable faith could be had) without any proper security, hostage, or safe guard for his person; or those which urged Mr. Collet to follow his example, when he knew his Chief was made a prisoner, and that consequently the trust, command, and government of the factory, fort, and garrison, devolved upon himself; or why this your Settlement was thus given up without a single stroke being struck for it, I am totally a stranger to, and can only hope for their sakes and the honour of their country, they have or will justify their conduct to you in those particulars. I will not subscribe to the opinion of our five Captains, as already recited, and say their force was sufficient to resist and defend the place for any long time against the *Suba's* army; but had it been defended at all, he could not have attacked and taken it, without the loss of time and many of his people, and probably some of his principal officers. A stroke of this kind might have had happy consequences to your affairs; it might have inclined the *Suba* to an accommodation by cooling still more the zeal of his Ministers, generals, officers, and people, who allmost to a man were averse to this expedition and attempt against the English, as [well] knowing the consequence would be as fatal to his country as to us, though he succeeded in it. A defence of only 24 hours would, in its consequences, have retarded in all probability his march to Calcutta for many days, and would have been a point gained to us of the utmost importance, by having more time for the completion of many requisites, which for want of it we were obliged wholy to neglect, or they remained unfinished at the time we were actually invested. A detention of his army before Cossimbuzar for two or three days, would have brought on dirty rainy weather in his march towards us, and incommoded him greatly, as well in the passage of his troops and cannon, as in the attack of our Settlement; whereas, by the easy possession he acquired of Cossimbuzar, he was enabled to march against

us without loss of time or obstruction from the weather, which afforded not a drop of rain during his march and attack of Calcutta, but on the 21st, at night, whilst I was prisoner in the camp, it rained heavily, and dirty weather succeeded for many days after, during which his musketry, being all match-locks, would have been rendered in a manner useless. We should also have had an important succour, in the arrival before the fort of the *Success* galley, the *Speedwell*, and *Bombay* frigate, these vessels having passed Tanners the 19th and 20th, and joined the *Dodaly* and the rest of our fleet about Govindpore, after they fell down from the fort though before it was surrendered. Many more are the advantages I could enumerate, which would have resulted from the smallest defence and resistance made at Cossimbuzar, and can only regret now its not having been done; repeating my hopes the gentlemen in trust there will give you sufficient reasons why it was not done. Their treatment could hardly have been worse had they been obstinate in its defence; they themselves being continued prisoners in the *Suba's* camp under many hardships untill, I think, the latter end of June; their effects plundered, and the gentlemen in the factory, *viz.*, Messrs. Hugh Watts and Chambers, with the whole garrison, put in irons and sent to the common prison at Muxadabad; the fate Messrs. Batson, Sykes, Hastings, and Marriott, would have undergone, had not luckily the two former made their escape, and the two latter been at the *aurungs*.

17. On Cossimbuzar being invested, we wrote to the several Subordinates and to all our *gomastahs* at the several *aurungs*, advising them of the *Suba's* proceedings, and to be upon their guard, and hold themselves in readyness to retreat with the Company's effects, &c., and on intelligence of the capture of the place and the *Suba's* march to Calcutta, we sent them orders to withdraw and join us with all expedition. But these orders were too late, excepting your factory at Luckypore, as I have already intimated in my letter of the 17th July. Mr. Boddam, your Chief at Ballasore, received our orders in time to withdraw himself, the few soldiers he had there and about 6,000 rupees of your effects; the remainder, to the amount of about 40,000 remain yet sequestered, and your factory house in part only demolished at

Ballasore; but Bulramgurry, by its situation, having escaped the Government's notice, and by the prudent conduct of Mr. John Bristow (left resident at Ballasore by Mr. Boddam) is still retained. Myself and Mr. Boddam were dispatched to take a formal possession of it the 18th September, and to negotiate other matters, which will be transmitted on the face of our Fulta Consultations; and we have thought it necessary to nominate Bulramgurry your Presidency, being divested of every other possession you had in these provinces. But to resume my narrative: dispatches were likewise forwarded express to Bombay, Fort Saint George, and Vizagapatum, the 8th of June, for a reinforcement of troops, stores, &c., and succours demanded of the French and Dutch settlements on this river; the success of which last negotiation you have likewise in my said letter of the 17th July. The militia were under arms for the first time the 7th June, something too late, I am afraid you will say, to be of much service, just coming to action.

18. I am now, Honourable Sirs, come closer to the unraveling the real causes which stimulated the *Suba* to the lengths he has proceeded against us. How far my conjectures and assertions will be supported by a probable system of politicks in him, and by the tenour of his whole conduct considered together, I humbly submit to your judgments. And first, I beg leave to remark on the three articles contained in the *machulka* (or obligation with a penalty annexed), which your Chief and Council were obliged to sign in the *Suba's* camp, when before Cossimbuzar; the terms of which were, *viz.*—

"That we should not protect the King's subjects,—that we should not misuse the liberty of our *dusticks*, by covering the trade of the native merchants,—and that we should refund and make good whatever sum it should be proved the King had been defrauded [of] in his revenues and dutys by this practice; and that we should demolish our fortifications."

These, Honourable Sirs, are the purport of the three articles of the *machulka*, howsoever I may have varyed the wording of it by not having it before me. Had the *Suba* any intention of being satisfyed with our concession to these articles he certainly would have rested here; your Chief, Council, fort, and garrison of Cossimbuzar were in his possession; the gentlemen had signed and executed

the obligation demanded of them; he knew their signing it was not valid or binding without our approval; and if he had ever inclined to an accommodation he would have transmitted the terms they had complyed with, and at least have desisted until our reply could have reached him, in place of cutting off for some days the means of all correspondence or intelligence between us and your factory, and marching directly against us, without ever replying to or taking notice of many *arassdasses* received from us; but the truth is, his jealousy of the independent power of the Europeans in his country was at this juncture confirmed, which he was determined to reduce; and being sensible ours was the most formidable to him, we became the first objects of his ruinous politicks. To support this my conclusion, I must here refer to three letters which Wazeed's *gomastah* in my presence read your President, (copys of which, I believe, is in Mr. Drake's possession) addressed to his master Wazeed from the *Suba*, all three to the best of my remembrance bearing date in May last. In each of these,

"He avows his intention to reduce the power of the English, forbids his interfering on their behalf, asserting his having long intended it, and swears by God and His prophets, that he will drive them out of the country, unless they are satisfyed to trade in it on the footing they did in Jaffier Cawn's[1] time;"

by which he meant before the time the Honourable Company obtained their *phirmaund*.[2] Your fort at Cossimbuzar (esteemed by all judges more regular and tenable than that of Fort William) so near his capital, appeared too dangerous a hold at a time he was influenced to believe our strength in India was four times more formidable than it really was; and that we were on the eve of a French war, which would be probably brought into his country: consistent with this was his expression of resentment, at Rajamal, on receipt of your President's letter:

"Who shall dare to think of commencing hostilities in my country, or presume to imagine I have not power to protect them?"

and it was current in the mouths of all degrees, when I was at Muxadabad, that Mahabut Jung[3] had long meditated to destroy

[1] Murshid Kuli Jafar Khan, Nawab of Bengal, 1704-26.
[2] The *Firman* of Farrukh Siyar, 1717. [3] Aliverdi Khan.

the forts and garrisons of the Europeans, and to reduce their trade on the footing of the Armenians. And here I hope it will not be deemed impertinent, if I recite, *verbatim*, the last discourse and council which Mahabut Jung gave his grandson a few days before his death, and which I had from very good authority at Muxadabad, after my releasement.

"My life has been a life of war and stratagem: for what have I fought, to what have my councils tended, but to secure you, my son, a quiet succession to my *subadary?* My fears for you have for many days robed me of sleep. I perceived who had power to give you trouble after I am gone hence. Hossein Cooley Cawn by his reputation, wisdom, courage and affection to Shaw Amet Jung and his house I feared would obstruct your government. His power is no more. Monichund *dewan*, whose councils might have been your dangerous enemy, I have taken him to favour. Keep in view the power the European nations have in the country. This fear I would also have freed you from if God had lengthened my days.—The work, my son, must now be yours. Their wars and politicks in the Telinga country[1] should keep you waking. On pretence of private contests between their kings they have seized and divided the country of the King[2] and the goods of his people between them. Think not to weaken all three together. The power of the English is great; they have lately conquered Angria,[3] and possessed themselves of his country; reduce them first; the others will give you little trouble, when you have reduced them. Suffer them not, my son, to have fortifications or soldiers: if you do, the country is not yours."

19. How consistent the *Suba* has been in his adherence to this last council of his grandfather we have woefully felt; but that we were not solely the objects of his resentment and designs, is evident. His *perwannah* to the French was dispatched the same day with ours. When he marched against us, he sent *perwannahs* to both French and Dutch, with orders to provide, and join him with ships, men, and ammunition, to attack us by water whilst he attacked us by land; they refused; in consequence of their refusal he invested their several forts and factorys, and demanded an exorbitant sum from each. The French were glad to accommo-

[1] Here means Southern India. [2] The *Mogul*. [3] The pirate chief of Gheria.

date matters for the payment of three *lack* and half of rupees; the Dutch for four *lack* and half, after having had (these last), for a day and a half, a body of the *Suba's* troops in their Settlement, waiting orders to attack it, and a man stationed with an axe in his hands to cut down their flagg-staff and colours. The French had not money to pay the mulct laid on them, but gained Roy Doolob to become their security: the Dutch were reduced to immediate payment; and both did then, and have ever since been obliged to endure the most audacious and exasperating insults from the lowest *peon* in the service of the Government. That there was this difference in the sum exorted from them has been accounted for (how justly I will not say) by the supplys of ammunition given the *Suba* privately by the agents for the French at Chandernagore. The thing, however, was verifyed by two of our spies, who brought us intelligence that the French by night crossed over 200 chests of powder to the *Suba's* army, lying near Banka Bazar.

20. Still consistent with the last advice of Mahabut Jung, he appeared at Rajamal satisfied with the answer from the French Directeur; though no one can imagine his intelligence was such, that he was really imposed on as to the pretence of repairing the damage they had sustained by lightening. He manifested sufficiently his resentment and intentions against both French and Dutch; but their time was not come; it was not his business to have the three nations to encounter at once, but to compromise at the present for as much as he could get from them; but that the French were, and still are, the next object of his arms, will not admit of doubt, no more than that he would have proceeded immediately against them, had not his advices from his Court obliged him to proceed against Shocut Jung, the Purranea Nabob, as an object more important; for when I was twice conducted into his presence after the surrender of the fort, allmost his first question to me was, 'Will you all engage to join me against the French?' Adequate[1] has been the conduct of the Government to another part of Mahabut Jung's advice; for though liberty of trade is granted to the Danes and Prussians, yet they are prohibited fortifications or garrisons. And in further proof of the resolutions of the Government to divest the Europeans of their forts and garrisons, and that

[1] *Uniform* in the *Indian Tracts*.

we were the objects of his policy and not of his resentment only (from either one particular private cause or other that may be transmitted you), I may justly add the apprehensions of the French and Dutch themselves, who, on the first approach of our troubles, sent strenuous dispatches to their principals at Batavia and Pondicherry for the most expeditious supplys of men, ammunitions, &c., and I doubt not but it will be soon their turn to regret the having so quietly given us up a sacrifice, unless the *Suba* should be vanquished in his present expedition against Shocut Jung.

21. The 3rd instant (November) a *perwannah* arrived to the Dutch from the *Suba*'s camp—demanding them to join him against us, with threatenings if they refused; and the same day a *perwannah* reached the French factory, purporting that [the *Suba*] was informed they were carrying on their fortifications, and that if they did not immediately desist, he would pass through the Dutch factory and Settlement, and with their (the Dutch) soldiers destroy their fort, and drive them out of the country, as he had done the English; and the Government have already obliged the French to take down their colours erected on their bounds.

22. I believe, Honourable Sirs, it will by this appear clearly evident to you, that the governing principle in the *Suba* was political, and the real object of his proceedings the demolition of your forts and garrisons, as his demands allways expressed; not that I will be hardy enough to aver he had no concurring subordinate causes, that had a specious colour of resentment; and this reflection leads me to consider the other two articles of the *machulka*, as their being incerted carry the appearance of complaint, though never before urged by him in any of his demands, as transmitted us by your servants at Cossimbuzar.

23. That the abuse of *dusticks* should be one cause of complaint, I am not surprized at; the face of your Consultations, just before the dispatch of your last year's ships, will give you, Honourable Sirs, my sentiments of the ill use made of this indulgence to your servants; my Minute and Motion on this subject was, after the dispatch of your ships, taken into consideration, and such remedys and checks resolved on as were judged might put a stop to the abuse.

24. That we should not protect the King's subjects, is an article will bear a much larger discussion. This prohibition, in the extent

it might have been carryed by the Government, whenever they were inclined to obstruct your business or plunder your merchants, would have rendered your trade most precarious. Had the article been explained so as to prohibit our giving protection to those who were actually servants to the Government or others not born in or for a term of years settled under our colours, it would, I think, have carryed nothing unjust or unreasonable in it; but that by no means was the real intention of it. The article had a latitude in expression that would include your merchants and inhabitants whenever the *Suba* or his Ministers were pleased to call on them: a call they would never fail in, on some pretence or other, whenever they had got any thing worth taking; so that in truth, it would have been as impossible for us, consistent with your interests, to have subscribed to this article as to the other regarding the demolition of your fortifications; and the most favourable terms intended for us (which I could with the utmost diligence learn when at Muxadabad) were, that if we had paid an implicit obedience to the *Suba's* commands by delivering our forts and dismission of our garrisons, we should then have been permitted to trade on paying Armenian dutys, admitting [a] *Fowzdaar* into your Settlement on the part of the Government, and relinquishing to them all duties of consulage, revenues, &c.,—terms scandalous and injurious to your honour as well as commerce; terms which we could never have submitted to, even if we had received no alarm from the side of France, without sacrifizing the rights of your *phirmaund*, giving up every part of our trust, and breaking through your repeated standing orders for more than thirty years past.

25. Thus, Honourable Sirs, it will appear to you that submission could not have been paid by us to two articles of the *machulka* executed by your Chief and Council of Cossimbuzar, and that we had many months before guarded against (as much as in us lay) the complaint laid in the third, if the honours and consciences of men were to be influenced by checks the most binding and solemn: but it is plain the two articles of complaint were at the last incerted, to give a colouring for enforcing the third (and only one the *Suba* until then insisted on, and had really in view). I am sensible, no small pains will be taken to throw the rise of your misfortunes here on every cause but the right.

26. From the appearance of the *Suba's* letter to Governour Pigot, your President seems to be solely culpable in drawing on his resentment, but neither justice or probability will justify the conclusion. Angry he certainly was at the terms of his letter; but had not his resentments been much deeper founded, the terms of this letter, or the error of one of your servants, would never of itself have provoked him, or can vindicate the cruel destruction both publick and private attending his proceedings which fell equally heavy, as well on the natives, subjects of the *Mogull* as on yourselves and us; and the immense plunder of Calcutta we know was one no small subordinate motive (instilled into him by two or three harpies in confidence about him) for his march against us at a time when he was rapaciously plundering wherever he could; amassing wealth to enable him either to buy at Court his confirmation in the *subaship* or keep such a standing force on foot, as would secure it to him, in spight of any opposition or orders from thence.

27. That matters might have been accommodated with the *Suba* for a sum of money, as was effected by the French and Dutch, I am likewise sensible will be strongly alledged against us; but by whomsoever it is, I will be bold to say, they are either ignorant of the chain of politicks and circumstances which influenced and led him on, or never reasoned or thought upon them. The *Suba's* whole conduct opposes this allegation; his Ministers were by our orders sounded on the alternative, and your Chief and Council of Cossimbuzar advised us that he had declared money was not the thing he wanted, but that we should desist from our fortifications, and destroy our new works, &c.

28. The protection granted the family of Raagbullob, (of which I have already given a faithfull account) will, I also know, be urged with circumstances which never existed as matter of heavy complaint against us, though the *Suba* never (that came to our knowledge) made complaint about it. I will not vindicate the protection being continued to them until the decease of the old *Suba;* I have already, and I think justly, condemned it; but (this excepted) I will hope the circumstances attending and urging it will be sufficient to extenuate that part of our conduct.

29. I am informed it has been cruelly asserted, and published

by the French that the bringing down the Nabob and his army, and the desertion of the fort, &c., had been long a concerted scheme of the President and the rest of the gentlemen of Council who went off in the shiping, and they mention, in proof as a corroborating circumstance myself and the other gentlemen of Council being left a sacrafize behind, (who they say used generally to oppose their measures) with this further addition that they had embarked and carryed off with them the greatest part of the wealth of the Settlement. However little right these gentlemen have to expect a vindication of their conduct from me yet here common justice to mankind forbids my silence, and urges me to defend them from a charge, which I from my heart believe to be infamously false, not only as to the act but the intention; nor would I even repeat a libel so scandalous and untrue, had I not received information that some of your own servants had forwarded from your Subordinates (for want of a better) the publick narrative the French in Bengall sent to their superiors of the capture of Fort William; in which narrative I hear the above cruel charge has a place in near the same terms I have recited it, with many other causes assigned for this misfortune, equally void of probability or truth.

30. It will by some, I doubt not, be represented to you, that Omychund was at the bottom of all the *Suba's* councils and proceedings against us; the part he really acted under cover in this affair is difficult to distinguish and point out; that he was much chagrined at the little influence he had in the Settlement for a few years last past is most certain; in applications to the *Durbar* (wherein he usually was the acting person between the Company and the Government) little use had been made of him, possibly more had been better. Be this as it will, it is most sure, he had no general weight in the place for these four or five years beyond what his wealth gave him, so that his name and reputation became lessened in the eye of the Government, as well as in Calcutta. Picqued at this and implacable in his resentment, it is not improbable he worked with some instruments of the *Durbar* to embroil us in such manner as would make his mediation and assistance necessary, and thereby regain his credit and influence with both; little imagining things would go the length they did: in which it

must have been most evident to him his own large possessions would be equally the *Suba's* prey with yours: that he advised the dispatch of Naran Sing to demand Raagbullob's family, and introduced him into the Settlement, will not I think admit of doubt, no more than that he deeply resented his being turned out of it again. His endeavours with Wazeed to mitigate things, when he really found they were coming to extremities, was I believe sincere enough until his imprisonment by the President, an act of his power and sole authority, for which the pretence made use of was, in my judgment, by no means sufficient; the correspondence detected between him and Rajaram *harkarah* (the *Suba's* head spy), which was read in the presence of many of us, contained in our opinions nothing to vindicate it, nor had your President even the consent or approbation of his Council for this step, or that I remember, ever required it. On his imprisonment his head *jemmautdaar* Jaggernaut Singh stabbed himself and set fire to his master's house, and some of his women either butchered themselves or were butchered by others in the family, which became a scene of much horror and confusion. It can hardly be doubted that Omychund became desperate in his resentments, and it is probable enough he expedited the march of the *Suba's* army, then advanced, I think, as far as Bankabazar; and it is likewise probable that he then sent him the real state of the fort and garrison, and afterwards might (as has been generally suspected) from time to time have given him intelligence; but this is all conjecture; we only know, that his *jemmautdaar* just now mentioned surviving of the wound he had given himself, was put upon his horse and joined the *Suba*, whom he informed of the transactions relating to his master's imprisonment; and when the enemy was repulsed at Baagbazar he led the van of the army to the eastward and directed them to the avenues by which they entered the next day.

31. From others, I believe, you will be told, that the dismission of your *dadney* merchants was one cause of our misfortunes, arising from their endeavours at the *Durbar* to embroil your affairs at the *aurungs* as conducted by your own *gomastahs*, hoping thereby to get the *dadney* reassumed and themselves reinstated; nay some I have been informed have been hardy enough to urge and assert

that the large increase of your revenues *zemindary* was another very principal cause which drew the *Suba's* attention on the Settlement, though themselves, your President and Council, and I believe the greatest part of the *subadary*, as well as my Honourable Masters, know the credit of that branch was only increased, without any innovations made in the branch itself but to its loss and disadvantage. Many more causes and reasons equally substantial will, I doubt not, be assigned and transmitted to you by such busy and very short sighted politicians as these: strangers to real ones, they think they shall not appear of any importance unless they assign some, no matter how incongruous: but you will have now materials enough before you to form your own judgments. I think my conclusions on every cause that can be alledged for the extraordinary and unprecedented conduct of the *Suba* have facts and probability to support them. To you, Honourable Sirs, I humbly submit them, with this one conclusion more, that your situation in these provinces on a re-establishment will be such as to admit of only two alternatives; that you must in future either keep such a fortification and garrison as will at all times be sufficient to force your trade against the opposition and extortions of the Government, or reduce your commerce to the footing of the Prussians and Danes, &c., without forts and garrisons at all, and on payment of the lowest dutys that can be stipulated. The immunities and priviledges granted you in your *phirmaunds* you find now are of no validity without a military expence (more, I fear, than equivalent) to put them in force; but on this subject it will be my duty to give you my sentiments on another occasion more at large, whilst at present I resume the thread of my narrative, broke off at the surrender of your fort and factory of Cossimbuzar; the easy capture of which, concurring with [the *Suba's*] intentions beyond his expectations, not only gave the finishing stroke to his resolves but expedited and facilitated his march to Calcutta; which leads me to a consideration of the immediate causes of its sudden reduction, most needfull to be known to my Honourable Masters, as the rocks and quicksands on which we have unhappily struck and split being fairly and candidly laid down, may prevent a second wreck of your estate and trade.

32. These causes I will beg leave to investigate under three general heads :—[1st,] The state of our fortifications and garrison : [2nd,] The state of our ammunition, guns, and military stores : and [3rd,] the several errors and miscarriages arising from a deficiency (or rather a total want) of military knowledge or order.

33. To the first article of my first general head, it will not become me to add much more than I have set forth in my letter before you of the 17th July, addressed from Muxadabad to your other two Presidencies of Bombay and Fort Saint George. The nature and extent of the power given to the committee of fortifications, Messrs. Drake, Watts, Scot, and Manningham, we have ever been kept strangers to ; but I will venture to conclude, that had the money which was expended on the redoubt, drawbridge, &c., erected at Baagbuzar, and that which was meditated to be spent on the circuit of the ditch beyond our bounds, as also that which was disbursed on the batterys, &c., raised on the *Suba's* approach, been timely appropriated to the demolition of the houses round us, to have given a proper esplanade to the northward, eastward and southward of your fort, the sinking a ditch round it well palisaded, it had been employed to a more important use and purpose, and have been a sufficient discouragement to the Government to have prevented any project or hopes of attacking it with any probability of success. I am sensible it will be urged the Government would have never suffered these measures ; a reasoning *ex post facto* will not invalidate my conclusion, for had it been thought of, or carryed into execution at the commencement of the old *Suba's* sickness, when every thing at the *Durbar* was in confusion, and both partys there employed on their own schemes and designs, the work might have been effected without any let or hindrance, a *perwannah* might possibly have reached us to prohibit our proceedings, but no troops could have been sent against us, whilst the attentions of the clashing interests at the *Suba's* Court were taken up in securing each their own safety on his demise. What might have been done during that favourable interval is sufficiently evident from the allmost inconceivable useless works which we accomplished during the space of a few days only ; and the same plea which your President urged in his letter to the *Suba*

subsisted equally at the beginning of the old *Suba's* sickness, when he had reason enough to be alarmed by the approach of a war with France. The ruinous state of the Line to the westward of the fort had been a reproach to your Settlement, and to every thing bearing the name of fortifications for more than two years, and was in just and strong (I will not say in very decent) terms represented in a letter to the Board, by Mr. Jasper Leigh Jones, the Captain of your Train, I think in April or May 1755, but no steps [were] taken to repair it until we had reason hourly to expect the enemy at our doors. The whole easterly curtain had been for many years in so ruinous a condition as not to bear a gun; one we fired from it, a three or four pounder as I remember, which made its way through the terrace. Through this curtain from the principal gate to the north-east bastion were struck out five or six large windows, so many breaches ready made for the enemy in a quarter too where we were most liable to be attacked; and to sum up the whole, the new *godowns* to the southward had rendered your two southerly bastions useless to each other and to the whole southerly face of the fort, which could not be flanked by a single gun from either bastion :—From a consideration of these circumstances, joined to the incumbrance of the church and houses round us, and the other wants and disadvantages mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, it is self evident the place could not have held out an hour against an European enemy.

34. The state of your garrison comes next under view; a subject on which I could wish my duty to your service would permit my silence, as truths disagreeable to me in the recital and very unpleasing to you to hear must arise from the smallest scrutiny made in it. It is most irksome to a benevolent mind to rehearse the faults which may be justly charged even against the living, much more so against the dead, become so in a great measure by their own errors, and want of knowledge in the duties of their profession; but the choice and appointment of commanding officers in your garrison is now become so important a consideration to the well being of your service, that none who would have any claim to your favour or would be deemed faithfull to the trust you have reposed in them can be vindicated in concealing the truth from you.

35. Your five commanding officers were Commandant Minchin, Captains Clayton, Buchanan, Witherington, and Grant; each of these gentlemen (Captain Clayton excepted) had seen service, either in Europe or on the Cormandel coast. Touching the military capacity of our Commandant, I am a stranger. I can only say that we were unhappy in his keeping it to himself, if he had any; as neither I, nor I believe any one else, was witness to any part of his conduct that spoke or bore the appearance of his being the commanding military officer in the garrison. Whether this proceeded from himself or his not being properly supported in his rank I cannot say; but such, I have heard, has been his allegation and plea for his supine remissness at a juncture which required the exertion of every quality he could have been master of. Your President, I remember, spoke to me more than once with much uneasiness at the beginning of our troubles, on the indolence of the Commandant, and seemed to think of breaking him. Had this measure been carryed into execution, it had been better for the service, and, I think, for that gentleman too; the disgrace would have been less, I believe, in the opinion of all mankind, than that which falls on him by his quiting the fort and garrison in the manner he did, whilst he bore the character of commanding officer in it; but the mischief was we could not have stopped here: the next gentleman in command to him had never seen any service, and I am sorry to say demonstrated his want of the most essential requisites of a soldier. Had both these gentlemen been set aside and the next in command prefered to the commandantship it would have promised a happier issue for them and us; and most assuredly this was no time to have regarded forms or ceremony. Remissness or a deficiency of military knowledge in commanders when coming to action are equally fatal in their consequences, and are ever the parents of neglects, confusion and disorders; and troops, I believe, are hardly ever known to do their duty, unless where they have an opinion of as well as love for their commanders. That neither was the case with regard to the two gentlemen above mentioned I believe the whole Settlement can witness with me; and they were in no higher degree of esteem with their subalterns than with their soldiers. The prefering Captain Buchanan, who was next

in command to them, would have obviated all the disadvantages we laboured under in this particular; a gentleman whose character as a man and a soldier deserved a better fate than the unhappy one which befell him by the errors and misconduct of others. The vacant companys would have been filled up with those we had good reason to think (and who indeed proved themselves) brave officers.—The next in command to Captain Buchanan in the battalion would then have been Captain Grant; a gentleman who had, during his stay in the garrison, remarkably exerted himself in every duty which could have been expected from him, and demonstrated no want of either spirit or military skill, but much the contrary, however both may have suffered in the eye of the world by his quiting the fort with your President and for want of an opportunity of vindicating his conduct by a proper enquiry being made into it. The Captain of your Train was a laborious, active officer, but confused; and would, I believe, have had few objections to his character, diligence or conduct, had we been fortunate in having any Commander-in-Chief to have had a proper eye over him and taken care that he did his duty. Here we had a fatal instance of a remissness in command; for that we had neither a sufficiency of ammunition, &c., nor that good, was doubtless as much the fault of those above him, (whose duty it was to have inspected his conduct) as his; but as this poor gentleman fell a sacrafize, as well to his own as to the errors of others, they should be touched as lightly as possible.

36. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have given you as faithfull a picture of the commanders of your five companys as I can draw, or as I [believe] can be drawn by any one else. Three of them, my wretched companions in the Black Hole, perished there, as did also all your brave subalterns (Ensigns Walcot and Carstairs excepted), where I will leave them and proceed to consider your troops in garrison; consisting, as already mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, by the muster-rolls laid before us about the 6th or 8th of June, of 145 in the batallion, and 45 of the Train, officers included, and in both only 60 Europeans. We were taught to believe, that there were at all your Subordinates at least 200 men, the best of our garrison, *viz.*, at Cossimbuzar 100, at Dacca about 40, at Luckypore 30 and Ballasore about the

same number; but it is certain the numbers there barely exceeded one hundred. Whether two hundred ought to have been there or not, I am not master enough of the subject to declare; so am obliged here to refer to your President for your further satisfaction; who (or in his absence your second) had always the inspection of the rolls and mustering the people. Of these handful of troops in garrison there were not five who had ever, I believe, seen a musket fired in anger. Had the militia of the place been (agreeable to your orders *per Godolphin*, anno 1751) regularly trained to arms, they might at this juncture have been a most seasonable supply: but this essential regulation, I am sorry to say, was totally neglected, so that when we came to action, there were hardly any amongst the Armenian and Portugueese inhabitants, and but few amongst the European militia, who knew the right from the wrong end of their pieces. From the militia, about 65, chiefly Europeans, entered volunteers in the batallion, (most of them your own covenant servants) in whose just praise, I can hardly say enough. They sustained every hardship of duty greatly beyond the military themselves; their address in the use of their arms was astonishing, the short time there was to train them considered; and though their bravery may have been equalled, I am sure it has not been exceeded, by any set of men whatever. A considerable body of these were on the Saturday morning relieved from duty, and were gone on board the ships to deposit their papers, or on other occasions relative to their private affairs; as were likewise on the like call many of the militia with four of their officers, to wit, the Reverend Mr. Mapletoft, Captain-Lieutenant, Captain Henry Wedderburn, Lieutenant of the first company, and Ensigns Sumner and Charles Douglas, all of them gentlemen who had failed in no part of duty, either as officers or soldiers, in defence of the place; so that there is no reason to doubt the veracity of their own assertions, in which they are joined by the volunteers: 'That they had no intention but to return to the defence of the place until they saw your President, Commandant Minchin, Captain Grant and Mr. Macket quit it (Messrs. Manningham and Frankland having quitted it before) and a general retreat rumoured;' and indeed immediately after all means of returning were cut off

from them by the falling down of every ship, vessell, and boat. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you see our garrison, small as it was, reduced and weakened, both in its strength, officers and councils, in a very important degree, to the disheartening those who stayed, and encouragement of the enemy; and when it is considered, those remaining, including officers, volunteers, soldiers and militia, did not exceed one hundred and seventy men, and that of those there were 25 killed, and about 70 wounded before noon the 20th, and the whole exhausted of their strength by continual duty and action, and our people of the Train reduced to 14 only; it would not, I hope, have been wondered at had we surrendered your fort without parley or capitulation, though it is certain we should not have surrendered ourselves had not our own people forced the western gate during the parley; for having no dependence on the clemency of the enemy we had to deal with, we had meditated, in case the *Saint George* with her boats failed us, the forcing a retreat that night through the southerly barrier by the river side, and have marched until we came under cover of the ships, then lying below Surman's Gardens; imagining the enemy would be too much employed on the plunder of the fort to have molested us greatly in our retreat.

37. On my second general head I shall have little to say. That we had not powder sufficient, and that we had, not good; that we had hardly any shells fitted, or fuzes fitted to them; that there was hardly a carriage that would bear a gun; that the 50 fine cannon you sent out three years ago, 18 and 24 pounders, lay neglected under your walls; and that we were deficient in almost every kind of military stores, are all truths will not admit of dispute; but who is properly accountable for these defects, or under whose immediate care and inspection they were or ought to have been, must, Honourable Sirs, be determined by yourselves.

38. I am come now to my third and last general head, our own errors; a subject, I am sorry to declare, too fruitful of matter, though bearing great extenuation when it is considered we had in truth no military head to guide us; and that I may be as little tedious as possible I will wave the rehearsal of our smaller errors, and keep to those most capital ones, which variously, in my judg-

ment, contributed to the loss of your Settlement, and were the causes of embarrassing and preventing our general retreat, with the public and private effects deposited in your fort; and shall recite these in order of time as they happened, that if due heed be paid to them the like misfortune may be avoided in future.

39. Our first capital error was the neglecting taking possession of Tanner's Fort on our provisions being prohibited the Settlement and when there was no force or troops there to have opposed us. This measure in our first council of war I moved and urged with every argument in my power should be done with 25 or 30 men and a party of *buxerries*, and that a battery of six guns should be immediately erected there towards the northward or land side. In this motion I was strongly seconded by Monsieur La Beaume and I think Captain Grant only, and consequently it was over-ruled. The utility I thought evident. It would have secured provisions from the other side of the river, or the *Suba* must have devided his forces; it would have secured the retreat of the shiping, it might have been a retreat to ourselves, or if at last drove from it we had it still in our power to destroy it in such wise as to have rendered it useless and prevented its proving a troublesome thorn in our sides, which it may possibly yet be if ever we advance again to retake your Settlement, as our ships must pass within almost pistol shot of it. The gentlemen saw the utility of this measure too late; our ships were sent down to attempt the possession of it; a great deal of ammunition was fruitlessly thrown away against it; our ships received much damage, and were obliged to make an inglorious retreat to the no small encouragement of the enemy and our disgrace: and to sum up all the misfortunes attending this error, our ships in their flight with that part of the colony, who left the fort, were, from the fire they were obliged to sustain from this fort, and the little order observed amongst themselves, thrown into such confusion that several ran ashore, and some, the richest in the fleet, fell into the enemy's hands and were plundered.

40. Our second capital error, with our small and untrained garrison, was, I conceive, raising the three advanced posts and batteries to the northward, eastward, southward, and at the Jail, which answered no purpose but exhausting, harassing, and de-



BUXERRIES OR NATIVE MATCHLOCK MEN.

stroying the few people we had. If we, in place of this measure, had kept our force more united, withdrawn Piccard and his party from Baagbazar, and taken possession with our musquetry of the Church, the Company's, Messrs. Cruttenden's, Eyre's, and Omychund's houses, the enemy could not have approached us without infinite loss and with hardly any possibility of success. From these posts, close under the cover of our guns, our troops could hardly have been attacked, much less been dislodged, as we had sufficient proofs afterwards when the outposts were withdrawn; or if there had appeared a necessity for abandoning them the retreat to the fort was secure; considerably less than half the number of troops stationed at the outposts would have been sufficient for this service, and this important consequence had followed, a regular relief for duty, of which we had none as things were unhappily conducted, nor would that infinite confusion and disorder in the fort have ensued, which did on withdrawing these batteries. The fort had been in a manner left defenceless for the support of them, and little benefited by the return of troops fatigued and hardly able to stand.—You have, Honourable Sirs, an exact plan of your Settlement, and of every house in it, on inspection of which you will, at one view, see the inutility of these three principal outposts. That to the northward was erected to defend the pass between the corner of Mr. Griffith's house and the river side; a precaution totally useless, as you will find Mr. Griffith's house, your saltpetre *godowns*, and the whole street were commanded by the guns on the north-east bastion within less than musket shot of your fort. That to the eastward, at the Court House, you will find commanded by the battery over the eastern gate, and from the old and new south-east bastions within musket shot. That to the southward was not indeed commanded by any gun from the fort, but field-pieces advanced a few paces without your eastern gate would not only have commanded that but the other two principal avenues to the fort, if the battery on the gate and the north-east bastion had not been deemed a sufficient defence against the approach of the enemy, and had they advanced by the ditch to the southward of the burying ground, and up the avenue between that and my house, or penetrated through the Burying Ground, we still had

nothing to apprehend from them, as the whole square between the southerly face of the fort and the hospital and gate of the Burying Ground was commanded not only by the new south-east bastion, but by seven four pounders on the new *godowns* and our small arms from thence and the Company's house. Had the disposition I have mentioned been made, and the walls of the Loll Baag and those opposite the Company's House levelled, it is more than probable the *Suba* at last would have been obliged to retreat with his army; for it is plain he had none with him capable of erecting any battery that could have hurt us, (that which did us most damage being our own eighteen pounders turned against us from the Court House), and with their small arms there was hardly a possibility of approaching near enough to have affected us.—My conclusions, Honourable Sirs, are on this head the result of reason and a late fatal experience, and not of art for I am no soldier; but I cannot help thinking such would have been the salutary disposition, had we been happy enough to have had a soldier at our head, or a chief commanding officer in any degree skilled in the art of defence; but, in place of it, lines were formed which required ten times the number of men to defend: lucky we were in having an enemy who had as little skill and address in the attack as we in the defence, and much less resolution, or on the night of the 16th or 17th they might have entered at four different posts, and cut off the retreat to the fort of each of the five advanced batteries (including Baag Bazar and the Jail), for not a gun could have been fired to cover their retreat but must have been equally levelled at our own troops, as at the enemy. In the avenue between Mr. Coale's and Omychund's houses we sunk a ditch and threw up a bank within, which post, for want of people, was trusted to the guard of 4 pykes only. The importance of this post will appear in a moment, (from the plan of your Settlement before you,) through which the enemy might have thrown ten thousand men into the very centre of our Lines, before or as soon as we could have known any thing of the matter. In the avenue north of the Court House tank [or pond] was another ditch sunk, which, from the same cause, was little better defended than the former. From the south-east angle of the Park, to the corner of Mr. Lascell's house, was a third, defended by a corporal and 6 men.

The fourth was at the entrance into the square of the lesser Tank, by Mr. Putham's house, and defended by a detatchment from the south advanced battery; at neither of these four immediate posts were planted a single cannon, and they might have been forced in the night without the loss of ten men to the enemy, and the neglect of it cost them some thousands. I am the more particularly decided on this subject in proof of the error I have here censured, because from the plan before you you will be convinced from the situation of those posts that the forcing any one of them in the night would have intercepted the retreat to the fort of the troops stationed at all the advanced batteries, and caused the immediate surrender of the fort; and points out not only the danger and inutility of these batteries but the impropriety of forming an extent of Line we had not men to defend. And to compleat our blunders in engineering, a trench was sunk through your Park, from north to south, within little more than half muskett shot of your bastions, the earth of which proved (after the advanced batteries were withdrawn) a secure breastwork to the enemy, and from whence they did us the greatest injury with their small arms. We were it is plain engineers in theory only, with the additional misfortune that those in superior command either had no judgment in the direction, or did not chuse to show it, whilst others who had probably better could not with propriety interfere; to which I may add, we had neither time for projection or execution; a still further proof we should have remained satisfied in occupying the houses round us and trusted to our fort only.

41. A third error, and which I esteem a capital one, was the neglecting to attack the rear of that body of troops which supported the enemy's 12 pounder in the attack of the Jail the 18th. This body consisted of 5,000 chosen men and officers. The troops that defended this post sustained the enemy's attack for some time in the open road, before the Jail, with two field-pieces and their small arms; but being intirely open to the enemy, and having some killed and several wounded, they were obliged at last to retreat under cover into the Jail with their field-pieces, having before prepared two embrazures for them in the wall, which commanded the avenue through which the enemy was advancing, and the post was obstinately and gallantly defended for

a great while, under the command of Monsieur Le Beaume and Ensign Carstairs. During the attack of this post, and just after the troops retreated into the Jail, we projected at the center advanced battery the attacking the enemy in the rear with 25 or 30 men and 2 field-pieces, to be marched from the north battery, whilst we advanced two more from our post, with all our infantry and militia, and joined the troops at the Jail to make one general sally and attack on them in front, whilst the detachment from the northward fell on the rear by order of Captain Clayton, who commanded at the center advanced battery. I wrote strenuously to the President to let him know our intentions, and to request he would instantly order the detachment with a couple of field-pieces to advance into the middle road on the enemy's rear; to which we received answer, that 'it was impossible, there were not men to send.' The error I censure on this incident is the not sufficiently considering the importance of it, and the troops that might have been without danger or inconvenience detached on this service, had the north advanced battery been divested intirely of the musketry stationed there, and with the volunteers sent out the post would have run no risque whilst there remained only a single officer and people of the Train sufficient to attend the battery; or on the march of the detachment, (if it had been judged necessary) that battery might have been reinforced with a detachment of the militia from the fort, as ours had been the 17th at night under Ensign Charles Douglas, when Captain Clayton was ordered on a piquet of 50 men, to secure the retreat of Lieutenant Blagg and the troops from Baagbazar; or some people might have been draughted off from the south advanced battery, which had not once been (or was likely to be) attacked; the misfortune of this neglect will best appear from the almost certain consequences which would have attended the carrying it into execution. There was no impediment that could have obstructed the detachment arriving directly close on the back of the enemy, who would have been between two fires, without hardly a possibility of a tithe of the whole body escaping a repulse and slaughter, which, I am convinced, would have struck such a panick into the enemy, as, in all human probability, had obliged the *Suba* to have retreated, and droped his designs

against us. Touching the error, I am far from blaming your President; I only regret his misfortune of having no commanding military officer near him, who could have seen at first sight and convinced him of the important use this sally would have been to the service.

42. The abandoning the center advanced battery at the Court House, has by some been asserted as the cause of the loss of the fort, and consequently comes under the head of our errors, and requires consideration in the fourth place, the more so as I am convinced much stress will be laid on this cause by those who are totally strangers to the situation of things at that battery, or the reasons which made it needfull to abandon it.—This post was commanded by Captain Clayton as eldest Captain (next to the Commandant), myself as Captain of the first company of militia, was stationed under him. At this battery, with a detachment of the militia, we had on the whole, including officers, batallion volunteers, militia, and Train, about 90 men and 15 *buxerries*, 2 six pounders mounted on the battery, 2 field-pieces, and 2 eighteen pounders. From the most superficial view of this post, it was evident, to any capacity, that the enemy would never venture to make an open attack against it; our musketry, for this reason, became useless at the battery; the manifest and only service that could be made of them was stationing them in the houses round us which commanded the battery and the lesser avenues leading to it; but this very important step not seeming to be attended to by Captain Clayton, myself and Captain Henry Wedderburn, my lieutenant, took the liberty to represent to him the utility and absolute necessity of this measure. Piqued, I fear, that a thing so obvious did not occur to himself, he replied 'there was not men enough; he would not weaken his post'; though this most certainly was the only means of strengthening it. Often as we urged it he persisted in his error; the consequence was natural; the enemy benefiting themselves by our neglect, took possession of every house round us, and of the Play House also, after the Jail was abandoned in the afternoon, and from thence by half-past 4 in the afternoon were breaking out several loopholes bearing on our battery. About this time the enemy had forced the pass by Mr. Putham's house, and had got in multitudes within our Lines.

They had also obliged the detachment from Captain Buchanan's post, under Lieutenant Blagg, to retreat to the south battery. They had also obliged the guard by Mr. Lascell's house which we had reinforced with 2 serjeants and 20 men to retire, and were seemingly advancing to attack our post in flank through the Loll Baag, and intercept our retreat, but having brought one of the eighteen pounders to bear upon them and sweep the whole easterly side of the lesser great Tank, we stopped their career with much slaughter; the fort at the same time keeping a warm fire upon them from the bastions. Thus circumstanced, Captain Clayton ordered me (I think about 5 afternoon) to go down to the fort and represent the state of the battery, and receive orders, whether the post should be withdrawn or maintained. The orders were to withdraw it immediately and spike up the cannon we could not bring off. I returned with these orders, and, to my astonishment, found the 2 eighteen pounders and one of the six pounders on the battery spiked up, and the post in such confusion as bars all description. There was nothing could have prevented our bringing off the cannon, and making the most regular and soldier-like retreat, had we been commanded by an officer of resolution and judgment; but as it was, our retreat had more the appearance of a confused rout, bringing off only one field-piece, and the cannon spiked with so little art, that they were easily drilled and turned against us. The orders for withdrawing this post circumstanced as it then was, caryed the utmost propriety with it (the enemy having then made lodgments in the theatre and houses close round us), for though with our cannon and cohorn shells advanced without the battery we dislodged the enemy from two of the houses, to wit, Mr. Bourchier's, and that formerly belonging to Mr. Twiss; yet, in an hour more, not a man could have appeared on the battery, or stired in or out of the Court House, without being a dead mark to the enemy; to say nothing of our people having been needlessly fatigued and harassed, to such a degree that I believe in two hours more not a man of us would have had strength enough to have walked to the fort. On the orders being issued for abandoning our post, precipitate orders were sent to Captain Buchanan and Captain-Lieutenant Smith immediately to withdraw from the other two

advanced batteries, and spike up their cannon. The reasons pleaded and urged in defence for this hasty step was 'the absolute necessity of doing it as soon as the center battery was withdrawn.' To this I am obliged to object as a reason very insufficient; if any reasons at all subsisted for their being erected and maintained prior to the withdrawing the center battery, they subsisted as much if not more afterwards; at least, there was no cause in nature for the order for spiking up the cannon. The south advanced battery had never been attacked, the northerly had in the morning and repulsed the enemy; the only circumstance to be apprehended was the retreat of the troops being cut off, which was easily guarded against as we knew the enemy was within our Lines. A reserve battery had been thrown up across the principal south avenue, just opposite to the Company's house, and close under the cover of the guns from the two southerly bastions, with intention that Captain Buchanan's command should retire to it with his cannon, in case he was obliged to retire from the advanced battery at the bridge; but this was never thought of. At this reserve battery they could not be attacked, without infinite loss to the enemy; nor flanked from the intrenchment cut through the Park or Loll Baag, which, in its whole length, was scoured by our small arms from the church; that and Mr. Eyre's house being taken possession of on abandoning the center battery, which likewise secured the retreat of Captain-Lieutenant Smith's command; so that there could be no reason for quitting either of those posts in the precipitate manner they [did], which was the cause of infinite confusion amongst ourselves and of no small encouragement to the enemy, and proves a support to the censure I think I have justly passed on our second capital error, that it had been a happy incident if these outposts had never been thought of. I must not quit this subject without doing particular justice to Lieutenant Blagg and ten of our volunteers, (8 of them your covenanted servants) *viz.*, Messrs. Law, Ellis, Tooke, N. Drake, Charles Smith, Wilkinson, Dodd, Knapton, William Parker, and Macpherson; these gentlemen were detached from Captain Buchanan's post to sustain a sergeant and 16 men posted in Mr. Goddard's house to defend the post at Mr. Putham's, and threw themselves into Captain Minchin's house, from the top of which they made

a great slaughter of the enemy; and when that post was forced, the serjeant and his men made a precipitate retreat to the battery, without once thinking of the gentlemen posted at Captain Minchin's, where these had a long and bloody conflict with a number of the enemy, most unequal, and at last forced a retreat, glorious to themselves but with the loss of two of their small detachment, *viz.*, Messrs. Smith and Wilkinson, who by mistake was separated from the body; the first refused quarter, and killed five of the enemy before he fell; the other called for quarter but was denyed it and cut to pieces.

43. I have now brought you, Honourable Sirs, to the fifth and last act of our tragedy of errors, which brought on as fatal and melancholly a catastrophe, I believe, as ever the annals of any people, or colony of people, suffered since the days of Adam; to wit, the Governor, Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, Macket, the principal officers, and a considerable part of the colony, abandoning your fort, effects, and garrison, with the ships and vessells, whereby the retreat of those who remained was to all intents and purposes cut off, to the number of about 170 persons, and left a sacrifice to an exasperated and merciless enemy; amongst those four of your Council, a great number of your principal and valuable covenanted servants, three military captains, several commanders of ships, eight or nine commissioned officers, many of the principal inhabitants, and others. Our proceedings in this distressfull situation I have in few words summed up in my letter of the 17th July from the capital of the province, which I beg leave to repeat here, lest that letter by any accident should not have reached you.

'Mr. Pearkes waving his right of seniority, he, and the gentlemen in Council with the unanimous approval of the gentlemen in the service, the garrison and inhabitants, elected me their Governour and administrator of your affairs during the troubles, and suspended your late President, and Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket, from your service, for their breach of trust; as also the military officers who accompanyed them.'

In my letter above referred to, I indiscriminately blamed the whole who had left us, in which I may well be excused, for I had it not then in my power to make the just distinctions and

exceptions I have here already done; for, in truth, it can be incumbent only on your Governour and Commander-in-Chief, and the gentlemen of Council, and the officers who accompanyed him in this defection, to vindicate, if possible, this piece of conduct; nor can it be wondered that those neither in trust or command, should quit a cause, where those who bore the highest distinctions in both deserted it. That the fort was not tenable is a truth cannot be contradicted, any more than that a general retreat with all its effects, publick and private, might with ease have been effected, had those on whom it rested done their duty. When I mention a general retreat, I would be understood to mean no more than of the European inhabitants, the garrison and their familys; as for the multitude of others which were (by an infatuation not to be accounted for) admited into the fort, to the number of 6,000 at least, they must have been abandoned; they would have suffered nothing by being left behind, and have caused much embarrassment and distress to the whole by being embarked. As I have before done justice to the officers of militia and others, who were embarked without (I am convinced) having any intention to abandon the fort, I must in this place likewise render justice, to the best of my knowledge and information, to the character of one of your Board, Mr. William Mackett. This gentleman had the command of the second company of militia, and [went to see his lady (and children) on board the *Dodaly* the 18th at night, where he left her dangerously ill about 11 and returned to the fort, though the strongest persuasions] I am well informed, were used to detain him on board. Could any consideration or plea have been prevalent enough to shake that of honour, the situation of this gentleman's family, joined to those persuasions, would have [determined] his stay; but he returned to the duty his honour called him to, and with the consent and approbation of Mrs. Mackett. Early on the morning of the 19th, the President, Mr. Mackett, the Reverend Mr. Mapletoft, myself and others were employed in cuting open the bales of cotton, and filling it in baggs, to carry upon the parapets; then (I recollect) Mr. Mackett intimated to me the unhappy condition he left his lady in the preceding night, and expressed his desire and intention to step on board for five minutes to see her. That this was the sole motive

of his going without any design of abandoning the fort, I am in my sentiments convinced of; and is, I think, proved by the whole of his behaviour during the siege, and his return to the fort from the *Dodaly* the preceding night. With equal pleasure I would embrace any, even probable, appearance to justify the conduct of your other servants in higher trust; against whom I with more real concern say, the charge lyes too heavy and obvious to admit of extenuation. The proof, and supporting this charge, I could wish a task imposed on any body else; but unluckily none but myself is equall to it, as none can be so well acquainted with the circumstances attending it; and however galling the remembrance of my own chains, sufferings and losses may be, they shall not influence me to deviate from truth, though such remembrance may urge me to terms of seeming bitterness, hardly unavoidable, when those sufferings can be attributed to naught but the unaccountable conduct I am now impeaching—a conduct which (however palliated by a thousand frivolous reasons) will justly lay your President, and Messrs. Manningham and Frankland open to the censure of breach of trust, of the highest imprudence and inconsistence, and prove them strangers to the very dictates of humanity.

44. In what degree either of the above named gentlemen may appear less culpable than the others, or really are so, is not my business to determine. This, Honourable Sirs, I will leave to your judgment and sentence, whilst I give you as faithful a statement of the facts as is in my power; that, Messrs. Manningham's and Frankland's falling down from the fort with the *Dodaly*, and refusing to return to it and join our councils the night of the 18th, though more than once summoned to it by your President, were the primary causes of all the confusion that ensued, will, I think, hardly admit of contest. The defence those gentlemen make to exculpate themselves stands on the face of the Fulta Consultations of the 14th of July last,[1] and is replyed to by me, on my return from Ballasore, in a letter to the Board at Fulta, under date the 25th of October last, a copy of which I hereunto annex. The departure of the *Dodaly* (of which those gentlemen were part owners) and their refusal to return were the cause of jealousies and fears, which otherwise would never have existed; and the

[1] These Consultations are, unfortunately, missing.

garrison were well vindicated in their conclusions, that when gentlemen, who bore the most distinguished characters both civil and military, had quitted and refused to return to their trust and duty, every man was providing for himself the best he could. The captain of the *Dodaly* exculpates himself by producing from your President an order of the 15th of June, purporting that he should obey all such orders as he should receive from himself or Mr. Manningham; and these gentlemen take the advantage of this order to prove their power and extenuate their departing with the ship; a power which devolved to Mr. Manningham for quite another purpose, and cannot be wrested, with either truth or propriety, to the purpose it is now produced to serve, as your President can well witness. The inspection and necessary orders to be issued in matters relative to the Marine was offered and undertaken by Mr. Manningham to ease the President and not with the intention that he should be thereby empowered to distress him and the garrison with the defection of that ship, and of quiting a trust which opened the way, and was I believe, in some measure, the cause of your President quiting his trust also on the succeeding morning, though I offer it not in sufficient vindication of a conduct not to be vindicated in one who bore the character of Governor and Commander-in-Chief of your fort and garrison. That things were in the utmost confusion I admit. That no proper order, rule or command was observed, is most true. That the proceedings of Messrs. Manningham and Frankland were suspicious and allarming, I grant; but on whom will all this reflect and recoil? Had, on the first refusal these gentlemen made to join our councils at this important juncture, the ship been remanded back under the cover of our guns, and a detachment sent to bring them to their duty, in place of their being suffered to wait for one to defend the ship from the hazard they themselves had brought her into without orders or knowledge of any one in the garrison, the measure would have spoke the Governor and Commander-in-Chief; a thousand mischiefs had been avoided, nor he himself reduced the next day to the unhappy dilemma which at last ended in his following their example, to the destruction of those left behind, and with the knowledge that neither the Company's treasure, books, or essential papers were

embarked, no more than the immense property then deposited in the fort, consisting of your own effects and of a multitude of others, left miserable and indigent by the desertion, in having all means cut off from them of saving it, and with those very ships that were employed and destined for its preservation. Fortitude is not given to every one; and I may most justly plead excuse for any failure arising from our want of military knowledge. It could not be expected from us, but every act of common prudence will. If the lives of so many brave and valuable men, who perished by this conduct, merited no regard, the gentlemen's own support with their Employers depended on their having a regard to their effects entrusted to their charge. As treasurers, it was encumbent chiefly on them to see that the treasure was embarked. This was a measure judged eligible in a council of war before the fort was judged not tenable, and sure ought immediately to have been carryed into execution. That *cooleys* could not be obtained to carry that and the Company's books off, as alledged on the face of the Fulta Consultations, must appear to every body then in garrison, and indeed to the whole world, a pretence to palliate a needless panick, disorder and neglect. That [money and] effects were that night embarked, is a truth known to every body; and on supposition there was not a *cooley* in the fort, a single *topaz* could have embarked the last year's books, the Consultations, and the essential papers. But it must appear a fact beyond contradiction, that these, and everything else were sacrificed and abandoned to the consideration of these gentlemen's own safety, though that no ways endangered but from the steps taken to secure it; for had we been joined in our councils, and the ships continued under the protection of our guns, or brought back, and any the least command exerted, we had it in our power to leave the *Suba* the bare walls of your fort only, without a gun in it that could have been of any use to him, or injury to us or the shiping. Had we remained united in our force, and proper spirit shewn, and examples made, what could have been apprehended from a few drunken Dutch soldiers, or a few seditious amongst the rabble of the militia. The President, Council, officers, gentlemen in the service, volunteers, and principal inhabitants, were surely more than equall to quell any tumult that could

have been raised by those to have obstructed an orderly retreat with every thing of value deposited in the fort. Had this been done with proper coolness and resolution, and the whole colony proceeded as early in August as the fleet could push out to Fort Saint George with the effects, publick and private, immense had been the gain to both. There proper measures might have been expeditiously consulted and adopted for the re-establishment of the Settlement; and the remains of our shattered and distressed colony would have met repose and shelter. This step would have been eligible, even in the wretched circumstances they retired; but the misfortune is errors are fruitful and generally beget one another. The panic which seized the gentlemen in command never lost its influence. The little saved was, in the general confusion, lost at Tanners and Buzbudgea: and in place of continuing their route to Fort Saint George the alternative of residing at Fulta was determined on, and such advices forwarded to that Presidency by Mr. Manningham as made it a case of necessity to remain there, under such disadvantages and distresses as I believe hardly ever a wretched people laboured, and at an immense expence to yourselves in supporting the colony and freight of ships for their reception and defence. Part of your expence, indeed, daily lessened by the multitudes of deaths here, which has proved a grave to a large portion of the colony and to more than half the detachment and officers sent under Major Killpatrick; all which might have been avoided by a prudent procedure to Madrass as above. Why this was not done in preference to the advices sent and our miserable residence here, I am a stranger, and have not yet received or heard one tolerable reason to support the measure. It has been alledged the quitting the river would have been giving up the cause. Had this been done it would have been only giving up a cause already lost, and which they themselves had first abandoned. The fleet quitting the river would have lulled the enemy into a security which would greatly have facilitated the retaking your Settlement; whereas our residence in it has kept them on the allarm, and preparations are made for the defence of it, which probably would never have been thought of. Nor is it possible, in my conception, to account for this strange perseverance in misery, heavey charge to yourselves, but from

these two motives, which swayed the councils of those gentlemen who had quitted your fort, garrison, and effects, whilst they bore the characters of command in it. Conscious and self-condemned of a conduct not to be vindicated, it became necessary that one of their own body should be dispatched to give the first impression of it. Had they proceeded with the colony, a hundred mouths would have been open to report their conduct as well as their own. This, Honourable Sirs, must, I think, have been the principle they acted on, to allow them the shadow of consistence. If the gentlemen support their remaining in the river from other even probable reasons, I will be the first to retract my sentiments; not my sentiments alone but that of near the whole colony. More, I think, I need not say in support of my charge against these gentlemen, that they justly incurr the censure of breach of trust, have acted with the greatest imprudence, and been consistent in nothing but errors from the first moment they meditated abandoning your fort in the manner they did. It remains only that I prove they might safely have retrieved this unhappy step by a return to it with all the ships, and that, by this neglect, they not only further merit the censure I have already passed on them but that of being strangers also to the very dictates of humanity.

45. The *Dodaly* (with Messrs. Manningham and Frankland) and some other vessells fell down the river the 18th at night. Your President, with the rest of the ships, vessells and boats, followed them the 19th, about nine in the forenoon. They lay in sight of our fort and flagg flying untill the 20th. About eleven forenoon [they] saw the *Saint George*, our last resource, was aground and could not come down to our succour, and heard us engaged with the enemy during all this period. They knew the desperate state they had left and abandoned us in, without all possibility or means to escape or retreat, and this their own doing. They were sensible we had not ammunition to defend the fort two days, or, if we had, that our strength, with continued fatigue, watching, and action, was exhausted, and that we were reduced to the wretched alternatives of either sacrificing our lives by resolving to dye sword in hand, or surrender ourselves to an enraged and merciless enemy; and yet neither ship, vessell, or boat was sent to favour our retreat, enquire what was our fate, or whether we existed or had perished.

To palliate this (I believe unequalled inhumanity,) the danger of returning with the ships has been, I hear, alledged. Captain Grant, in his letter to us, in vindication of himself, the 20th August, asserts he more than once urged your President to move up with all the ships and sloops before the fort, once in the presence of Captain Young, Commander of the *Dodaly*, who represented it as a dangerous attempt. I submit it to you, Honourable Sirs, to determine whether your President ought to have remained satisfyed with an answer of this kind, or whether the ships would have run greater risque in moving up to the fort than they did in moving down from it; or if there actually had been danger in the attempt (of which there was not even the shadow, whilst we remained in possession of the fort) was the preservation of the lives of so many brave and valueable men as were cooped up in it, with your treasure, effects, books, &c., of such small estimation with these gentlemen as not to merit one attempt to retrieve them, though even this attempt had been attended with danger? But it has been urged, that they were at no certainty whether we were in possession of the fort or not, and by some conjectured that we had surrendered or the place had been taken by assault, and that the flagg was only kept flying by the enemy to decoy the fleet back.—But if these were the doubts that actuated them, why did they not satisfy themselves? A single sloop or boat sent up in the night of the 19th, might have hailed us on the bastions, without risque, even had the place been in possession of the enemy, the contrary of which they would have been ascertained of, and the fleet might have moved up that night. This motion would have put fresh spirits in us and given dismay to the enemy, already not a little disheartened by the numbers slain in the day when dislodged from the houses round us, and otherways, particularly by our shells and cannon at Lady Russell's and the Court House. Had the ships moved up and our forces reunited, and part of the ammunition on board them been disembarked for the service of the fort, the *Suba* at last might have been obliged to retreat with his army, or at worst the effects might have been shiped off the 20th, even in the face of the enemy, without having power to obstruct it, and a general retreat been made of the whole garrison, as glorious to ourselves, all circumstances considered, as a victory would have been;

the gentlemen would then have found a plan ready formed, to the minutest circumstance, for a general retreat, that would have been attended with no disorder, confusion, or difficulty, if proper resolution and command had appeared. Had your President, as was encumbent on him, hoisted his flagg on board the *Dodaly*, of which he was likewise part owner, and moved up even the 20th, not a man or vessell but would have followed him, and he would then have been early enough to have given a new face to things; but, in place of that, he rendered himself totally inexcusable, by not only quiting us himself, but in telling others, and amongst them some of the officers of the militia then on board the *Dodaly*, that the retreat was general; thereby cooling the resolutions and endeavours of those who were returning to us, and had never once entertained a thought of quitting the fort. The want of boats has been another cause alledged for a general retreat not being practicable. Were there any grounds for this assertion, where did the fault lye? Though there might have been few boats at the Crane *Gat*,[1] when the President went off, yet it is a known truth that the wharfs to the right and left were lined with them, and that not one of them stired from the shore until immediately after he put off, when they all rowed cross the river, most of them with grain on board; and this desertion occasioned by neglect of the obvious measure of having a sufficient guard over them. But to obviate every excuse that can possibly be urged against the facility with which we could have made the retreat general, I will suppose there had not a country boat existed, those belonging to the ships and the small craft brought close in shore would have been amply sufficient to have embarked the effects, garrison, and their familys, which we had not at all despaired of effecting, even with the *Saint George's* 3 or 4 boats, (had she happily came down to our succour) and the assistance of Captain Witherington's pinnace then lying at the Crane. But, in short, Honourable Sirs, it is not to be wondered at, that, in a panick such as here evidently possessed those in the chief command and direction, means the most obvious should either not occur or be neglected, nor that handles, the most weak and improbable, should be laid hold of to extenuate the conduct resulting from it. As such I think myself justifyed, in

[1] The chief landing-place of Old Fort William.

treating every reason advanced in vindication of these gentlemen quiting your fort in the manner they did, and not returning, when they had it so demonstrably in their power, and thereby losing the means of saving your treasure, books, and effects, of preserving the lives of the many gallant worthy men, who perished in their defence and thus fell a sacrifize, of preventing the tears of the fatherless children and widows, left destitute and unhappy, as well as those of the many parents and relations deprived thus of the ornaments of their familys in the miserable death of a number of the most promising youths you ever had in your service, and lastly, of saving myself and others, your faithfull servants, from chains, shame, and imprisonment, with other distresses and sufferings hardly to be described.

46. This subject, Honourable Sirs, disagreeable as it is, I must not quit, without speaking to an aspersion[1] which has been spread in the fleet, and I doubt not elsewhere, that, 'those who were left behind, and some of the principal of them intended going, had not the means of doing it been cut off from them, and so made a virtue of necessity.' This assertion I will venture to term bold as well as base, being founded on the conjecture only of some, with impotent hopes to reduce others on a level with themselves. The intentions of the heart are impenetrable but to the breast it dwells in, therefore I can only say, I solemnly believe that not a man left in the fort had any intention or design of quiting it but in a general retreat, nor could aught be discovered in their behaviour that either did then or could since give me cause to alter my sentiments. As to myself, against whom I do not question but this slander is chiefly aimed; it has also been as audaciously said, that I was not only privy to your President's going away but was to have gone with him. Of both he has honourably and publickly acquited me. My knowing myself free from this scandalous imputation of intending to quit your fort (otherwise than in a general retreat) is not enough; it is my duty to convince my Honourable Masters likewise, that such could not be my design; if it had, my motives were superior, the means equally in my power, and the reflection less in proportion to the less command and trust invested in me. These gentlemen declare they

[1] See vol. i., pp. 64 and 168.

embarked no private effects belonging either to themselves or constituents. The *Diligence* snow lying at my *gat*, I sent orders the 18th afternoon from the out battery, to embark my cash, plate, essential papers, and some jewells, and in all to the value of about fifty to fifty-two thousand Arcot rupees, which was done by my own people, my servants having before brought me word every *cooly* in the Settlement was employed in emptying the rice boats at the factory, so that they could not get people to carry them to the fort, where most people's valuable effects were deposited. My *godowns* being unfortunately full of heavy and cumbersome goods, there was no possibility of embarking them or depositing them in the fort, though my house so far detached as surely to be one of the first possessed and plundered by the enemy, which so happened. Had my intention been to abandon the Settlement, the temptation was great, and still greater as the whole remains of my fortune then in Calcutta was embarked, the means in my own hands, the vessell under no command but my own, without any possibility of my being obstructed the whole night of the 18th or the morning of the 19th. If such had been my design, I might have laid hold of the pretence to accompany Mrs. Drake and the ladys embarked on board the *Diligence* about eleven the night of the 18th, or afterwards when I requested and sent Monsieur Le Beaume with three of my servants to embark on board that vessell, for the greater security of her and the ladies. Such were the opportunities, and such were the temptations I had to have quited your fort, but the thought never entered my breast, nor that it could enter the breast of any one else, with the certainty there was of the retreat being general the succeeding night; that I neither did go nor had a sentiment that tended to it I am still happy in, notwithstanding all my sufferings, and though with this reflection, that had I gone, I had in all human probability saved the above remains of my fortune, which fell a prey to the enemy the 21st[1] at Buzbudgee, without any one friendly, humane or salutary step being taken by the fleet, or those who commanded in it to preserve the snow: the officer on board, having weighed in the general rout and accompanyed the other ships without my orders or knowledge. As to our having 'made

[1] This should be the 24th.

a virtue of necessity,' these gentlemen should be the last to reproach us, or take an advantage even in expression of the necessity they had reduced us to. That any has assumed a virtue from it I do not believe. We did our duty and no more, in defending your property as long as was in our power, which certainly is a virtue comparatively considered [with respect] to those who did not do their duty.

47. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have with strict truth, to the utmost of my knowledge and remembrance, traced out and laid before you the causes and various capital errors, which caused the loss of your Presidency and your Settlements in the provinces. Necessary as it has been, I am sensible by what I felt myself on this subject how unpleasing to you, therefore will not give you further pain than in the addition of a few lines, explaining the manner your fort was surrendered, on which I find I have in my letters from Muxadabad and Hughley been rather too short.

48. Having been pressed at different times on the 20th by the gentlemen of Council and others to throw out a flagg of truce, I opposed it as much as possible, foreseeing the little utility would arise from it, considering the enemy we had to deal with, and that they were as perfectly acquainted with our distressed situation, as we ourselves; however, to quiet the minds of everybody as much as in my power I caused a letter to be wrote the 20th, early in the morning, by Omychund who was left a prisoner in the fort, to Raja Monick Chund to the following purport:—

'That, as he and his house had always been a friend and tenant to the English, we hoped to experience it on this occasion, and that he would use his influence with the *Suba* to order his troops to cease hostilities; that we were ready to obey his commands, and persisted only in defending the fort, in preservation of our lives and honours.'

At this period I was at no certainty of the *Suba's* being at the siege, and all the hopes I had from this letter, or a flagg of truce, was to amuse them until the *Saint George* came down, and that we might have the night to make our general retreat in. About noon, as I before observed, the enemy were repulsed from the attacks they made this day to the northward, and a cessation on both sides ensued for more than two hours, and not one of the enemy were to be seen; the gentlemen of Council, officers and

inhabitants still pressing me, I was prevailed on to consent to a flagg of truce being thrown out before dark. About 4 afternoon word was brought me that one of the enemy was advancing with a flagg in his hand and called to cease firing, and that we should have quarter if we surrendered. This was judged a favourable juncture to answer it with a flagg of truce; accordingly I repaired with the flagg on the original south-east bastion, where Captain Buchanan was then posted, and ordered firing to cease. I had a letter prepared with me, addressed to Roy Doolub, the general of his forces,

'Importing an overture to cease hostilities till the *Suba* could be wrote to, and his pleasure known.'

This letter I threw over the ramparts, and hoisted the flagg of truce on the bastion; the letter was taken up by the person who advanced with the flagg, who retired with it. Soon after multitudes of the enemy came out of their hiding places round us, and flocked under the walls. A short parley ensued, I demanded a truce to hostilities untill the *Suba's* pleasure could be known; to which I was answered by one of his officers from below that the *Suba* was there, and his pleasure was that we should immediately strike our colours and surrender the fort and ourselves, and that we should have quarter. I was going to reply when at that instant Mr. William Baillie, standing near me, was slightly wounded by a muskett ball from the enemy, on the side of his head, and word was brought me that they were attempting to force the south-west barrier, and were cuting at the eastern gate. On being ascertained of this, I ordered Captain Buchanan to point a cannon from the bastion which flanked the eastern curtain and told them to withdraw from the walls or I would instantly fire amongst them. They withdrew, and I immediately took down the flagg of truce, and steped to the parade to issue orders for a general discharge of our cannon and small arms. The moment I arrived there, Captain Dickson, (who now commands the *Lively* grabb at present in your service) and just after him Ensign Walcot came running to me and told me the western gate was forced by our own people and betrayed. I instantly sent Ensign Walcot with orders to see if there was no possibility of securing it again. He returned and told me it was impossible, for the locks and bolts were forced off. On this I returned to Captain Buchanan's post, and found some of the

enemy's colours planted on the bastion. I asked him how he came to suffer it. He replyed he found farther resistance was vain, for that the moment I had left him advice was brought him of the western gate being betrayed, and turning myself I saw below multitudes of the enemy, who had entered that way, and others who had scaled by the south-west bastion and the new *godowns*, that bastion and the barrier, as I afterwards learnt, having been deserted at the time the western gate was forced. To the first *jemmautdaar* who scaled at the south-west bastion I advanced and delivered my pistols; he told me to order instantly our colours to be cut down. I replied I would give no such orders, they were masters of the fort and might order it themselves. He demanded my sword; I refused delivering it but in presence of the *Suba*, on which the *jemmautdaar* carryed me round the ramparts, opposite to where the *Suba* was below without the walls; from thence I made him the customary *salaam*, and delivered my sword to his *jemmautdaar;* the *Suba* from his litter returned my *salaam*, and moved round to the northward and entered the fort by the small western gate. I had three interviews with him that evening, one in *Durbar*. At first he expressed much resentment at our presumption in defending the fort against his army with so few men, asked why I did not run away with my Governor, &c., seemed much disappointed and dissatisfyed at the sum found in the Treasury, asked me many questions on this subject, to all which I made the best replys that occurred, and on the conclusion he assured me, on the word of a soldier, that no harm should come to me, which he repeated more than once. The consequence proved how little regard was paid to this assurance, for I was with the rest of my fellow sufferers about eight at night cramed into the Black Hole prison, and passed a night of horrors I will not attempt to describe as they bar all descriptions. On the ensuing morning, (the 21st June) I was taken out from amongst the dead, and again carryed before the *Suba* more dead than alive. He seemed little affected. I told him the miserable catastrophe of my companions; he answered me by saying he was well informed there was an immense treasure buryed or secreted in the fort, and that I was privy to it, and commanded me to point out where it was hid if I expected favour (one of his *jemmautdaars* had

told me on the way the cause of my being sent for, and advised me to make a full discovery, or that I should be shot off from the mouth of a cannon the next half hour). I urged every thing possible against the information he had received, or that if such a thing had been done I was totally a stranger to it; but all I could say seemed to gain no credit with the *Suba*, who ordered me a prisoner under charge of one of his generals, Mhir Modun, and with me Messrs. Court, Walcot and Burdet, as intimated in my letter from Muxadabad, to which letter I beg leave to refer for the account of our subsequent sufferings, and to subscribe myself, with the most perfect respect and duty, &c., &c.—J. *Z.* HOLWELL.

114. *Letter from Dr. W. Forth to Council at Fulta, dated Chinsura, 11 December, 1756.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—Your Honour, &c.'s, favour of the 2nd I received the 8th and would have immediately set out for Cossimbuzar had not the Dutch business been stopped at Houghly and their *futtacks* shut by the *Fouzdar's* order. I have been detained ever since, and finding there is no appearance of the dispute being likely to be made up for some time I have this day employed a friend of mine who is intimate with the *Fouzdar* to have my boat passed. I hope to succeed and I shall set out to-morrow. On my arrival here I was informed of two Moor men of distinction, great friends of the old Nabob, whom I was acquainted with when I attended the *Durbar*, one of them Nusheroutaula Khan, the other Fackeir Mahomet. I sent to Houghly to advise them of my being here, as they had been enquiring for me, and that I would visit them, hoping to learn what news passed at the *Durbar*, they having lately left Muxadavad I believe afraid of meeting with the same fate with most of the old Nabob's intimates. They came to see me at Mr. Bisdom's, from them I learnt the following particulars *viz.*: That Shocutt Jung's rashness had been the ruin of himself and all his party. He is certainly dead, his three brothers with all his family prisoners at Muxadavad in the house of Hassein Kouly Khan. The battle was fought on the banks of a small river some distance from Pooronea. The two armies [being] situated at some distance from it on each side, in the after-

noon some spies returned to Shocutt Jung's camp and advised him that Souragud Dowla was advancing with a small party of men. He immediately mounted his horse and with a favourite *jammadar* and 800 men marched across the river with a design as it was thought of observing the enemy, for he had left orders for the rest of his army to follow him. When he came in sight of the enemy and finding them advance fast, the *jammadar* advised him to retire across the river and join his troops as it was too late to bring them and next day attack them with his whole force. Finding him still going on, he spoke to him again and told him that he judged the best part of Souragud Dowla's forces was in sight, that he thought it rashness to attack them, and desired him to consider the consequence that would attend his defeat, and in case of his being killed it would be the ruin of his party and family. He gave him no answer but that he would not return till he had seen his brother[1] Souragud Dowla. On he went and a little before sunset the engagement began. He fought bravely. So did all with him and was at last shot in the temple by a gunman belonging to Golaum Shaw, but not before he had seen the death of most of his people with him. Souragud Dowla was not in the engagement but about 6 miles off. He had dressed that day Jaffer Ally Khan's son like himself and sent him out with the best part of his army. This was what deceived the spies. On the news of Shocutt Jung's death his army fled. Souragud Dowla marched on, took possession of the province and all Shocutt Jung's family prisoners, appointed Rajah Mohonloll Governor and returned triumphant to Muxadavad, and to finish all has at last received his *phirmaund* from the King; it cost him two *crore*, two *lack*, 50,000 rupees. A copy of it is come down here. He has likewise taken a particular account of his riches; they amounted to sixty-eight *crore* of rupees some *lacks* in silver and gold exclusive of his pearl and other jewels. They likewise informed me that Juggutseat and Omichund are endeavouring to make up matters, and that Coja Wazeed is called on that account. There is two things they say that the Nabob will not give up, that is the mosque and the name he gave Calcutta; that a *Fouzdar's* [residence in Calcutta], and some other articles he made a point of, is dropped or

[1] The Hindustani word *bhai*, or brother, would be applied to a cousin.

at least will not be insisted on. Coja Wazeed left Houghly the 9th for Muxadavad. Monickchund is likewise called upon. He leaves Calcutta in a day or two. Hukembeg and family turned out of the country and Meer Seer Joudy in his post. I last night received your Honour, &c.'s, duplicate of the 2nd and a letter from Mr. Keir[1] with two letters for Juggetseat enclosed. I shall take care to have them delivered.

I remain, &c. &c., WILLIAM FORTH.

P.S.—There was about 5,000 of Souragud Dowla's people killed and wounded. He himself was not there.

115. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S.* 'Kent' *at Culpee, 14 December* 1756.[2]

The late misfortune which has befallen the English East India Company who have been violently and unjustly expelled from their Settlements in this province, plundered of their property and treated in their persons with the greatest barbarity, accompanied with every mark of ignominy and contempt, is the cause of my coming here with his Britannick Majesty's squadron, to reestablish them in their Settlements, rights and priviledges, to procure them ample satisfaction for all the injuries and insults they have received in their properties and persons, and to wipe off the stain and indignity in some measure offered to all European nations in the Nawab's treatment of the English.

With views and designs so every way just and equitable, I fully persuade myself, I have no opposition to apprehend either secret or open from any European nation whatsoever, more especially from one so long and so closely connected with us in the strictest alliance and friendship.

Convinced of this truth, I should have deemed it unnecessary to have acquainted you with my resolution of making war on the Nawab and his subjects, had I not been made acquainted since my arrival here that he has demanded your assistance, both of ships and men, to act against the subjects of the King my master, my duty to whom obliges me to acquaint you that should you

[1] Mr. Keir, a surgeon, acted as Secretary to the Secret Committee at Fulta.

[2] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

grant him the assistance he demands I shall regard any such act as an open declaration of war and act accordingly.

I should be extremely sorry to find myself necessitated to make such a return to the good and humane offices you have so lately rendered to my poor unhappy countrymen, of whose distress I have a very just and tender sense.

I have the honor, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

116. *Ammin Manjey's Report.*[1]

That he went with the Nabob to Muxadavad, when the Nabob's tent was embarked on board his boat; that the Nabob proceeded to Sicklagully and then to Rajahmaul; that from thence with his troops he passed over to Poorenea; that his boat with the Nabob's tent went among the rest; that four days after a battle ensued; that eighteen elephants were caparisoned like the *Subah's;* that he was mounted on the last of them; that in the battle he was wounded by a ball in the breast and with an arrow in the cheek, and fell and was put into a *palankeen;* that a rout ensued; that half his troops under Rambux Hazarra joined the Poorenea Nabob; that Doostmahmut Cawn and other officers fell in the battle; that the *Subah* with about 1,000 troops fled towards Muxadavad, whether he is dead or not nobody knows, that is (among other boats) (*sic*); and himself &c. were imprisoned by Amanaut Cawn (Suffrage Cawn's son) for the space of 20 days; that in this space he was often brought before Amanaut Cawn, and being a *riot*[2] of Calcutta was interrogated touching the *Subah's* treatment of the English and capture of that place; that at last they dispatched him with a large packett sealed with seven seals, giving him sixteen rupees and a suit of cloaths; that the seals were those of Shockut Jung, Amanaut Cawn, and five more principal men; that they ordered him either to deliver the packett to the Governor or *Zemidar* to whom they told him it was addressed; that in case he was molested on his passage to throw the packett into the river or destroy [it] to save his own life; and that he should deliver in place of it a verbal messuage to this

[1] An instance of the very untrustworthy native intelligence to which Clive refers in his letters of January 8, 1757.

[2] A subject or tenant.

effect, 'That they had received a letter from us, and that their hearts and powers were ready to render the English restitution and justice; that they were preparing accordingly and bid us hold ourselves likewise in content and readiness.' He likewise adds that he thinks from all appearances the *Subah* is dead, all orders issuing by orders from the *Begum*, and that on the side of the Poorenea Nabob a first cousin and a principal *Gentoo* was killed and about 1,000 men, but on the side of the *Subah* three and four thousand killed and a much greater number drowned in their flight cross the river; that the King's *pungah* was erected on the van of the Poorenea army and that they are waiting the arrival of fourteen thousand of the King's troops which were hourly expected; that being arrived on this side Bungwan Golla he was stopped by the *Subah's* people and imprisoned ten days, three of which he was in irons, and, being fearful of his life which they had often threatened, he threw the shoe in which the packett was sewed up into the river; that he believes he was betrayed by somebody, for that they three times almost drowned him and likewise tortured him over fire to make him confess whether he had papers in his trust.

117. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Raja Manickchund, dated 15 December, 1756.*

Upon my arrival in these parts from Madras I was informed that you had shown a great friendship and regard for the English Company, for which I write to return you thanks. I doubt not but as you have hitherto professed a desire to serve the Company, you will at this time, when their affairs must require it, retain the same disposition in their favour.[1]

118. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Kent' at Culpee, 16 December, 1756.*[2]

SIR,—Since my arrival at this place I am informed by Mr. Drake and his Council, that some time ago they applied to you

[1] The Raja replied amicably and sent Radha Krisna Malik as a confidential agent to Clive. Very similar letters were sent by Clive to Jagat Seth and Coja Wazid on 8 January, 1757.

[2] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

for the assistance of your pilots, which at that time you were not able to comply with as several of them were indisposed in your hospital. I hope that objection is by this time removed, and from the friendship subsisting between the States General and the King my master, I doubt not you will upon the receipt of this letter assist our endeavours to bring the Governement to proper terms by sending me immediately as many of your pilots and masters capable of taking charge of ships as are not employed or can possibly be spared, which will oblige, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant, CHARLES WATSON.

119. *Translation of an extract from a letter from the French Council at Chandernagore to the Superior Council in the Isle of France, dated* 16 *December*, 1756.[1]

We think, gentlemen, you will be astonished to learn the principal circumstances of the revolution which has just driven the English from all their Settlements in Bengal. We will give you a very brief account of them.

The Nawab, Siraj-uddaula, having, contrary to every one's expectation, succeeded his grandfather Aliverdikhan, in the month of April, as *Suba* of Bengal, the English had speedily a most terrible experience of the violent and passionate character of this young Prince, whom they had irritated by their arrogance and the shelter they had given to one of his enemies. Driven to extremities by their bravados, he first treacherously seized a little fort which they had near the capital, and then came with a formidable army to besiege them in Calcutta, which was their chief Settlement on the Ganges.

The vanity of the English having persuaded them the Moors would never dare to venture so far, they were so surprised and terrified that they lost their heads and could not profit by any of those advantages which Europeans have over such contemptible troops. Though numbering 600 whites, well provided with all sorts of munitions and sheltered in a regular fort, they made scarcely any resistance at all after the Nawab's arrival. The

[1] Pondicherry Records.

Governor himself, Mr. Drake, with the Commandant of the troops, the greater part of the Council, officers and inhabitants, and all the women took refuge on board the ships which were in the port. The few soldiers, who had remained in the fort, refusing to recognise any authority, disorder prevailed to such an extent that the white flag was displayed on the afternoon of the 20th, i.e. after three days' siege. But the Moors, before the capitulation was arranged, crowded to the gates and, as no one fired on them, easily burst them in and entered, killing all who tried to resist. The plunder in the Settlement and fort was immense as the English had not taken the precaution to embark their wealth.

That was, so to say, only the beginning of their ills. The prisoners to the number of 200 having been hurriedly shut up in a warehouse were almost all suffocated in one night. Those who survived, especially the chief men, after having suffered all kinds of misery and after having been dragged in chains to Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal, were sent back (to us) by the Nawab in the most deplorable condition, which we tried to alleviate in every possible way.

The lot of those saved in the ships has been hardly less wretched. Having with difficulty gained the mouth of the river, they have since endured all the bad weather of the Rainy Season, and at the same time been embarrassed by the numbers of women and children with whom their ships were crowded. This, joined to the bad provisions which were all they could obtain, quickly caused a kind of pestilential sickness which carried off many of them.

The capture of Calcutta drew with it the ruin of all the small factories which they possessed scattered over Bengal, and now they do not retain a single establishment in this kingdom. Since this sad revolution only one vessel has arrived from Europe. It brought them 250 men from Madras, but this reinforcement not being large enough, they have planned no enterprise so far. They expect every moment the arrival of a squadron of six ships of war and five of the Company's, which left the Coast on the 14th October and which brings them 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys. There is no doubt that with these forces they will be strong enough to retake Calcutta, which is now defended by only

a small number of Moors. But besides the fact that its capture will not recoup them . . . the colony being entirely ruined and plundered, it is not certain that they will be able to maintain themselves in it against all the forces of the Nawab. What is absolutely certain is that this war must derange commerce, as it drives all the merchants away.

Since the above was written the English squadron has arrived in the Ganges. The Director received a letter some days previously, by which M. Verrier, Chief of the Surat factory, informed him that a small vessel, which was sent express by the English Chief at Bassora and arrived at Bombay on the 5th October, brought letters from London intimating that war had been declared between France and England the 17th May preceding, that the Governor of Bombay had announced this by beat of drum in his island, and had immediately sent *pattamars* express to the Commander of the English squadron in the Roads at Balasore so that he might profit by this news and capture any of our vessels which were entering or going out of the Ganges. This news obliged us to postpone the departure of the *Ruby*. But the frigate *Danae* which has just arrived having passed without any difficulty makes us think that the English, whom we cannot suppose ignorant of the aforesaid news having other things to think of do not intend to avail themselves of their (superior) forces against us, and the owners of the *Ruby* have in consequence determined to despatch this vessel promptly in order to profit by these favourable circumstances, which make us suppose that the English think they must be careful in their behaviour towards us. Consequently we are going to work so as to despatch the *La Favorite* as quickly as possible.

120. *Letter from Dr. W. Forth to Mr. Drake at Fulta, dated Chinsura,* 16 *December,* 1756.

HONOURABLE SIR,—I hope you will forgive me in not answering my promise before now. Please to take what follows as facts that I was acquainted with and know to be true, afterwards I shall mention reports and from whom they came. When Amabeg came on our factory he did not know for what reason, his orders

from Mirza Ellis (who acted as *Naib*[1] in the absence of the Nabob) was to go directly with the forces under him to the English factory under the conduct of Mirza Hassan Ali son to Huckembeg and follow such orders as he should give. When I went to see him next morning I asked what was the matter, his answer to me was 'don't you know?' I told him we did not, and was very much surprized we should have forces sent on us without any previous notice or complaint. He said that he heard in the way the Nabob was angry at some works that we and the French were a-making, and was given to understand that his affair with us would soon be over, and then he was to be ordered on the French factory. To the last this man thought always that the Nabob's intention was only to *domcou*[2] us, or frighten us (his message to Mr. Watts) till he heard of Mr. Watts being gone out of the factory; then, as he told me afterwards, and not till then did he believe he had any other design, and to the last imagined affairs would be made up below, and often sent me word by my servant that there was a treaty set on foot. Golaum Shaw received orders the 30th of May to march and join the above which he did that very day and came on our factory that afternoon about 4 under the conduct of Mirza Hassan Ali. This *jammadar* if I remember right Mr. Watts conversed with for some time but I believe learnt nothing of the Nabob's intentions from him. The 1st of June came four *jammadars* more, Cassim Ali Cawn, Kissore Cawn and two Persians. Being well acquainted with the two former they immediately sent for me (observe that all orders issued from Cassim Ali Cawn, being immediately under Roydullub and commanded all the other *jammadars* that were on our factory). I went and after the usual compliments I begged to know of him the reason of the Nabob's sending such numbers of forces. He told me that the Nabob was very angry that we were enlarging the ditch, building new works, particularly a drawbridge and small fortification[3] beyond it by Chitpore, and that if they were demolished everything would be quiet again, and desired me to acquaint the Chief and tell him to write a letter to the Nabob directly, and Kissore Cawn would carry it. I returned, acquainted

[1] Deputy Governor. [2] To frighten. [3] Mr. Kensall's octagon.

Mr. Watts with the particulars; a letter was wrote and got ready to be given Kissore Cawn in the afternoon when he and Cassim Ali Cawn came to see the Chief as they promised me they would; but [they] not coming the letter was sent to Kissore Cawn who refused carrying it for fear of the Nabob's anger, having received dispatches that afternoon to inform them the factory would be attacked next day, which was accordingly intended but put a stop to by a letter Mr. Watts wrote Roydullub. The contents I am not acquainted with; however the effects were Mr. Watts going to the Nabob in the evening accompanied by your humble servant. The paper Mr. Watts signed in Roydullub's tent I presume you are well acquainted with. It was one article that if any of the Nabob's subjects were then in Calcutta they should be delivered up, something to this purpose. Thus sir, I have given you the particulars that I was acquainted with till the loss of our factory and the making my escape the 5th of June from thence, 2 days after the Moors were in possession of it. Some things may escape my memory but I believe not to the purpose, either one way or other.

I shall now inform your Honour what I heard afterwards, and from whom, reports only for I don't know them to be fact, and this was after the factory was given up, for I don't remember to have heard anything more than this before that time *viz.* that the Nabob had wrote you and the French to desist from making any more works, the French returned for answer that they were only repairing a bastion that had been hurt by lightning but desisted immediately on receiving his letter. The answer you sent was more plain and seemed to hint that you would go on notwithstanding his orders. Wither it is so or not, you must certainly be the best judge, and if I remember well it was this letter that put him into a passion when he made use of the expression that he would scourge the English out of his country. A design at least to humble us I believe in my conscience was intended before that time. But to proceed, the 4th June in the morning the Nabob was encamped at Monkorah; he sent a eunuch to the factory to bring all the horses to him. Amongst them was two of mine, I was advised to send my servant along with them in hopes that when he knew they belonged to me that he would return them, but was disappointed. My servant went to Golaum Ali

Cawn than *Arresbegey*. He called him into his tent and, before Hodgee Mindee, former *Arresbegey* to Shaw Hamet Jung, and Aga Meer a favorite of the old Nabob's, told him that Mr. Drake's letter to the Nabob and the detaining of Kissendass, the ill treatment Narainsing had met with—several complaints being at the same time made of the disrespect to his orders and proud behaviour of the English in general—was originally the cause of all this unhappy affair. From than he went to Narainsing who repeated the same complaints and much to the same purpose. When the Nabob returned to Cossimbuzar, Juggut Seat came to visit him at the second's house. He repeated to him the many insults he had received, the detaining his subjects that had wronged him and fled to them for protection, and, says he, 'I have never forgot the behaviour of one of the Chiefs here. When I came one day to their factory with my mother I sent to let him know that we wanted to come in and see it. He refused it. This,' says he, 'has stuck by me ever since.' This I had from Jacob John an Armenian who was than present and came that night to the Dutch factory to acquaint me of it. The above affair was in Mr. Eylis's time, but contrary to what he says, for Mr. Eylis sent him word that his gate was open for him, but that he could not prevent the soldiers seeing him or the ladies with him. He returned for answer that he did not mind the Europeans but desired the black people might be turned away. However he did not come but walked round the factory with his mother. Before I left Cossimbuzar I went to the city to see some of my old acquaintance, both Moors and *Gentoos*, and remained there two days. It seemed to be the general opinion that the keeping of Kissendass was the occasion of the Nabob's resentment, though all agree that he had acted wrong by distroying a body of people that were the principals in enriching the country by the large trade carried on, and sooner or latter he would be sensible of it; that if we could remain quiet for a few months they did not doubt but of his own accord he would invite us back again if it pleased God to give him a right way of thinking, for that without our return they looked on the country as ruined and trade would daily decay, which they were then not a little sensible of.

Thus have I given your Honour both facts and reports that

I knew or heard of and wish there may be anything in this account that may be of service. Omichund and Coja Wazeed how far they may be concerned in it I cannot possibly say, but it was reported that a letter from Omichund to the Nabob advising him to make a speedy march to Calcutta before the ships arrived, it would be an easy conquest as they had very little military and but a few inhabitants, Europeans, at that time; that Omichund for some years past has been endeavouring to make himself respected at the *Durbar*, to gain the friendship of the Nabob and the principal officers about him, which he had succeeded so well in that in short he could obtain any favour almost he wanted—witness the *perwannah* he obtained from Souragud Doulet to engross all the ophium trade at Patna and that none should be bought or sold but by him. What difficulties the Dutch and French had before they could get that order broke throw and leave to purchase their ophium as formerly! I forget now what money they paid to have it passed. The respect paid his *gomastah*, Baulkissen, by the principal men at the *Durbar*, always admitted and made much of whilst our *vakeels* were never looked on or had liberty to go to the *Durbar* but when sent for, and if they had occasion to go with any particular message in regard to the Company's affairs they must first go to the houses of the principal officers to acquaint them and ask them permission, and not often granted without much solicitation. It will naturally be imagined that it must have cost Omichund much money, but far otherwise; his *Durbar* expences I have been well informed seldom amounted to above 15 or the most 20 thousand rupees *per annum*. Presents to the Nabob of trifles was the principal method he used, and a little money properly distributed amongst the officers. There was no trifle but he bought, be it ever so mean, only rare or had not been brought out before,—even cats he used to purchase. I shall give your Honour an instance which I was an eye witness of. About 2 years ago he had got a large Persia cat, which he sent to the old Nabob. I happened to be at the *Durbar* that morning when his *gomastah* brought it in. Finding the old man very much pleased with it he took the opportunity to acquaint the Nabob that Omichund had a quantity of ophium and saltpetre lying at Jullongee which came down with the *Begum's* ophium (the

present Nabob's mother) that was to go alltogether to Hughly, but that remaining there so long he should loose the opportunity of selling it; begged that the Nabob would give an order that he might take out his concern from the *Begum's* and send it down in boats of his own. This was immediately granted, the ophium and saltpetre was taken out and sent down. I had occasion to go from the *Durbar* to the *Begum's* who was at that time my patient. When I came in she was very angry having just heard of the order obtained, and said that Omichund could have anything he asked, even to her prejudice, and that the Nabob had granted him leave to take his ophium away, which he would sell first and she would loose the sale of hers. She wanted the old Nabob (her father) to recall the order but in vain. The *perwannah* for engrossing the ophium was got by a present of a horse and a clock made this Nabob,—the clock was to have been paid for, so Chawnd the watchmaker told me, charged at 2,000 *siccas*. About two months before the old Nabob's death when I was sitting with him and his hopefull son, there was some complaints made to him in regard to the English,—what it was I can't tell,—but he turned round to me and said that he had more trouble with the English than all the Europeans together. Souragud Doulet made answer that it was true and that they had not a friend in Calcutta but Omichund; he was the only person kind to their people when they went there and that took any notice of them. This was said in much passion. Some officious flatterer who [was] desirous to mend the matter, answered the English are a very proud, haughty people and showed little respect to Moormen. This, sir, is what I have heard and known of Omichund, and as Coja Wazeed was always mentioned as one that went hand and glove [with him] it was imagined that he was concerned with him in every branch of trade, and I have often heard it mentioned by many people both *Gentoos* and Moormen that he [Omichund] would be the ruin of the English at last if he lived but a few years longer; that he had ruined by his schemes every black merchant in the place, and, being disappointed of having the providing of the principal part of the Company's investment by the methods fallen on of sending our own *gomastahs*, being backed [? thwarted] in his views, was determined to make himself considerable at the *Durbar* in hopes that at last by his

interest, the whole management of our affairs there would fall into his hands. That it could have been the case at last I am fully persuaded except some other method had been fallen on, for that of a *vackeel* was of little or no use, nay I don't know if they have not at least for some time been of deservice and often been the cause of disputes. I believe there may have been a design to reduce or humble us before the old Nabob's death, for when the news of the destruction of Angria arrived it occasioned a good deal of talk; they spoke of our wars on the Cormandel Coast, that the French and us divided the country at last between us, and when the old Nabob asked me at that time why we kept Arcot and some other places, I told him that it was put into our hands as a security for the great debt owing the Company by the Nabob Mahomed Ali. Just about this time Shaw Hamet Jung's *Begum* retired to Mootey Geel, as it was thought, to secure herself and effects in case of the old Nabob's death. An affair happened, which in itself very triffling (*sic*) and not much to be regarded, yet I believe it irritated the present Nabob much, as he is one that never has almost forgot any slight or affront put on him in the old Nabob's time, has given convincing proofs of it since he has had the power in his hands, for few has escaped his resentment. About fifteen days before the old Nabob died his son came in and with a face full of resentment and anger addressed the old man thus: 'Father, I am well informed the English are going to assist the *Begum*.' The old Nabob asked me if it was true, I told him that it was a malicious report of some who were not our friends and raised on purpose to prejudice him and his son against us, that the Company were merchants and not soldiers, and all the troubles that had happened since their first settling in Bengal, which was nigh a hundred years, if he would inquire he would soon be satisfied that we never had joined any party or enterfeared in anything but our trade, nor had they ever any dispute with the Government on that head. How many soldiers have you in your factory? Answered about 40, gentlemen and all included. Have you never more? No, only when the Marratoes used to be in the country, but as soon as they were gone they returned them again to Calcutta. Do you know if the Dutch or French have had any soldiers come up? I

can't tell. Where is your ships of war? At Bombay. Will they come here? Not that I know of as there is no occasion for them. Had you not some here about three months ago? Yes, there comes one or two yearly to carry provisions to the rest of the ships. What is the reason you have these ships of war in these parts of the late years? To protect the Company's trade and for fear of a war with the French. Is there a war betwixt you and the French? Not at present but that we were apprehensive of it. He turned round to his son and told him he did not believe a word of what had been told him. Souragud Doulet answered that he could prove it, on which the old man desired me to send our *vackeel*. On the return of the *vackeel*, I asked him what the Nabob said to him, which was word for word almost with what I have mentioned. The report of the English's going to assist the *Begum* arose from one Bailey, a corporal in the train at Cossimbuzar, who going often to Muxadavad to buy horses for the gentlemen pretended likewise to the cure of some particular disorders and often went to the Moormen's houses to physick their horses. The *Agababa*, a son of Suffrage Cawn, being under the protection of the *Begum* and apprehensive of disputes with Souragud Doulet after the old Nabob's death, was desirous of entertaining some Europeans in his service. Knowing Bailey, he sent for him to see one of his horses, and asked him if he could get him any men. He told him that if he would give him good pay he would enter into his service and get him more, he went five or six times to this youth, when some way or other Souragud Doulet heard of it that he was taking English men into his pay. The *Agababa* was spoke to about it and orders sent to Bailey to come no more there. This is what I learnt some time afterwards from Mirza Emam Bux under whose immediate care the *Agababa* was. That poor youth was afterwards sent prisoner to Dacca. This was the affair that I believe nettled the Nabob a good deal and if the reports are to be credited it was the advise of the old Nabob to his son to reduce the power of the three nations, but more particularly ours, for what with our conquests on the coast, the destroying of Angria, and the libertys granted us in Bengal by our *phurmand*, he was apprehensive that at last we should demand after his death all those branches of trade cut off from us by him and

former Nabobs which our *phurmand* gave us a right to, and if not granted might involve his son in troubles by bringing our forces into his country, and the consequence might be a conquest of it to the ruin of his family, and that he thought a timely severity would prevent it. Some will have it that his advice to his son was to turn the English entirely out of his country, but, trace the character of this man from the earliest accounts we have of him, we shall find that he was too wise, too good politician, his whole conduct shows it, ever to advise his son to such measures as to hurt his country and lessen his revenues by so false and imprudent a step, well knowing the advantage of trade, especially that part carried on by the English, superior to all the Europeans joined together. Thus have I finished and made good my promise to your Honour later than I intended it, some things I have mentioned that may be wide from the first design, however they may have their use. Accept the above from one who wishes you all success and believe me with much respect,

Honourable Sir, &c. &c., WILLIAM FORTH.

121. *Letter from Dr. William Forth to Secret Committee at Fulta, dated Chinchura, 17 December, 1756.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—Notwithstanding my endeavours to procure a *dustick* with, to go by land or water, I have not been able to obtain one. The 11th the *Fouzdar* of Hughly promised me one next day. When I sent for it he refused granting one to any European, having then just heard from Monnickchund of the arrival of our fleet, who [Manik Chand] had sent expresses to the Nabob to advise him and wait his orders. The *Fouzdar* was then dispatching letters to the same purport. They have both received their orders the 16th, Monnickchund to go to Budgbaggee, the *Fouzdar* to Tannah and to defend those places; in case they should want assistance to let him know and he would be with them in three days. The former is gone and with him most of the forces at Calcutta, having left about 500 in the last; the *Fouzdar* sets out to-morrow; but I believe not, as he pretends to be now sick to avoid going. They stop all boats now at Calcutta either going or coming, they say to make a bridge

at Tannah to hinder the ships passing, and that they have ordered all the ships and vessels at Calcutta to be sent down filled with earth and intend to sink them opposite to that fort where the passage is narrow. The person who brings this news says he saw the ships moving down, that they have laid hold on all the Dutch boats at Calcutta going down with the Company's goods, taken the goods ashore, and loading the boats with what furniture and goods remained still in Calcutta, with a design I believe to make off as soon as our ships come in sight for Hughly, so the chief mate of the Dutch commodore (who was kept there a day) judges from the confusion and consternation they are in and when he came to Barnagore he says that there was crowds of people running away from Calcutta loaded with all kinds of things. For several days past numbers of large boats passes by this place, with cottons, furniture and many other kind of goods for Hughly. This place at present is pretty rich. If my information is right, during the time the Nabob was gone against Shokut Jung there was many people at Muxadavad sent their effects down. I suppose there will still be something to make it worth while to push up immediately after the taking of Calcutta, as it will prevent the runaways joining and making a stand as intended at Hughly and save a good deal of goods that will be carried off by the other forces if suffered to remain any time, for they don't seem to think that place in much danger. Fackeer Mahmod whom I mentioned in my last, from whom I have learnt something mentioned in my former, being I believe afraid of staying longer at Hughly, came yesterday to take his leave, and informed me of what follows, that the Nabob's tents were ordered out under pretence of going a hunting; some say he is going against the Bonbisnapore Rajah—but he thinks his hunting tends this way; that he was a good deal surprized at the news of the ships being arrived, having been informed from the Europeans that it was only a report in order to facilitate our negociations and that we had few forces or ships to send to our assistance at Madras; that there had been some means used to interrupt the treaty lately carried on, by whom he said he could not tell but intimated the French, from the following message sent the 10 at night, by Monsieur Renault the Chief of Chandernagore; whilst he was

there, Renault's *Chobdar* came with his master's compliments, that the English being returned with their ships of war and a great force and not being then friends, as he well knew, requested that he would order his *peons* to seize any of their people that should get out of their bounds, for which they should be rewarded; that the English had employed people privately to carry them off by offering them twenty rupees per month, they only giving 8 as customary; that they were apprehensive of losing them all and having none left to defend their fort in case of a war with the English, which they were apprehensive of. He informed me likewise that there was a number of spies gone down to learn our force, and thinks the Nabob will use some means to bribe the black troops that are come. He further adds that if we were once firmly established in Calcutta and in no danger of losing it again, there is many of the principal people of the country would fly to us for protection with their families and riches in case we would admit of it. He wished us success and said if we would get the Nabob in irons the whole country would be glad of it, for that at present they had nothing that they could call their own, his mind was taken up with nothing but getting of money, it did not signify by what means. His other favourite passions drinking and women. He has discharged Omarkhan and turned him out of his country, likewise Dunmahomet and Golaum Shaw, both of them considerable men, especially the former. They each claimed the credit of their people killing Shokut Jung in hopes of getting the reward formerly offered, but the Nabob told them that his orders was not to kill his brother, but to bring him alive that he might make a friend of him. As they had disobeyed his orders he would not take away their lives though they deserved it, but ordered them away immediately out of his country; that there was many more he intended to discharge, but believed he would defer it till he see how affairs went on a little first. I intimated if some of those he had discharged would not, if properly applied to, engage in our service; his answer was not to attempt it till we had once beat him, for none would be so rash to hearken to a proposal of this kind whilst things were in this situation; if we succeeded we then might have them, as they were souldiers of fortune and would take service wherever they had the first offer,

he promised to write me by one of his people as soon as he arrives at Muxadavad and inform me what news. His advice to me was on no account to move upwards even if I could obtain the *Fouzdar's dustick*, but to wait a few days till I heard from him, for that if forces should be in the way down, I might be plundered and ill used. The Dutch are close shut up both by land and water, and there is no appearance of its being over. I dispatch these *cossids* express, there being no other way open to convey them, and wait your Honour &c.'s orders what I shall do, whether to proceed upwards if an opportunity should offer, or join the fleet by the first opportunity, or remain here to gain what information I can in regard to the Nabob's motions, or employ some people to go up the country and bring what advices they can inform themselves of. What your Honour &c. will please to order I will put in execution if possible.

I am, &c. &c., WILLIAM FORTH.

122. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' at Fulta, in the River Hughly, 17 December, 1756.*

The King my master (whose name is revered among the monarchs of the world) sent me to these parts with a great fleet to protect the East India Company's trade, rights and priviledges. The advantages resulting to the *Mogul's* dominions from the extensive commerce carried on by my master's subjects are too apparent to need enumerating. How great was my surprize therefore to be informed that you had marched against the said Company's factories with a large army, and forcibly expelled their servants, seized and plundered their effects, amounting to a large sum of money, and killed great numbers of the King my master's subjects.

I am come down to Bengal to re-establish the said Company's servants in their former factories and houses, and hope to find you inclinable to do them that justice as restoring them and as to their ancient rights and immunities. As you must be sensible of the benefit of having the English settled in your country, I doubt not you will consent to make them a reasonable satisfaction for the losses and injuries they have sustained; and by that piece of

justice put an amicable end to these troubles and secure the friendship of the King, my Master, who is a lover of peace and delights in acts of equity. What can I say more ?

123. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 16-17 *December*, 1756.

The occasion of my coming here you are already informed by letters from Nabob Sullabut Jung and Annaroody Cawn and from Governor Pigot. You have likewise heard, I make no doubt, that I have brought with me a larger military force than has ever appeared in Bengal. You will judge it therefore prudent both for your own interest and the welfare of your country to consider maturely how injuriously the English settled in the provinces under your jurisdiction have been treated by your people, their houses and factorys seized and detained, their effects to a large amount plundered, and *great numbers of the Company's servants and other inhabitants inhumanly killed.* These are acts of violence which I hope you do not approve of, and I expect you will take care to have them severely punished. Your power and personal bravery are universally known; my reputation in war is likewise established by being ten years continually in the field upon the Coast, in which time my undertakings have always been attended (by the blessing of Providence) with success; and I trust in God, that I shall be as fortunate in these parts. Should necessity oblige me to proceed to those extremitys one of us must [be] overcome, we cannot both be victorious and I leave you to reflect how uncertain the fortune of war is and whether it is your interest to risque so previous [?precious] a decision—to avoid it, you must make proper satisfaction for the losses sustained by the Company, their servants and *riots*, return their factorys and invest them in their ancient priviledges and immunities. By doing this piece of justice you will make me a sincere friend and get eternal honour to yourself, and save the lives of many thousands who must otherwise be slaughtered on both sides without any fault of their own What can I say more ?

124. *Translation of a letter from Mr. A. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated Hugli, 19 December, 1756.*[1]

HONOURED SIR,—I have the honour to bid your Excellency welcome in the Ganges, intelligence of which reached us in your Excellency's esteemed missive of the 14th instant.

In respect to the warning contained therein to lend no assistance to the Nawab, I know my duty too well to enter into a course of action contrary thereto, even if (which Heaven forefend!) I should thereby again be exposed to the fury of His Highness and to a fine similar to that which has already before this been extorted from the Company on that account, to the amount of about five *lacs* of rupees.

May God bless your Excellency in your enterprise, whilst I have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM.

125. *Translation of a letter from Mr. A. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated Hugli, 21 December, 1756.*[2]

I regret not to be able to fulfil your Excellency's demand contained in your letter of the 16th instant, but not only five of our seven pilots lie ill, but also the navigation down to the sea is so encumbered that neither vessel nor man may pass. Twenty-four of our vessels lie (with packs, bales, anchors, ropes and provisions for our ships) under embargo at the Moorish posts of Calcatta, Tanna Makwa, and Besbesja under pretext that the anchors, ropes, and provisions might be destined for the English nation. Our remonstrances against this measure have proved unsuccessful.

People who know us will acknowledge that we have a sincere regard for the British nation and that we have been mortified at their disaster. They also know the Nawab has forbidden us by a strict *parwana* to assist you or to pilot your ships, under penalty of being treated in the same manner as you have been. Not being able to do anything which could remain a secret to the Nawab, I beg your Excellency not to ask us for an assistance which would expose us to the wrath of the Nawab, but to take into account the danger in which we are, &c., &c.

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. [2] *Ibid.*

126. *Account of forces in Calcutta and other Forts, appended to Select Committee Proceedings, 22 December, 1756.*

In Calcutta...	332 horse.	
,, ...	1,100 *burgundasses.*	
,, ...	500 *pykes* and *peons.*	
At Tannahs	300	
Opposite Tannahs		6 guns.
At Tannahs...		9 ,,
Mr. Holwell's garden		5 ,,
Surman's do.		4 ,,
At the Carpenter's yard		2 ,,
By the Water side the same as formerly		
On the Bastions the same		
Mr. Watts' his house		2 ,,
Seats gaut		2 ,,
Margas's gaut		2 ,,
At the Gunge		4 ,,

Opposite Tannah's 3 sloops and 2 brigantines filled with earth. They are teaching people to play bombs.

127. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Major Kilpatrick, dated Fulta, 23 December, 1756.*[1]

SIR,—A violent cold and slight fever has reduced me to the necessity of committing to writing what otherwise I should have been glad to have executed in person and by word of mouth.

* * * * *

I would have the two six-pounders and two three-pounders well supplied with ammunition and in readiness to land at a moment's warning, for I take it for granted we shall march from Bujee Bujee to Calcutta by land. It would save us the trouble of embarking if we could do the same from Fulta. Please to speak to the Governor to give orders that the vessel which has the 100,000 musket cartridges on board accompany the squadron.

I am very anxious for the return of the man who is sent to

[1] This letter is imperfect, and the other letters mentioned by *Malcolm*, vol. i., p. 152, are missing.

examine the situation of Bujee Bujee, a good account from him would save us a world of trouble. Pray make enquiry if there be any other road to Bujee Bujee except the footpath between the two fortifications.

There are many other things which do not occur to me, which may fall within your knowledge, in short I leave everything to your prudence and discretion for the present. Dispose of the troops in such manner that they may be in readiness to march over land to Calcutta, and, if necessary, to attack Bujee Bujee, Tana Fort, &c.

It would be singular service could you prevail upon the Bazar people to follow us to Bujee Bujee.

128. *Letter from Raja Manikchand to Colonel Clive, dated 23 December, 1756.*

I have had the pleasure to receive your most friendly letter. To hear you are in good health gives me the sincerest pleasure. Your sending a copy of your address to the Nabob enclosed in your letter to me for my perusal I esteem as an instance of your friendship. Finding in it many improper expressions and concluding that by sending me the copy you desired to know my sentiments upon it, I have, therefore, made some alterations in it and return it entrusted to Radakissen Mullick, who will deliver it to you. You will write your letter after that form and dispatch it again to me, and I will forward it to the Nabob. You write that you are desirous of peaceable measures. I likewise am as desirous, as nothing is better than peace. To take away every cause of ill-will or contention, this is the part of a good man. For the rest you will be informed from Radakissen of my further sentiments. You write that you send three (letters) for the Nabob, one from yourself, one from Asephad Doula, one from Anaverdi Cawn. Two of these I have received, but that from Anaverdi Cawn is missing. Perhaps by some mistake it may not have been sent. This I have thought proper to acquaint you with. I hope you will continue to inform me of your health, and look upon me as your real well-wisher.

129. *Copy of a form for a letter to be sent by Colonel Clive to the Nawab.*[1]

The sacred and godlike Prince, the Nabob Salabat Jung Bahadur, His Excellency of the rank of Ameers, Anniverdi Cawn Bahadur, the Prince of Arcot, and His Excellency the Governor of Chinapatam,[2] have wrote to you upon the subject of our affairs, which you will understand from their letters. You may have already heard that there are forces arrived in Bengal, and such as both in valour and experience never came into the country before. I hope you will consider this, and that by doing good to the English you will do good to and establish the trade of your own country. Thus far let us obtain your favour that the English may obtain restitution of all their losses at Calcutta, Cossimbazar, and their other factories and that by your favour they may again be permitted to remain in your dominions and trade as formerly; that your lenity to your subjects may be known through the world, and your people may bless your Government, under which they enjoy so much happiness and tranquility. In the events of war God is the disposer of victory, but there must be a loss of soldiers on both sides, and the whole nation must be involved in the calamity. It is the praise of great men to behave with generosity and forgiveness towards those who have offended them.

130. *Translation of an extract from a letter from the French Council, Chandernagore, to the Superior Council, Isle of France, dated Chandernagore, 25 December, 1756.*

Nothing new has happened since the arrival of the English squadron. The rumour runs that this nation has accommodated matters with the Nawab who consents to their entering Calcutta, and that this has been brought about by the intervention of some powerful friends at Murshidabad, but this news needs confirmation.

131. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Raja Manick Chand, dated 25 December, 1756.*

I have received your letter with the form enclosed for a letter to the Nabob. I am very sensible of your friendship and kind intentions in sending me the latter which I have read, but am sorry I

[1] Sent by Manikchand with his letter of December 23.

[2] Native name of Madras.

cannot consistently with my duty to the Company or their honour, accept of your advice in writing to the Nabob a letter couched in such a stile, which, however proper it might have been before the taking of Calcutta, would but ill-suit with the present time, when we are come to demand satisfaction for the injuries done us by the Nabob, not to entreat his favour, and with a force which we think sufficient to vindicate our claim. Anaverdi Cawn's letter went by a former conveyance which I have taken notice of in mine to the Nabob.

132. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 25 December, 1756.*

Salabat Jung, the Nabob of Arcot and the Governor of Chinapatam have wrote to your Excellency about our affairs. The Nabob of Arcot's letter is gone by a former conveyance. The rest I send you by means of Rajah Monickchund. Your Excellency will hear from others what force is come to Bengal. Such a force was never seen before in your province. When your Excellency comes to hear all these things and to consider seriously of them, I hope you will have so great a regard for yourself, for us, and for the trade of your province, as to give the Company full satisfaction for all the losses they have sustained by the taking of Cossimbuzar, Calcutta, and all other factories belonging to the English in Bengal.

I know you are a great Prince and a great warrior. I likewise for these ten years past have been constantly fighting in these parts, and it has pleased God Almighty always to make me successful. The like success may attend me in Bengal, it may attend your Excellency. Why should the soldiers on either side run the risque of war, when all things may be made up in a friendly manner by restoring to the Company and to the poor inhabitants what they have been plundered.

133. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated on board the 'Salisbury,' 29 December, 1756.*

SIR,—I have received advice about half an hour ago from a *peon* that left Calcutta this morning, that he saw Monickchund on his march to Calcutta, at Mr. Pearkes's garden which is about

half a mile on this side Surmonds, with about two thousand horse and foot and eight or ten pieces of cannon; the *peon* who brings this advice says he was in Tannas Fort, that no additional works were made to it or trench dug, and that there were not above one hundred and fifty men there; that opposite to Tannas there was nine guns with about fifty men, and before Tannas there was lying the *Prince Edward*, a brigantine and 2 sloops; few or no men are left in Calcutta. I thought it incumbent on me to send this as also the *peon* who brought it.

Excuse this hasty scrawl from, &c. &c., WILLIAM WATTS.

P.S.—Further particulars you will hear from the *peon*.

134. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' ¼ past 8 o'clock. Received 30 December, 1756.*

I have received your letter, and approve of your scheme, and will be ready to give you all the assistance in my power.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

P.S.—Remember you have some seamen. I am persuaded you may succeed, taking a proper precaution, they will mount the breach, provided you properly support them.

Your friend.

135. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 2 January, 1757.*

SIR,—After what I said to Major Kilpatrick, I am extremely surprised to find you have not withdrawn the Company's troops, which puts me under a necessity of acquainting you, if you still persist in continuing in the fort, you will force me to take such measures as will be as disagreeable to me, as they possibly can be to you. I hope yet, after you have prudently considered this affair, you will not drive me to the extremities I should be sorry to be urged to, for the plea you make of being commanding officer of the land forces, gives you not the least authority to enter a place (forcibly) conquered by me, and garrisoned by troops under my immediate command.

Your most obedient humble servant, CHAS. WATSON.

136. *Translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated 2 January, 1757.*[1]

I have just received the agreeable news of the recapture of Calcatta by the arms of His Britannic Majesty under command of your Excellency. I beg to congratulate you with all cordiality and respect. May the Almighty crown your further purposes and undertakings with the desired success.

Our equipment-master[2] Captain Lucas Zuydland will have the honour to convey this letter to your Excellency. He is instructed to bring down some of our vessels with provisions for the Company's ships. I beg to ask your Excellency to let him pass and carry out his instructions, and to accord, furthermore, a free passage up and down for our ships as before.

137. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Director and Council of Bengal to the Assembly of Seventeen in Holland, dated Hugli, 2 January, 1757.*[3]

In accordance with the intelligence conveyed in our reports to Batavia despatched on 5th July and 24 November, the young Nawab, after the death of his grand father Aliverdy Khan Bahadur, having seized upon the reins of government of Bengal and considering himself injured by the English, marched against them at the head of an army of 70,000 men, wrested from them the fortress of Cossimbazar, besides Fort William and the matchless colony of Calcutta, drove them from their counting-houses at Dacca and Balasor, *and treated the British who had fallen into his hands with great cruelty.*

Together with the aforesaid letters Your Worships will find in the extract, among the annexes, from our day-register of the month of June, *item* the translation appended of the letters exchanged with the Nawab, and our Resolutions of 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 21, 25, 26 and 27 of June last, that our refusal to assist the said Prince with military, ammunition, sloops and *goerabs*[4] has been viewed by him as a mark of disloyalty against the King of Hindostan and that on

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

[2] *Equipagiemeester* corresponds, I think, to the 'master-attendant,' the officer in general charge of the shipping.


[3] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

[4] *Grab*, a kind of ship.

HUGLI BĂNDĔR

id est Portus Huglinus, seu Statio navium.

A. *Templum*
B. *Monasterium S. August.*
C. *Ædes sacra collapsa Soc. Iesu.*
D. *Arx latere constructa.*



HUGLI.

that pretext, after the conquest of Calcutta he has turned his arms against us, and as it were, with a pistol against our breast, extorted from us the immense sum of four hundred thousand rupees, not including a sum of a hundred thousand rupees which are further gone for good, in mediation moneys and charges for the transport and the further conveyance of the Nawab's army, as well as for the afore-mentioned banqueting (? mediation money) and a few equipments here as well as at Cosimbuzar.

And as if that blow were not heavy enough to dishearten us, we were fain to receive also tidings that the Company's ship *Voorburg* in sailing from the Ganges was lost, cargo and all, except the silver which had as usual been transferred to the sloop.

After the tyrant had had his fill at our expense as stated, in the same way and for the same offence he bled the French to the tune of about 350,000 rupees.

The other nations trading out here, though in no way asked for assistance, and consequently innocent of the crime of refusing, had also to bring their offerings, all according to their means as:

The Danes to the amount of	...	...	25,000	rupees		
,, Portuguese	,,	,,	...	...	5,000	,,
,, Emdeners[1]	,,	,,	...	...	5,000	,,

The last-named having hired their ship *The Prins Heinrich of Prussia* to make a voyage to Coromandel, the same was wrecked on the banks of this river; and further, the super-cargoes, it is said, have invested the money they had brought out, to the amount of two hundred and fifty thousand rupees, with the English for the homeward trade, which therefore they may safely look upon as lost, the same as we fared with our Dacca (?) goods. So that not only our allies,[2] but also the Danes and Portuguese having been eye-witnesses, at the aforementioned event, of the 'wondrousness' of Indian Princes, will, maybe, soon get tired of the trade with Bengal; which happening, we might perhaps view our ill-fortune with quite a different eye and think it at the same time had afforded us a relief, that could not have been brought about even with great difficulty and expense by other means. In whatever way it may end, we can assure your Worship that they

[1] The Prussian Company. [2] The English.

are not (any more than the English and Portuguese) in a position to send any homeward Bengal freights this season to Europe, and that what the French are about to send by Pondichery, and the Danes by Tranquebara, will be of but trifling importance. And as this news may be of considerable influence on the demand and the market for our return cargoes at home, immediately upon the persecution of the European nations [settled in Bengal], we attempted under the date of 3 July to inform your Worship thereof, if possible by Bassorah and Aleppo by letter, copy of which is annexed, but the agents at Surat have written us that upon the arrival of the intelligence, there was no opportunity of sending it further west, so that our endeavours in that direction have proved futile.

The English, as appears from their letter of 7th June have also requested our aid, and upon our refusal, in a reply thereto the other day according to a Resolution of the same date, protested against us in emphatic and threatening terms, as appears from their letter of the 13th of that month, a result, it seems to us, of their distress and perplexity, for, according to our aforementioned Resolutions of the 8th and 14th of June, we and the other nations with us should have great reason to complain of them as the prime causes of all the evil, but not to be unnecessarily hard upon our ill-advised and now pitiable friends, we respectfully beg that your Worships will keep *in petto* the reason of the Nawab's exasperation against them, contained in our letter to your Worships, 5th July last, *viz.*, the construction of a permanent fort and the grant of protection to a dependant of the Prince, until such time as it shall prove unnecessary, which we, however, cannot think likely.

138. *Appendix to letter to the Assembly of Seventeen of 2 January, 1757, dated 22 January, 1757.*[1]

It having been our intention to despatch this at the beginning of the month, we were prevented by the arrival of Charles Watson, Vice-admiral of the Blue, or rather by the Moors who in order to prevent the Europeans from having an opportunity of supplying the aforesaid nation with provisions and other ship's stores or

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

ammunition, closed the fairway channel so strictly that not a soul could pass. The said Admiral having further sailed upwards, retook Calcutta with the other Moors' nests along the river banks with pretty much the same ease as that with which his nation had before lost them, his Excellency, among other plunder in the Residency, having found from five to six hundred bales of linens that are to be sent to England at the beginning of next month.

Mr. Watson having thus re-established his countrymen in their former colony and openly declared war against the Nawab of this province, immediately sent a portion of his squadron, reinforced by about fourteen hundred European soldiers and sailors, and five or six hundred native, to this place, ordered them to take the Moorish fort, the residence of the Hoogley *Faujdar* just above our village, and to sack, burn, and destroy everything adjacent thereto, above and below, right up to the enclosures of the Company's grounds. Notwithstanding the strict neutrality observed by us during the proceedings of the Nawab against the British, and all the covert services rendered by us to the same while they were 'down,' possibly from jealousy of the advantage of the course we have chosen, Mr. Watson has since his very first appearance in the Ganges shown a kind of displeasure and mistrust in regard to us, and further in the sacking and plundering of the Moorish territory made it a pretext that the fugitives had been afforded an opportunity to escape and place their goods in safety, among which, as the English stated, there were many that were the proceeds of plundering by the Moors. Further that we had assisted the Moors with artillery, pretexts totally devoid of truth and, maybe, concocted so as to extend their raids even to within our limits, for Director Bisdom, when Calcutta was despoiled for the Nawab, ordered it to be publicly proclaimed by beat of drum, that all dwellers in our territories were strictly prohibited from buying any of the plundered goods. The only thing that can have caused the Admiral's displeasure may be that in the case of some of the officers of this expedition the plundering of a few villages was averted, and that those people [*i.e.* the Moors] being informed of our defenceless condition and being daily witnesses of the violence of the English sailors, fled elsewhere. What will further come of it and whether they will make it hotter still for us, God alone knows,

in provision [? foretaste] of which the captain and lieutenant of the ship *Naarstigheit* on the point of departure and the commander of 's *Gravensand, item* a large number of our vessels in sailing down, were stopped by and taken on board one of the men-of-war; whereupon we sent a deputation to the English with the effect that license was granted for the release of one and all. In addition to the acts of hostility committed within the Company's jurisdiction, the above-mentioned Mr. Watson caused one of the Company's quartermasters who had to bring up the brigantine *De Ryder* from Batavia, to be carried off his ship and compelled to pilot his armada right up to the Moorish fort here, which act will apparently be considered as an open proof of hostility by the Nawab who has already approached very near, wherefore and because we do not know what his forces now moving down to Calcutta may undertake against us in passing this Settlement, we have on the 16th instant sent in a written protest against the action of the Vice-Admiral, and must now patiently await what is further in store for us, as not being able to offer any resistance worth mentioning, for our palisades, that have to serve as a kind of rampart, are as little proof against a cannonade as the canvass of a tent, and our entire military force consists of 78 men, about one-third of whom are in the hospital, all the seamen being below and the other military on the Patna expedition, whilst all our native servants ran away from fear of the English, so that if matters come to such a pass, we should have to man and aim the guns ourselves, in short perform and do all the work for which assistance is required. Meanwhile it affords some slight consolation that His Highness the Viceroy,[1] with his vast army and magnificent artillery, himself seems to be fearful of the English, the natives being as it were thunderstruck on seeing the quickness with which the British by means of a shift, while swinging to their cables, are able to give fire on both sides of their vessels and so make a clear space.

139. *Extract from Fort William Public Consultations, 3 January, 1757.*

'Vice-Admiral Watson having taken Calcutta with His Majesty's ships of war, now delivers up the charge and possession of the fort

[1] The Nawab.

and town to us the President and Council as representatives of the Honourable East India Company.

'Agreed likewise that we proclaim Fort William the seat of our Presidency and publish our protection to the black inhabitants who are willing to return to the place.'

140. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Admiral Watson, dated 3 January, 1757.*

Having published a manifesto and declaration of war against the Nabob of these provinces, we take the liberty to send you a copy thereof for your perusal: And are to request the favour you will likewise declare open war against Surajud Dowla, in behalf of His Majesty, for the depredations and injuries committed against the subjects of Great Britain.

We have, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, ROBERT CLIVE, WILLIAM WATTS, RICHARD BECHER.

141. *Declaration of War by the Council at Fort William, dated 3 January, 1757.*[1]

The President and Governour for the affairs of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies in Bengal, to all those who shall see or hear these presents send greeting. That in or about the month of June, 1756, being in a profound peace and perfect tranquillity and relying upon the royal *phirmaund* granted us by the *Mogul* of Indostan, we found ourselves destitute of everything that might serve for our defence and withstand so potent a Prince in case he should make war upon us, and so much the more in that it could not enter into our thoughts that Sirrajud Dowla, *Subah* of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa and Nabob of Moxudavad should violate the said *phirmaund* contrary to all justice and equity. We have nevertheless beyond all expectation been suddenly attacked by the said Sirrajud Dowla

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy. A copy of this Declaration was sent to Admiral Watson, dated January 2, and in his own Manifesto he refers to it as of that date. Probably the date was altered to the 3rd, as being the day on which it actually appeared. Though copies were sent to a large number of persons, and even to England, I have not been able to find any other copy of this most important document.

without provocation or commission from the present King for so violating the *phirmaund* heretofore granted to the Honourable East India Company, but not observing the aforesaid *phirmaund* and contrary to the law of all nations he did invest the Honourable Company's factory at Cassimbusar, imprison the Chief of the aforesaid factory and by force exacted the delivery thereof with the guns, military stores, garrison and effects into his hands.

And whereas the aforesaid Sirrajud Dowla not satisfied with this violent proceeding and, without assigning any reason or even proposing any demands to us the President and Council, did some time in the said month of June 1756 march towards Calcutta and Presidency of Fort William with a large army and train of artillery, attacked the said factory, took the fort, seized and plundered the effects of the Company and of the private inhabitants to a considerable amount, killed many of their servants both civil and military and expelled the few who escaped, and whereas likewise the East India Company's other factorys established in the dominions under his jurisdiction were by his orders seized and plundered and the Company's servants residing there expelled, the Company's money and effects outstanding at the *aurungs* as well as that belonging to private persons sequestered to his use and seized by his officers, with many other acts of open violence by the aforesaid *Subah* committed against the East India Company, their servants and tenants, and against the subjects in general of the King of Great Britain, we the President and Council for affairs of the said East India Company in Bengal having therefore applied to Charles Watson Esq. Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's squadron in the East Indies, for redress of the injuries before mentioned; in consequence of which application Admiral Watson having brought his squadron to Bengal and upon his arrival wrote the *Subah* a representation of our complaints and injuries sustained, demanding satisfaction and hoping to find him inclinable to accommodate matters in an amicable manner, to which letter the *Subah* having made no answer, Vice-Admiral Watson proceeded with his squadron up the river with a view of taking peaceable possession of the East India Company's Settlement of Fort William, but his ships being fired upon in a hostile manner by the Nabob's forts erected on the

banks of the river Hughley, the said Admiral Watson thought it incumbent on him to resent the insult offered His Majesty's flag, took and destroyed the said forts and places of strength belonging to Sirrajud Dowla and brought the squadron on before the town of Calcutta, where being received likewise in a hostile manner and fired upon from the fort, he was necessitated by open force to retake the Settlement of Fort William and having delivered over the said fort and town of Calcutta to us, the President and Council in Bengal, we do hereby on the behalf of the said East India Company and as their representatives in Bengal, in consideration of the several acts of hostility and violence already premised, declare open war against the aforesaid Sirrajud Dowla, *Subah* of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa and against the subjects of the said *Subah*, their cities, towns, shipping and effects, according to the maxims and rules of all nations, untill ample restitution be made the East India Company, their servants, tenants, and inhabitants, residing under their protection, for all damages and losses by them sustained in the late acts of violence committed against them by the said *Subah* and untill full satisfaction be made the said East India Company for the charges by them incurred in equipping a large army and marine force to procure a re-establishment in their factories and towns held by royal grant from the *Mogul* of Indostan. But to prevent any misinterpretation of their declaration and to obviate any suspicions of their designs in bringing so large a force into this kingdom, the President and Council think it proper to notify that they do not intend to molest any Europeans [settled here] in their propertys or priviledges, provided those Europeans observe and maintain a strict neutrality between the *Subah* and the British nation and do not directly assist the said *Subah* or his adherents with any men or warlike stores or in any other shape whatsoever. For the satisfaction likewise of the natives who cannot but detest (?) the ruinous (?) conduct of the *Subah*, the President and Council do hereby advertise that the inhabitants of such towns and districts whose *jimmidars* do not take up arms in favour of Sirrajud Dowla but live peaceably and furnish the contributions we may call upon them for, may rest assured of our favour and live in security, as no hostilities will in that case be offered them in their persons, habitations, grounds or

effects. Dated in Fort William this 3rd day of January 1757. By order of the Honourable the President and Councill of Fort William. JOHN COOKE, Secretary.

142. *Admiral Watson's Declaration of War against Siraj-uddaula dated 3 January, 1757.*

Whereas the President and Council for the affairs of the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies in Bengall have represented to me, that in consequence of the many hostilities and acts of violence committed against the servants of the said Company, His Majesty's subjects, by the *Subah* of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, and his officers, to the great detriment of the Company, the ruin of many private people His Majesty's good subjects residing under their protection, *many of whom have also been deprived of their lives in the most barbarous and inhuman manner*, and that notwithstanding their repeated applications for redress they have not been able to obtain any satisfaction, but on the contrary have been treated with the contempt of not having their letters answered or any notice taken of their just applications; with many other particulars as set forth in their Manifesto of the 2nd January in the year of Our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and fifty seven, they have been obliged to declare war against the said *Subah* and his subjects on the part of the East India Company, and requesting that I would do the same on the part of His Britannick Majesty my Master. Their reasons for so doing appearing to me both just and equitable, the duty I owe to the King my master, whose honor hath been insulted, and the regard due to the welfare of his subjects, for whose support and protection he hath sent me here, will not permit me to refuse them this their just request. I do therefore in the name of His Britannick Majesty hereby declare war by sea and land against the *Subah* of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa and his subjects, who hath so unjustly begun it. Relying on the help of Almighty God in this just undertaking; and hereby willing and requiring all captains, officers, seamen and soldiers, serving in His Majesty's squadron under my command to do and execute all acts of hostility in the prosecution of this war against the *Subah* of Bengal &c. his vassals and subjects, and to oppose their attempts. And I do hereby in the

name of His Majesty, forbid all his subjects, and advertize all other persons, of what nation soever, not to transport, or carry any soldiers, arms, powder and ammunition, or other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the said *Subah*. Declaring that whatsoever ship or vessell shall be met withall transporting or carrying any soldiers, arms, powder, ammunition or any other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the said *Subah;* the same being taken, shall be condemned as good and lawful prize. Given under my hand on board His Britannick Majesty's ship *Kent* laying off Fort William in the river Hughley in the kingdom of Bengall, this third day of January in the year of Our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and fifty seven.

143. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta,* 6 *January,* 1757.[1]

SIR,—The inhabitants here not being yet collected together, we have but few refreshments brought in, I shall therefore be much obliged if you will supply us with five hundred head of cattle, and send them down as soon as possible.

I have, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

144. *Extract from Fort William Select Committee Proceedings,* 6 *January,* 1757.

Received four letters from Dr. William Forth at Chinchura dated the 26th and 29th ultimo, 2nd and 3rd instant. The first . . . those of the 2nd. . . . That the merchants are sending away their money and effects from Hughly. That the French are knocking down their houses to the northward of the Factory and appear much frightened. That Coja Wajid an Armenian had received letters from his house at Surat, informing him that there was war in Europe and that the same was publicly declared at Bombay.

* * * * *

His letter of the 3rd informs us. . . . That the French are hard at work fortifying Chandernagore; that they have received *cossids* from Pondicherry dated the 4th November, in which the

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

Governor of that place mentions that he hopes by this time Monsieur Bussy is well advanced to their assistance with 1,200 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys.

* * * * *

It being necessary to publish our reasons for disturbing the tranquillity of these provinces before we take any further operations, ordered the secretary to exhibit a manifesto of our injuries and the several acts of violence committed by the *Subah* and his officers against the subjects of Great Britain with declaration of war against Souragud Dowla and his subjects.

145. *Fort William Select Committee Proceedings, 7 January, 1757.*

At a Committee present the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq., Robert Clive, William Watts, Richard Becher and John Zephaniah Holwell, Esqs.

Received three letters from Doctor William Forth dated the 5th, 6th, and 7th instant with a description of Hughly Fort and the country about it, and giving us such intelligence as he has learned concerning the Nabob's army and approach.

War being declared in Europe against the French, the Committee are of opinion a neutrality with that nation within the Ganges would be of great advantage in our present circumstances, as a junction between the Nabob and them might put a stop to the success of our arms or at least obstruct the measures we must take to bring the *Subah* to our terms.

Agreed we address Admiral Watson upon that subject and recommend the concluding a treaty of neutrality with the French in Bengal for the reasons aforesaid.

146. *Translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated 7 January, 1757.*[1]

I would willingly give myself the pleasure of providing your Excellency with the desired cattle, but our whole stock is consumed. During the month the Moors have prohibited the supply of victuals, and the moment this difficulty was removed all the inhabitants fled to the interior on hearing the Nawab was in the field.

Hoping your Excellency will excuse me, &c. &c.

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

147. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated* 8 *January*, 1757.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—After a tedious and difficult passage the whole fleet which left Fort Saint George under command of Admiral Watson arrived off Point Palmiras, the 3rd December, excepting the *Blaze* fireship and *Marlborough* Indiaman, the former proving leaky about a fortnight after our outset was dispatched to Bombay, and the latter parted Company with the fleet the 16th November last, in latitude 18° N., since which we have heard nothing of her.

The *Kent*, *Tyger* and *Walpole* arrived at Ingerlee the 12th of December, and at Fulta the 15th, but the *Cumberland*, *Salisbury*, and *Bridgwater* having fallen in with Point Palmiras to leeward of the shoal, were obliged to put to sea again, by which accident the *Salisbury* and *Bridgwater* did not reach Fulta till the 22nd December, and the *Cumberland* has not as yet been heard of.

The *Protector*, *Lapwing* snow and *Boneta* ketch arrived in the river about the same time with the earliest of the fleet. By the two former I received original and duplicate of your favour of the 27th October.

After finding so few effective Europeans at Fulta who (volunteers included) did not amount to more than one hundred, my disappointment on finding the small number of sepoys that had been embarked on the *Protector* and *Lapwing* was very great.

The absence of the *Cumberland* and *Marlborough* deprives me of about 250 Europeans and 430 sepoys with almost all the artillery and military stores.

Notwithstanding these disadvantages I have the pleasure of acquainting you that we are in possession of Fort William, which was retaken the 2nd instant. Admiral Watson took possession of it in His Majesty's name, and the next day delivered it over to the Company's representatives. For all the particulars of the military operations I take the liberty to refer you to the accompanying journal.

The 7th at night a detachment of military and seamen embarked on board the *Bridgwater* and all the sloops and vessels that could be got together, to surprize Hughley. The *Bridgwater* running

aground retarded the expedition, however she was got off, and proceeded yesterday with the other vessels.

As our quick progress has occasioned a general consternation we have room to hope they will meet with success.

The letters to the Nabob of Bengal from the President Salabat Jung and Mahomet Ally Cawn were forwarded with one from myself, and I understand safely delivered, but as yet I have received nothing from him in answer.

The President's letter to the Nabob of Cuttack has been likewise dispatched, but as he is at a considerable distance being gone to treat with the Morattas, I have not as yet heard of its receipt.

Our intelligence from the country is as yet very indifferent; what appears certain is that the Nabob of Perenea is killed, and his country subjected, and that Surajah Dowlat is at Muxadavad, and intends marching against us the 12th of this month. I have fixed upon the most convenient spot without the town to wait his coming. From the slight trial we have hitherto had of the enemy we cannot form a judgment what success we may promise ourselves against them; deficient as we are of our compliment of men, artillery and stores, the event must needs be doubtful.

I hope gentlemen this will determine you to send a speedy reinforcement of sepoys, if not of Europeans, such a supply as will at least make up the number intended me of 2,000 sepoys, of which only the half is come.

The gentlemen here are come to a resolution of razing the houses near the fort, and I shall give my utmost assistance in putting it into the best posture of defence possible, which however can never make it more than barely tenable against a country enemy, for to all its former defects when taken from us the Moors have broke down part of the curtain to make room for a mosque they were erecting.

As there is no one here capable of planning or erecting a fortification proper for this Settlement, I cannot help representing to you gentlemen the immediate necessity of sending a skilful person for that service from the Coast.

Most of the cannon, carriages, shott and shell lost in the place

were either retaken here, or at Tanna's and Bougee Bougee, but hardly any small arms or powder.

A large quantity of broad-cloth and about 600 bales of the investment for Europe has been likewise recovered, but of all other goods, whether Company's or private, little or nothing is left. The Dutch and French both have accounts that war with France was declared at Bombay some time in October, and the French we hear are very busy in fortifying Chandernagore.

Monsieur La Poitrie, third of Council at Chandernagore, arrived the 4th instant, with proposals from the Governor and Council there to Admiral Watson for a neutrality in the Ganges between the two nations; which Mr. Watson offered to accept, provided they would immediately join the English against the Nabob, but the gentlemen at Chandernagore rejected the condition, and so the matter dropped.

Monsieur La Poitrie gave out that he saw a letter from Monsieur de Leyrit to the Governor of Chandernagore, dated the 4th of November, which mentioned that at the receipt of that letter Monsieur Bussy would be far advanced in his march towards this province, but the circumstance is too improbable to gain any credit.

The gentlemen here intend dispatching the *Syren* sloop in a few days to England, when I shall take the opportunity of acquainting the Secret Committee with the retaking the place and other transactions.

Enclosed is a general return of the troops under my command. The Paymaster and Commissary likewise transmit their accounts of disbursements at Fort Saint George, also rolls of the sepoys and *lascars* paid there.

You will please, gentlemen, to order that the expedition be credited with the amount of pay advanced to such companies of sepoys as were detained at Fort Saint George.

The accounts for December shall be forwarded by the next opportunity.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

Since writing the foregoing, the gentlemen of the Select Committee here, have shewn me a letter they intended to send you,

the tenor of which being very different from my sentiments, I have refused to sign it.

P.S.—I have this moment received news of the *Marlborough's* arrival in Ballasore road.

148. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London, dated* 8 *January*, 1757.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. As we deem it of the utmost importance to the Company to transmit the advice of our re-establishment by every channel in our power we have desired the gentlemen at Fort Saint George to forward this packet *viâ* Bussorah, if there is any conveyance under dispatch from thence to the Gulph of Persia, otherwise to send it under cover to the President and Council of Bombay to be forwarded to Europe.

2. We have now the pleasure to inform you, Honourable Sirs, that Fort William was retaken by Admiral Watson on the 2nd instant, and the next day delivered up by him to your President and Council with the guns, military stores, and effects, publick and private, for the benefit and on the behalf of the proprietors. In your warehouse was found a considerable quantity of export goods, with which we purpose to dispatch home the *Delawar* some time this month if possible. We shall likewise endeavour to return the *Walpole* and *Marlborough* to Fort Saint George with as much saltpetre as we can procure to be dispatched home from thence.

3. That this important intelligence may reach you as early as possible we are preparing the *Syren* sloop to proceed to England with it, and hope to get her away from hence in eight or ten days. By her and the *Delawar* we shall address you more particularly and remain with the greatest respect, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, W. WATTS, JAMES KILLPATRICK, RICHARD BEECHER, J. *Z.* HOLWELL.

149. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated* 8 *January*, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—We have taken up the *Sally*, Captain Richard Finley, to carry these advices, and are to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 13th and 27th October.

The general letter to your Board will inform you of the time the forces arrived at Fulta, and the recapture of Fort William by Vice-Admiral Watson, who has delivered it over to the President and Council here.

We are obliged to you, gentlemen, for the efforts you have made to re-establish our Honourable Masters in these provinces, but we apprehend that cannot be compleated upon terms either honourable or advantagious to our Employers by any other means than compelling the Nabob by dint of force to consent to such propositions as we may judge for the interest of the Company to make. This we are afraid cannot be expected from the present number of our troops against so powerful an enemy as we have to deal with, and as it will by no means answer the ends of our re-establishment merely to defend our own without exacting ample restitution for our losses and satisfaction for the charges the Company will be put to in consequence of the *Subah's* violent proceedings, we must recommend it to you, gentlemen, to exert yourselves still further on behalf of our Employers, by supplying us with more men, powder and other ammunition by the first conveyance.

We shall now speak to your conduct relative to this expedition; first concerning the independent powers you have given Colonel Clive, next the very extraordinary step of consigning all the money and military stores to that gentleman only, and lastly, giving him directions to return with his troops whenever you may call upon him, leaving as many as he may judge necessary for the defence of Calcutta.

In regard to the first, though no persons can have a higher opinion of the integrity of Colonel Clive than we have, or would more readily acquiesce to his judgment for conducting any military operations by land which may occur in the course of this expedition; yet we cannot conceive by what authority you have assumed a right in giving that gentlemen the powers you have done, and therein treating us in the light of a subordinate, notwithstanding you have admitted and addressed us as a Governor and Council. The incoherence of this proceeding is so apparent, that we are astonished at your overlooking it. The only reason assigned by you for this unprecedented conduct, *viz.*, 'That a difference in opinion might not obstruct the necessary operations for the good

of the service,' is very weakly guarded against by the alternative you have adopted in giving this independent power to Colonel Clive, as you must know it is impossible we can submit thereto, or admit that you have a right to give them, whilst we think ourselves the Governor and Council you have stiled us. We must remark likewise that we think the service is more likely to be prejudiced by these powers than benefited, it being but reasonable to imagine that we who have resided in the country so many years must be better acquainted with the nature of it, and what operations would be most for the Company's interest, than an entire stranger. Should any of the Colonel's plans therefore miscarry which deviate from our sentiments, we must esteem you gentlemen responsible to the Honourable Company for the consequences.

As to the very extraordinary step you have taken in consigning the money and military stores to Colonel Clive only, we must take the liberty to observe, that you have by this act entirely rendered invalid the orders from home that no money or cash shall be disbursed without the consent and approbation of the Board, neither have you made the Colonel's accounts liable to any check whatever agreeable to our Honourable Masters' directions. We are at a loss to conjecture what motives could have urged you to this irregular conduct, being no way conscious of having merited so much diffidence from you, gentlemen, and we think our unhappy situation deserved a very different treatment.

We must in the last place object to the superiority you have assumed in directing Colonel Clive to return with his troops from hence when you shall call for him, leaving as many as he may judge sufficient for the defence of Calcutta; a superiority we can never submit to, as we esteem ourselves competent judges what number of troops will be necessary for our defence. Give us leave to remark likewise, that the number of men now sent us, joined to the supply under Major Killpatrick do not exceed, if equal, the number of military detained at your Presidency which were destined by the Honourable Company for the service of Bengal.

Upon the whole we are of opinion, gentlemen, the authority and trust invested in us by our Honourable Masters have been highly

infringed by your unprecedented conduct; that you have assumed a power which may in its consequences prove prejudicial to our Honourable Masters' affairs in these provinces, should Colonel Clive determine to abide by the independency you have given him. That you have deviated from the orders of our employers, wherein they strictly direct that no money shall be disbursed without the consent and approbation of the Board, and that all accounts shall be submitted to the inspection of a committee appointed for that purpose, and that you have acted very derogatory to the true interest of the Honourable Company in several particulars, all which we shall represent in our advices to the honourable the Court of Directors, and doubt not they will do us and themselves the justice to take notice of a conduct so new and despotick.

Captain Finley having agreed to bring down as many men on his vessel as he can accommodate upon terms to be agreed on with you, we beg leave to recommend the assisting of that gentleman in the sale of his cargo, and returning his vessel to us as soon as possible with troops.

Before we conclude this letter, permit us, gentlemen, to second the request made in our general letter for an ample and speedy supply of money, as the neglect of it may be very prejudicial to our affairs, circumstanced as we are at present.

We are, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, WILLIAM WATTS, RICHARD BECHER, J. *Z.* HOLWELL.

150. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Pigot, dated Fort William, 8 January,* 1757.

MY DEAR SIR,—I need not tell you we had a very long and disagreeable passage, you must have learnt it *viâ* Vizagapatam from the *Cumberland* and *Marlborough* which ships were not able to get round Point Palmeiras. The want of them, added to our disappointment of seapoys puts it quite out of my power to undertake any considerable enterprize against the Nabob; we can only chuse some advantageous spot of ground near the riverside, entrench and there wait for him. This step though a hazardous one is preferable to continuing in the fort which is in a most wretched defenceless condition in itself and all the houses round it in such

numbers that I almost despair of its being made defensible in any time.

Between friends I cannot help regretting that ever I undertook this expedition. The mortifications I have received from Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the squadron, in point of prerogative, are such, that nothing but the good of the service could induce me to submit to them. The morning the enemy quitted Calcutta, a party of our seapoys entered the fort at the same time with a detachment from the ships, and were ignominiously thrust out. Upon coming near the fort myself, [I] was informed that there were orders that none of the Company's officers or troops should have entrance. This, I own, enraged me to such a degree, that I was resolved to enter if possible, which I did, though not in the manner maliciously reported, by forcing the sentrys; for they suffered us to pass very patiently upon being informed who I was. At my entrance, Captain Coote presented me with a commission from Admiral Watson, appointing him Governor of Fort William, which I knew not a syllable of before; and it seems this dirty underhand contrivance was carried on in the most secret manner, under a pretence that I intended the same thing, which, I declare, never once entered my thoughts. This affair was compromised, by the Admiral consenting that I should be Governor, and that the Company's troops should remain in the fort. The next day the Admiral delivered up the fort to the Company's representatives in the King's name. Added to all, the gentlemen here seem much dissatisfied at the authority I am vested with. It would be contradicting my own sentiments, if I was not to acknowledge that I still persevere in the opinion that the gentlemen of Madras could not have taken a step more prudent, or more consistent with the Company's interest; for I am sorry to say, the loss of private property, and the means of recovering it, seem to be the only object which takes up the attention of the Bengal gentlemen. As an instance, I shall only mention the expedition to Dacca[1], which you may remember to have heard of a little before we sailed. It was settled that the Company should defray the expenses, and that what was taken should be divided among the sufferers of Calcutta in proportion to their losses;

[1] I cannot find any reference to this in the Fort Saint George Consultations.

the sufferers repaying the Company what might be advanced on that account.

The rumour of a war is in every one's mouth, the French and Dutch both acknowledge it was declared publicly at Bombay by Mr. Bourchier sometime in October, and though the gentlemen have not addressed me in a public manner I am well informed they intend protesting against any of the military or seapoys returning and have even threatened to quit the factory if they do. They are attempting to gain over Mr. Watson by a most assiduous attendance and respect. In the Company's present distressed circumstances they propose giving the sailors 50 bales of broad cloth which I think might well be spared, however if they do I shall insist upon something of the same nature for the military, otherwise the Service may suffer.

My dear Sir, I would have you guard against everything these gentlemen can say; for, believe me, they are bad subjects and rotten at heart, and will stick at nothing to prejudice you and the gentlemen of the Committee; indeed, how should they do otherwise, when they have not spared one another? I shall only add, their conduct at Calcutta finds no excuse, even among themselves; and that the riches of Peru and Mexico should not induce me to dwell among them.

You will find by the return, that our loss in the skirmish near Budjee-Budjee was greater than could well be spared, if such skirmishes were to be often repeated. You must know, our march from Moidapoor to the northward of Budjee-Budjee was much against my inclinations. I applied to the Admiral for boats to land us at the place we arrived at after sixteen hours' march by land in which the men suffered hardships not to be described. It was four in the afternoon when we decamped from Moidapoor, and (we) did not arrive off Budjee-Budjee till past eight next morning; at nine, the Grenadier company and all the seapoys were despatched to the fort, where I heard Captain Coote was landed with the King's troops. At ten, Monichaund, the Governor of Calcutta, attacked us with between two and three thousand horse and foot, and was worsted. The people of the country raise fabulous reports about the killed and wounded; but there is reason to believe, from the smartness of the fire while it lasted, and the

nearness of the enemy, some of which were within twenty yards, one hundred and fifty might be killed and wounded, and with them four of the principal *jemidars* and an elephant. Monichaund himself received a shot in his *turban*. Our two field-pieces were of little or no service to us, having neither tubes nor port-fires, and wrong carriages sent with them from Fort St. David; indeed we still labour under every disadvantage in the world, for want of the *Marlborough*. It seems the enemy were encamped within two miles of us, and we ignorant of the matter; so much for the intelligence of this country.

I cannot take upon me to give my sentiments about our future success against the Nabob in the open field; the little affair above mentioned was attended with every disadvantage on our side; a number of houses, *jungalls*, bushes, &c., which this country seems full of, served as a cover for the enemy—all our seapoys and the choice of our Europeans absent—our cannon in a manner useless. Indeed I fear we shall labour under many of these disadvantages when attacked by the Nabob, as I take it for granted that he will be down before the *Cumberland* and *Marlborough* can arrive. As yet there appears but little probability of getting draught bullocks, without which we cannot move.

The expedition against Hugly has been so long delayed by the *Bridgwater's* running on shore that I think our success very doubtful, there being assembled at that place as I am informed near 6,000 men.

I am, dear Sir, your affectionate Friend and Servant, ROBERT CLIVE.

151. *Translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated Hugli, 8 January, 1757.*[1]

A sloop of one of your Excellency's ships lying between Calcatta and Bernagore having had the boldness to remove by force one of our quartermasters from our brigantine lying before Bernagore, with the intention to make him pilot up the said ship, I cannot but complain to the utmost and pray your Excellency to release the said pressed sailor, for otherwise we are in danger of being accused to the Nawab of having lent this man to your Excellency

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

with the intention of promoting your designs. May it please your Excellency to consider that we have the Moors all around us, that the Nawab may be here in a few moments, and that we are without defence . . . &c. &c.

152. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' in the river Hughli,* 11 *January,* 1757.[1]

SIR,—It is with much concern, that at a time, when your letters refuse me every aid and assistance I have had occasion to ask of you and as you say through the necessity you are under of keeping fair with the Nawab, I find you do not observe the same scruples on the other side of the question, but on the contrary have given shelter and protection to the persons and effects of such of the Nawab's subjects, as have applied to you for that purpose.

I wish this was the only cause of complaint I have against you! but your suffering your guns to be taken out of your fort, to be employed against us at Hougly, is so barefaced a connivance with our enemies, that nothing will remove the impression of it but your immediate delivery of every subject of the Nawab's (who has taken shelter with you) with their effects to Captain Smith of His Britannick Majesty's ship the *Bridgwater,* whom I have directed to demand and receive them from you.

If you are desirous of keeping on those terms with me which the strict alliance between our nations demands, you will not fail to take care that these people with their effects are not suffered to escape but are safely delivered into my hands. If otherwise you must expect to answer not only here but at home for all the evil which may result from it. I have done my duty in giving you this warning.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant, CHAS. WATSON.

153. *Translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated Hugli,* 12 *January,* 1757.[2]

It appears to me from your Excellency's missive of yesterday, as if the expression of feelings of gratitude for the services

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

[2] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

rendered by us to the British nation in the days of distress is to consist only of words and that our fair-dealing and uprightness are in danger of being rewarded with the devastation of our colony and an attack upon our fort, as your Excellency attaches credit to accusations not one word of which is true and as to-day, already, a lieutenant with a small armed force has commenced to use force within the precincts of our town, to pillage the houses of our old inhabitants, in direct opposition to the tenor of the Manifesto sent us by Governor Drake and the Council at Calcutta. We have granted protection to no one save to our own inhabitants, and in regard to the charge concerning the removal of our cannon, it is inconceivable how your Excellency can accept such false reports. Why not rather make inquiries into the matter among the English sojourning here, if a true report about us is what is wanted, but if our ruin is what is aimed at we must leave our cause in the hands of God, and, in the measure of our weakness, meet force with force, I myself entertaining no doubt but that I shall, by virtue of my innocence, be able to justify my action both here and in Europe.

I have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM.

154. *Letter from Captain Smith*[1] *and Major Kilpatrick to the Dutch Council, Hugli, dated 12 January, 1757.*[2]

HONORABLE SIR AND SIRS,—As we are credibly informed, there are sundry effects and treasures belonging to our common enemies the Moors, deposited in the Dutch Factory at Chinsura, we find ourselves obliged to make a demand for them, not in the least doubting but that you and your Council will order the immediate delivery of them, especially when we reflect upon your Honour's character for integrity and the strict friendship and alliance that exists between our two nations.

We are, &c. &c., HENRY SMITH, JAMES KILLPATRICK.

[1] Captain Smith of the *Bridgewater*.

[2] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

155. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to Captain Smith and Major Kilpatrick, dated* 12 *January,* 1757.[1]

HONOURED SIRS,—We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed letter of this day, and having seen with the greatest surprise that your Honours have been informed of there being divers moneys and effects belonging to the Moors concealed in our fort and that your Honours have sent to demand delivery of the same, We are quite sure nothing belonging to them is to be found in our fort, and that the Moors in our Settlement have dwelled there for many a year, and we are, therefore, surprised that divers Englishmen are guilty of all kinds of insolence against people who, pursuant to the contents of the Manifesto sent us by the Governor and Council of Calcutta, may sojourn in our village without fear of molestation, of which we hereby complain with the request that your Honours may be pleased to issue strict orders for its cessation in order to prevent the inconvenience and difficulties to which we are exposed by the flight of all our settlers.

We are, &c. &c., A. BISDOM, R. H. ARMENAULT, M. TSINCK, J. L. VAN SCHEVICHAVEN, J. BACHERACHT, S. DE HOOG, M. BASTIAANSE, S. CROMBON.

156. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort William, dated* 12 *January,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received your letter of the 10th instant representing to me that a neutrality with the French will be greatly advantageous both to the Company and the community.

You are not unacquainted[2] with my having already offered to enter into a neutrality with the French provided they would join our force against the Nabob of this province, which they have refused to agree to. I on my part can by no means consent to any other terms as I am well perswaded whilst I remain here they will not dare to act against us, and my not directly agreeing to their terms will be a cheque on their trade. In the meantime I have no intention of breaking the neutrality whilst the observing it can be of any advantage to the Company's interest and it shall

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

[2] See mention of these negotiations on p. 91.

be my care when I go away to leave you in perfect security against the French as far as it depends on me.

I had flattered myself the constant attention I have showed to your interest since my arrival here would have made it quite unnecessary for you to have made me such an application.

I am, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

157. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Council, Hugli, to M. Vernet, dated 13 January, 1757.*[1]

On account of the present critical juncture of affairs, both by the taking of the neighbouring Moorish fort Hoogley and the outrageous behaviour of the English in our village and the arrival of the Nawab with a numerous force, not knowing what plans His Excellency is contriving in his busy mind and whether we shall remain free from molestation, or, may be suddenly attacked, not being in a position to defend ourselves or offer resistance to the Nawab, whilst nearly all of our inhabitants have already taken to flight, we have provisorily resolved to send all the European women aboard the ships to-morrow to remain there until the danger is over. As we are absolutely unable to send your Honour a commando of military, all the *jemadars* having run away, therefore, in case of peril, you will have to try and save yourselves as well as you can. Hoping that Heaven will ordain everything for the best, we remain, &c. &c.

158. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 13 January, 1757.*[2]

SIR,—I have received your letter of yesterday in answer to mine of the 11th instant.

As disputes by letters may continue for ever, to make ours as short as possible, and to convince you how very far I am from being inclined to do you the least injury, I have sent you my Captain to make you thoroughly acquainted with my sentiments and intentions.

You will be so good as to give credit to what he shall tell you on my part and be persuaded that nothing but the very greatest

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague.

[2] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

provocation and refusal of the justice I demand and expect from you shall make me do anything to the prejudice of a nation for whom mine has so long had a regard and friendship.

I have, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

159. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort William, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 13 January, 1757.*

SIR,—Having yesterday received copies of His Majesty's declaration of war against the King of France[1] and his subjects, and my duty thence obliging me to prosecute them with all manner of hostilities within my power, the effect it may have on the affairs of the English East India Company have employed my most serious thoughts: but as there are many things necessary to be known in order to the discussion of this question, (which) the little time I have been amongst you have[2] not admitted of my being acquainted with, I have not been able to come to any determination, to my own satisfaction. I must beg therefore, Sir, that you will do me the favour to assemble your Committee with all convenient speed; and propose to their consideration, which of (all) the following ways of acting, will in your present, and probably may be in your future circumstances, the most eligible for the Company's advantage(s).

First, whether a simple neutrality with the French within the Ganges as well by land as water; and if so, at what time to be concluded, whether now or some time before my departure from hence.

Secondly, whether a neutrality joined with a league offensive and defensive against the *Subah* of Bengall and his subjects (if it can be effected) or even only defensive.

Thirdly (and lastly) whether we should attack Chandernagore by sea and land, and prosecute the French in these dominions with all our power to their utter extirpation.

These, Sir, appear(s) to me to be the only methods of acting we have in our choice; but if you think there is[3] any other I do not mean to bias your judgment, or in the least to subject it to my

[1] 'The French King' (Admiralty copy). [2] 'Has' (Admiralty copy).
[3] 'Are' (Admiralty copy).

opinion; I have nothing in view but the Company's interest and the discharge of my duty.

I am, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

160. *Letter from Jagat Seth to Colonel Clive, dated 14 January, 1757.*

Your favour I have with great pleasure received and give due attention to the contents. You are pleased to say that the Nabob listens to what I may recommend, and hope I will exert myself for your good and the general benefit of the country. My business is that of a merchant, and probably what I may recommend that way he may give ear to. You have acted the very reverse part, and possessed yourselves of Calcutta by force, after which you have taken and destroyed the city of Hughley, and by all appearances you seem to have no design but that of fighting. In what manner then can I introduce an application for accommodating matters between the Nabob and you? What your intentions are it is impossible to find out by these acts of hostility. Put a stop to this conduct and let me know what your demands are. You may then depend upon it I will use my interest with the Nabob to finish these troubles. How can you expect that the Nabob will pass by or overlook your conduct in pretending to take up arms against the Prince or *Subah* of the country. Weigh this within yourself.

161. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 14 January, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—I am favoured with yours of the 14th ultimo, for which am much obliged to you. I heartily wish our affairs were compleated at Bengal that I might leave Fort William, but the situation we are in (notwithstanding our success) makes it highly necessary I should remain here some little time longer, as the Nabob would most likely profit by my absence, and all the trouble and fatigue we have had turn out to no other end than shewing our resentment without the Company reaping any benefit therefrom.

And now, Sirs, give me leave to give you joy of our having taken and destroyed all the Moors' forts and batteries between this and Fulta, of our being in possession of Fort William, and of our having since taken Hughly, which was effected by the twenty gun ship,[1] sloop,[2] and boats of the squadron, manned and armed in

[1] The *Bridgwater*. [2] The *Kingfisher*.

conjunction with the King's troops, Company's Grenadiers, and 200 sepoys under the command of Major Killpatrick. For the particulars I must beg leave to refer you to others, who possibly may have more time to write. Believe me I am often interrupted, and therefore I persuade myself you will excuse this hasty scrawl. All I will say the great ships got up here contrary to my expectation, indeed the necessity of making a speedy push made me resolve to try. I accordingly did, and thank God, have succeeded.

I have received the Committee's letter, and cannot help observing, that whatever operations are to be carried on here in the *subah* of Bengal for the interest of the Company, in my opinion come under the consideration of this Presidency, who alone are the most competent judges what further can be done for their security, and whether my committing hostilities in the Ganges against the French will be for the Company's interest.

I hope the news you write me with regard to Mr. Byng and West is not true.[1] It comes from Paris, therefore the less to be credited.

I am, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

162. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Admiral Watson, dated* 14 *January*, 1757.

SIR,—We have maturely weighed and considered the propositions contained in your letter of the 13th current to our President, and are of opinion for many strong reasons that a simple neutrality with the French, within the Ganges, by sea and land, would be of the utmost advantage to the affairs of our employers, and to the community in general settled in these provinces, to continue during the term of the war now subsisting between His Britannick Majesty and the French King, and that such a treaty of neutrality be concluded as soon as possible, in preference to the other propositions you have laid before us.

We have, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, ROBERT CLIVE, WILLIAM WATTS, RICHARD BECHER, J. *Z.* HOLWELL.

[1] Admiral John Byng and Vice-Admiral Temple West were in command of the English fleet in the indecisive action against the French off Minorca on May 20, 1756. Admiral Byng was shot for neglect of duty. Admiral West was promoted for good conduct, but refused to 'serve on terms which subject an officer to the treatment shown Admiral Byng,' and resigned the service.

163. *Letter from Captain Speke to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Bridgewater' at Hugli, 15 January, 1757.*[1]

SIR,—As I am not fond of noise and particularly of that of words, in our conference of yesterday evening I appeared to you to be content with the reasons you gave me to justify your conduct towards us since we entered into war against the Moors, and more particularly your conduct since the capture of Hugli. But it would be betraying the truth to hide my true sentiments from you any longer or to let you think that I am so blind as not to see their [M. Bisdom's reasons] weakness.

To begin at the beginning you rely on the fact that you have had published, by beat of drum, an express order to all the people dwelling under your protection prohibiting them from purchasing the merchandise or any part of the pillage made upon the English at the capture of Calcutta. If this prohibition has been observed we have nothing to complain of, but if the contrary is true and we can prove it to be so, since every Government is held to be able to make itself obeyed by it subjects, the contravention of this prohibition will justly cause strong suspicions that your Government did not act in good faith when publishing it. Let us see how the prohibition has been observed.

Everybody told us, long before the siege of Hugli, (and we have since seen it with our own eyes), that Chinsura has been filled with English merchandise. After we had received and verified information that there was some of this merchandise either lodged in a house within your bounds, with every mark of having been placed there but recently, or that it was in the compound of a ruined house when we reclaimed it, far from assisting us to seize it you have managed so that all this merchandise was passed on and our people had to suffer the mortification of seeing bullocks laden with the merchandise issue by night from this very house. Permit me, Sir, to take the liberty to tell you that it is very difficult to reconcile all this with the professions you have made of not assisting the Moors and of keeping yourself strictly within the limits of perfect neutrality.

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

Not to make my letter too long I will content myself with this one fact so perfectly verified which many of our people are ready to swear to. Let us pass further. Having seen how you have behaved in regard to the property of the Moors let us examine into what you have done relative to their persons. You have received and protected them so openly (which I am able to prove on the oaths of people who have seen and spoken to them) that the day after the capture of Hugli there were at Chinsura some Moors of the highest rank. After the demand made by Admiral Watson for their surrender they all made off, and instead of replying to the demands in his letter, you made a declaration, deploring your sad situation, and insulting him by the pretence of fearing an attack on his part, though you had not the least reason for doing so, for I cannot persuade myself that you pretend to insist seriously on the circumstance of the small guard of 30 men placed on the suspected houses, which was only sent by the advice of your Fiscal[1] given to Captain Smith and Major Kilpatrick, as being your sentiment and desire, and which was recalled the moment you objected to it, a proof as clear as day that we did not wish to cause you the least annoyance. What has been the consequence of our easiness? The goods have all been passed on, the persons of our enemies are all in safety, we are in a great empty town, and vengeance for our insults and recompense for our loss have escaped from our hands.

If, Sir, you will reflect a little upon what I have stated I flatter myself you will try to repair the past by the future and, instead of opposing us in the searches we are making and shall make for the goods and persons of our enemies, you will give the facilities we have the right to expect from a good friend and ally.

If not Monsieur (which I do not wish to believe) I shall be obliged to represent the matter to the Admiral who will doubtless know how to obtain his rights.

I shall await your reply before making up my despatch and hope you will make it in French as I do not understand the Dutch language.

I have given orders to Lieutenant Clark of the Admiral's ship to narrate to you what he saw yesterday evening and also to

[1] Jacob Larwoot van Schevichaven.

request your assistance in regard to the information given to us of the property of the Moors carried into your bounds. I expect in accordance with your promises that you will place guards over them and that you will permit some commissary on our behalf to make an inventory of them.

I have, &c. &c., HENRY SPEKE.

164. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Council, Hugli, to Admiral Watson, dated 16 January, 1757.*[1]

Although, for aught we know to the contrary, we have always observed the duties of friendship towards the British nation in its discomfiture as far as was possible without giving too much offence to the Government, yet your Excellency, far from evincing any sign of being sensible thereof, immediately before your arrival at Culpy, in a letter dated 14 December, treated Mr. Bisdom, the Director of the Netherlands East India Company in Bengal, in a most off-hand and ungracious manner, and warned him, upon forfeiture of our mutual friendship, not to choose the part of the Moorish Government, just as if we were suspected of such guilty steps, whilst all the world knows that our scrupulous and sincere observance of the neutrality has cost our Company well-nigh five *lacs* of rupees, but the respect we feel for your Excellency's character and the satisfaction we felt at your appearance, removed every feeling of vexation, and the Director in his reply did nothing but courteously welcome you, giving at the same time an assurance of his adherence to strict neutrality, as appears from his letter of the 19th December.

Afterwards in your later missive of the 16th of the aforesaid month your Excellency demanded, on the ground of the friendship existing between the King of Great Britain and the States-General, a few pilots and some boatswain's mates, a service which in time of peace would be of no importance whatever. But besides our being quite unable to do so on account of the illness of the greater part of our river pilots and watermen, it would, forsooth, be rightly looked upon by the Government of the country as an evident proof of hostility for us to promote thereby the plans of its adversary; and whereas, as far as our knowledge extends, no such

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

close alliance is known between two separate nations as to make the one bound to throw itself into evident peril with the mere view of saving the other, our Director, Mr. Bisdom, in his reply of the 20th (? 21st) of the above-mentioned month laid before your Excellency our weak condition and the probability of our ruin, if we deviated from neutrality, together with such deprecations, expostulations and warnings as he considered convincing.

But in despite thereof, one of our boatswain's mates of the Company's brigantine *De Ryder*, just arrived off Bernagor, was carried off by force by the crew of one of the men-of-war and taken on board, where the man was compelled to bring up your Excellency's war ships here alongside the Moorish fort, without your Excellency's having deigned to take the least notice of the Director's protest in his letter of the 8th instant, but you have even connived at, nay, even as we must fain gather from your Excellency's latest missive of the 11th instant, even forsooth directly ordered all the mischievous doings and hostilities committed by the seamen sent against the Moors, both in the seizing of loaded vessels from our water frontage and in the harrassing of our village with the pillaging of some of the dwellings of our people, your Excellency, to give these hostile acts a *quasi* colour, giving as a pretext in the above-mentioned letter that we had concealed goods belonging to the Moors, nay, what is more, that we had helped the same Moors with artillery, pretences which will certainly not be credited by any one in the world, save your Excellency. And even supposing one or other of our Mohametan villagers had tried to find a safe place of deposit for his goods under our flag, would he not be free to do so, or is he actionable on account of his religion?

And in addition to the above-mentioned inimical acts an officer with a detachment of Major Ḳilpatrick's military were posted in our village without our foreknowledge or sanction, and committed various acts of violence, thus publicly damaging our credit and infringing upon the rights of our flag.

And, whereas all these wrongs, especially the first mentioned, will apparently be pregnant with injurious and ruinous results to our Company upon the Nawab's arrival, we find ourselves compelled to protest most solemnly and emphatically not only against the aforesaid acts of violence and insolent conduct, but also

against those that may be further practised and committed by the men of the expedition under the command of your Excellency and the other officers cited, even as we do hereby protest against all expenses, damage and other evil consequences that might result from the above enterprises or any other that may be further contrived, which we leave to the responsibility of your Excellency; reserving, further, to our Masters, the Netherlands India Company, the right and faculty to take satisfaction for the affront and vexations inflicted on them and their servants, where and whenever it shall seem most fit to them.

We have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM, R. H. ARMENAULT, M. TSINCK, J. VAN SCHEVICHAVEN, J. BACHERACHT, S. DE HOOG, M. BASTIAANSE, S. CROMBON.

165. *Extract from Select Committee Proceedings, Fort William, 16 January, 1757. Rung Loll Bramin's Intelligence.*

That he went to the Nabob's camp which was then at Amboe. That Souragud Dowla was there himself and about 2 hours after he moved from thence and encamped near Nya Saray. That he has with him about 15,000 horse and 7,000 gunmen, that he has a Train of about 50 pieces of cannon, six of which are large, the rest are small. That there are four sledges (? kedges) of baums (? bombs) or rockets behind the artillery. That there are 6 waggons of gunpowder and 4 waggons of shott, where the red flag is hoisted. That Jaffer Cawn is about one *cors* above the *Gunge* at Hughly and Dussmatun ud Cawn at Nya Saray. That Rohim Cawn is on this side the river opposite the *Gunge*. That the Nabob has sixty boats with him, on which he designs to cross his army as soon as he has recovered Hughly.

166. *Extract from a letter from Coja Wajid to Colonel Clive, dated 17 January, 1757.*

I have always harboured in my breast a particular regard for the English Company, for which reason and for the interest and benefit of your nation settled here, I have desired Mr. Renault, the Director of Chandernagore, to endeavour accommodating matters between the Nabob and the English, Mr. Renault will inform you more particularly.

167. *Translation of a letter from Mr. Bisdom to Captain Speke, dated Hugli, 18 January,* 1757.[1]

SIR,—In reply to your esteemed favour of the 15th instant, this is to apprize you that, since the proceedings undertaken by you against the Moors of Hoogley, all our inhabitants and servants have fled from fear, our territory being all but open in nearly every direction, as will, no doubt, have been reported to you by your armed men who continue to rove about here and infest our village. Anyone may come and go without its coming to our knowledge from want of servants and watchmen, not to mention the fact, as well known to yourself as to me, that it is always possible to buy the services of the natives for a penny or so, wherefore I am greatly astonished that you ascribe my powerlessness in the matter to a want of sincerity in the observance of neutrality and the maintenance of the published prohibition. To the same cause we should have to ascribe the conveyance of some goods of a Moorish dweller into our village, if such be true, as I assure you, on my word of honour, I have never heard the least thing about it before the receipt of your letter; and I have interceded for my villagers (which was not in order to frustrate your designs), but as I considered it an obligation I owed to the residents in our territory.

As regards the fugitives whom I am said to have protected, I hereby positively assure you I have had no Moors of consideration with me, save only Jubbo, the half-brother of Wazid, a dweller in our village; further a nephew of Mirza Reza, who in accordance with an old custom of his on his return from Dhecca (? Decca) annually sojourns at Sintoura (? Chinsura), and a Persian, who has already lived here since the time of Director Huyghens, being lately come from Persia *viâ* Surat. Can your Honour expect me to arrest and surrender those people to you, nay, even foreign fugitives (whom, however, I declare I have not come across), for how could such officiousness be considered consistent with neutrality in respect to the Moorish Government? Did I arrest or deliver over to the owners Captain Rannie (?) when he was pursued by the Moors right into our Factory who wished to drag him with violence to the *Durbar* on account of

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

some freight goods? Did I not become security and afford him an opportunity to escape, not being able to protect him by force without infringing the neutrality on the other side?

And in order that your Honour should not again look upon my assertions as paltry excuses, I hereby offer, though not bound thereto, to declare on my solemn oath, that I will do everything possible to preserve the good harmony of our two nations for the prevention of further disputes, and to affirm before the world that I am innocent of all the accusations laid to my charge, and that I have been absolutely compelled to make the protest of which I herewith send you a copy.

From information received, after the accusation that the guard in our village was placed there upon the advice of our Fiscal, the latter, who, however, is not so well acquainted with the English language but what he may have made a mistake in expressing himself, declares his readiness at any time to affirm on oath that it never entered his mind to tell either Major Kilpatrick or Captain Smith that he should like to have a company of English soldiers sent to our village, but that he merely intended to say that it appeared to him a good thing if a few English soldiers were sent to restrain the excesses of the British sailors and remove them from our village, as it might have led to dire consequences if forcible resistance were offered them by our soldiers.

The inventory requested by you of the goods of the inhabitants at whose dwellings I have placed a guard, I cannot grant, firstly because the Nawab would take it very ill of us and secondly because it would be against the legal privileges of our in-dwellers.

In accordance with your Honour's request I annex a French translation, but unsigned on account of my slight acquaintance with that tongue, whilst its preparation has also delayed the despatch of this letter longer than I should have wished.

I have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM.

168. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Council, Hugli, to Admiral Watson, dated* 18 *January,* 1757.[1]

Whereas we have been informed that not only most of our craft late sailing downwards, but also two captains of our Company's

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

vessels have been stopped, and are detained on board your Excellency's ship, whereby our Company is exposed to great inconvenience and loss in despatching its ships, not to mention the wrong done to our flag. We have, therefore, deputed two members of our Council, Armenault and Bacheracht, to inquire into the reasons that can have moved your Excellency to such a procedure. We doubt not but that after hearing the said deputation, you will immediately give orders for the release of all of them.

We have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM, R. H. ARMENAULT, M. TSINCK, J. VAN SCHIEVICHAVEN, J. BACHERACHT, S. DE HOOG, M. BASTIAANSE, and S. CROMBON.

169. *Translation of a letter from the French Council, Chandernagore, to the Syndics and Directors of the India Company at Paris, dated* 18 *January*, 1757.[1]

GENTLEMEN,—The channel by which we transmit you the present letter does not allow us to delay it in order to answer the two letters, which you did us the honour to write in December 1755, and which reached us only a few days ago by *patamars*. We can only acknowledge their receipt and assure the Company in advance of our zeal to carry out all the arrangements communicated to us in the first of these letters and of our exactitude in scrupulously observing every detail so far as circumstances will allow us.

You will have seen, Gentlemen, by all that we have had the honour of writing you since last January that if the troubles, which have happened in Europe and which you have communicated to us, have upset the plans you had formed for procuring for the factories in India, and especially for Chandernagore, a condition less irksome than that of which we have explained to you the details, on the other hand the events which have happened in Bengal have entirely upset all the ordinary operations of commerce, and have made it impossible for us to despatch the single vessel sent us from Europe for the reasons explained in our previous letters, the duplicates of which we will send you on another occasion.

[1] Bibliothèque Nationale MSS., Paris.

Our embarrassments have only increased since the departure of those letters. As we had foreseen our position has become more critical than ever since the advantages gained by the English. Nothing indeed was more false than the rumour which was spread of their having made terms with the Nawab. The Nawab was never willing to listen to any of their propositions, which were in truth a little extravagant, for the Admiral required that Calcutta should be restored to him in the state it was in before the capture, and also that the Company and all private persons should be recouped for all the losses they had suffered. Accordingly having seen the uselessness of their attempts, they came up the river and on the 31st December attacked by land and water a fort named Budge Budge situated on its banks. Although this was only an earthwork and the Moors had only 2,000 men they held it for 10 hours, but they have made nothing like the same resistance in Mukwa Tana, another fort below Calcutta, nor in Calcutta itself, where they merely fired off a few guns which killed from 12 to 20 men on the Admiral's ship. This is practically all the loss the English have suffered in taking possession of these three places.

We were still ignorant of the capture of Calcutta and believed the English in front of Budge Budge, when we sent Messrs. Laporterie and Sinfray as a deputation to the Admiral in order to find out their intentions. Their instructions were, in general, to have an interview with him, to ascertain if we were to regard the English as enemies, seeing the rumours afloat of the declaration of war in Europe and its announcement in Bombay, or whether he intended to maintain the neutrality always observed in the Ganges between Europeans, in which case we proposed to make a treaty to prevent the commission of any act of hostility. You will receive, Gentlemen, by another channel the papers concerning this negotiation in which you will see the details of all that has passed and the formal refusal of Admiral Watson to sign the treaty unless we would make a defensive and offensive alliance against the Nawab. This arrangement by no means suiting us we were compelled at all risks to recall our deputies and we have been, only the more, impelled to continue our preparations and to keep ourselves on guard, for it was natural to think that the English, to whom it was essential not to have us for enemies,

rejected the neutrality only to reserve for themselves the power of attacking us whenever they considered they could do so advantageously; we had all the more reason to suspect them of this design because in the interview with the deputies, the Admiral pretended that we had committed breaches of this neutrality in the Ganges during the last war and that we had recently given assistance to the Nawab at the time of the capture of Calcutta, although there were so many proofs to the contrary even on the testimony of his own compatriots. Besides all these reasons, which were more than sufficient for our distrusting them, they were preparing to push their advantage and were going to send a part of their forces up the river to attack Hugli, a town situated a league above Chandernagore and important because of its size and because it is the ordinary residence of the *Faujdar*.

On the return of the deputies we doubted for a long time, in the state of incertitude in which we were as to the intentions of the English, whether it were wise to allow them to pass under our cannon to seize a place which permitted them to place us under two fires, and the capture of which might draw on us a quarrel with the Government, which would reproach us for not having stopped its enemies when we could. On the other hand it was alleged that our Factory was exposed to serious danger of being burnt if we opposed the passage of the English ships, which we could not do without the Nawab's orders. Besides the Ganges having always been neutral water and the English not having yet committed any act of hostility, but on the contrary having allowed some of our vessels to pass, we could not take it upon us to begin the attack without express orders, or at least without some infraction of the neutrality on their part, and in consequence it was unanimously agreed, after having maturely considered the reasons on both sides, not to depart from the neutrality and to continue solely to hold ourselves prepared for all events in such a fashion as to deprive them of the desire to attempt anything against our colony.

As for the English, though they did not know the result of our deliberations, and though they must have been very anxious about it, it seems from the carelessness with which they passed that they never even believed it could enter into our thoughts to dispute the pasage with them, so haughtily did they behave. The

9th in the afternoon they passed before our Factory in a frigate of 20 guns, a brigantine and several boats or sloops, guided by Dutch pilots, without condescending to salute our flag or sending ashore to show the least politeness. From here they went and anchored almost before Chinsurah, and next morning, after having landed a portion of their troops at the last house in this colony, they advanced in good order on the town of Hugli, which the Moors had abandoned to devote themselves to the defence of the fort; but the Moors frightened by the fire which was set to the houses on all sides and by the cannon shot fired from the frigate which had approached close to the bank in order to batter [the walls] retired about 3 a.m. and the English immediately entered by the breach.

This is, up to the present time, the extent of their advantages, more brilliant than solid, for the capture of this place, in which they have not found much booty, decides nothing in their favour and will only irritate the Nawab, whose army is a day's journey from Hugli. Whatever pretence the English may make that they will maintain themselves in this town, there is little appearance of their doing so or that they will divide their force between this town and Calcutta at the risk of seeing themselves driven from both at once. What is certain is that they will speedily have on their hands all the troops of Siraj-uddaula, who is always in a position to repair his losses and will not hesitate to sacrifice men to keep them ceaselessly on the alert, whereas the slightest check might deprive them of all resources and oblige them to withdraw. In fact whatever success they may have, one may perhaps be sure that they will never re-establish themselves firmly without coming to terms with the Government, and that it will be only by virtue of a treaty that they will be at peace in Bengal. But whatever may be the result of these events we think we have always much more to fear from the Nawab than from the English, or to speak more exactly we think we have everything to fear on the part of the former, whether he is successful in scattering his enemies or whether he is beaten. Our fears indeed on this subject are no longer mere doubts after what M. Law has written to the Director, that Siraj-uddaula has left Muxadavat with rage in his heart against Europeans in general, and that he is a man of such ferocity that if he is defeated he may be guilty of the

greatest excesses against the smaller factories and may cut the throats of all in them to avenge himself at any rate on some Europeans for the affront which he has received from others, though of a different nation. You know too well, Gentlemen, what were our fears on this subject last June at the time of the attack on Calcutta, and what was the event[1] which dissipated them.

In reference to the former of the suppositions mentioned above, *i.e.*, the defeat of the English and their second expulsion from the country, that would be a much more desperate position for us, for one cannot say how far the Nawab would push his violence, and whether he would not be equally inclined to revenge upon us this last irruption of the English. M. Law adds in fact in his letter that this is the general rumour, and that the Nawab, enraged at the English burning and ravaging everything, is in the most terrible disposition against us whom he believes to be in connivance with them because we allowed them to pass on their way to Hugli and that he is resolved to rid himself, once for all, of all the Europeans scattered throughout his government. Such a statement, which deserves the most careful attention, makes us believe that we are now, as it were, in the most critical condition possible, and we see already a moral impossibility in following for any length of time the plan of neutrality which we have prescribed for ourselves, unless we hazard everything. In a position so embarassing we think we ought to be guided by circumstances, and if, notwithstanding our resolution not to depart from the neutrality we see there will be as much risk in keeping it as in declaring for one side or another, we think that the orders we have received from Pondicherry authorize us to take whatever course we shall judge most advantageous to the Company and ally ourselves either to the English or to the Moors. But as an alliance with the former is not acceptable for many reasons, of which the strongest is the sacrifice of the persons resident in the little factories [up-country] which such action would immediately bring about, we shall not hesitate to ally ourselves with the Nawab, whose friendship may procure us great advantages in the augmentation of our privileges

[1] It is difficult to guess what Renault refers to, unless he means the heavy contribution the French had to pay.

and several other matters, not to mention the injury we shall do to the special enemy of our nation in obliging her to retire perhaps with loss, and to abandon an enterprise for the accomplishment of which she has stripped her principal establishments in India. Whilst waiting however on the course of events, we have eagerly seized this favourable opportunity to erect outposts in the principal avenues of the town, to mask by earthworks the two gates of the fort, and especially to pull down the church and the house of the Jesuits, the octagon in the Dutch garden, the houses of the *banians*, and in general all those houses which by their proximity could most incommode the factory [if they were occupied by the enemy].

If by these demolitions, which are absolutely necessary for the safety of the fort, and by all our other preparations, we can accomplish our object, which is to force the English to treat us with respect, we shall have reason to be thankful to our foresight when we think what has happened and is actually now happening at Chinsurah. The Dutch, who ridiculed our precautions, have had reason to repent of their negligence in this respect, for under pretext that their lands and those of Hugli run into each other the English have spread through their Settlement to pillage the Moorish houses, and in the confusion some belonging to the Dutch have also been involved in ruin. Now it is said the English demand from them five *lakhs* and all their pilots. The ladies also, who think they are no longer in safety there, have all left the place.

To give some colour to these acts of violence the English reproach the Dutch with having furnished the *Faujdar* with guns, and further assert that their Factory is even now filled with rigging, munitions of war, and other articles from the pillage of Calcutta. The Dutch are so much the more embarassed in this compromising condition because they have still more to fear from the resentment of the Nawab than we have as they furnished the English with pilots who brought up their vessels to Hugli, and also secretly allowed a portion of their garrison to desert to them. It is not possible that Siraj-uddaula who has committed upon them, as upon us, such cruel outrages for not having furnished him with assistance in his expedition to Calcutta, will treat them less roughly on this occasion when they have aided his enemies and contributed to the ruin of one of his towns. The position in which they have put

themselves in order to propitiate the English makes the action of the latter still more incomprehensible, and proves to us more than ever the utility of our preparations, without which perhaps we should have had still more to suffer from the insolence of the conquerors, and that with so much the more reason as they must have regarded us as enemies.

The Council at Calcutta, to whom we wrote a letter of congratulation on their re-establishment, sent us their thanks on the 9th of this month, and accompanied their letter by a Manifesto setting forth all the subjects of complaint they have against the Nawab, which have forced them to declare war against him and all his subjects in the name of the English Company. They conclude this paper by warning the European nations that they have no intention of interfering with them, their property or their privileges, provided these same Europeans observe the most exact neutrality between them and the Nawab and do not assist the latter either directly or indirectly. As to this clause which they have inserted and which opens the door to all kinds of arbitrary interpretations, we cannot think it was put in without design, though it is quite just in itself, and we have judged that prudence will not allow us to relax any of the precautions which we have taken, all the more because this Manifesto was not issued by nor even confirmed by the Admiral, who takes no orders from the Council, and acts independently. It even appears to us that this promise of tranquillity does not enter at all into his ideas, which are nothing less than pacific to judge by his last words to our deputies in reference to our refusal to join him, *viz.* that he would be forced to try his luck. We have had still further reason to confirm ourselves in this belief by a Manifesto which he also sent us a few days later, by which he in his turn and in the name of the King of England declares war against the Nawab. He concludes in exactly the same way as the Council of Calcutta. He gives warning that any ship, to whomsoever it may belong and to whatever nation, which is found carrying soldiers, arms or munitions of war, and which lands them in countries, lands, places or rivers in the dominion of the said Nawab will be seized and declared lawful prize as being laden with contraband of war. This law which he imposes in a country where he is

not the ruler, and which he will interpret as he thinks convenient, shows us that, flattered by his recent successes, he already commences to speak as a master, and to lay down conditions the non-execution of which will put him in a position to make prizes.

So probable a suspicion giving us the right to repel force by force we foresee that we shall be obliged, in spite of our wishes, to fortify ourselves by an alliance with the Moors and to cause the evil which they wish to do to us to fall upon the English.

We are, &c. &c., RENAULT, M. FOURNIER, CAILLOT, NICOLAS.

170. *Translation of a letter from Monsieur M. Fournier to Monsieur le Marquis Dupleix at Paris, dated Chandernagore, 18 January, 1757.*[1]

SIR,—Since the capture of Calcutta in June of last year, which I had the honour to mention in my letter of the 24th August following, the English remained inactive at Fulta till December when Admiral Watson's squadron arrived in the Ganges with about two thousand five hundred men, of whom one thousand were Europeans and the rest sepoys. They at once took Budge Budge, which had been fortified by the Moors, and Mukwa Tana, without much resistance on the part of the latter. Calcutta, which followed in almost the same way was not better defended than the other places.

Afterwards they went up [the river] to Hugli with a frigate of twenty guns, a brigantine and four boats. The terror amongst the Moors was so great, that the *Faujdar* who commanded there did not hold out only a few hours against the cannonade of these little vessels. He retired with his troops some leagues inland, and the English having taken possession of the fortress blew up a part of it, and from it the conflagration spread into all the neighbourhood, as far as the Great *Ganj*, [and] on the other side of the Ganges as far as opposite to Chinsurah. This expedition finished, they retook their way to Calcutta, where they are working, without cessation, at fortifying themselves. The Nawab who arrived two days after their retreat, a little above

[1] Bibliothèque Nationale MSS., Paris.

Tribeni, stopped there some time for means to convey his army across the river.

You will learn, Sir, from the letter of the Council of the Company here, into what embarrassment we are thrown by these revolutions, and what precautions we have taken, to put our Factory, so far as is in our power, in a state of defence, as much against the English as against the Moors, having no less cause to fear one than the other, for the English having now no reason to behave properly in the Ganges, may well undertake some enterprise against our colony if they get the advantage over the Nawab, and the latter who comes, so they say, with rage in his heart against [all] Europeans, may equally do us all the evil he can if he is victorious a second time over the English.

This position, Sir, is so much the more critical as we find ourselves without silver, without credit, without resources, and with a very feeble garrison. It is much to be hoped that Pondicherry may soon be able to send us the reinforcements which are so necessary to us and which we wait for with the utmost impatience.

My wife and family present their respects to you. We have the honour to present them equally to Madame the Marquise.

I have that of being with respect, Sir, your very humble and very obedient servant, M. FOURNIER.

171. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Colonel Clive, dated* 18 *January*, 1757.

SIR,—Our letter to the Select Committee of Fort Saint George under date the 8th instant will inform you of our sentiments upon the extraordinary conduct of those gentlemen in respect to the expedition they have set on foot for the recovery of the Honorable Company's Settlements, estates, rights and priviledges in these provinces. Since the dispatch of those advices we have procured a copy with a perusal of your instructions; copy of which we think should have been transmitted to us from the Committee.

For the reasons given in that letter supported by a Commission received from the Honorable Company this season (to the tenor of which we think their conduct diametrically oposite), we think it our duty to require you as follows.

That you recede from the independent powers given you by the Committee of Fort Saint George as Commander-in-Chief of their land forces, and subject yourself to the orders of this Presidency.

That you strictly comply with and follow whatever plans of military operations the Select Committee of Fort William may judge proper to point out, and that you do not think of making any treaty of peace or accommodation with the *Subah* without their concurrence and approbation.

That you remain in Bengal with the troops under your command untill honorable and advantageous terms can be obtained from the *Subah*, and that when circumstances will admit of your leaving us, the number of men necessary for our defence be submitted to our determination, in which we shall give due attention to the exigences of the gentlemen at Fort Saint George.

We are further of opinion that your muster rolls, victuallers', paymaster's, and commissary's accounts should be laid before our Committee of Accompts to be inspected and passed agreeable to the Honorable Company's directions.

We must likewise demand the attested copies of the *phirmaund* and the orders to the *Subahs* and other officers, to comply with the tenor of those grants, and in the last place we think it necessary to require that such part of the military stores as are not immediately wanted in the camp, with the cash consigned singly to you, be submitted to our directions.

These, Sir, are the demands we think it our duty to make, and hope to find you (upon mature consideration) inclinable to comply with them; but if contrary to our expectation (and we think in violation of our rights) you are determined to abide by the independant powers given you by the Select Committee of Fort Saint George, we must not only represent to our Honorable Masters such a refusal on your part as an infringment of the authority they have invested in us, but must exculpate ourselves from any bad consequences attending it, by protesting against you and the said Select Committee.

We are, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, WILLIAM WATTS, RICHARD BECHER, J. Z. HOLWELL.

172. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Camp, 20 January, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have received your letter which you were pleased to send me under date the 18th and flattered myself your sentiments so fully expressed in the letter to the gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort Saint George would have been deemed sufficient without calling upon me to surrender an authority you are sensible I cannot do but to those who entrusted me with it.

What I have had the honor to represent to the Board, I now take an opportunity of repeating in writing, that I do not intend to make use of my power for acting separately from you without you reduce me to the necessity of so doing, but as far as concerns the means of executing those powers you will excuse me, Gentlemen, if I refuse to give them up. I cannot do it without forfeiting the trust reposed in me by the Select Committee of Fort Saint George.

It does not become me as an individual to give my opinion whether the conduct of the gentlemen of Fort Saint George has been faulty or not; that point must be determined by our Superiors, to whom a particular account of their Proceedings has been transmitted.

I have but one interest, which is that of the Company, and as long as that is kept in view, I do assure you, Gentlemen, you shall always find me ready to follow your instructions.

All accounts relative to the Madras detachment agreeable to the Committee's directions are to be passed by me; copies of all such accounts with the lists of stores, &c., I shall do myself the pleasure of sending you in a few days; and if you will supply me with an assistant, I will deliver you copies of the attested copies of the *phirmaund* and the order to the *Subahs* and other officers to comply with the tenor of those grants, and at my departure from hence the original shall be delivered you likewise.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

173. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp, 20 January, 1757.*

SIR,—Enclosed I have the honour to send you a return of our present strength in camp, to which if the Grenadier company

be added our whole military force, rank and file, will not exceed 300 Europeans. You are very sensible, Sir, that with sickness and other accidents how far this force falls short of what was intended to act offensively against the Nabob of Bengal; indeed at present nothing but our strong situation can enable us to act against him at all. I must therefore request the favour of you, Sir, to land the King's forces and to lay your commands on the officer who commands them to put himself under my orders; assuring you at the same time that whenever you think it for the good of the service to recall them, upon signification thereof to me by letter, they shall be returned.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

174. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Seth Mahtab Rai and Maharaja Swarup Chand, dated 21 January, 1757.*

I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write and have communicated the contents to the Governor and Council of Calcutta.

It is with great pleasure I find you so ready to make use of your interest with the Nabob to come into terms of accommodation, and to settle the troubles of this country. It would be but repeating to you what you have heard from all mouths, the devastation and ruin committed by Seraja Dowla on the English. It would be unfolding a tale too horrible to repeat if I was to relate to you the horrid cruelties and barbarities inflicted upon an unfortunate people to whom the Nabob in a great part owes the riches and grandeur of his province. *No less than* 120 *people, the greatest part of them gentlemen of family and distinction, being put to an ignominious death in one night and in such a manner as was quite inconsistent with the character of a man of courage or humanity, such as I have always heard the Nabob represented to be, and for this reason I believe it must have been done without his knowledge.* Under these circumstances how can you expect we should any longer defer our resentment. Did we not send many letters to the Nabob in expectation that he would have sent answers thereto and complied with our just demands? Did we not wait many days at Fulta without committing any hostilities? Did not the Governor of Budgbudge first declare

war against the English by firing on the King's ships? What could we do but resent such treatment! Notwithstanding these just reasons of complaint you will find us ready to conclude such a Peace as I think both for the interest of the Nabob and of the Company, to which purpose I send you enclosed the proposals on which we are willing to treat. As you are a man of sense, you will easily see the justice of our demands, and use your interest with the Nabob to induce him to comply with them. In so doing you will get the name of a patriot and prevent the country from being made a scene of ruin and destruction. You should consider that the English are a great nation, and that a King reigns over them not inferior in power to the *Padsha* himself. What resentment will not His Imperial Majesty express when he comes to hear of the death of so many of his faithful subjects? You should likewise consider that the great Commander of His Majesty's ships is sent to represent him in person, and that I have the same power, as the King of England's officer, and have my commission signed by his own hand. I hope you will not think me vain in telling you that we have had as powerful enemies as the Nabob to deal with upon the Coast of Coromandel and been attended with success; the like may happen here. However I hope the Nabob will not reduce us to the cruel necessity of trying our strength, for after all success depends upon God alone, who will aid and assist the injured.

175. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Coja Wajid, dated 21 January,* 1757.

I have received both your letters and I do assure you I look upon you as a good friend and well-wisher to the English, and shall always be glad of an opportunity of doing you all the service in my power. It was with great concern I heard of your losses at Hughley, which I think must be very considerable, but I do assure you what was done there was not meant against you, but against the city of Hughley in revenge for the ruin of Calcutta. You know very well with *what barbarous circumstances the destruction of that place was attended,* and it was resolved before we left Chinapatam that that city should fall a sacrifice.

The letter you mention to have wrote to Major Killpatrick neither he nor I have seen, so believe it must have miscarried.

You have doubtless heard of what we have done upon the coast of Coromandel. What numerous and powerful enemies we have always had to encounter, and yet we have been constantly successful, which will lead you to consider of the fatal consequences that may attend a war in this country, especially if any other enemy should rise up and join us against the Nabob, which it will be in his power to prevent by listening to our proposals, which I enclose for your perusal; and I hope you will use your interest to induce the Nabob to comply with them, and bring this matter to a happy conclusion, and the Nabob shall find the English his friends instead of enemies, ready to join him and fight for him against all the disturbers of his province.

I cannot upon many accounts approve of the intervention of the French in these affairs. Your integrity and friendship I can safely rely on, and beg that you and the Seats will be mediators between the Nabob and us.

176. *Proposals to the Nawab enclosed in the two foregoing letters.*

1. That the Nabob cause satisfaction to be made to the Company, to the English and all other inhabitants under their protection, for all the losses they have sustained by the captures of Calcutta, Cossimbazar, and all their other Settlements; that he cause restitution to be made of all goods, effects, merchandize, &c., seized at the different *aurungs*.

2. That he put the Company in full possession of all the countries, villages, priviledges, &c., granted them by the royal *phirmaund*.

3. That he suffer the English to secure and fortify themselves in their own possessions in such manner as not to be liable to the like misfortunes in future.

4. That he suffer the Company to erect a mint in Calcutta, endowed with the same priviledges with the mint at Muxadavad, and that if the rupees of Calcutta be of equal weight and fineness with those of Muxadavad they may pass current without any deduction of *batta*.

177. *Translation of Coja Wajid's reply to the Gentlemen of the Council, Chandernagore.*[1]

In general, Coja Wajid asks that the proposals for peace made by the gentlemen of the Secret Committee should be translated into Persian and signed or at least sealed with the seal of the Secret Committee, so that the Nawab may himself see and examine these proposals and reply to them also under his seal, which will make the communications on both sides more authoritative.

1. Coja Wajid thinks there will be no difficulty about the first article.

2. Coja Wajid asks the English to fix the amount of damages claimed, if it is wished to make the Nawab responsible for the pillage of Calcutta by his troops. It seems to him that if the gentlemen of the Secret Committee sincerely desire peace, they can only reasonably demand and claim the merchandize and property taken at Calcutta besides those mentioned in the inventory already prepared.

3. As regards the right of fortification Coja Wajid thinks that this article may be granted in the terms demanded.

4. As regards the fourth article he says that, seeing that the English nation has never had this privilege in Bengal, it is not right to demand it, and further the Nawab is not able to grant a right which depends upon the *Mogul* and which might damage the currency of that Prince.

178. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' 21 January,* 1757.

SIR,—I have received your favour of yesterday's date, enclosing me a return of your little army, and desiring the King's forces may be sent to join you. I cannot help thinking the number of your own troops are too few even to act defensively against the Nabob, therefore I have given orders to the captains of the several ships to discharge their troops, and have directed Captain Weller to join you, and put himself under your command until further orders.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

[1] Apparently Coja Wajid replied to Clive's proposals through the French, with whom he was better acquainted than with the English.

179. *Translation of a letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to Admiral Watson, dated 22 January, 1757.*[1]

EXCELLENCY,—Having received intelligence from a good source that the Nawab would fain see the disputes existing between him and the British nation settled through our intercession, we take the liberty of informing you thereof, with a request that you will kindly advise us of your ideas on the subject. And our deputy-members Messrs. Armenault and Bacheracht having reported concerning the favourable results of their commission to your Excellency, we cannot forbear expressing our gratitude, whilst the matter of the granting of a pass to the *manjhis* of vessels to be sent down shall be treated in accordance with your Excellency's instructions.

We have, &c. &c., A. BISDOM, R. H. ARMENAULT, M. TSINCK, J. L. VAN SCHEVICHAVEN, J. BACHERACHT, S. DE HOOG, M. BASTIAANSE, S. CROMBON.

180. *Letter from Mr. Matthew Collet to Council, Fort William, dated 22 January, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—As Mr. Holwell in his letter to the Court of Directors of the (30th) of November last, has arraigned my conduct in regard to the loss of Cossimbazar factory, I must beg leave to reply in a few lines, and set him right in some particulars which he has misrepresented. He says, he wonders why Mr. Batson and I, would trust ourselves in the camp, when we knew Mr. Watts was a prisoner, to which I reply that when we were sent for as it was told us to finish the dispute with the Nabob we did not know Mr. Watts was prisoner, any more than that he was detained, till we arrived to sign the *machulka*, though on our arrival in the camp it was neither presented, nor mentioned to us, nor did we ever sign it or see it, notwithstanding Mr. Holwell's affirmation that we did. Again he says that I wrote from Cossimbazar that I was obliged to deliver up the Factory. I wrote that the next day after Mr. Watts, Mr. Batson, and self went to the camp, we were told on the road by Roy Doolub that the Nabob insisted on having our cannon and ammunition, but that nothing else should be touched. We stopped for some time, and after con-

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

sulting together agreed to deliver them, (for reasons we have already given our Honourable Masters in Mr. Watts and my letter from Chandernagore). The person pitched on to deliver them was myself, and I was sent with a guard of the Nabob's to the Factory for that purpose. On my arrival at the Factory gate, I told the officer he must deliver up the cannon and ammunition to the person who was come to receive them; he accordingly set about it, and many of the cannon were taken out when Mr. Batson was sent back to the Factory, and I was carried again to the camp, so that during my stay neither the keys of the gates, of the *godowns*, or of the Company's treasure were either delivered or demanded, so that I could not write what never happened, that I delivered up the Factory.

In regard to Mr. Holwell's insisting so much that we ought to have made some defence though never so little, I shall reply that had we imagined the gentlemen of Calcutta were determined to go to the extremities they did, and not come to terms with the Nabob, it might have been right for us to have sacrificed ourselves to prolong their fate; but as we concluded that money was the only thing wanted though it was never expressly demanded, nor indeed is it ever at first, but some fault is found with our conduct, and money afterwards quiets all, (for as to Alliverde Cawn's last dying speech to his nephew, I look on it as a specious fable), I say judging this, we thought it more prudent to act as we did than go to blows, which had we done and affairs afterwards been compromised with the Nabob by the Calcutta gentlemen, I believe I need not say who would have been the first to have accused us of rashly and imprudently involving the Company's affairs.

Since Mr. Holwell has been so kind as to wish we may be able to vindicate ourselves, I must say I wish he may be as able, so that neither his conscience or the world may accuse him of acting since the first rise of these unhappy troubles otherwise than for the Company's interest. I thank God I can lay my hand on my heart without accusing myself of any malpractice or deceit through this whole affair. If I have erred in judgment I readily submit to the censure of my Employers and of the whole world, Mr. Holwell excepted.

I am, &c. &c., M. COLLET.

181. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' 22 January, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—I have your favour enclosing me the translation of two letters you have received from Juggut Seat and Coja Wazeed. I am obliged to you for communicating them to me, and as it is your desire, I return them. I own I am not so very averse to our putting some confidence in the French, who I think would be glad at this juncture not to embroil themselves, but endeavour to make matters up between our Company and the Nabob; and should it appear necessary to choose a mediator, most certainly the French ought to be preferred to the Dutch, who are only a Republic, and I am persuaded will not have the same weight, neither can it be so honourable to ourselves.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

182. *Letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated 23 January, 1757.*

You write me that the King your Master sent you into India to protect the Company's Settlements, trade, rights and privileges. The instant I received that letter I sent you an answer,[1] but it appears to me that my reply never reached you, for which reason I write again. I must inform you that Roger Drake, the Company's chief in Bengal, acted contrary to the orders I sent him and encroached upon my authority. He gave protection to the King's subjects who absented themselves from the inspection of the *Durbar*, which practice I forbid, but to no purpose. On this [account] I was determined to punish him and accordingly expelled him my country. But it was my inclination to have given the English Company permission to carry on their trade as formerly, had another chief been sent here. For the good therefore of these provinces and the inhabitants, I send you this letter, and if you are inclined to re-establish the Company only appoint a chief, and you may depend upon my giving a currency to their commerce upon the same terms they heretofore enjoyed. If the English

[1] This assertion was never credited (*Ives*).

behave themselves like merchants and follow my orders, they may rest assured of my favor, protection and assistance.

(*At the bottom is wrote in the Nabob's own hand.*)

If you imagine that by carrying on a war against me you can establish your trade in these dominions you may do as you think fit.

183. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Mr. Bisdom, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 23 January, 1757.*[1]

SIR,—I am obliged to you and the gentlemen of your Council for your good intentions expressed in the offer you have made me of interceding in our behalf with the Nawab; which nevertheless I cannot except as the intent of my coming hither was not to beg mercy, but procure justice for the subjets of the King my Master, who have no way offended the Nawab, but who have been by him greatly injured. If the Nawab is disposed to do them justice and make them satisfaction for the wrongs which have been done them, whenever he thinks proper to apply to me, he will always find me ready to receive any honorable proposals. If otherwise not, but he must expect to answer for all the ill which by his refusal of justice, is going to fall on the heads of his innocent subjects.

You will please to make this known to those who have desired you to interfere in this matter.

I have, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

184. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' 25 January, 1757.*

SIR,—I had given orders for the *Bridgewater* and *Kingfisher* as they came down the river to place themselves in such a manner that they might annoy the enemy, should they come to attack you. I had also ordered the *Salisbury* to proceed up the river and observe the same, but upon taking a survey of the height of the bank, I find the ships cannot possibly fire over it, particularly at

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague. Not in the English Records, but translated from a Dutch copy.

low water, without greatly lowering their metal whereby their guns can be of no manner of service. I have therefore countermanded the orders, and directed the twenty gun ship and sloop to come down and join me.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

185. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Pigot, dated Camp, 25 January, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—My letter to the Committee by this conveyance is so very full that nothing very particular is left for me to say in a private way.

You will observe I was not mistaken in telling you the gentlemen here would not be wanting in their endeavour to possess themselves of the whole or part of my power, however they have found themselves mistaken and Mr. Watson has not been prevailed upon to look upon them in any other light than what they really deserve. It seems Mr. Holwell has been at the bottom of all this, he is going home upon the *Syren* sloop and the carrying of the packet [has] been unanimously refused him.

The gentlemen seem well satisfied with my answer and [I] believe I may venture to assure you I shall meet with no further opposition.

I need not represent to you the immense consequence of Bengal to the Company; and, while there is a prospect of concluding matters, either by a treaty or by a general battle, which, I think, cannot be far off, I am persuaded you would not approve of my leaving everything unfinished in a sudden and abrupt manner.

If we cannot conclude everything by the end of March, I will give it up, and content myself with leaving Calcutta in a defensible state. By the Return you will see, exclusive of the King's troops and artillery, I have not above three hundred European rank and file fit for duty, so that, if the Bombay troops don't arrive, I cannot possibly bring with me more than the Grenadier company and fifty of the Train, exclusive of the King's. The *sepoys* must be left, of which you have no want on the Coast. Fort William cannot be left with a less garrison than three hundred military and Train fit for duty.

At last the King's troops are put under my command during the Admiral's pleasure (or rather during mine if I insist upon my right). It had been better for the service they had never come and I had the like number of Company's in their room.

* * * * *

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received two publick letters.

The Admiral has not wanted a number of people to advise him to pay no manner of attention to any representations but what come from the gentlemen here, and that the gentlemen of the Coast cannot be judges of what is fit for the interest of the Company in these parts. He is very desirous of getting away by the latter end of next month, but has been so much persuaded that he is concerned in honour to see matters concluded, that he swears he'll stay till September, if it be necessary. You will easily conclude how difficult it will be for me to get from hence without his consent and assistance. I do assure you I believe the Nabob desires peace most earnestly; and I have told the gentlemen very plainly, that if he will give such terms as are consistent with the interest of the Company, and no other, all private satisfaction must be laid aside.

Yesterday his private Minister despatched one Coja Petrus an Armenian to me, desiring I would send a trusty person with our proposals, intimating that the Nabob was desirous of settling matters in a private manner, without the mediation of the French. I have desired the gentlemen will send their proposals very fully explained that we may lay them before the Nabob as soon as possible. Be persuaded I long most earnestly to have the Peace concluded, and if in time shall desire the Admiral to call at Vizagapatam that we may have a slap at Bussy if near at hand.

Ten thousand men under the command of the Nabob's brother crossed the river the day before yesterday. They are at a place called Cowgauche about 18 miles from our camp. They have 30 pieces of cannon, which we probably may give a good account of if they come near enough.

Yours affectionately, R. C.

Pray make my excuses to Orme for I cannot possibly write to him.

186. *Letter from Mr. Roger Drake, Junior, to Council Fort William, dated 17-25 January, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—In an address to the Gentlemen of Council at Fulta, under date 31st October last, it was my particular request that those gentlemen would be pleased jointly or separately to give into Council their accusations in writing of the whole censure that in their judgments I merited by the late misfortune that befell our colony; and that they would fix such limited time they should think sufficient for others of that Colony to lay my blame before them, that in return I should give the speediest reply expected for the determination of those whose servants they are as well as myself. In part those Gentlemen of Council indulged my request in making the following Minute:

'In consequence of the President's letter agreed, that every member of this Board deliver in what he may have to alledge against Mr. Drake's conduct within one month from this day;'

refusing my desire to publish for any accusations against me to be brought by the inhabitants who were on the spot of Calcutta from the beginning of our troubles with the Country Government to the capture of this Settlement by the Moors. That evasion of my request caused me to publish for my accusers, and to place up at every ship's mast at Fulta, and at the most publick place ashore, the following advertisement, that I might have knowledge of what by the publick was laid to my charge, and time to respond to false accusations, and to acknowledge all truths in such accusations contained, which I purpose by replying to the vague aspersions and chimeras of some brains fruitful at invention and credulous to idle tales. Let it here be premised that such parts of their letters or Minutes I do not speak to are by me acknowledged as facts.

Advertisement to the late inhabitants of Calcutta and others under the protection of the English flag at Fulta and on board ships anchored off shore.

Whereas it has been my request to the Gentlemen of Council that they will be pleased jointly or separately to acquaint me publickly of the censure that in their judgment I merit by the late misfortune that has befell our Settlement

of Calcutta, and which they have assented to deliver in within one month from the date hereof, so I hope to be granted by you, gentlemen, the indulgence of being accused of such actions you may think me blameable in committing within that time, and that you will be pleased to deliver such your accusations founded on truth either to the Gentlemen in Council in their publick capacity, or addressed to any one separate member, or to him who is, gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant,

ROGER DRAKE, JUNR.

SHIP FORT WILLIAM,
Off Fulta, 31*st October*, 1756.

Which advertisement though I have patiently waited to this time has only brought in the following letters and Minutes on the Consultations:—

One letter from Mr. Becher at Kedgeree, dated the 26th November, and delivered into Council the 1st December last.

One letter from Mr. Becher and Council at Dacca to the Court of Directors, dated the 12th July, and delivered into Council the 10th instant.

One letter from Mr. Becher and Council at Dacca to Governor and Council at Madras, dated the 13th July, and delivered into Council the 10th instant.

A Minute made by Mr. Pearkes at Fulta the 1st December last.

One letter from Messrs. Watts and Collet to the Court of Directors, dated the 16th July, and delivered into Council the 18th instant.

One letter from Mr. Holwell to the Court of Directors dated the 30th November, and delivered into Council the 20th December last.


It may not be insufficient (*sic*) to remark that I called for and minuted in Council the 7th December last that every gentleman would lay before the Board such advices as they had separately transmitted to the Presidencys of Madrass, Bombay, or to Europe since the 20th June last, which has been the consequence of the above mentioned letters being laid before us, and to which my answer will be set forth, as I have ranged them, further observing that some are screened, and I naturally conclude they are too full of aspersions and false weak reflections to be exposed to the perusal of the Secretary at our Board, but intended to gloss

over the part the authors thereof have acted to the prejudice of some of their fellow servants, giving them no opportunity of vindicating their character before conclusion is had thereon by the Court of Directors, a proceeding which in itself should obviate what in those letters carry the face of scandal aspersion and reflection.

Referring to Mr. Becher's letter under date the 26th November last, that gentleman condemns my conduct in that I granted protection or admitted into Calcutta Kissendass, that I refused to receive the Nabob's *perwannah*, and insulted the messenger, the assuming to myself such an authority to act without the advice or acquainting my Council thereof, my not using proper means to accommodate matters when I found the Nabob irritated, and not securing on board the ships the Company's books, papers, and treasure, and finally abandoning the fort in the manner I did. To all which accusations I reply that the admission of Kissendass into Calcutta was permitted by Mr. Manningham in my absence on a visit to Ballasore, where I went after the dispatch of our last Europe ship that season the 9th March, and returned the 21st of said month. Kissendass arrived here I think the 16th and he or some of his people introduced a letter from Mr. Watts to Mr. Manningham, with one enclosed for myself under a flying seal, to the following purport, as far as my remembrance leads me:—

That an application had been made to him by Rajahbullub (who is father to Kissendass) requesting he would admit his, Rajahbullub's family, into Calcutta for the space of two months until one of the women was brought to bed, and able to proceed on her journey to Jaggernot Pagod, and strenuously recommended we would not refuse that request as Rajahbullub was likely to hold great posts in the Government, and might from such favour shewn his family be instrumental of giving an uninterrupted currency to our business at Dacca and its dependancies.

Which recommendation from Mr. Watts, who then was so nearly situated to the *Durbar* of Muxadavad, drew a grant from Mr. Manningham to admit Kissendass, his family and attendants into our bounds. I think Messrs. Frankland and Holwell are able to testify that such a letter was penned by Mr. Watts, nor would I be understood to throw any blame on



MAXADAVAD OR MURSHIDABAD.

Mr. Manningham for having had regard thereto. Had I been present on Kissendass his arrival I should certainly have adhered to so strong a recommendatory letter from our Chief at Cossimbuzar, nor was any disturbance surmised would happen on account of that family's residence here, or on any other account until about the 15th of April, when a *perwannah* arrived here said to contain an immediate demand from the Nabob of Rajahbullub's family and wealth, which leads me to answer Mr. Becher's second accusation, that I refused to receive the said *perwannah* and insulted the messenger; that the *perwannah* was refused to be received by Messrs. Manningham, Holwell, and myself is a fact, and the messenger was ordered out of our bounds, our then reasons that induced us to act, were, that this messenger or rather a spy came into our bounds in disguise, and his first foot on shore was at Omichund's house, who received him privately, and a *perwannah* for himself tending as we learnt to this purport, that he Omichund was to interest himself to obtain the immediate delivery of Rajahbullub's sons and family to Narraindass, brother to Rogeram, the Nabob's head spy. This first arbitrary and unusual proceeding of the new Nabob before his having advised our Presidency (as has been ever customary on change of Government) of his succession to the Government, caused a suspicion that the said *perwannah* had been wrote without his consent or knowledge, and not at that time having had any intelligence from Mr. Watts that such a person had been dispatched by the Nabob, joined with the fear Omichund shewed on the occasion, determined us to reject the *perwannah* (which Mr. Manningham or myself never had a sight of), and to order Narraindass instantly out of our bounds, and if that gentleman and Mr. Holwell will recollect, I think they must acknowledge, I then produced Mr. Watts' his original letter recommending in most strenuous terms the reception of that family into our Settlement, with two or three others certifying how useful the retaining Rajahbullub in our interest would be, who was likely to hold great posts in the Government. At the same instant I was required by those gentlemen to acquaint Mr. Watts of the clandestine manner whereby Narraindass stole into our bounds, of our refusal to receive the *perwannah*, and his being ordered to quit our Settlement, to which Mr. Watts replied

that our *vacqueel* had represented to the chief *Durbar* officers the whole that had happened, and that the reply thereto was that we surely had a right to dismiss such people out of our bounds. It is with regret I mention not having Mr. Watts his letters to produce, but I appeal to Messrs. Manningham, Frankland and Holwell to whom I communicated at different times the purport of those letters, whether circumstances to be gathered therefrom were not implying that Rajahbullub would be taken into favour again, and advising rather shewing civility to his family than any ways to distress them, giving his opinion that we should be cautious and not let them leave Calcutta. One letter did imply to give them warning to depart as the space of time his father had applied for their residence here was nigh elapsed; that was soon contradicted, and I call on Mr. Watts to declare, whether I did not frequently express I was apprehensive that family's residence here would bring the Company's affairs into trouble, and whether I ever shewed any disinclination to their quitting the bounds or submitting to the delivery of them had the Nabob openly required it. Further Mr. Watts wrote me he had acquainted the principal men at Muxadavad that I should have no objections to deliver Kissendass, but that he thought I should not consent to the giving up of his women, nor would that be insisted on. To the blame Mr. Becher is pleased to cast on me for assuming to myself the sole authority of acting without the consent or advice of my Council in the protection granted Kissendass and the dismission of the messenger who brought the *perwannah* for the immediate delivery of him and his family, I must beg leave to refer in part thereof to my reply to his foregoing accusation against my conduct, wherein it will appear beyond contradiction that I assumed no power of acting by arbitrary will. I could wish the *perwannah* had not been refused but in publick Council which sat that very morning, and the gentlemen were assembled in the Consultation room before Messrs. Manningham and Holwell quitted my apartment, and were all well acquainted with the steps we had taken, but not one member of the Board opened his mouth to speak thereon, which was their duty to do, had they then imagined evil consequences would be the attendant on that proceeding, which leads me to remark that no gentleman of Council can excuse himself for that

silence as I think I shall be [supported] in declaring I never attempted to bridle their tongues. I further am led to think that Mr. Becher, who was in Calcutta from the latter end of February to the beginning of April, though not obliged to attend our Councils (when his absence from his Chiefship of Dacca on account of his own concerns was permitted), might then have set forth his apprehensions that such our proceedings were wrong, which any slight intimation of, to or at the Board, would have saved me many an unhappy reflection on what my character has since suffered from after-thinking men. What availed it me or either Messrs. Manningham or Holwell whether Rajahbullub's family was or was not to be admitted and kept in our town, but to hold in good correspondence and harmony people who then had great influence at the *Durbar*, thereby to promote the interest of our Employers, and to act according to the Chief of Cossimbuzar his recommendation, who has always been supposed a competent judge here to hold the great men in favour at the *Durbar*. Even had any letter private or general from Cossimbuzar hinted so much as even an apprehension that the protecting Kissendass would be likely to draw on the Nabob's anger, I dare aver either of those two gentlemen would have communicated the same in publick Council. I answer I should for my self, and I am sure liberty of speech or writing has too much prevailed in this Settlement not to admit it from any person who then thought the Company's interest was injured. I should fall into the same error with after-conjectures if I ask why the gentlemen of Cossimbuzar did not at any time inform us it was a wrong proceeding to continue Rajahbullub's family with us. If they thought so, it was their duty to have set forth the Nabob was irritated thereat, and at the dismission of the spy; but far otherwise no mention was ever made to us from that factory of any umbrage the Nabob took on that account, not even the name of any of Rajahbullub's family appeared in their general letters. The next accusation Mr. Becher is pleased to alledge against me, though I think it may be deemed rather a general blame on the whole Board, is that I did not use proper means to accommodate matters when I found the Nabob irritated. I would ask Mr. Becher if he has hitherto made an enquiry or from his certain knowledge can give the Board intelligence what methods were pursued to

hinder the Nabob's approach and to pacify his ungovernable passion and premeditated resolution to extirpate the English from his dominions. I shall not therefore immediately enter here a detail of those measures, but think they promised to be the most effectual means those members present could take and I do conjecture will be now so by them acknowledged, as the appearance and circumstances of every matter then presented itself to us.

My not securing on board the ships the Company's books, papers and treasure, is another allegation laid to my charge by Mr. Becher, I should think Mr. Becher's time in the Company's service might have learnt him that the different branches of the Company's employ was allotted according as their servants stood in rank, or were appointed by the Board, and could wish he had been present to have shewn a calmness of mind in such our then situation. Men are apt to reflect who have not been engaged in the enterprize reflected on, therefore I conclude all such speech to promote their own interest and to be exculpated from errors, that if they had been present they intimate would have altered the scene of action, but such intimation implying faults to other doors that deserve not the least consideration to obviate. I do say that unless every man in his office appointed attends to what concerns that office or the orders issued thereto, it is impossible and impracticable during a town is besieged for a Governour to see that every order is fulfilled, who has his whole thoughts engaged and his time taken up in military orders and operations, not to mention the constant application and addresses from different quarters, that I am sure will be allowed afforded me not time to take the rest that simple nature required, whereby my only and great error was committed in leaving the Fort, for which action I hope in turn to moderate men's passions when they give due reflection to our then avowed situation. I can scarce admit that an order was minuted to secure the Company's books and papers, however such a step I do admit to have been highly necessary, and that the Accomptant, Sub-Accomptant, and their Assistants should have attended and put in execution such order. Why should the whole blame fall on me but with sinister views to deprive me of a station they know not who will inherit, but to

which station all are grasping at, and in which I affirm to have acted without any pecuniary advantages but with an attachment to the Company's interest that I hope they may find in my successors, whomsoever my Employers may please immediately to appoint if my enemies' assertions bear down matter of facts which I have and shall record before the close of this letter. That the treasure was ordered to be shipped is a certainty, and to the best of my remembrance the whole ballance could not exceed eighty thousand rupees, and that in scattered money, received account outcrys &c. not packed. The order let me mention was not passed untill the 18th June after sunset. The treasury *banyan* was not to be found, nor I believe no one saw him that whole day or afterwards, neither could I on inquiry find the sub-treasurer who was on his duty and station as volunteer; the other two treasurers I believe thought no more of the order, at least they replied that I should see it put in execution, which would have been performed could I have got *cooleys* when I called for them that night, but perplexity, want of sleep and harrassed almost to distraction made me void of mature thoughts. I acknowledge it as a truth otherwise though I was sole treasurer remaining in the Factory, next morning I should have recollected it was my duty to see it shipped off and to have remained there until the place had been in possession of the Moors or a general retreat essayed the night of the 19th June as had been agreed on at about two in the morning. To justify my quitting the garrison I shall not attempt. Contrary thereto I with as much fervency as any one can do blame myself for that inconsiderate action, whereby I acknowledge that charge of Mr. Becher's against me to carry a truth I can in no ways vindicate, but circumstances may alleviate that action and set at nought the many false representations dispersed and transmitted to Europe. Fatigued in body by continual harrassment for two days and nights without any proper refreshment of sleep, I still kept up, and with Messrs. Holwell, Baillie, and others went through the Factory in the morning of the 19th June to encourage the several soldiers and militia who were then in the Fort resting themselves, to take up their arms and to go to the relief of those who had been on duty all night. This I think Mr. Holwell can attest and that I was myself aiding in filling bags of cotton as soon

as dawn of day appeared, without his or any other person surmising by any of my actions, words, or shew of diffidence then or before that the lot would fall on me to make answer for quitting the Factory which I solemnly declare never entered my thoughts until the moment my confused ideas hurried me off shore. Impatient to know and be an eye witness of every event that might happen I refused the sollicitations of Mr. Holwell and many others to go to rest (who plainly saw I could scarce support my own weight for want of sleep), nor indeed could I any longer keep active than about eight in the morning when I took my seat on a chest below stairs and slumbered for about an hour. When walking to and fro a man astonished me, who had charge of the delivery of the powder, by whispering in my ear that the whole that was good was delivered upon the several bastions and curtains. This knowledge caused my first perplexity, however I still kept musing and observing several persons flocking into the passage leading to the back gate (when no orders given were to be heard through the crouds of Portugueze women and several of our black militia who were pressing to get off shore, which many then did, carrying away the boats laying at the wharf). I went to seek for an officer and met Lieutenant Talbot to whom I gave orders to have that gate shut, but he returned and told me he did not know in whose possession the keys were. At this time there was a strong rumour that the enemy was attempting to force our southerly barrier which would give them possession of the whole part of our Factory by the water side. On which I proceeded with Lieutenant Talbot, and desired he would endeavour to get two guns manned which were placed to defend both the southern and northern barrier, but vain were my efforts, for he did not return during the time I stayed on shore, which was I believe until half an hour past ten in the forenoon, when perceiving the ships and vessels were all dropping down the river without orders, and several persons had then quitted the Factory, my imagination suggested it would be impossible to make a general retreat, the method proposed for so doing it being frustrated by the desertion of our boats intended for that purpose in case of necessity as had been agreed on; therefore it then appeared to me justifiable and necessary to provide for my own safety, as I then thought my

longer stay could be of no service, which I did by going on board of a small *pansway*, the only boat then remaining at the wharf except a large *budgrow* which was full of people who made therein their escape.

To the Chief and Council's letter from Dacca, addressed to the Honourable Court of Directors, under date the 12th July 1756, I remark that those gentlemen have signed two paragraphs [*or* to a paragraph] expressing "it is universally believed the protection granted to Kissendass was the cause of all our misfortunes." However great the censure of that act is supported by the event which happened to our colony, no objection ever appeared in Council to his residence here, and when he was admitted his father then was held in great esteem by Alliverdi Cawn, and after his death it was matter of great doubt whether the party he espoused would not get the upper hand of Souragud Dowlet, in which case the dismission of Kissendass was an apparent consequence that the Company's affairs would be embroiled, therefore the detaining him was a medium wherewith we imagined to extricate ourselves from trouble, for had he been demanded after Souragud Dowlet had persuaded the *Begum* of Nowarris Mahmud Cawn to lay aside the opposition she was forming against him, in favour of her husband's adopted son, or, as I have said before, had we had notice from any quarter after the Nabob was firmly established, that his anger was occasioned by our holding that man from him, we certainly should not have been so daring to dispute his commands in that point. Another part of that letter contradicts Mr. Becher's allegation blaming me for not using proper means to accommodate matters when I found the Nabob was irritated. As I have spoke to that point before, I am only here to notice the contradiction thus set forth, that they can hardly credit my refusing to listen to any terms of accommodation. I am now come to answer those gentlemen's letters to the President and Council of Fort Saint George, dated the 13th July last, as to those points which carry not veracity, or bear any degree of circumspection, for the least consideration surely would have withheld their speedy resolution to dispatch so suddenly an account of the taking of Fort William which they received from the French, and to aver they see no reason to doubt the authen-

ticity thereof. I could wish I had been able to have obtained a copy of so scandalous a libel as it has been represented, but as it does not appear, I can only answer thereto by repeating the sense of some former words, that it is too full of aspersions to bear being brought to light at this Board, and intended to prejudice most of our characters. To go further they say I tore the *perwannah* that was sent to demand Kissendass and threw it in the face of the bearer. I protest I never saw the letter, neither the person that brought it, and call on Mr. Holwell, as I could on Mr. Manningham if he was here, to assert that to their certain knowledge I relate truth. If men are thus to be attacked on such slight foundations as hearsay it is difficult, very difficult, to wipe off the stain that hidden evil reports convey; such is the addition that concludes there were great riches carried off by my self and others. It is a known fact that I had not shipped or brought with me wherewithal to purchase a meal of rice, unless the cloaths on my back or the buckles of my shoes could have served to obtain some small provision. Different was the scene I had experienced, no shift of linen for eight days untill relieved by one of our pilots, and the deck was my bed, the comins of a hatchway my pillow, my sustenance rice half mixed with paddy, slain starved animals that hunger reduced me to eat, treble that time with river muddy water for my drink to quench my thirst.

The tenour of Mr. Pearkes his Minute of the 1st December is chiefly answered to already. I have this addition to make which supports what I have already said, that every member of the Board had free liberty of their tongues, and Mr. Pearkes is the man (though he may think I have a short memory) that extolled the proceeding of turning Narraindass from the Settlement, and told me, with that joy he expresses himself when in his opinion any point is rightly executed, that we had the praise of every one in the Settlement for so doing.

I shall now set forth the errors in Messrs. Watts and Collet their letter to the Court of Directors, under date the 16th July, 1756, and beg your patience for the remarks I shall give thereon. Let it be observed those gentlemen positively declare I did not receive the *perwannah* sent by Narraindass. The manner that was used in turning him out of this place cannot have the inter-

pretation of disgrace, the orders given were to the centinels not to let him into the Factory, and to my *chubdars* to see that he departed the bounds, which he immediately did conveyed in the *palanquin* he came in and with the parade of his or rather Omichund's *peons* before him. Mr. Watts might have added that the intimation of his having been turned away came from me when he sent the *vacquil* and wrote to the *Durbar* officers thereon, if he had recollected I had not been advised from him that such a man had been dispatched by the Nabob. How those gentlemen can assert so glaring a falsity that Coja Wazeed's *duan* was threatened to be ill-used, is as astonishing as their positiveness that he was sent to persuade us to pay a sum of money; the errands he came on were to make known the purport of some letters his master had received from the Nabob, setting forth his utmost indignation and wrath, to persuade us his master would interfere and accommodate matters, if we would give him a sanction, which was readily assented to. At the same time he intimated to us that we should continue to strengthen ourselves with the utmost dispatch, for that the Nabob dismissed those from his presence who had dared to plead in our behalf, which was intimating to us the high influence Coja Wazeed had with Souragud Dowlet, to whom we gave power to make up matters as he should think best, intimating that he well knew we were incapacitated to pay a sum above three or four *lack* of rupees, though let me here repeat there was no intimation that money was required from us. The letter Messrs. Watts and Collet wrote us from the opposite side of Hughley came to our hands, but did not imply that the dispute with the Nabob might be finished for a sum of money. Their expression was that they flattered themselves if a proper person was sent from Calcutta, affairs might be compromised, or if we thought proper to send proposals to them; to which we replied that as we had left it to Coja Wazeed to accommodate matters with the Nabob on our behalf, we were of opinion it was unnecessary to send another person, that it was impossible for us to make any proposals to the Nabob as we were at a loss to know his demands. Let us now consider of how little use those gentlemen could be towards mitigating our affairs when they were themselves obliged to obtain Coja Wazeed's interest for their releasement.

Though the task assigned, or rather every member of this Board their duty in one respect or other, to be respondents to Mr. Holwell's letter of the 30th November, delivered here to be sent by the first conveyance to the Honourable Court of Directors, it has not yet been intimated to me by any member that they intended a replication thereto. I am amazed at their taciturnity, whose employments are not in any degree to be spoken off comparatively to the present attention required in my station for the future emolument of my Employers, and in such station hourly engaged in giving orders and directions, and listening to the opinions of everyone who had to offer their sentiments on measures to be pursued; nevertheless I had rather be wanting in a respect I owe separate correspondents that will not find leisure to make publick answer to such part of Mr. Holwell's letter, which in most points I shall reply to I think to have the voice of the Board and of the Settlement, if called on to affirm I have made true answer.

To compleat my promised reply Mr. Holwell's letter calls my attention, which is to be transmitted by the first conveyance to the Honourable Court of Directors. As that gentleman has touched on some points which I have already explained myself, it will curtail my repeated remarks on those heads which he so vehemently censures to my prejudice and injury. The acrimony he makes use of against his superiors in the Service I do suppose will be by those gentlemen noticed. I shall only remark thereon that his accusations are confined to them only and not to inferior covenanted servants, therefore I hurry to proceed giving a reply to part of his assertions contained in the 11th and 28th paragraphs of his letter, and am not a little surprized that his memory should not make him recollect an addition which he might with a safe conscience have added thereto, namely that we had no surmize of any disturbance about Kissendass until after Alliverdi Cawn his death. To instance the truth thereof, the first cause of any apprehensions that trouble would ensue on the protection he had obtained was after the dismission of Narraindass. I think the 15th or 16th of April; how he can then assert, that I shewed him a letter from Mr. Watts, setting forth it would be expedient that Rajahbullub's family should have no longer pro-

tection in Calcutta about the time the death of the old Nabob was deemed inevitable, must appear an ill-told tale, since Narraindass was not sent from Muxadavad untill Souragud Dowlet was seated in the government, and further if Mr. Holwell was not setting himself up for the standard of truth in his long recital of affairs he might have covered that reflection on my actions by mentioning he had seen letters of a latter date cautioning against that family being allowed privately to quit our bounds. I do acknowledge with him that that family having had residence here involved us with difficulties how to act whether to detain them or wink at them leaving the place. It is my wish to shun any further mention of that family, and therefore the next point I have to answer to carries me to the 9th and 11th paragraphs, the purport of the *perwannah* mentioned to have been received from the Nabob is just. What else but ambitious views can make Mr. Holwell conceal that the answer thereto was entered in Consultation and forwarded with a letter signed by the Board (including himself) to Mr. Watts and Council at Cossimbuzar, the translation of which was entered after Consultation, and I have it affirmed that our *vacqueel* at Cossimbuzar declared it to be a very proper answer. I may have forgot the whole purport but to the best of my remembrance it contained as follows :—

'That for this century past we had traded in his dominions, and had been protected and encouraged by the several *Subahs*, always having paid obedience to their orders, that it gave us concern to observe that some enemies had advised His Excellency without regard to truth, that we were erecting new fortifications, that we hoped he would not listen to any false representations, and that we depended on his favour to protect our commerce which tended to the benefit of his dominions, that he must have been acquainted of the great loss our Company sustained by the capture of Madrass by the French, that there was now an appearance of a war between our nations, that therefore we were repairing our walls which were in danger of being carried away by the river, and that we were not otherwise erecting new works.'

Had Mr. Holwell thought there was any impropriety in that letter, he should then have set forth his objections thereto, and not arraign a conduct he was present at, and deny its having been a transaction of Council. The *perwannah* was received on a Council day, and he was by me particularly applied to in what manner to answer it, which answer and every other letter wrote by the

Nabob in our troubles was by the Secretary translated and entered. In the 23rd paragraph Mr. Holwell expresses himself as if no limitation had been observed in the granting of *dustucks*. Had any good will prevailed to his superior in the Service he might have done me so far justice as to say I had in a great measure curbed that unlicensed practice, and some in the place can aver I have refused applications on that head, further that I was warm to remedy and put those checks which were resolved on to prevent the abuse of that indulgence. I must acknowledge a fact mentioned in the 30th paragraph, that Omichund used to be the acting person between the Company and the Government, and that his weight in the Settlement and at the *Durbar* became less for these four or five years past which picqued his pride and was an expence to his pocket. This I own may have urged him to attempt making himself considerable again, and with this view I am as fully convinced as Mr. Holwell can be that he was a chief operator in bringing down the Nabob's forces, as thereby he might have expected to gain Souragud Dowlet a handsome sum and have saved his own wealth, wherewith he surely bribed to obtain the favours he received from the Government, and which heretofore will not be improper to say at times were answered by the Company; that is to say he might have boasted to the *Durbar* officers that by his management former disputes were accommodated, by which artifice his own pocket was not drained as has been latterly from the presents he has been obliged to bestow to warrant his own security here, [and] to obtain the sole privilege of purchasing opium with other immunities. It must also be recent in our memories, that on a rumour (which was said he spread himself) of his death, not a twelvemonth since, guards were sent from Muxadavad to secure his *gomastahs* and effects at the *aurungs*, which we must believe to have been an essay to try the temper of the Government, for no sooner was that report contradicted by himself, than letters arrived to him from principal men at Mŭxadavad implying that it was out of their abundant regard that his *gomastahs* had been confined, who were then ordered to be released. That the Company's trade has not had so great a currency and with so little *Durbar* charges attending thereon for these five years past must be a truth owned, nor was I ever given to understand that the lessening

Omichund's power was destructive to the Settlement. I have heard he benefited himself when he had the hidden management of this Colony, and I think it has been intimated he bought at a cheap rate the Company's raw silk, which was some years past plundered by the Morrattoes. What can be said in favour of a man who offered me seven thousand rupees to relinquish my endeavours to bring about the contract for saltpetre with Coja Wazeed in the year 1754, and of which I immediately acquainted Mr. Holwell, and have since often lamented I did not publickly accuse him. That I ordered his confinement in the Factory is most certain, and should repeat such an authority with less suspicion of treacherous dealings than he in my then opinion was carrying on, and which confinement was waranted by the greater number of Council, and I am sure by most of the inhabitants. I will not go so far as to say Mr. Holwell did not at that time approve of the step, but to the best of my remembrance he did not then think it would be attended with any bad consequences, nor at any meeting of the Council afterwards was his releasement intimated, a proof that his innocence was not to be affirmed, though no other reason could be assigned for my suspicion than his correspondence with Rogeram, the Nabob's head spy and *phousdar* of Midnapoor. I still think that correspondence was of itself sufficient to keep Omichund within the Factory. Further, the letter that was found hid under a plank in the boat, and would not have appeared but by the confession of two of the boat's people who were punished. Other letters might have been thrown over board, and though this obtained did not contain any virulent matter as read by one of his, Omichund's, people in the presence of Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Holwell, yet there will be allowed cause to justify my proceeding when I declare the boat wherein the before mentioned letter was found had been observed plying to get ashore the day before unobserved, on which intelligence I offered a reward to my people if they could seize her, which when effected, the *mangee*[1] and *dandys*[2] denied having any letters with them. The receiving no intelligence of the Nabob's motions or his real intent from Omichund, his pretended great favourite, alarmed my thoughts that he was an hidden enemy within our bounds, and

[1] Head boatman. [2] Boatmen.

who had been always accustomed to maintain in his service armed men. The having despatched letters to Monick Chund without my knowledge contrary to a publick order, given out defending all correspondence of that kind, and that in the dead of night, as Mr. Holwell can attest, whose people impeded them though with some difficulty, was another alarming incident, and which Mr. Holwell might have committed to writing and mentioned his, Omichund's, attempt about this time to purchase a quantity of firelocks which the owner prudently refused to sell him; also a following circumstance which plainly proved him a dangerous man: what can be said in his vindication when after every inhabitant was desired to send into the Factory what military stores they had in possession, that an entire room in his house was found full of arms of different kinds, which information I had from Captain Lieutenant Smith in writing?

Mr. Holwell inserts a reasoning in his 33rd paragraph that would have better become him at the time Colonel Scott, our Engineer-General, proposed the plan of erecting a redoubt and drawbridge at Baagbazaar with other works, and which works were then totally approved of by the Gentlemen of Council and by the Company, who ordered them to be completed, which were begun before Colonel Scott's death, and afterwards carried on by his assistants, Messrs. Wells and O'Hara untill the finishing the redoubt and drawbridge, therefore this, after-too-late opinion of what should have been more properly done would have been a motion with great propriety made early last year, if he was then so well instructed in fortifications and had been so well inclined to give his advice setting forth the fortification he now recommends, which probably would have secured us if such operation had been agreed [to]. The letters from the Gentlemen of the Secret Committee are never recommended to be made publick, nor are the replies given there to any man his business to enquire after in this Settlement. I do suppose those gentlemen who had the honour of that correspondence are satisfied they did the duty which was of them required by the tenour of those letters. A short remark I am induced to make on the purport of the 35th paragraph of the letter now before me which reflects on many characters, and had Mr. Holwell given his opinion that it was then no time to

regard form or ceremonies, he perhaps might not have had occasion to write such bitter sentences, which now cannot avail in any point, but to goad and vex mankind. If he had made an enquiry what ballance of gun powder for many years past had been remaining on the Company's books, he would not have found such a store as we had during the siege, which was seven hundred *maunds*. I allow part thereof was damaged and I believe one third of the whole quantity from its age, which in this country cannot be remedied but by preparing it again in the Mills. If he would do justice to his superior, he might well have continued to alledge, I moved for the purchase of the Powder Mills built by Colonel Scott, and recommended that Captain Buchanan should have the making of the gun powder two months before that purchase was made, and it is generally owned that article manufactured by him was better in quality than Europe powder brought here. In the 36th paragraph I find the Muster Rolls are attacked as if I had connived and supported the captains in making false Musters. This intimation I solemnly declare, (whatever advantages the captains may have made) to have been without my knowledge, except those faggots[1] which were allowed by Major Mosman in recompense and in lieu of house rent, as we had no barracks, consequently no lodgings appropriated for the officers, and those allowances were,

For a Captain - - - -	3
For a Lieutenant - - - -	2
For an Ensign - - - -	2

Mr. Holwell who acted as Captain Fenwick's attorney while that gentleman was absent at Bombay and since on his leave of absence to England can by that power I suppose ascertain the profits his company brought in and how they arose. If he had not imagined those profits justifiable, why has he so long covered a fraud, that on his first speaking I should not have hesitated to prevent, nor is he right in the number of military he sets down to have been laid before us on or about the 8th June, which were not Muster Rolls, but particularized in a letter from the officers, nor has Mr. Holwell taken any notice of the sick to the amount

[1] Dummies, persons not actually existing, but for whom pay is drawn.

seventy odd which were then in the hospital and quarters. He does vouch to ascertain the number of military we were told were at the Subordinates to be two hundred men, which is a fact according to the returns from thence, but if we are deceived by our commanding officers there, and deserters from thence and those men who die are still kept on the Rolls, it cannot be expected I can answer for such a deceit. This I am confident of, that at the last Muster day before our troubles, which was the beginning of May and not as is implied in June, the men then under arms with those sick or put down so in the hospital and their quarters with the numbers returned from the Subordinates, and the allowance of men granted by Major Mosman amounted to the number whose pay was drawn for. I had almost forgot that there was daily desertion of many of the Portugueze soldiers and Dutchmen in the Train [as] soon as our troubles commenced. Many Europeans we could not possibly have as for years past we received no recruits, therefore take the number of 215 which appeared under arms the 11 June,

70 sick at the hospital and their quarters,
200 at the Subordinates according to the Returns,
20 up and down the river on different occasions,

with a moderate number that had deserted. It may be found our Employers did not pay for more effective men than really here were maintained without any power of contradiction, except an allowance for servants, which the Board to my knowledge never pleaded ignorance of. Mr. Holwell believes there were not five who had ever seen a musket fired with anger. In that supposition I agree with him. We could have but few Europeans and those deserters from the Dutch ships, the remainder country-born Portugueze wedded to a place of tranquility. If the gentlemen he mentions declare they went on board the ship to deposit papers and on their other occasions, I can only say I never before heard that was their plea for absence from the Factory, or that they intended coming back, but remember well, when I arrived on board the *Dadley*, I was by most of them congratulated with this expression that they were afraid I should have stayed so long in the Fort to be deprived of the means of coming away. Why

the militia were not trained I cannot well explain further than mentioning the Second on the spot according to ancient establishment was their commander, and he for reasons best known to himself was backward in promoting the summoning of them, which to be sure was not put in practice untill the 7th June last. Though really fatigued with the necessity there is to contradict misrepresentations, I cannot quit the task I have assigned myself, and come to answer the 37th paragraph which is partly replied to already. That there were a number of shells filled is certain, but length of time made them of little or no use through the damp of this climate. Had we been apprized that an attack from the Moors was nigh at hand, we certainly should have prepared for their reception by employing those who had a shallow understanding in military works; but a saving system prevented the expence attending fortifications, and having in store materials we did not think to use and those not properly worked. Guns we had mounted more than could be employed and waited for the trucks, &c., Colonel Scott indented for to mount the new cannon. The death of that gentleman left us without an experienced engineer and we expected one to supply his place and put our town and Fort in state of defence against an attack in case of a French war, not apprehending any assault from the Moors.

I am sorry to find Mr. Holwell so forgetful as to deny we did not at the commencement of the troubles take possession of Tannah's Fort, which was effected, and most of the guns then found there were thrown over the walls, and a beginning was made to break down the embrazures, when a party of seven or eight hundred of the Moors' forces appeared, which obliged the small number of men we had ashore there to take to boat, after which it was judged improper to keep any military on board the ships laying there, as it too much divided our strength. The works that were raised to annoy the enemy were nigh as Mr. Holwell sets forth, and I joined with him that more useful steps and operations might have been effected for our better security if we had had men of experience to point out all necessary measures that should have been pursued in the attack of our enemy and for the defence of our Fort. Not willing to pass over any misconstruction of orders I am well persuaded no such were given to Mr. Holwell

(when he repaired to the Factory in the afternoon of the 18th June) that the battery Captain Clayton and he commanded at should be immediately withdrawn, as the maintaining that post was by our wiseheads judged of the greatest consequence, and we set forth to Mr. Holwell that if it was practicable to maintain it until night. We imagined from the number of men slain of the enemies a terror might seize them, and that they would decamp. At the same time a detachment was ordered to support that battery, but before Mr. Holwell returned, or the reinforcement arrived there, Captain Clayton had spiked up the guns and beat a retreat, on which a general shout from the enemy was heard, and I have been told the soldiers expressed themselves much dissatisfied at coming away, and which retreat from the Court House battery was the cause of orders being sent for our people at the other outposts to come in, a measure then thought to have its utility, whether right or wrong I shall not take on me to say. Let military gentlemen judge of those things; I pretend not to have gained any knowledge of that art or of fortifications whilst breathing an unwholesome air at Fulta. Let me repeat again an observation I have made before, and which again is implied in the 43rd paragraph of Mr. Holwell's letter, an attack on his superiors in the Service. To expatiate further than I have already done on my having come away will be repetition of what I condemn myself for, and though that act was not becoming the station I enjoyed, yet my longer stay would have been of no service to my Employers as I am verily persuaded Captain Grant, Mr. O'Hara, and myself were some of the last persons who found means to escape from the cruelty of the Moors, and no one will deny that had the Nabob got me in his possession it would not have been in my power to set at nought vain, idle and false representations of our unhappy fate, nor should I have had as fair occasion to convince my Employers of my zeal for their service, and to promote their future interest, to which end my thoughts shall be employed, and I shall wait their orders to quit a station I have been placed in by Admiral Watson (without any objections being made thereto by any of the Council, covenanted servants or inhabitants) if so it seems to them meet. By this determination I may wrong myself, by being absent from an audience in Leadenhall Street to answer my accusers, and nothing on my

word but having the Company's interest at heart and a sufficient opinion that my residence here is necessary to forward and obtain a happy issue from our troubles, greater priviledges than heretofore on a surer foundation, reparation in full for the losses and damages sustained, and a free open trade, otherwise it would have been my petition to have accompanied Mr. Holwell, an acquaintance of long standing, who proceeds to make me have a belief that the consent Mr. Manningham [obtained] of myself and Council to give directions on what regarded the Marine during the siege has been converted to another purpose than designed. The cause of Mr. Manningham taking that trouble on himself was to ease me from such a multiplicity of applications he saw me encumbered with, and as that order to the commanders of shipping was dated in Fort William, it cannot I think be construed in any other sense than that his, Mr. Manningham's, directions and orders were to be obeyed from that place, nor can any man of sense imply it gave Mr. Manningham power to act out of Fort William, whatever arguments the captain of the *Dadley* may make use of.

Be the motives what they will that urges Mr. Holwell to blame our stay at Fulta, he is singular in his opinion that we should have immediately proceeded to Madrass, an advice I never heard proposed until the middle of September by Major Killpatrick, who was not then seconded by any member of the Board except Mr. Watts. Our arrival at Fulta was not until July, too soon to proceed directly out of the river without a week's provision of any kind, not a market open to supply ourselves, and what small quantities we did get for a month afterwards was brought to us by night. This time elapsed made us well conclude of receiving soon succours, which would have arrived according to our expectations if, as I am told, Admiral Watson his proposal had been accepted, and we had been in possession of our Colony so early as to have transmitted advice thereof that would have reached England as soon as the discontented news of the capture of Calcutta, when we should also have had the advantage of time to conclude terms with the Government that would in all probability now have been finished. If such assistance the Admiral offered joined with the military, His Majesty's ships and the Indiamen could have brought down, had succeeded in

their undertakings, which no man will have the boldness to say otherwise, that early repossession of our Settlement would probably have enabled us to have secured a tolerable good investment for the ships now laying here, which great advantage and many other material points I could fix on would have been accomplished had the gentlemen of Madrass more nicely studied, or had it in their capacity to judge of the Company's interest they have so apparently neglected by not concurring with the early sentiments of Mr. Watson, which had the proposal taken effect, and we had quitted the river and proceeded to Madrass at a time of year the tract there cannot admit of speaking with vessells bound from thence, the disappointment of the ships not finding sloops in the Road or pilots to bring them in the river is too evident to need explanation. Information of the motions of the Nabob and what enemies he had to deal with was also very necessary to learn, with other particulars I shall not here enumerate. I admit that our continuance at Fulta has been an expence the greatest part of which on inspection of the accounts could not have been saved, though we had for the benefit of our constitutions proceeded to the Cormandel Coast, a step [which] in that respect and no other would in my weak judgment [have] served private people who had an averseness to publick good or the community in general.

I demand to what end Mr. Holwell his sophistry all consists, but to have a vote of approbation, and supplant his seniors in the Service. For my own part by my publick advertisement it will I hope appear to every man of reasoning I sought not for or coveted a station I should, if the publick voice had required, submitted its possession to him or to whomsoever it should have been elected, and would of my own accord quitted my allotment had it been required in favour of a gentleman, that not only the Company's servants but the voice of the inhabitants had proclaimed a more fit person to manage the approaching scene, which I doubt not will tend to the emolument of the India Company, and that what is past will prove to have been a necessary measure to awaken us and them from a supineness and lethargy. Could Mr. Holwell true answer make, and bring evidence to his assertions, he would be entitled to all favour. From whom he had the intelligence that no means were used to send succours to the

Factory after I arrived on board ship he does not mention. I protest all methods were pursued to persuade the return of such boats we had in call. I aver that Captain Nicholson of the *Hunter* schooner was the only man that could be persuaded to return with that small vessel to the Factory. His obedience was of no use, for no sooner did he reach the southernmost part of the town, than his people jumped overboard, and he was under a necessity to put back. Inhumanity was never before Mr. Holwell's declaration an apothet attending my character. It is well known I have been too good to those who merited not kindness, and that my compassion was great for the sufferings those men underwent who had not the means left to escape from a cruel enemy. I firmly deny any expression of mine that could be interpreted that there was a general retreat. The most I said was that I did imagine those would follow who could get off shore, and notwithstanding the positiveness assumed by Mr. Holwell to the veracity of what to my knowledge he has set forth, I am an entire stranger to any one person having had a design to return back whom I found on board the *Dadley*. This my assertion let it be deemed a truth, and that I have not wavered from that principle knowingly or wilfully in the course of this letter or in the narrative I present with it, both intended for the perusal of and examination of my Employers as a standard of uprightness, not covering my own faults, which if egregious they have it in their power to vacate my seat in favour of anyone they may esteem more worthy, and who has their interest deeper rooted in heart than him who is without guile but with future circumspection,

Gentlemen, your most obedient servant, ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR.

187. *Letter from Mr. Richard Becher to Council, Fort William, dated 25 January, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—As I am still of opinion that the protection granted to Kissendass and the insult to the Nabob's messenger were essentiall causes of our late misfortunes and very imprudent and unwarrantable actions notwithstanding what Mr. Holwell has wrote on that subject, I must beg leave through your channell to convey my reasons for the said opinion to our

Honourable Employers. The first, admitting Kissendass and his wealth into Calcutta I look on as a very wrong step. Mr. Watts' letter even supposing it to have been worded as in Mr. Holwell's address was not in my opinion reason sufficient. Could it ever be imagined the Government would permit the English to protect or screen from justice a man who had been in so considerable a post as *Naib* or Deputy to the Nabob of Dacca? Surely the Nabob has a right to call his subjects to an account without our interfering, and how the Company's interest was anyway concerned I cannot find out. As to his influence at Dacca, I am to observe, that at the time Mr. Watts wrote his letter, Rajahbullub's family were entirely out of the government of Dacca, and that while they had the management they were very oppressive to the Company and their servants. So that I am sure the Company owed them no obligation on account of their behaviour at Dacca, nor do I believe it to have been in their power at the time Kissendass was received in Calcutta to have been of any materiall prejudice to the Company's affairs at that Factory. I must also differ in opinion with Mr. Holwell as to the probability of the *Begum's* party getting the better of Sur Raja Doula. That there never was much likelihood of it I am convinced, and remember when Messrs. Jenks, Reveley, and Law came from Cossimbuzar in March last, they did not seem to make the least doubt, but that Sur Raja Doula would succeed to the *Subaship* with little or no difficulty, and this was the generall opinion as far as came to my knowledge, and indeed I do not believe the *Begum* had ever above 3 or 4,000 men in her party or pay, and amongst them very few or none of consequence, those shut up in an unfortifyed place, while Sur Raja Doula had at his command in the city at least 30,000 men. So that it does not appear to have been essentiall to the Company's interest to gain the friendship of Rajahbullub and the *Begum's* party at the great risque of the *Suba's* displeasure. I think it would have been more in character if those gentlemen had declined interfering in either party, with which neither could in reason have been offended, and they would have followed the constant practice of the President and Councill of Bengall who have allways prudently thought it their bussyness to carry on the Company's affairs and remain neuter in any disputes in the

Government. This they certainly ought to have done, and I own Mr. Holwell's reasons for acting otherwise are no way convincing to me, nor do I think will to any impartiall person. One wrong step being taken naturally occasions others. Kissendass not being sent out of Calcutta, the receipt of Mr. Watts' letter advising the necessity of his dismission appears very extraordinary, but as I am a stranger to the reason assigned for it, I can say nothing further on the subject than that it appears to me to have been highly necessary to have complied with what Mr. Watts recommended and would have been a step towards retrieving the error before committed. I must now beg leave to make some remarks on the insult offered to the Nabob's messenger, Rajaram's brother, a man as Mr. Holwell justly observes in much trust and confidence both with the late and present *Suba*. I own myself greatly at a loss to find any reason for his coming into Calcutta in disguise. He was sent by the Nabob in a publick character to demand the person and wealth of Kissendass which the English unjustly detained from him, an errand he had no reason to be ashamed of, nor do I imagine he looked on the English in so formadable a light as to prevent his coming openly to make his demand. I am therefore firmly of oppinion that he did not enter Calcutta in disguise and Mr. Holwell's own account of the affair convinces me he did not. That Omichund might come to Mr. Holwell as he represents, and tell him that Naransing came into the place in a Christian dress, I do not doubt, and think it easily accounted for. Omichund had I believe been instrumentall in getting admission for Kissendass and his family into Calcutta and was very sensible the errand Naransing came upon would be disagreeably received. He therefore in dread of the gentlemen's resentment (some of whom he knew were not his friends) might pretend Naransing came in disguise in order if possible to clear himself from any knowledge of his coming. The representation of the *Chokey Zemindar* to Mr. Holwell the next morning that one of Omichund's servants came to him and desired him to let Naransing pass as one of his relations confirms me in my opinion, though I must own the difference of the pretended disguise is not so easily reconciled; there cannot well be a greater distinction in dress, than between a Christian and a Bengall *picar*. Mr. Holwell has not mentioned

which of the disguises he gave credit to, for my own part I believe the whole to have been a story raised by Omichund, but even if he did come in disguise, as Mr. Holwell received him that same evening and was acquainted he had a *perwannah* from the Nabob to demand Kissendass and his wealth, I think the step taken the next morning was very wrong and likely to involve the Company's affairs, it being an affront that it could not be expected any Prince would put up with from a sett of merchants, and I think it will appear before I conclude this letter that the protection of Kissendass and the insult of the messenger were principall causes of our misfortunes; but here I can't help expressing my astonishment to find that the Councill were never consulted on either of the above actions though of such great consequence, but that Messrs. Drake, Manningham, and Holwell assumed to themselves the power of acting as above, though they had no proper authority delegated to them either by the Court of Directors or the Councill here that I ever heard of. Mr. Holwell has certainly taken much pains to make out that the protection of Kissendass and insulting the messenger were not in any shape causes of our late misfortune, but he must excuse me if I think otherwise, and in proof of my opinion I beg leave to refer to the Nabob's letter to Mr. Pigott, in which he declares his intention was not to drive the English out of his country, but that Mr. Drake had behaved ill in protecting his subjects from him, therefore he was obliged to punish him, and in the *muchulca* he got Mr. Watts to sign at Cossimbuzar his first demand was that the English should not protect his subjects. Monickchund and Jaggerseat in their letters[1] to Major Killpatrick assert that the Nabob's anger against the English began on their protecting his subjects, and for my own part I declare every native I conversed with told me the same, and I see no reason by any of the Nabob's actions to think otherwise. His constant demand that we should demolish our fortifications probably proceeded from the same cause for if we demolished our fortifications he might reasonably think it would disenable us from protecting his subjects in future. I cannot help taking notice of that part of Mr. Holwell's address where he says that on a proper representation of the Chief

[1] These letters are not to be found in the Records or in the Orme MSS.

of Cossimbuzar at the *Durbar* the affair of the messenger hardly made any emotion. If I am rightly informed the insult of the messenger was never represented to the Nabob till he reached Rajamahall, owing I believe to the interest made by Mr. Watts with Golam Hussein Cawn and others, but that when the Nabob received Mr. Drake's letter and appeared greatly incensed, Rajaram's brother took that opportunity of acquainting him how he had been used in Calcutta, upon which the Nabob immediately gave orders to march his army back, and swore he would drive the English out of Bengall, and in all likelihood this was the time he wrote the letters to Coja Wazeed which Mr. Holwell supposes the Govêrnour to have in his possession. That he must have been greatly incensed some how or other is certain; he had proceeded as far as Rajamahall against the Purnea Nabob, who he must have looked on as a competitor for his *subadarry*, and yet he waved his resentment against him and marched back directly to attack the English. This does not appear like a premeditated design but rather a sudden gust of passion. What prevented you gentlemen from using proper means to molify him while on his march I do not know, unless it proceeded from severall of you being unacquainted with the provocation given, so that you might be at a loss what to judge of the Nabob's actions, and those few who had been concerned in it took great caution to prevent its being made publick from a conviction I presume that they had acted wrong, else I cannot any way account why the affair of Kissendass and the messenger were never laid before the Councill, as it certainly would have enabled them to form a better judgement of the Nabob's actions. That money would have satisfyed him I am perswaded. It is the custom with the Government here to make exorbitant demands, but it is very seldom that money will not accommodate matters. The Nabob certainly was greatly irritated, but still I think he might have been pacified by a few *lacks* of rupees, besides his Ministers are all venall, and I do not doubt but they might have been bought over to our interest and probably have stopt the Nabob's resentment, but this is a step which I believe never was attempted, but instead of it I am informed you talked big and even refused the mediation of Coja Wazeed when offered. I have heard it alledged that money could not be paid as being contrary to

the Company's positive orders. I must beg leave to assert the contrary. To the best of my remembrance the last orders from the Court of Directors on that subject are in answer to the payment of near 200,000 after our bussyness had been stopt six months.[1] If I am not mistaken the Court approved of that payment, as there appeared an absolute necessity for it, and only gave a caution against complying with the Nabob's exactions while it could be avoided. Surely if ever there was an absolute necessity it was on the late occasion. The Government had never before gone greater lengths than stoping bussyness and putting some forces on our subordinate Factories, but here Cossimbuzar was taken, our gentlemen made prisoners, and the Nabob's army marching to Calcutta, and yet no step taken to prevent his vengeance, though Calcutta was in a defenceless situation having neither men nor ammunition to resist a powerfull army. Besides the subordinate Factories and daily apprehension of a French war ought to have had great weight with you, gentlemen, in promoting an accommodation if possible, but they seem to have been below your notice. Certainly reason would have dictated as the most eligible method to have given way to the times, tried submission or payment of money, after which it would have been very proper to have wrote to the Admirall and Presidencies for assistance, and when you had force sufficient laid hold on a favourable opportunity to demand restitution of the money extorted from you and some security not to be used so in future; how much more eligible this would have been than the fighting system I think will appear to every reasonable man who considers the state of Fort William, the town of Calcutta, &c. I shall therefore say no more on that subject. I think what I have already mentioned will make it appear that the English had given Sur Raja Doula sufficient provocation to make him their enemy without any need of his grandfather's advice. Mr. Holwell will excuse me if I do not admitt Alliverdee Cawn's speech as genuine till better proofs are brought to support it than any I have yet seen. Such advice if realy given it is reasonable to imagine had few or no witnesses, so that it

[1] Mr. Becher's reference is not clear. In letter from Court to Bengal, dated February 12, 1731, paragraphs 37, 38, a payment to the Nawab of Rs. 320,000 for the cessation of hostilities is approved. Stewart (*History of Bengal*, p. 426) mentions a similar payment in 1733.

appears very improbable Mr. Holwell in his distressed situation at Muxadavad should have been able to unravell the mysterries of the Cabinet and explore a secret never yet known to any one but himself. I cannot agree with Mr. Holwell that Sur Raja Doula's actions were entirely consistent with the advice said to be given him by his grandfather; that appears to me to warn him to be on his guard against the French as well as us. They have had their share in the troubles on the Coast so that their fortifications ought not to have been permitted them any more than ours, and never could the *Suba* have a better opportunity of reducing them to his own terms than just after he had conquered the English, when he surrounded them with his victorious army, and they were even in a worse situation for defence than Fort William. It is true the demand was for them to levell their fortifications, but on a proper representation and agreeing to pay 3 *lacks* or 3½, the whole dispute was accommodated in 48 hours. This I think never would have happened had he had a design to reduce the three European nations to the same footing as Armenians and other merchants, for I will venture to assert that he might in three or four days have been in possession of both French and Dutch Factories. So that I cannot see how it would have interfered with his intended expedition against the Purnea Nabob, as I think he did not set out on that expedition till October, which I believe was the soonest it was possible for him to undertake it. During the rainy season the country is so overflowed and the rivers increased that it would have been scarce possible to have crossed an army to the Purnea country. This the Nabob must have been sensible of when he marched back from Rajamahall; but it appears he was so angry with the English that he chose rather to abandon his own interest than not to shew his immediate resentment. I beg leave to assure you, gentlemen, that I have to the best of my knowledge asserted nothing but as it really happened, but if I have inadvertently committed any errors I shall be very ready to acknowledge and correct them as soon as they are pointed out. My only design is to acquaint our Honourable Employers with what appears to me to have been essentiall causes of our misfortunes and such actions as can never be justifyed. I submit the whole to their consideration and with respect.

&c. &c., RICHARD BECHER.

188. *Letter from Major Killpatrick to Court of Directors, dated Camp near Fort William, 25 January, 1757.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOURS,—In my letters from Fulta of August the 15th and September the 19th, 1756, I endeavoured to represent to you in as few words as possible the cruel situation your affairs were then in, in this part of India. I have now the pleasure to congratulate Your Honours on the agreeable change which has since happened and on the prospect there now is of soon seeing every thing resettled.

I will refer Your Honours to Collonel Clive for Returns and particulars in all your military affairs, as he has here now the chief command and has undertaken to inform you of every thing.

What was done since I last had the honour of writing to you, and before the arrival of the squadron, was little more than in keeping up a correspondence with some principal people in the country; which answered almost all our intentions in gaining of time and having provisions supplyed to us while we were obliged to remain inactive, but of this with the particulars of all our transactions you will have an exact account in the general letters. Your Honours are to be the sole judges of our conduct, and I am hopeful you won't find that we have acted amiss. One thing which I am sure of is that many of your servants here seem to have your interest truely at heart and would do to the utmost of their power to promote it. I can answer for myself at least, as I am persuaded that no man in this way would go further; and I am also well convinced so far as I am able to judge from what I have yet seen that there are others, and in particular your Honourable President here, who is perfectly attached to your interest.

I received the commission you were pleased to honour me with as a very great mark of your favour and esteem, and shall do every thing in my power to make you ever think that you have not bestowed it unworthily, though I must own it gives me some concern to observe that you should have thought proper so much more to have lessened my allowances than what you had ever done to any former Major in Bengal, so that you have left me little more than barely my Major's pay, which is but five shillings a day more than that of a private Captain, though I have to support the rank of Third in Council and Commander of the Bengal troops.

I am not greatly interested nor desirous of extraordinary allowances, particularly at a time like this; but what has been given to others in the same station before me I think in some measure is but my right and due, as I hope you will never find that I have done or will do less for your service than any whom you have formerly employed, and I can assure Your Honours that the £250, which I still hope you will order to be payd me, is not any extraordinary sum for one who would support as he ought the character of the station in which you have placed me, for you must be very sensible that it is entirely out of my way to do anything in trade or to enjoy any post which might bring me any other advantages, as all the civil councillors can. So that I hope Your Honours will be pleased to consider of this as also of the request which I made to you in my last concerning getting me a brevet from His Majesty, which may likewise prove for the benefit of your service, if you can think that from my experience in the country and my attachment to your interest I might some time or other be of more use to you in having the command than one of equal rank in His Majesty's service without those advantages.

I have suffered greatly in my health since I last had the honour of addressing you by fatigues and bad accommodation, which has affected my wounds so much that the doctors have strongly advised my going home. However while I am at all able I am resolved not to leave the country at a time like this, though I thought it necessary to let Your Honours know so much, least I should be obliged to quit before even I can be honoured with an answer to this, which I will certainly wait for if my health will permit. Having the honour to be with the greatest respect and sincerest attachment,

May it please Your Honours, &c. &c., JAMES KILLPATRICK.[1]

P.S.—Though I mentioned to Your Honours in the above that Collonel Clive would send you general Returns of the whole, yet I think it my duty also to send particular Returns of the Bengal troops; which I here now have the honour to inclose you, being as above.

J. K.

[1] This is the correct spelling of the name. (See autograph signature, *Bengal Letters Received*, 1757, p. 367, India Office.)

189. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London, dated 26 January, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. Copy of our letter transmitted under cover to the President and Council of Fort Saint George to be forwarded *viâ* Bussorah is enclosed. We shall in this address give you a summary account of our proceedings since our appointment by the *Walpole's* packet.

2. By that ship we received a letter from the Select Committee at Fort Saint George importing the following particulars:—that His Majesty's squadron and the Company's ships *Marlborough* and *Walpole* were then upon the point of sailing for Ballasore Road; that they had embarked on them 528 military, all officers included, 109 of the Train and 940 seepoys under the command of Robert Clive, Esqr.: that they had sent 4,00,000 rupees on the above ships for the expences of the expedition consigned to Colonel Clive; that they had directed him to apply to us for plans of a treaty to be made with the Nabob and of military operations, but had empowered him to deviate from the whole or part of such plans if he thought them inconsistent with the Company's interest, and that they had directed him in case they should recall him to return with his troops, leaving as many as he may judge sufficient for the defence of Calcutta.

3. The *Protector* and *Lapwing* brought us another supply of seepoys.

4. Upon the arrival of Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive we judged it proper and necessary to give them an invitation to our Committee, and accordingly our Consultations while at Fulta were always held on board the *Kent*, particular regard being paid to Mr. Watson's advice, whose attachment to the Company's interest we have since experienced.

5. Esteeming it necessary previously to request of Mr. Watson the assistance of his squadron to retake Fort William and oblige the *Suba* to make us reparation for our losses and injuries, we did so on the 16th December, and received a handsome assurance of the Admiral of doing all in his power for the Company's benefit; as far as was consistent with the safety of His Majesty's ships.

6. A letter was then wrote to the Nabob from the Admiral

implying his design of coming here to re-establish the Company and procure restitution of their losses, which it was hoped the Nabob would be inclinable to grant. This letter was wrote with intention to amuse him and prevent his reinforcing the garrison at Calcutta during the delay of the squadron at Fulta account of the spring tides. Hitherto no answer has been received to that letter, though we are assured it was delivered.

7. The time of moving from Fulta with the success of the squadron have already been mentioned, as well as the publication of our Manifesto and Declaration of War. Upon our request Admiral Watson has likewise declared war against the *Suba* on His Majesty's part.

8. One of the first steps we took after our return was to write to the *zemindars* of the neighbouring *pergunnahs* to pay the rents and revenues of their respective districts into our Treasury, on pain of having their country destroyed in case of refusal. Several of them have sent their *vackeels* and promised obedience to our orders. By this means we have hopes of easing the Company considerably in the charges of the operations it may be expedient to carry on against the *Suba*.

9. The capture and destruction of Hughly was esteemed so essential to strike a terror into the *Suba's* troops and encourage any malcontents to declare in our favour, that the *Bridgwater* and *King's Fisher* with a considerable detachment of land forces were sent upon that expedition, which has been executed with the loss of but few men of our side, but it is reported that a great number of the enemy have been slain. The fort was blown up by Major Killpatrick and the town, *gunge*, &c., burnt to ashes. This we have reason to believe has had the desired effect and thrown the country into a vast consternation. We have withdrawn our troops, and have encamped our military, seepoys, &c., upon a plain near Dumdumma.

10. Our intelligence from all quarters agreeing that the Nabob is on his march this way with a large army, we have wrote the Select Committee at Bombay and Fort Saint George and inforced the necessity of supplying us with troops to compleat our re-establishment and procure reparation for our losses, damages, and charges.

11. The French settled at Chandernagore having made proposals to Admiral Watson for a neutrality within the Ganges which the Admiral had not accepted, we thought it our duty (upon receiving private advice from Mr. Boddam of His Majesty's Declaration of War) to represent the benefit a treaty of neutrality would be of to the Company and community by taking away any pretence for a junction of that nation with the Nabob—a junction which would prove very detrimental to our measures if permitted to take place. Mr. Watson was accordingly addressed to upon that subject. A few days after the Admiral made us the three following propositions regarding the French settled here and requested our sentiments, which of the three would be the most eligible for the interest of the Company in our present circumstances. The first was:—For a simple treaty of neutrality with the French within the Ganges and if so, when to be concluded, whether now or some time before his departure. The second:—for a treaty of neutrality joined with a league offensive and defensive against the *Suba* if it could be effected, if not a defensive league only. The last:—for acting against the French openly by sea and land and using our whole force to exterminate them totally out these provinces.

12. These propositions were duly weighed by us and the result of our deliberation was, that a treaty of simple neutrality with the French within the Ganges, to continue during the course of the present war subsisting between the Crowns of Great Britain and France, was to be preferred to the other two propositions, and that the sooner such a treaty was concluded the better. This opinion we transmitted in writing to the Admiral.

13. Our reasons for this opinion were chiefly these:—By concluding such a treaty of neutrality, we prevented their assisting the *Suba* in any shape against us; secured our own Settlement (at present but ill prepared to withstand an European enemy) from any apprehensions of its being attacked by them, and were thereby left at liberty to prosecute the war against the Nabob with more vigour. It will likewise give the Settlement an opportunity of recovering its trade should we be able shortly to put an end to the troubles.

14. By a letter of the 13th November from the Select Committee at Fort Saint George we expect to be reinforced from Bombay

with 500 men. Upon the arrival of their troops and those embarked on the *Cumberland*, we hope to be enabled to act in the field, and if successful in one decisive battle to end these troubles upon terms both honorable and advantageous to the Company in a short time. That the Nabob is uneasy and apprehensive of the consequences of the war he has brought upon himself, we have good reason to believe from a letter of Coja Wazeed's to Colonel Clive and the mediation they have desired the French to undertake in order to accommodate matters. The demands we verbally made the French deputies were in substance:—To have restitution for our losses and satisfaction for the damages and charges sustained in consequence of the *Suba's* violences; to have permission to erect such fortifications as we might think proper in whatever part of the country we chuse to settle a Factory; and to be allowed a mint in Calcutta. These demands were forwarded by the French to Coja Wazeed, by whose answer there is great room to imagine there will be little difficulty made to any of the articles except the mint; and we flatter ourselves that we shall not only compel the Nabob to make restitution and reparation for the private and publick losses sustained by the Europeans, but likewise exact a more punctual obedience to the tenour of our *phirmaund*, and claim such an increase of our revenues and such immunities for our commerce as to render this Settlement more beneficial to the Company than it has been since its first establishment.

15. To preserve such an acquisition of priviledges and indulgences as we may be enabled to make the *Suba* consent to, and to secure your trade in these dominions, it will be essentially necessary to erect a strong fortification and maintain a respectable military force, a proportion of which charge may be borne by the inhabitants. For this purpose it will be proper to assess every black merchant or resident within our bounds according to his abilities for the support and expence of a body of troops consisting of Europeans and seepoys, and to raise the ground rent of such houses as are situated within the fortifications for the disbursement of that charge. Both of these methods we imagine will be readily assented to by the Europeans and natives, will enable the Company to keep the Government within bounds at an easy

expence, and put an end to the continual extortions and venal practices of the *Durbar*. Terms so beneficial and desirable we doubt not will be highly satisfactory. We must therefore recommend it to you, Honourable Sirs, to send us out able engineers to plan a strong and regular fortification, and give us permission to execute that plan immediately. We must likewise repeat that it will be proper to keep up a large military force, and request you will send us out by the first opportunity a considerable body of disciplined troops if possible, with positive orders to the gentlemen at Madrass not to detain them upon that Coast on any account whatever.

16. Military stores of all kinds will be wanted with good artillery officers, which company is now under the command of Major Killpatrick.

17. As it would be imprudent to risque a second capture of the Settlement in case we should be unsuccessfull in the field, we are making the present fort as defensible as we can by digging a ditch 30 feet wide round the walls [forming a *fausse-bray*], levelling the houses within — paces round, and throwing up a glaçis with the dirt of the ditch and the rubbish of the houses. These works will amount to a trifle, and will we imagine secure us from further attempts of the Government. We purpose likewise to detain the *Protector* in the river, and have wrote to Mr. Bourchier and his Council for another ship of force to remain here till we are better settled. We have likewise ordered 20,000 *maunds* of rice and provisions of all kinds to be laid in by the *Buxey*.

18. The quick arrival of the troops from Bombay in town and those on the *Cumberland* may be of such importance to our affairs, that we have dispatched boats and small craft to Ingellee to bring them up immediately on their importing.

19. Having recited a detail of our transactions, we are next to request your permission to make some observations on the extraordinary conduct of the Select Committee at Fort Saint George in the course of the expedition they have set on foot to recover your possessions, estates, rights and priviledges in Bengall. Those gentlemen have authorised and empowered Colonel Clive to act as Commander-in-chief of the land forces to be employed on this expedition. They have given him an independant power to

pursue such plans of military operations and to make such treaties of peace as he may think fit in case he differs in his opinion from us. They have consigned singly to him a sum of rupees 400,000 with all the military stores; have enjoined him to return upon being recalled with his troops, leaving only as many behind as he may judge sufficient for the defence of Calcutta, and have appointed a Paymaster and Commissary to the troops.

20. The authority they have assumed of appointing Colonel Clive the Commander-in-chief of the forces in Bengall (notwithstanding they acknowledge us as the Governor and Council here and in direct opposition to the tenour of the commission we have received this season) is so unwarrantable that we cannot avoid taking notice of it as an encroachment upon the rights and trust invested in us by our Employers.

21. Their motive for empowering Colonel Clive to execute whatever plans of military operations he may judge most efficacious to compel the *Suba* to terms, and to conclude such treaties as he may think most for the Company's interest, is so extremely weak and insufficient that we have been obliged to require of Colonel Clive to comply with and follow all orders he may receive from this Committee respecting any plans of military operations, and on no account to conclude any treaty of peace or accommodation without our assent and approbation. We doubt not, Honourable Sirs, you will concur with us in thinking it strange that a greater confidence should be put in a single person (totally unacquainted with the nature of the country and Government) for prosecuting and finishing these disputes than in us, the Governor and Council established here by the Honourable Company. As we are of opinion this proceeding of your servants at Madrass may prove a prejudice rather than benefit to the Company's affairs should Colonel Clive deviate from our directions, we have protested against any miscarriages that may happen by lodging such an extravagant power in the Colonel.

22. Consigning so large a sum of money as 4,00,000 rupees and all the military stores singly to Colonel Clive without subjecting his, the Paymaster's or Commissary's, accounts to any inspection or controul of our Board is a latitude the Company have not even conferred upon their Governor and Council

at this place. Whether they are warranted for such an extraordinary step or not, you are the best judges, Honourable Sirs. We can only say, it is a treatment very unhandsome and diffident, and what we are not conscious of having merited from those gentlemen.

23. Their orders to Colonel Clive to return with his troops in case of being recalled, and submitting to his judgment what number of men may be necessary for our defence, is likewise partial and void of regard to the Company's interest. How important a re-establishment in these provinces must be to our employers they cannot be ignorant. [To leave that unfinished, to forego the hopes of obtaining reparation for your heavy losses and satisfaction for the charges incurred on this occasion, merely because the French may attack their possessions on that Coast, is in our opinion far from consistent with the true interest of the Company.] We must also remark that though they have been pleased to give Colonel Clive these directions, the number of troops sent under his command with those which arrived with Major Killpatrick do not exceed, if equal, the number of recruits designed for this Presidency and detained on their Coast.

24. We have required of Colonel Clive to recede from the independant powers given him by the Select Committee at Fort Saint George, and subject himself to the orders of this Presidency; but he has refused to surrender that authority. We must leave it to you, Honourable Sirs, to take proper notice of so injurious a conduct in your servants on the Coast.

25. Since writing thus far the Admiral has received an answer from the Nabob to his letter and has wrote another to desire he would listen to the proposals he would receive from us.

26. Mr. Holwell, who is one of our Committee, being on his departure for England on this sloop by reason of his health, we have given the care of these advices to his charge, and are with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sirs, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, RICHARD BECHER.

190. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, 27 January, 1757.*

Your letter of the 23rd day of this month I have this day received. It has given me the greater pleasure, as it informs me you had written to me before, a circumstance I am glad to be assured of under your hand, as the not answering my letter would have been such an affront as I could not have put up with without incurring the displeasure of the King my master.

You tell me in your letter that the reason of your having expelled the English out of these countries was the bad behaviour of Mr. Drake, the Company's chief in Bengal. But besides that Princes and Rulers of States, not seeing with their own eyes or hearing with their own ears, are often misinformed, and the truth kept from them by the arts of crafty and wicked men, was it becoming the justice of a Prince to punish all for one man's fault, or to ruin and destroy so many innocent people as had no way offended, but relying on the faith of the royal *phirmaund* expected protection and security both to their property and lives, instead of oppression and murder which they unhappily found? I say are these acts of justice becoming a Prince? No body will say they are. They can only then have been caused by wicked men, who have misrepresented things to you through malice or for their own private ends. For great Princes delight in acts of justice and in shewing mercy. If therefore you are desirous of meriting the fame of a great Prince, and a lover of justice, shew your abhorence of these proceedings by punishing those evil counsellors that advised them. Cause satisfaction to be made to the Company and others who have been deprived of their property, and by these acts of justice turn the edge of the sword that is ready to fall upon the heads of your innocent subjects.

If you have any cause of complaint against Mr. Drake, as it is but just the master alone should have a power over his servant send your complaints to the Company; and I will answer for it they will give you satisfaction.

Although I am a soldier as well as you, I had rather receive satisfaction from your justice, than to be obliged to force it by the distress of your innocent subjects.[1]

[1] The last paragraph was written in the Admiral's own hand.

191. *Letter from Omichand to Colonel Clive, dated 28 January, 1757.*

God be praised that Calcutta is again restored to its former splendour by your happy arrival. Most fortunate is their lot who serve you, but how unhappy is mine who am secluded from your presence by my confinement, which you must be acquainted with. I hope that when I shall have the honour to be called to attend you I shall be able to find means to procure my liberty. At present I understand I lie under your displeasure by means of some evil persons who have misreported me to you. But I doubt not of being able to wipe off that stain. I have made it the subject of my constant devotion that God would bring back my masters into the country. God has granted my prayers. How little I am deserving of blame will be evident when I appear before you, and then I shall have justice done me. A man who can wish ill to those from whom he receives his bread will be branded with ignominy in the world. How can he hope for success or happiness? God grant that I may get free from my confinement, that I may throw myself at your feet and lay my whole conduct before you, who will grant me justice, and then I shall be delivered from all my misfortunes.

P.S.—I desire Major Kilpatrick to accept of my humble respect.

192. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated Camp on Barnagut Plain, 28 January, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—The Bombay troops are not yet arrived, neither have we heard anything of them; the absence of the *Cumberland* is another disappointment, and by the enclosed Return you will see our present effective strength, now we are all joined and encamped.

Mr. Watson has not yet come to any resolution about his departure, and I fear it will be difficult for me to leave this place without his concurrence and assistance; however, nothing but the prospect of a speedy and honourable Peace will induce him to stay much longer, and you may be assured I shall accompany him without something of the like nature happens so as to give hopes

of a Peace being soon concluded greatly to the honour and advantage of the Company. Be assured, gentlemen, I shall follow your instructions, and not draw out the war to length on any consideration whatever.

Since my last dated 8th instant the *Marlborough* is safely arrived at Calcutta, and all the sepoys and most of the artillery and military stores landed. A few days ago the Admiral heard of the *Cumberland's* arrival at Vizagapatam in a very sickly condition, and immediately ordered Mr. Pocock to Culpee.

The attack upon Hughly has proved very successful as will appear by the enclosed journal. The unlucky accident of the *Bridgewater* grounding in the river gave time to the inhabitants to carry away all their money and most valuable effects, however much was burnt and destroyed and goods estimated at 1½ *lack* of rupees taken. The Dutch have acted a very unfair part by receiving and secreting the Moors' effects which they have absolutely refused to give up. Their treatment we must submit to for want of sufficient proof.

The expedition to Dacca is in great forwardness, which is to be carried on by 400 sailors in boats under the command of Captain Speke. The surprize of this place may be of great consequence to the Company's affairs. The success might be rendered more certain and the consequence more advantagious by a military force, but that does not depend on me; neither would it be prudent to divide our little army when there is reason to expect the Nabob with an army of 40,000 men every day. Our last advices say he is at a place called Nieseray, a few leagues beyond Hughly.

I have wrote several letters to the great men of the country, and since the capture of Hughly received two from Juggut Seat and Coja Wazeed which I inclose you. It is thought these letters were wrote by the Nabob's order; they were sent to Monsieur [Renault] Governer of Chandannagore, who dispatched two of his Council with them and offered at the same time his mediation. Last night came likewise a message from the Dutch that the Nabob was inclinable to treat and that they were likewise desirous to be mediators. The Admiral seems to approve of the offer from the former, to which I am greatly averse, not thinking a nation at

open war with us and declared enemys, fit subjects to entrust the Company's concerns with. If a peace be concluded through the French mediation, they will become of consequence by our means and at our expence. My answer to Juggut Seat and Coja Wazeed with the proposals delivered me by the President and Gentlemen of the Select Committee, I enclose you.

Soon after the Gentlemen of the Select Committee addressed you on the power you had invested me with, I received a letter from them likewise requiring me to give up my authority. Enclosed is a copy of it, and likewise my answer which I hope will meet with your approbation. You may be assured I shall act with that moderation towards the Gentlemen here, that it must be their own fault if anything detrimental to the Company's affairs should happen through a misunderstanding between them and me. I have hitherto acquiesced in all their proposals and shall continue so to do as long as they lead to the good of the service.

The Gentlemen here are of opinion that a neutrality with the French in the Ganges is most for the Company's interest, and have applied to Mr. Watson for that purpose. Nothing is yet concluded. It is certain Chandernagore has been much strengthened of late under pretence of a war with the English, the French having obtained permission to fortify it; the houses all round it are cleared away and there is a good ditch; their number by the best intelligence amounts to 180 Europeans, volunteers included, and 160 sepoys from the Coast.

The ships, boats and forces are come down from Hughly, and there is reason to believe the Nabob's army will soon be here. We have fortified a great tank near Barnagut with high banks which command a very extensive plain; we have likewise erected two batteries, one advanced towards Dum Dum Bridge and another to the river side to keep our communication open with the river; in short we are in a very good condition to act defensibly against his whole army, and when the other forces arrive hope to finish everything by a decisive stroke.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that a ditch of 30 feet and 12 deep is finished. An esplanade of 200 yards and a glaçis will likewise be compleated in five or six days. To the southward the

wall of the *godown* is raised equal to the curtain, and a strong battery will be erected at the southern barrier by the waterside which will flank all that face. Another at the northern barrier by the waterside will flank the northern face. To the east a ravelin, which had been begun by the gentlemen of Calcutta, will be made a large and fine battery, which will flank all that face. From the western side there is nothing to fear, being well secured by the river and a strong Line of guns. All this work I am positive will be compleated in less than ten days. The ditch will be pallisaded and may be either kept wet or dry with great ease. In short, I may assure you, Fort William cannot be taken again by the Moors, but by cowardice.

Enclosed go the Paymaster's accounts for December, Rolls of the military and a general Muster of the troops, &c., on the Madras establishment.

You will perceive that the pay of the troops and *lascars* has been according to the Madras establishment, reckoning at 350 Arcot rupees for 100 *pagodas*, which in fact is a very moderate exchange. Major Killpatrick's detachment having been paid in this manner, I found myself under a necessity of continuing the practice. Most of the officers being desirous of receiving their pay on the Coast, their names, and the arrears due to them, are noted at the foot of the Paymaster's accounts.

The sepoys claimed a promise made them in Madras before they engaged to come on this expedition, that they should be paid *batta* according to the old regulation, and indeed I have some remembrance of it myself; however they seemed to insist so strenuously on their point, that I thought it would have bad consequences not to acquiesce to it.

The King's officers having been always in point of emoluments put on the same footing with the Company's officers, to prevent dissatisfaction by which the Service might be prejudiced, I ordered *batta* to be paid them from the time the Company's officers received it.

As the number of voluntiers here were large and their *batta*, which was equal to an ensign's, run very high, I thought it necessary to reduce it to two rupees *per* day.

I omitted to mention in my last that I had contracted for the

victualling of the military at ⅓ of a rupee a man *per* day, which, considering the present disturbed situation of the country, is not unreasonable.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

GENTLEMEN,—Since writing the above, several occurrences have happened very necessary to acquaint you with.

I have duplicate of your favor of the 2nd and original of the 11th December. I need not repeat how ready I shall be to follow your orders in returning to the Coast as soon as possible with all the force that can be spared. At present the Admiral seems determined not to quit the province till affairs are accommodated, which there seems some prospect of. Yesterday he received a letter from the Nabob, the purport of which was that the Company should be restored to their former possessions, and restitution of their effects, provided Mr. Drake be deprived of the management of their affairs. Coja Wazeed's answer to me gives hopes of further advantage as will appear by the enclosed. The Dacca expedition is suspended till the result of our negotiation is better known.

For the sake of dispatch and to prevent confusion it is agreed that all correspondence with the Nabob and his Ministers be carried on jointly by the Admiral and me, and that all the treaties be signed and ratified by us. You may be assured I shall pay no regard to private interest when such terms as are consistent with the Company's interest can only be obtained.

I cannot pretend to say whether the Nabob's intention be really to treat or only to amuse us. By this day's advices his brother has crossed the river with 10,000 men and he himself is said not to be far off. I hope soon to give you a better account in what manner things are likely to end.

The French mediation has been refused and a neutrality in the Ganges offered them.

By Mr. Pocock's letter to the Admiral, dated at Vizagapatam the 9th January, he seems doubtful whether Monsieur Bussy's intentions are for the northward or southward, or whether he will not continue where he is to keep up his influence with Salabat Jung. His march to the northward (if his design was not against

Vizagapatam) gives reason to believe he is coming into this Province.

I remain, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

Camp, 29 January, 1757.

193. *Letter from Mr. Bisdom to Admiral Watson, dated Hugli, 28 January*, 1757.[1]

In pursuance of your Excellency's request, as expressed by your letter of the 23rd inst., I have forwarded your reply to the persons who had induced me to write to you in respect to a cessation in the present strife, but have received notice that no one would dare lay it before the Nawab, and that I had better drop the business altogether.

I have the honour, &c. &c., A. BISDOM.

194. *Translation (by one of the Company's clerks) of a letter from Monsieur E. Dechaulaye to M. Merlet, Brigadier, &c., at Paris, dated Calcutta, 29 January*, 1757.

It will without doubt seem very particular to thee, my dear Merlet, to receive news from me still, thinking me in all likelyhood set out in order to rejoin my wife, children and the rest of our family. Such was my most ardent desire, but a destiny (which I am every moment cursing), has determined it otherwise. Mr. Young[2] seeing himself detested, despised, and not knowing how to support himself with honour has taken the resolution of withdrawing to the English nation with about 80,000 rupees value of merchandize belonging to the Company, which he got out of the magazine[3] in a hurry under pretence they would be safer on board an English ship on the Ganges from the insult of the Moors' tyranny (the effects of which all the European nations have severely felt) and thought that I would have fallen into his schemes which he concealed under a panick to which I did not give in. Being therefore against him and protesting against the violence of his proceedings, I was under the necessity of chusing either to remain and take upon me the recovering and putting these unfortunate affairs into

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

[2] Agent of the Emden or Prussian Company.

[3] French *magasin*=warehouse.

order, or leave them to be carried away no one knows where! The loss of a stock of 1,700,000 lb. at least, of which I shall scarce recover a 16th part after all my care, trouble, &c. On the other hand besides the danger I have run of being drowned by shipwreck,[1] and the illness I have undergone since that event, I have still been obliged to support the entire loss of what was saved from our misfortune by the tyranny of the Prince of the country who caused it to be seized, and there is no likelyhood of recovering any part of the merchandizes as the seizing of them was by no means lawful. The *Durbar* or *Phousdar* had such a contempt for my Chief, that he would not permit me a favourable audience to him for four months, at the end of which time the English coming into the Ganges with a great number of troops and King's ships of war, after retaking their city of Calcutta set fire to all the Moorish villages and plundered Hugley, a little city where the *Phousdar* resided and had his magazines, so that my goods and effects became a booty to the English the 6th of this month. I have suffered 1,200 lb. and have lost everything without having a single comfort left. The war that has been declared here between the French and English has not yet occasioned any hostilities within the Ganges, but without [doubt] they have taken the advantage, for they have lately taken a ship dispatched from Pondicherry for the Mallabar Coast. This prelude has spread a general fear into the minds of the merchants and will hinder their sea undertakings, lessen their estates and deprive me of any assistance during my unexpected stay in Bengal, to which I was induced by honour and duty, my passage having been settled with M. le Vigne Buisson, a very friendly man and of the best of characters, the only French Europe ship in Bengal, but he was detained absolutely eight days ago, but if things were like to be as they were at first, I would take passage on a Dutch ship, a people extremely clownish and who live solely on nasty provisions and sea biscuit, which I would however put up with for the pleasure of seeing my own estates again. Though I may not do very well, it may happen that my stay in India may be of some advantage to me as I shall not be idle, if I am assisted by some

[1] Apparently he was on board the *Prince Henry of Prussia*, which was wrecked in the Ganges about August 21. (See Log of the *Delaware*.)

friends who have made large promises to me. Poor St. Leger (who was of great service to me during my absence on the Coast, who I had this autumn like to have lost by illness, and who, as well as I has lost all) keeps by me, not being willing to leave me a moment. It makes me uneasy that I cannot have an opportunity of employing him to advantage that he might regain what he has lost with me.

I am under the utmost concern about the situation of my wife and poor children, whether things are in the same condition as I left them, but what can I do? God knows the desires of my heart, and I am conscious His Will can accomplish them. I write to thee, my dear friend, in a great hurry to take the advantage of the secret despatch of an English packet boat. Besides we have been on the river Ganges for these four days, and from the accounts we receive from Mr. Young affairs are so intricate that he himself scarce knows whether I may write to thee and my wife by the English ship, on which he tells us he is to embark. Adieu my dear friend, I recommend my son to thee more than ever, and intreat thee to let me hear from thee by every opportunity.

I am allways thy faithful friend, EHCEVRON DECHAULAYE.

P.S.—I recommend thee my dear friend to my wife, who mentions my disaster of which I believe she is informed. If she is not I commit the informing her of my misfortunes to thy prudence for she may fear the worst should she be longer ignorant of them. My most humble respects to thy dear family. I shall write to thee next week by the Dutch ship.

195. *Letter from Mrs. Massey to Mr. William Davis, dated Calcutta, 30 January, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—Your favour of the 5th January, 1756, came safe to my hands, and it gave me an infinite deal of pleasure and satisfaction to find you injoy a perfect state of health, which I pray God for the continuance thereof to the end of your days. I, thanks to God Almighty, am in a good state of health, but the extreme miseries that I am now under since the capture of our town of Calcutta on the 20th June last to this day has reduced me to a mere skeleton being for want of sustenance and raiment to defend

myself from the inclemency of the cold weather, having had the misfortune, as well as the rest of the inhabitants, to lose every individual thing I was mistress of in this world; the coming down of the Nabob was so sudden that nobody had time to secure their properties, so that it fell an entire sacrifice to the infidells. Among the rest of my irreparable losses Mr. Holwell had the misfortune to loose my interest bond for the 10,000 Company rupees with the rest of his papers which was the only support that my deceased spouse left me, so that at present I am left in the void world a most miserable wretch destitute even of common supports of life.

My brother Pollock for this seven years last past by sailing as a supracargo, thanks to God, had acquired a competent fortune, but in the sackage of the town he was stripped to his shirt, and Providence got him out of the fort with life that he was not shut up in the Black Hole after the taking of the fort. Luckly got out with the Armenians, and as he has lost everything he possessed in this world, and a family to maintain, it is hardly in his power to maintain and support me, though at present I live with him and have done so since the capture of the town. I can say on my conscience that he is a very affectionate and loving brother to me as he always has been and uses me with the greatest kindness imaginable, but the declaration of the French war will deprive him from going to sea to work for his bread, and by that means I must be an intolerable burden to him when he is not hardly able to support his own family with common necessaries of life.

I have made my application to Mr. Holwell, who is extremely concerned for my calamitous condition but no means left him to relieve my miseries even with a small sum of money, and as he is going home I most earnestly intreat for the love of God that you and him joyntly will endeavour to secure me the interest of the aforesaid sum of ten thousand rupees of the Company and procure a new bond from them which will be the only means and comfort of my old age. My dwelling-house is in a most ruinous condition and have not wherewithal to repair it, and am extremely afraid it will come down this Rains, the infidels has so misused not only my house but all the houses in town. My brother joyns with me in compliments and best wishes for your and Miss Davis's health and happiness, &c. Success attend you in all your undertakings

and that you may injoy all the blessings and comforts of this life and remain with the greatest respect,

Dear Sir, your most obedient and ever obliged humble servant, ANN MASSEY.

P.S.—I shall be infinitely obliged to you to commiserate my hard case and send me out some charity that I may not entirely starve.

196. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 30 *January*, 1757.

I wrote Your Excellency a letter some time ago to which you have not been pleased to send me an answer as yet. No doubt Your Excellency has been informed that I am Commander-in-chief of the land forces, and that I am the King of England's officer. In future the Admiral and I shall address Your Excellency jointly in all affairs relating to the interest and welfare of the Company, and in a day or two shall send you some proposals, the purport of which will be to settle peace in your dominions, and to request some favours of Your Excellency for the benefit of the Company.

Your Excellency well knows what great hardships and immense losses the English have suffered through your displeasure. As you are a great soldier you must likewise be a man of great justice, for the one is inseperable from the other: and I am sure your goodness and equity as well as affection for your poor unhappy subjects will induce you to give the Company satisfaction for their losses. Though I have been a soldier many years, and it has pleased Providence always to bless me with success on the Coast, I had much rather the Company should be indebted to your generosity for the restitution of their affairs than to the force of arms.

I hope Your Excellency will weigh and consider this affair, and by your kindness to the English make them your friends instead of your enemies, by which means you will find them ready to join and support you against all such as dare to disturb the peace of your province.

197. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to John Adlercron, Esq., dated Camp, 30 January, 1757.*

Our situation in camp is a very good one. The banks of a great tank, which we made a fortification of, covers our rear, and we have erected two advanced batteries to remedy as much as possible any inconveniences attending the spot of ground we have occupied.

Yesterday I received advice that the Nabob's brother had crossed the river with 10,000 men at a place called Cowgauchee, about 18 miles from our camp, and that the Nabob himself was following. It is computed the whole army may amount to 30,000 fighting men and 50 pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding these formidable preparations he seems disposed for Peace and we are now treating. How affairs will end is very doubtful.

198. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 30 January, 1757.*

The letter you wrote me I have received, and take proper notice of the contents. You write that you desire to have matters accommodated, and to live in good understanding with me, to have reparations for the Company's losses. Assure yourself I will make no scruple of complying with the demand. I find it is both our intentions that measures for the Company's losses, the country's good, and the safety of the inhabitants should be pursued. Therefore send a person of entire trust and confidence with orders and power to treat upon these affairs. You may send such a person without being under any apprehensions of his safety. You may depend upon my giving a currency to the Company's business at all their Factories upon its former footing. I make no doubt things will be soon accommodated upon your sending such a person. The manner and time of restoring the Company's losses shall be settled. This I hope you will agree to. I know you are a soldier and as such I should chuse to be your friend. If you are willing to make up these troubles and will live in friendship with me, I shall never be wanting on my part to forward your Company's business, and shew their servants my favour upon all occasions. To render justice and to study the

good [of] my country and tenants are what I am desirous of. This is what I have always had at heart: for this reason God has always blessed me with success.

199. *Translation of an extract from a letter from Monsieur E. Dechaulaye of the Prussian Service to his wife at Paris, dated on the Ganges, before Calcutta, 30 January, 1757.*

Every one has lost by different misfortunes this year; the entire stagnation of trade occasioned by the troubles in Bengal, the tyranny of the government of the country princes and the preparations for a fresh war between the different nations have greatly lessened their fortunes and thrown me in particular into the greatest perplexity. I don't know but our affairs relating to the ship may oblige me to remain in India longer than this year from a point of honour, in case Mr. Young resolves to go to Europe to render the Company an account of his transactions, for he has taken a great deal more on him than he ought, for which the three supercargoes and myself have protested against him in form.

200. *Translation of a letter from the Nawab to M. Renault, 30 January, 1757.*[1]

To the greatest of merchants, the model of true friends, M. Renault, Director-General of the French Company. Be always happy. I remember that between the greatest of merchants and the English, a people without faith, there is enmity and hatred. This agrees with what these faithless persons have written to Farpuktontdjar, that they do not wish to correspond with me through the French, whilst I—I will never pardon their crimes except at your intercession. For your information I send you the letter to Farouktontdjar which I have received. I learn also by Raja Manikchand, my beloved brother and sustainer of my grandeur and power, that it is certain that the greatest of merchants promises to assist me. This is why I notify you, that if you, who are the model of true friends, employ your power to aid me, and if you continue in this intention, you should prepare

[1] Archives Coloniales, Paris.

the ships of war which you have in this country, put one of my people on each, and send them to punish this faithless people and chase them from this country. I abolish for ever the annual imposts on your commerce, and I give you the right to establish a mint at Chandernagore. I will demand a *firman* for this from the light of the presence, the greatest and purest, the Emperor of Delhi, and will send it to you. Until the arrival of the *firman* I will give you a *parwana*, with my seal, so that you may exercise these two privileges with perfect tranquillity of mind. I will load you with benefits and marks of my good will. If you will send me a reply promising to help me, I will also write on this subject to the high in honours and in dignity, the very illustrious Nawab, M. Bussy. Given this 11th day of *Djamadiel-mah*, the third year of the reign of the Emperor. I will tell you further that I am sending to you Mir-macha-halla, (?) who has my confidence. He will instruct you fully [in all things].

201. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to William Mabbot, Esq., dated Camp, 31 January, 1757.*

One word more for the good of the Company and then I must conclude.

Mr. Holwell is a specious and sensible man, but from what I have heard and observed myself I cannot be persuaded he will ever make use of his abilities for the good of the Company. I am well informed there is no merit due to him for staying behind in the fort, nothing but the want of a boat prevented his escape and flight with the rest.

* * * * * *

I cannot address Mr. Drake without giving him concern and uneasiness; assure him of my gratitude and respect; assure him at the same time, that if his nephew has erred I believe it is in judgment not principle.

202. *Extracts from a letter from Council, Fort William, to the Court of Directors, dated 31 January, 1757.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOURS,—1. Triplicate of our letter from Fulta under date the 17th September we now inclose in this

packet. You will therein see the misfortunes which have befallen your Settlement of Fort William and its Subordinates, the miserys and hardships we underwent by remaining in the river so many months confined to a few ships and vessels, and the steps we pursued to obtain a re-establishment in these provinces with restitution of the heavy losses Your Honours and the private inhabitants of Calcutta have suffered. In that letter we promised you the particulars of the siege when we next addressed you, but upon second consideration we find it impracticable to form a narrative that will be assented to by all the members of the Board who were concerned in these transactions. We must therefore beg leave to refer your Honours to the several addresses those gentlemen have separately made you through the channel of this Board. They are transmitted in this packet and to your candour we submit our conduct, without any further comment.

2. We have already apprized Your Honours of the distress of your servants and the inhabitants of Calcutta, which made it necessary for us to allow them a subsistance at your expence. In this allowance we have been as frugal as possible, and we flatter ourselves the extra charges incurred by this means will not be esteemed unreasonable. Should we be fortunate enough to succeed in our operations against the *Subah*, (which we have not the least doubt of) we shall take care to see you reimbursed the amount of that expence.

3. By the face of our Proceedings while at Fulta, Your Honours will observe, we took the ships *Doddaly*, *Fort William*, *Speedwell*, and *Lively*, and *Nancy* grabs into your service on the most reasonable terms we could; this we were necessitated to do for the accommodation of the inhabitants and military, the security of your effects from any attempts of the Moors, and to lade the stores we purchased for the use of the military, &c. We found it necessary likewise to freight the *Success* galley for an hospital ship, numbers of our military being sick, and the unwholesome damps of the ground at Fulta rendering it dangerous to send them ashore.

5. The Board having judged it expedient to appoint a Secret Committee for receiving all intelligence relating to the Nabob's motions and concerting measures for our re-establishment, a copy

of their transactions is likewise forwarded by this conveyance for your perusal.

6. The Select Committee appointed in your commands of the 11th February, 1756 will advise of whatever may be relative to the trust reposed in them. The number of members in that Committee has been increased by the addition of the Major and Mr. Holwell which was moved for by our President in our Consultation of the 16th December, to which day's Proceedings and that of the 20th we beg leave to refer Your Honours for our several opinions.

7. That Committee will inform you what efforts have been made by your servants at Fort Saint George for the recovery of Fort William and the re-establishment of the Honourable Company in these provinces. We can only acquaint your Honours that in consequence of what Mr. Pigot and his Council wrote us by the *King's Fisher* sloop of war, we ordered all our pilot sloops to wait the arrival of the squadron in the Road,[1] and deputed Messrs. Watts and Becher to give the Admiral as full an account of the state of the country at that time as our intelligence enabled us to do.

8. Admiral Watson arrived at Fulta on the 14th December with the *Tiger* man-of-war; he was soon after joined by the *Salisbury* and *Bridgwater*. Upon these ships and the *Walpole*, with two country vessells freighted as transports, Colonel Clive arrived from Fort Saint George with part of the troops sent under his command, and after refreshing the military and seamen the squadron moved up the river on the 28th December. Two days after Buz Budgea (a place of great strength) was attacked by the Admiral's ships and about eight in the evening carried by assault. From thence Mr. Watson proceeded towards Tannah, and, having dismounted their guns both there and at a battery erected opposite to it, he brought his squadron before Fort William on the 2nd January and retook the place in less than two hours.

9. The next day we waited upon Mr. Watson in the Fort, who delivered over that, the guns and military stores, the town and effects found therein, to us as Your Honours' representatives on behalf of the respective Proprietors. We are now making the

[1] Of Ballasore.

Fort as defensible as our time will admit of, to prevent a second capture should the Nabob attack it again. To do this it is immediately necessary to level several of the houses near the Fort; they have been pointed out by Colonel Clive and Mr Barker, and valued by Messrs. Becher, Collet, Raitt and Beaumont. This expence will not be very considerable, and is a charge which cannot be avoided.

10. Sensible of the importance it must be of to your affairs to be early informed of our repossession, we applied to Admiral Watson before he left Fulta for the *King's Fisher* sloop of war to carry that intelligence to Europe, but as he could not spare that vessel for the reasons assigned in his answer entered after our Consultation of the —— December, we determined to forward these advices by the *Syren* sloop, and have given the command of her to Mr. Jones[1] at the recommendation of Admiral Watson.

11. As we esteemed it necessary to publish the reasons of our bringing so large a force into these provinces before we attempted any further acts of hostility, we have exhibited a Manifesto of our injuries and complaints, with a declaration of War against the *Subah* of these provinces till ample restitution be made for the publick and private losses, and satisfaction given for the charges incurred by his violent proceedings. Copies of that Manifesto were sent to the French and Dutch to prevent any suspicion that we might intend their hurt or prejudice. Enclosed in this packet we send a copy likewise for your perusal.

12. We have the pleasure to acquaint Your Honours, that we had the good fortune to find a large quantity of export goods in your *cottah*, which we are now embaling, and hope to send the *Delawar* away almost fully laden by the 10th of next month. Particulars of what stores, &c., has been found will be transmitted by the *Delawar*.

13. Some private property has likewise been found in the place, and notice has been given for all persons who have claims to any effects left in the Fort or town to send in their demands to the Sub-Accomptant who has our orders to deliver it upon a receipt being given by the claimant to be responsible for the said effects or their amount, in case it should be contested and awarded to another.

[1] Mr. Evan Jones, mate of the *Doddington*, wrecked in 1755.

14. The inconveniences we experienced at the siege of Calcutta from the prodigious numbers of Portuguese women who were admitted for security into the Fort, the very little or no service which that race of people are of to the Settlement, added to the prospect we had of a war with France (in which case we had reason to suppose they would refuse to take up arms against an enemy of their own religion should we be attacked) induced us upon our return to interdict the publick exercise of the Roman Catholic religion, and to forbid the residence of their priests in our bounds.

15. Our chaplains having both demised, Mr. Gervas Bellamy in the Black Hole and Mr. Robert Mapletoft of a fever at Fulta, we have appointed the Reverend Mr. Cobbe our chaplain till your pleasure is known with the usual salary and allowances annexed to that benefice. He was chaplain to the *Kent*, which station he has quitted to serve Your Honours, and he appears to us very worthy of your favour.

16. We were under a necessity during our stay at Fulta to dispose of the bullion to Mr. Bisdom, sent us by the President and Council of Fort Saint George, at a low rate to procure rupees for our current expences; but we can assure Your Honours we used our utmost endeavours to obtain a higher price, which the unsettled face of things made impracticable.

17. Most of the military and artillery officers upon our establishment being dead, several promotions were made by us, for the particulars of which we beg leave to refer Your Honours to our Consultations, wherein you will observe Mr. Dugald Campbell had a captain's commission granted him, in consequence of your recommendation of that gentleman. He was since unfortunately killed at the taking of Buz Budgea, We have given the company vacant by his death to John Fraser Esq.

19. We shall now reply to such parts of Your Honours' general letter this season as we have it in our power to answer in our present situation, many parts of which we are obliged to leave unanswered from the loss of all our Papers, Books, Consultations and Accompts.

24. The house and ground Your Honours mention to have been bought by Colonel Scott, was purchased at his death by Captain John Buchanan, of whom we bought the Mills for making powder

for the sum of 4,000 rupees, and took the provision of that article into our own hands on your account, allowing Captain Buchanan a gratuity to supervise and give the necessary orders for incorporating and working the ingredients agreeable to the rules received last season, by which measure we should not only have been supplied with better gunpowder than we could purchase of any persons who made it for sale, but found it likewise turn out considerably cheaper; which method we shall always adopt for the future.

26. Major James Killpatrick has received Your Honours' commission and desires to return his humble thanks for the favour you have shewn him. As he has desired to receive his pay of 15 *sicca* rupees *per* day instead of the salary you have appointed him of £250 *per annum*, we have consented to that alteration of your directions.

28. Our Books and Papers being lost we are to request you will transmit us a set of Standing Orders for our future conduct, copy of our treasury and cash accounts and account sales to the despatch of the *Denham* with the General Books ballanced to April 1755.

29. It will be proper likewise to send us an exemplification of the Charter, Instructions for the Mayors Court and Courts of Oyer and Terminer, Commission for holding Courts of Admiralty for the tryal of piracies, and Powers to appoint Judge Advocates to general courts martial.

31. The inconvenience and little utility of having any part of our military force detached at Subordinates has been so much felt and experienced by us in our late misfortunes, that we take upon us to recommend to Your Honours never to maintain a garrison up the country, or have any numerous Factorys or buildings which may require a large expence of repairs. Should we find it necessary to have some Europeans at Cossimbuzar, Dacca or other *aurungs*, a few of the servants at each will answer the end as well and put the Company to little or no charge either in *Durbar* presents or otherwise.

32. We have determined to defer filling up the vacancies in Council, while we have no members absent at Subordinates, unless the Board should by casualties or otherwise be reduced

to less than nine, the number which was usually on the spot, when we had Factories in the country.

33. Enclosed is a list of the covenanted servants upon our establishment, which compared with the list sent you last season will mark out those who are dead, most of whom were killed at the taking of Fort William; Messrs. Hyndmam, Lyndsay, and Vasmer died at Fulta of fevers.

34. A copy of the Charter having been preserved by one of the Mayor's Court Attorneys, we found it absolutely incumbent on us (in consequence of a clause therein) to constitute and declare Bulramgurry (the only Factory we had remaining) to be the seat of our Presidency, which your Honours will observe we did on the 25th October and published the same by our Secretary. Upon our return to Fort William, we have again removed the seat of our Presidency from Bulramgurry to this place, and have advertised such removal at the Fort gates as usual.

35. Judging it necessary to put the black merchants and Armenians under some regulations in future, we shall take into consideration when we have more leisure upon what footing to admit their residence within our bounds.

36. The greatest part of the inhabitants being totally ruined, and unable to discharge the whole of their debts by the fatal loss of the Settlement, we beg leave to recommend their unhappy situation to your consideration, and as the calamity has been so general and destructive, and their misfortunes owing to no mismanagement of theirs in trade but to the pillage and depredations of a powerful and unexpected enemy, we should esteem it an ineffable piece of goodness if Your Honours could obtain a clause to the Statutes of Bankruptcy in favour of the unfortunate sufferers at Calcutta, by which they should be discharged of all demands, upon giving up and assigning to and for the use of their creditors whatever assets they may now be possessed of, after which to be left at liberty to provide for themselves and families by trade, without being liable to lett or molestation from their former creditors. Such a relief in the distresses the inhabitants in general labour under at present would be of universal benefit, and we think but fair and equitable.

37. The long and dangerous sickness of our Secretary[1] at Fulta,

[1] Mr. John Cooke.

the death of the Sub-Secretary,[1] and the impossibility of conducting the business of that office in a regular manner on board the ships and vessels we lived in, may probably occasion the omission of some papers being entered after our Proceedings, and other neglects of that kind, which we hope Your Honours will excuse.

38. Mr. Holwell has delivered in a letter to the Board addressed to Your Honours which we transmit by this packet. He begs leave to apologize for any errors in the dates he has mentioned, as he had no vouchers to rectify them, and was obliged to depend on his recollection alone. He likewise desires the slovenly manner it is transcribed in may be overlooked, as he had not time to get a fairer copy engrossed for this conveyance.

40. We are now to acknowledge the receipt of our commission transmitted us *per Chesterfield*, for which we return our most humble thanks, and shall do everything in our power to deserve Your Honours' favour and regard.

41. Before we close this letter we beg leave to mention the good inclinations Mr. Watson has manifested to the interest of our Employers. His bringing the squadron down the Bay notwithstanding he was called home, his readiness to assist us with His Majesty's ships in recovering our Settlements, and with his advice when requested by our Select Committee, declaring war against the *Subah* on His Majesty's part, and the disinterestedness he has shewn in delivering up the Fort and town with the guns, military stores, and effects found therein, are all marks of the strongest attachment to the good and welfare of the Honourable Company and deserves a particular notice.

42. Major James Killpatrick having delivered us a letter concerning his salary of £250, which Your Honours have ordered should not be paid to the Majors in future, we enclose that letter and beg leave to observe that his pay and other perquisites are very insufficient for the manner it is necessary for him to live in: exclusive of the extraordinary care and charge he must have upon him as Major of the garrison.

44. As Mr. Holwell takes his passage in this sloop we have committed the charge of this packet to his care.

We are, &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, JAMES KILLPATRICK, R. BECHER, P. R. PEARKES, W. FRANKLAND, W. MACKET.

[1] Mr. Vasmer.

203. *Letter from Admiral Watson to John Cleveland, Esq., dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, in the River Hooghly, 31 January, 1757.*[1]

SIR,—Three days after the date of my last letter of the 13th October, 1756, I sailed from Madrass, with His Majesty's ships *Kent, Cumberland, Tyger, Salisbury* and *Bridgwater, Marlborough* and *Walpole* Indiamen and *Blaze* fire-ship, which last, seeing I should have no occasion for, I sent to Bombay with directions for her being put out of commission and sold. I endeavoured to make the best of my way to Ballasore Road, but meeting with trifling winds and strong southerly currents, we were three weeks driving to the southward, till we got into the lattitude of 6° 30′ N. and then had not made more than four degrees easting. This had the appearance of having a long passage, which with the number of men we had on board might have proved a very unfortunate circumstance.

By our getting to the eastward as much as possible, we began to meet with the north-east trade, which not being set in, proved variable and squally, though never blowing enough to expect any bad consequence from it, but I found our ships were in no condition to beat against a *monsoon*. The *Salisbury* (which I looked upon to be the least defective of any ship in the squadron) on the 13th November made the signal of distress, having sprung a leak in her wooden ends, and made so much water, that after four hours' pumping it had gained something upon them. I sent her all the assistance in my power, and stopt her leak as much as possible, but even then she made upwards of four feet every hour, which obliged her to carry an easy sail, whereby our passage was greatly retarded. This unlucky accident made me doubtful whether the expedition would not be overset, as, had she been

[1] This letter is practically a duplicate of a letter to Lord Holdernesse of the same date. The latter, however, begins as follows:

'MY LORD,—The 16th of October I sailed with all the squadron and the *Walpole* and the *Marlborough*, Indiamen, from Madras for Bengal, but by adverse winds and waiting for the *Salisbury*, who on the 13th November had sprung a leak, my passage became longer than I expected, and before I arrived all the ships were very sickly, being crouded with men, and our provisions and water almost expended; we were then in a melancholy situation, but our good fortune since has made amends for all the trouble and fatigue we have undergone in our passage by sea and up the river. The 2nd December, about nine o'clock at night, &c., &c.' (India Office, Home Misc., 94)

obliged to bear away, another ship must have gone with her, and that would have taken so much force from the squadron, that I should have esteemed the remaining part proceeding to be of very little or no service. However, her leak not increasing, we all continued together, and on the 2nd December, about nine o'clock at night, the *Cumberland* unexpectedly struck upon a shoal off Point Palmiras, but luckily got off again without receiving any damage. She immediately made the signal for danger, and soon after to anchor, which I repeated and came to in eight fathoms. The next morning we found the *Kent* within the Point, the rest of the ships were to leeward among the shoals, however they all got clear of them that evening, but were not able to get round the Point, except the *Tyger* and *Walpole*. On the 5th of December, I anchored in Ballasore Road, and the *Tyger* and *Walpole* soon after. There I met with Messrs. Watts and Becher, deputed to me from the Governor and Council, to acquaint me with the state of their affairs, which were in so bad a situation as to require immediate assistance. I consulted the pilots about carrying the *Kent* and *Tyger* over the Braces,[1] who were of opinion it might be done with safety during the Springs, and, if I would permit them, they would take charge of the ships up the river to Fulta. The tides serving I weighed the 8th December and proceeded over the Braces. The 15th I arrived at Fulta, where the Governor and Council and late inhabitants of Calcutta had retired to since the loss of Fort William and all their other Settlements, with as many of their ships and vessels as had escaped falling into the hands of the Moors. I also found there the *King's Fisher*, who I dispatched from Madrass, some time before the squadron sailed, with advices to Mr. Drake of my preparing to come to his assistance.

After having consulted with the Governor and Council, I saw there was a necessity for a stronger force than the fifty gun ship and frigates to proceed up the river, as the enemy, not thinking the forts of Tanna and Busbudgia to be a sufficient defence, were raising new works on the banks of the river, which they had been employed about for some time. Hearing this, I thought it most adviseable to proceed as soon as possible, but the Springs then

[1] 'Which are sands that great ships can only go over at a particular time of tide.' (Letter to Lord Holdernesse.)

coming on, the pilots would not take charge of the ships till they were over. In the meantime I wrote to the Nabob, a copy of which I herewith inclose, and made such preparations as were necessary for my proceeding.

By the 25th the tides began to slacken, when the *Bridgwater* joined me, and the next day the *Salisbury*. The pilots then acquainting me of its being a proper time to move up, and having received no answer from the Nabob, I gave orders for embarking the troops the 28th, and sailed the same day with the *Kent*, *Tyger*, *Salisbury*, *Bridgwater* and *King's Fisher* sloop. The next afternoon Colonel Clive was landed in order to march to Busbudgia to make an attack by land, at the same time the squadron was to appear before the place. The 30th about eight o'clock in the morning the squadron anchored and began to cannonade, at half-past eight I ordered the King's troops to land to support the Colonel, who, from the reports I received, I had great reason to believe was engaged with the enemy. A little before nine they joind him, but the action was then over, the enemy having retired with loss. We soon after heard they marched back with great haste to Calcutta, but the Governor of Busbudgia continued in the Fort and defended it. The Colonel was ill provided with cannon and all sorts of military stores, and was unacquainted with the situation of the enemy, having taken no prisoners to inform him, or indeed could get any intelligence to be depended upon. The Moors in their usual way fired from behind the bushes, it was therefore impossible to know exactly when they retreated, but by accounts they certainly had encamped not far off, which they broke up with the utmost expedition. In this skirmish were killed an ensign and eleven private men, and about twenty slightly wounded.

The ships soon silenced the enemy's fire: but we had occasion for most part of the day to fire some guns to keep them from firing on our troops who were lodged near their walls with an intention to storm before night; but that being put off, at seven o'clock in the evening I ordered about a hundred seamen on shore under the command of Captain King, and at half an hour after eight the body of the Fort was on fire, and immediately after I received the agreeable news of the place being our own. The moment the seamen, soldiers, and *seapoys* entered, the few people

who were left in the Fort ran out, and we were so unlucky as not to take a man. Captain Campbell one of the Company's captains lost his life after he was in the Fort, and about four of the King's soldiers were wounded while they lay under the walls. This Fort was extremely well situated for defence, and had the advantage of a wet ditch round it, but was badly provided with cannon, as we found only eighteen guns, from twenty-four pounders downwards, and about forty barrels of powder with ball in proportion.

On the 1st January the *Kent* and *Tyger* anchord between Tanna Fort and a battery opposite, both which places the enemy abandoned as the ships approached. In these we found about forty guns, some twenty-four pounders, and all mounted on good carriages, most of them the Company's. We also found some powder and ball.

In the night, I sent the boats manned and armed up the river, to set fire to a ship and some vessels that lay under a fort, which was executed without opposition. That was a necessary piece of service, as I heard they were filled with combustibles in order to be set on fire when the ebb made, to burn our ships.

The next morning early, agreeable to the Colonel's request, I landed the Company's troops, who immediately began their march to Calcutta. The *Kent* and *Tyger* soon after weighed and proceeded up the river together with the twenty-gun ship and sloop, which last had directions when I should anchor off Calcutta, to pass me and the *Tyger*, and anchor above, where they saw they could most annoy the enemy. As there was no necessity for more than two ships at Calcutta and the keeping Tanna Fort was of some consequence, I thought proper to leave the *Salisbury* there as a guard ship to prevent the enemy from regaining it and the battery opposite.

The *Tyger* being the leading ship, at forty minutes after nine o'clock the enemy began to fire upon her from their batteries below Calcutta, which they deserted as we approached. At twenty minutes past ten, the *Tyger* anchored abreast the Line of guns at Calcutta, at half an hour after ten the *Kent* anchored, and both ships made a very warm fire, insomuch that the enemy were soon drove from their guns and presently after ran out of the Fort. Captain Coote with the King's troops and an officer from the *Kent*

entered the Fort a little before eleven, but the flight of the enemy was so sudden that only two or three poor ignorant fellows were taken. I garrisoned the place that day with the King's troops and appointed Captain Coote to take the command. The next day I delivered it up to the Company's representatives with all the effects found within their bounds. Here we found four mortars, ninety one guns of different sizes and a considerable quantity of all kinds of ammunition: We have suffered very little from the enemy in our masts, yards and rigging, and have lost very few. The enclosed is an abstract of all the men killed and wounded at the several attacks.

The Governor and Council being now in possession of their principal Settlement, determined for the violencies they had received from the Nabob and his subjects, to declare war against him, and to publish the same throughout all the country, and wrote me a letter desiring I would do the same in the name of His Majesty, which I accordingly did. A copy of their letter and my Declaration I herewith inclose. The misfortune of neither the *Cumberland* nor *Marlborough* being arrived made it quite impossible for any enterprise to be undertaken by land, and it was absolutely necessary to push the enemy before they had time to recover from their pannick. Accordingly an expedition was proposed against Hughley, to be executed by the twenty-gun ship and sloop, the boats of the squadron manned and armed, assisted by all the King's troops amounting to one hundred and seventy, the Company's grenadiers and two hundred *seapoys*, which were to be landed under the command of Major Killpatrick. Several sloops were procured to embark them, and there being a proper vessel[1] for carrying two mortars, which being judged of great consequence to the success of the expedition, the Committee offered her to go upon this service, if I would appoint a proper officer to take the command of her. I accordingly gave my First Lieutenant, Mr. Warrick, a commission as Captain, and appointed a Lieutenant and Surgeon to her, which I hope their Lordships will approve of.

Everything being prepared the troops were embarked the 5th instant and all proceeded up the river under the command of

[1] The *Thunder* Bomb.

Captain Smith of His Majesty's ship *Bridgwater*,[1] who by not having a good pilot grounded before he got two leagues above me, where he lay forty-eight hours in great danger, but got off without receiving much damage, and by the assistance of a Dutch pilot, who he took on board in his passage up, he proceeded agreeable to his orders.

On the 11th I received the agreeable news of our being in possession of Hughley. For the particulars of the attack, I beg leave to refer their lordships to the inclosed account of Captain King's, who commanded a party of seamen ashore, and by whom I now take the opportunity of sending my dispatches, and beg leave to recommend him to their Lordships' favour.

The *Bridgwater's* grounding in going up, occasioned great delay, by which means the enemy had time to carry off most of their effects, and the Dutch did not scruple to receive them under their protection, as well as several of their principal inhabitants. I represented this proceeding to Mr. Bisdom the Chief of Chincura, to which I received nothing but evasive and equivocal answers. As I was extremely unwilling to have a misunderstanding with any European Power, I sent my Captain up to him, with a letter of credit in the usual form, to explain such matters as could not so readily be settled by letter. To this he made me no reply, neither did he make any answer to two letters wrote to him from Captain Speke while at Chincura and by my authority, and one from Captain Smith.

Their behaviour altogether has been so very partial in favour of our enemy, that I should do an injustice to myself in passing it over without taking some notice of it.

After I received Captain King's account of the attack upon the Fort, I had for several days news brought me of our progress in burning and destroying the city of Hughley, also of setting fire to their granaries, and store-houses of salt, which were situated on the banks of each side the river and extended near two miles in length. The destroying these granaries will be of great prejudice to the Nabob, as they contained a store for the subsistance of his army while it is in this part of the country.

This service being done, and nothing else to undertake either

[1] i.e., the twenty-gun ship.

with the ships or boats, I ordered Captain Smith and the sloop to come down and join me.

On the 12th instant I received His Majesty's Declaration of War against the French King, which was transmitted from the Directors of the East India Company by land to Bussero, from thence to Governor Bourchier at Bombay, who acquaints me there came by the same conveyance publick letters for me, which I hear he has sent by one of the three ships coming here from thence with five hundred troops, but neither of them are yet arrived. When they do they will be a very considerable reinforcement to the little army here, and I hope I shall see them before I am obliged to leave the river.

Notwithstanding our success, the Company's affairs here are yet on a very precarious footing, and nothing but a lasting advantageous peace can possibly free them from ruin. From this reflection, I wrote a letter to the Committee, offering proposals relating to our conduct with the French, a copy of which I herewith inclose, with an extract of their answer, which I hope will justify me if I enter into a neutrality with the French in the Ganges as it was observed last war, and especially as we are now already embroiled with the country Government, who would be too powerful for us by land if joind by the French, and particularly so when I leave the river, therefore I think a neutrality with the French must be observed in the Ganges. If it could be with a league offensive and defensive against the Nabob, no doubt but he might be brought to terms the sooner; and this I proposed to the French soon after the taking Calcutta, upon their application to me to enter into a simple neutrality, but they excused themselves as they were not in a condition to join with us against the Nabob, whose resentment they much feared.

On the 20th January the *Marlborough* arrived here with between three and four hundred *seapoys* and all the Field Train. About the same time I received a letter from Mr. Pocock acquainting me that he had used his utmost efforts to get round Point Palmiras, but his provisions and water being almost expended, and his people very sickly, he was at last obliged to bear up for Vizagapatam, where he arrived the 14th December. As there are near three hundred troops on board the *Cumberland*, I thought it proper to

send Mr. Pocock orders to make the best of his way to Bengal, and proceed up the river as high as Kedgaree, and to disembark the troops without loss of time, and send them to Calcutta, it being at this critical juncture of the utmost importance our land force should be augmented.

A few days ago an application was made to both the French and Dutch from two of the principal people about the Nabob's Court, with views of bringing about a peace; and though it did not come immediately from the Nabob himself, yet it is supposed it was done by his authority. By the opportunity of the *Delawar* I may be able to acquaint their Lordships what will be the issue of this seeming inclination on their side for peace: But since this application was made, I have received a letter from the Nabob, a copy of which I herewith inclose together with my answer. What will be the event I cannot pretend to say, but I am afraid I shall be under the necessity of continuing longer here than I would chuse to do, as I must not think of leaving them till such time they are in a state of security against any insults from the country Power; though I am afraid my stay will be attended with very disagreeable, if not bad, consequences to the squadron, all our ships being in a bad condition, and our men very sickly. We have already lost more since we have been in the river than in a whole year before. This is but a melancholly circumstance in a French war considering how short the ships are of their proper complement, and the impossibility of getting men here.

Inclosed I send you the state[1] of the squadron and am, Sir, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

204. *Captain King's account of the taking of Hughley.*[2]

On the 10th of January 1757 between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon the troops rendezvoused on board a Moors' ship we had taken possession of in the morning, and lay moored near the *Bridgwater* and about one mile to the southward of Hughley Fort. At 4 o'clock the *Bridgwater* weighed and droped up with the flood, till about half an hour after, when being opposite to

[1] In the attacks upon Budge Budge, Mukwa Tanah, Calcutta, and Hughley, there were in all 9 seamen and 3 soldiers killed, and 26 seamen and 5 soldiers wounded (Home Series, Misc., 94, p. 358).

[2] Enclosed in No. 203.

and less than musket shot from the Fort, she anchored and began to cannonade, which the enemy smartly returned with both great guns and small arms. And while she was droping up several single shot were exchanged between the Fort and her; soon after the *Bridgwater* weighed, the *King's Fisher* anchored near the same place, in order to cover the troops who, accompanied by 70 seamen, immediately landed, and possessed themselves of a merchant's house; upon which the *King's Fisher* moved up above the *Bridgwater* and engaged the Fort, and the *Thunder* bomb, who about this time was placed at a proper distance, began to bombard the south-east bastion, which had a good effect and greatly alarmed the Moors, who were not accustomed to being attacked in that manner.

The troops finding no opposition marched about two hundred yards to another house, and then on towards the Fort, but that being surrounded with houses, no guide to direct us, and our men much exposed to muskettry from those houses, it was therefore judged proper to return to the second house before mentioned, and wait till the *Bridgwater* and *King's Fisher* had made a breach, or by means of reconnoitring or taking a prisoner we could get information of the properest place to make an attack. In the meantime the seamen and *seapois* were employed setting fire to the town.

The house we had now made our quarters had a large garden and a good substantial wall round it, with two gates, one towards the Fort, at which we mounted two three-pounders (sent ashore from the *Bridgwater*), the other facing the river, which was guarded by *seapois*.

At 8 o'clock a prisoner was brought in and his life promised him on condition he would guide us to the Fort. At 9 o'clock more seamen were landed, which increased the number of them to about 130. Soon after Captain Coote of Colonel Alderron's regiment, Lieutenant Lutwidge of the *Salisbury* and Lieutenant Hayter of the *King's Fisher*, taking with them the prisoner, went to reconnoitre, and returned again between 10 and 11 o'clock, informing Major Killpatrick, who commanded the land forces, that they had examined several parts of the Fort and found it in general so much crowded with houses and black people's hutts, that in their opinion the best part for storming was the south-east bastion where the *Bridgwater* had already made a small breach. As soon

as this intelligence came, the scaling ladders were sent for, but the vessel they were on board of being some distance down the river and the ebb tide made, which must necessarily prevent their arriving soon, the soldiers were ordered to rest on their arms, and permitted to refresh themselves. Major Killpatrick then desired Lieutenant Lutwidge and myself to go on board the *Bridgwater*, consult with Captain Smith, and take a view of the breach from the ship, which having done, and Captain Smith joining in opinion that storming was practicable, we agreed that the *Bridgwater* and *King's Fisher* should continue a brisk fire at that part of the Fort till they were called to from the shore to cease, and then returned to our quarters, and acquainted the Major with what had passed, who ordered a party of *seapois* to be ready to make a false attack towards the south-west part of the Fort. By this time it was past 1 in the morning, and when we got to the breach between 2 and 3, at which time the false attack was made, and the seamen who marched in front with the ladders placed them, and mounted the breach. Next to them followed the *seapois*, then the King's troops, and after them the Company's.

The Fort was entered without much difficulty, though many of the enemies' men were in it, who endeavourd to make a stand but were obliged to retire after a little skirmish in which they wounded several of our people. Here we found 20 guns from 24-pounders downwards with a quantity of ammunition.

205. *Letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated — January, 1757.*

You have taken and plundered Houghley, and made war upon my subjects: these are not actions becoming merchants! I have therefore left Muxadabad, and am arrived near Houghley; I am likewise crossing the river with my army, part of which is advanced towards your camp. Nevertheless, if you have a mind to have the Company's business settled upon its ancient footing and to give a currency to their trade, send a person of confidence to me, who can make your demands, and treat with me upon this affair. I shall not scruple to grant a *perwannah* for the restitution of all the Company's Factories, and permit them to trade in my country upon the same terms as formerly. If the English, who

are settled in those provinces, will behave like merchants, obey my orders, and give me no offence, you may depend upon it, I will take their losses into consideration, and adjust matters to their satisfaction. You know how difficult it is to prevent soldiers from plundering in war; therefore if you will on your parts relinquish something of the damages you have sustained by being pillaged by my army, I will endeavour to give you satisfaction even in that particular, in order to gain your friendship and preserve a good understanding for the future with your nation. You are a Christian, and know how much preferable it is to accommodate a dispute than to keep it alive, but if you are determined to sacrifice the interest of your Company and the good of private merchants to your inclinations for war, it is no fault of mine. To prevent the fatal consequences of such a ruinous war I write this letter.

206. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Secret Committee, London, dated Camp on Barnagore Plain, 1 February, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—I addressed you from Fort Saint George under date of the 11th October and now I have the pleasure to write you from Bengal, and congratulate you on your being in repossession of Fort William and on the taking and demolishing of Hughly.

The enclosed copies of my advices to the Select Committee of Fort Saint George together with the accompanying journal of military transactions and Return of the forces with me will fully inform you of all our proceedings, as well as our present strength and situation of affairs.

You will perceive, Gentlemen, that, what with the terrible mortality in Major Killpatrick's party at Fulta, 240 Europeans absent on the *Cumberland*, and not above half the intended number of *seapoys* sent me from the Coast, the force with me is vastly short of what I had room to expect and will not admit of my carrying on an offensive war against the Nabob, till I am joined either by the *Cumberland's* men or the expected reinforcement from Bombay; however by the situation of our camp, and some batteries we have erected, I am quite in a condition to act defensively against his whole army.

Fort William is already in a very tolerable state of defence.

The ditch is finished, and in five days a glaçis will be compleated with an esplanade of near 150 yards. The enclosed plan will inform you what other works will be added: on the whole, I may venture to assure you that in eight or ten days it will be out of all danger from the Moors.

The Gentlemen of the Committee of Fort Saint George, on advice of the war with France, immediately despatched letters to me, directing my return to the Coast as early as possible with what troops could be spared, which considering the reinforcement from Bombay, they hoped would be near as many as I brought with me. Further advices from them dated 2nd and 11th December mention Monsieur Bussy's having set out from Heyderbad the 16th of November and advanced towards the sea coast with about 1,000 men, having left 100 with Salabat Jung; they conclude his destination is for Pondicherry, there to join other troops that were expected from the Islands and make up a formidable force for action in the Carnatic; therefore urging my return with as many troops as possible, both of the Madras and Bombay detachments, for that all schemes of action in Bengal must be dropped for the present, and our whole force bent against the collected strength of the French on the Coast.

I have no accounts myself from the Chief of Vizagapatam, but, by Mr. Pocock's letter to Mr. Watson and the information of Lieutenant Rumbold arrived from thence, I understand that Monsieur Bussy gave out that he was coming to settle the affairs of this province, but that by the direction of his march he seemed to have a design on Vizagapatam and the English Settlements in that neighbourhood. That when he was within about six days' march of Vizagapatam and heard of the *Cumberland*'s arrival there, he detached Monsieur Laws[1] with about 300 Europeans to Mazulipatam to defend it against any attempts from that ship as it is supposed, and he himself halted with the rest of his army, consisting, as it is thought, of about 4 or 5 hundred Europeans, and a very large black force, both foot and horse. The accident of the *Cumberland*'s falling in with Vizagapatam has saved your northern Settlements for the present, which I fear on her coming

[1] Younger brother of Monsieur Jean Law, Chief of the French Factory at Saidabad (Cossimbazar).

away must fall a sacrifice to the superiority of the French forces in that quarter.

All circumstances concur to make me wish a speedy accommodation in the province both with the Nabob and French, and it is my ardent desire to be able to embark for the Coast this month with some of the troops, but it is hardly to be expected that matters will be sufficiently settled to admit of it. The Admiral declares he is ready to stay till September if your affairs require it, and it will be impossible for me to return without the squadron. Indeed I am myself so sensible of the consequence which the trade of this province is of to the Company that I think I ought not on any account to draw off part of the troops while a fair prospect remains of a speedy and advantageous conclusion of affairs either by force of arms or a treaty. Whenever we return I will endeavour to prevail on the Admiral to call at Vizagapatam to know the state of the Coast, and whether our services will be necessary in that neighbourhood.

A second offer has been made to the French of a neutrality in the Ganges and without the condition we formerly insisted upon of their joining us against the Nabob. As yet we have had no answer from them, but I think the proposition too advantageous for them to decline, unless indeed the Gentlemen of Charnagore should not be vested with powers to enter into engagements of such a nature, which I somewhat suspect.

As to the Nabob a treaty is now on foot with him, but I cannot yet judge how sincere he is in his intentions towards a Peace. He has wrote to the Admiral, and I am informed he despatched a letter to me, but as yet I have not received it; however I have heard from several of his great men, and all their letters intimate the Nabob's desire of an accommodation with the English. Nevertheless his troops advance slowly towards us and he himself is within 30 miles on the other side of the river and hourly expected to cross it. His force consists of 30,000 men, horse and foot, if we may trust our intelligence which indeed has all along proved very defective. It is possible his design may be only to amuse us with a treaty for some particular end, but a few days must bring that to light; by the *Delawar*, if not by this conveyance, I shall be able to write with more certainty on this

subject. Enclosed I send a translate of a letter I have received from Juggut Seat's *vakeel* who accompanies the Nabob, also copy of my answer to him and of a letter I desired him to deliver the Nabob, by the tenor of which you will observe I am endeavouring to see if any good effects can be reaped from a moderate conduct.

The Gentlemen of the Select Committee here have left the correspondence and negotiations with the Nabob to be transacted by the Admiral and me jointly. All propositions they make will be attended to, and for my part you may be assured, Gentlemen, that notwithstanding my independent command, I shall endeavour to maintain a perfect harmony with them, and act throughout if possible with their participation. They thought proper some time ago to demand a surrender of my commission as Commander-in-chief, and that I would put myself under their orders, which I looked upon myself as obliged to refuse in justice to those who had entrusted me with such powers; however I represented to them what I had often declared at the Council Board, and what indeed the whole tenor of my conduct had confirmed, that I had no intentions of making use of my independent powers unless they reduced me to it by necessity, for we had but one common interest to pursue, which was that of the Company, and as long as that was kept in view they would always find me ready to follow their instructions.

The Nabob of Pruneo was unluckily cut off, and his country entirely subjected just before our arrival here. The only competitor that is now likely to rise against Surajah Dowlat is the Nabob of Cuttack, who it is said set out about two months ago to bring the Morattas in the province and is now expected back. It is not improbable the Nabob is under some alarm from that quarter.

It would be unnecessary for me to explain the sources of the late unhappy loss of Calcutta, or make any observations on the conduct of your servants before or during the troubles; their own letters public and private will lay open the whole. I shall therefore spare myself the invidious task.

I request the favour of you, Gentlemen, to consider that I have a large army near me, and am taken up with many civil as well as military avocations, and hope you will therefore excuse me if my advices are not so compleat as you might expect. You may

nevertheless be assured that no one has a warmer zeal or a more constant attention for your service.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

207. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 1 February, 1757.*

Your plundering Hughly was not like merchants. Many goods have been destroyed and lost. I am likewise arrived at Hughly, and purpose to march forwards. Now if you want to have the trade of the country and the Company's business restored to its former currency, send a person of trust to me, who may confer with me upon these matters. I will allow you the same freedom in Calcutta and your other Factories as you enjoyed formerly, if you are willing to trade in the country again and make peace with me. As soon as this conference is finished I will restore to you all your losses. You know very well that what plunder falls into the hands of soldiers in war cannot be restored, but let there be peace and friendship between us, and I will certainly allow you something in consideration of those losses. You too have the principles of religion to guide you. You know peace is better than war. Whether the Company's business shall flourish or fall is in your own power, therefore I have sent you these two words to prevent further trouble.

208. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 3 February, 1757.*

'I thank God that I have found you so graciously inclined. I shall send a relation of my own and another person to-morrow morning to confer with Your Excellency about our affairs, who will fully explain to you my inclinations, and may advise me in return of your pleasure.'

209. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Camp, 3 February, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—Coja Petruse is returned with a letter and present from the Nabob, and I propose dispatching the commissaries to him without delay, therefore request you will send me the proposals immediately. I am sorry to find that Metre has been writing to Rajah Doolahbrum that nothing can be concluded unless the

Nabob addresses himself to Mr. Drake. I am perswaded, Gentlemen, that measures so opposite to the Company's interest could not have been taken with your knowledge and will not escape your examination and resentment.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

210. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 3 *February*, 1757.

This place being unfit for encamping my army, for this reason my forces have marched forward and are encamped in Omichund's garden. Let not this give you any uneasiness. Your business is with me. Rest contented and send me your relation and the other person whom you shall depute to settle affairs with me as soon as possible. I swear by God and His Prophet that no evil shall happen to them. Let them fairly represent your demands to me, and I will grant [them]. I have given orders to all *jemmidars* that they commit no disturbance. Do not be under any apprehensions on this account but send away the deputies to me with safety.

211. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to his father, dated* 3 *or* 4 *February*, 1757.

I wrote you last by the *Chesterfield*, and acquainted you with my being just ready to set out upon the expedition to Bengal. I have now the pleasure to inform you that we all are safely arrived, and that success has attended our arms hitherto by sea and land. Calcutta is retaken and fortified; and some time ago, the second city in this province[1] was taken by storm and plundered.[2]

We are encamped with our little army; and the Nabob is at the head of forty thousand men to give us battle. I am in hopes everything will be concluded to the Company's advantage, though not in so glorious a manner as I could wish. For more particulars I must refer you to Mr. Mabbot.[3]

It is not possible to describe the distresses of the inhabitants of this once opulent and great town. It must be many years before

[1] Hugli.

[2] 'The booty taken was estimated by Clive at a *lac* and a half of rupees—£15,000' (*Malcolm*, p. 163).

[3] Mr. William Mabbot, Chairman of the Court of Directors.

it is restored to its former grandeur. It is computed the private losses amount to upwards of two millions sterling.

I enjoy my health better than could be expected, and think my nervous complaint decreases. Mrs. Clive was very well when I last heard from her, which was the fourth of last month.

Colonel Lawrence is Governor of St. David's during my absence. I believe it would be no difficult matter to get appointed from home Governor of this place; but it would be neither agreeable to me nor to my advantage. I heartily wish in these perilous and uncertain times all my money was in England; for I do not think it safe here; no one knows what the event of war may be in these parts. My loss by the capture of Calcutta is not less than £2,500; so that hitherto I am money out of pocket by my second trip to India. I hope the end may crown all.

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212. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated 4 February, 1757.*

The letter which you sent me in answer to my reply to your former letter I received the day before yesterday. But as I was sitting down to write an answer to it, intelligence was brought me that part of your army had entered Calcutta, and that the remainder was advancing in great haste towards our camp. I had no sooner heard these things than, looking towards the town, the smoke and flames which I saw ascending from it confirmed their truth. Wherefore from such appearances, looking upon all treating as at an end, I gave over the thoughts of writing. Since this, I hear from Colonel Clive, that you have again made offers of treating, and that in consequence thereof he has sent to you Messrs. Walsh[1] and Scrafton with proposals of accommodation; a proof so demonstrative of our pacific inclinations that nothing can be added to it. For my own particular sentiments, if you will look back upon my letters, you will find that they always proposed amicable methods; and my actions have always corresponded with them, for it was not till after despairing of Peace, by having no answers to my letters, that I could prevail on myself to commit any hostilities; to which I was always so averse, that even in the

[1] The relation of Clive referred to in previous letters.

midst of victory, I stopt short to listen to the voice of Peace. I am still inclined to it, notwithstanding the little prospect of its taking place. However to take away all blame from me, both in the eyes of God and man, and to convince the world how much rather I wish to see the happiness of mankind than their misery I write this.

If you really and sincerely mean to treat of Peace, listen to the proposals which will be made by the gentlemen who are now with you. They ask nothing but justice, nor mean anything more than the mutual good of both nations. If you refuse it, remember, that princes are only placed at the head of mankind to procure their happiness, and that they must one day give a very severe account, if through ambition, revenge, or avarice, they fail in their duty. I have done mine in giving you my advice.

213. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Calcutta, half-past* 6 *o'clock in the evening,* 4 *February,* 1756.

SIR,—Before I received your letter, requesting I would send my letter for the Nabob to you, that Mr. Amyatt might carry it with him, I had sent it to Mr. Drake to be translated, which when done he is to return it to me. In the meantime I herewith enclose you a copy, that you may get it translated at camp, and send it by Mr. Amyatt when you think proper. I desired Mr. Drake to insert Mr. Amyatt's name, which you will take care is now done in your translation. I hope matters will be accommodated to our satisfaction, you may depend on everything in my power to facilitate them. I wrote you a few hours ago, acquainting you of my having ordered the *Salisbury* up to your assistance, who I hope will be nearly opposite to your camp by the time you receive this.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

The *Salisbury* would have been with you sooner, but the pilot was unwilling to take charge of her, as some difficulties were started; I hope now everything will end well. You may assure yourself I am fully persuaded of your good intentions for the public good.

My compliments to all the gentlemen.

214. *Extracts from a letter from Monsieur Jean Law to Mr. J. Knox, dated Cossimbazar, 5 February, 1757.*

SIR,—By a letter received from Mr. Nicholas I see you are alive. It is strange that since so many months passed you have not found a moment to write to me. You could judge very well I had some reasons not to expose a letter to be intercepted. The danger I believe is passed, however I must give you an account of the Tootenague. It was sold in July, but the money one way or other by the violence of the Government upon the merchants has been stopt till about the middle of October which then I have received. You have here enclosed the note of sale so as your account, by which you may see remains in my hands for ballance eight thousand and fourteen Arcott *rupees*, two *annas* and fourteen *gandas*. Now how to pay you that sum at present believe me I don't know well except I yet sold some of the goods I have below. . . . I have goods below for a pretty large sum, there is . . . and they are in Mr. Nicholas' hand. Should you take a look of this effects I believe you might willingly take some for yourself, if not pray be so good to wait a little till I be able to pay you. There is many reports here that I can trust to now. I wish you a good state of health in all these troubles, and remain,

Sir, your most obedient humble servant, LAW.

215. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated 6 February, 1757.*

The letter, which you will receive with this, was written the day before yesterday; but before that I could get it translated into the Persian language in order to its being sent to you, I was informed by Colonel Clive that you had treated his deputies with disrespect, and that you was within the bounds of Calcutta, from which you had refused to retire. Evidences so full and positive of your bad intentions towards us, that however strong my inclinations might be towards Peace, I could no longer entertain any reasonable hopes of seeing it accomplished. I therefore desired Colonel Clive to shew you what an army of Englishmen was capable of doing, that before it was too late you might agree to the proposals, which would be made to you. He yielded to my

desire, and marched through your whole camp, as if it had not been filled with armed men; after which he returned to his own, where he will remain yet a little while, in hopes of seeing you accede to the reasonable proposals, which are now offered to you for the last time from the Secret Committee. If you are wise, you will grant them the justice that is their due; otherwise, the sword is going to be drawn that never will be sheathed again.

216. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 6 *February*, 1757.

I sent two gentlemen to treat with you about a peace at Nabobgunge, where, by your letters and the promise from your own mouth to Coja Petruse, I expected they would have found you, instead of which they found you in Calcutta. This action sufficiently shows you meant only to amuse me, but did [I] want further evidence your firing in your march upon my people, your burning the town, and the disrespect shewn to my deputies, put it out of all doubt that you intended to carry on the war. I therefore made a tour through your camp to show you what I was capable of effecting. I cautiously hurt none but those that opposed me. If you still think meanly of my force, I assure you upon the faith of a soldier, that I shall shortly receive a supply of English soldiers equal to my present number. If these should not prove sufficient to procure us satisfaction from you, let me further assure you that when the great King of England shall have heard of the treatment his subjects have received in this kingdom he will certainly send forces sufficient to destroy the whole province if satisfaction cannot be had from your own justice. I hope you will again consider of the matter and resolve to comply with my reasonable demands. My regard for your people, for my own nation, and for mankind in general makes me wish for Peace. If we must continue in war I call all men to witness that it is not my fault.

217. *Letter from Ranjit Rai to Colonel Clive, dated* 6 *February*, 1757.

I thought that the English were always faithful to their words and agreements, for which reason I interposed with the Nabob in your affairs and dismissed your deputies who could not properly

settle the business they came upon. Therefore I wrote you desiring that you would send a paper containing your demands which I would prevail on the Nabob to sign. The Nabob agrees to give you back Calcutta with all the privileges of your *phirmaund* and whatever goods you lost at Cossimbuzar or elsewhere, and will grant you permission to coin *siccas* in your mint at Calcutta or Allenagur, and that you may make what fortifications you please in Calcutta. Your conduct yesterday morning greatly amazed me and put me to shame before the Nabob. What passed between the Nabob and myself Coja Petruse will inform you; what has happened will occasion no difference in this affair. If you want to accommodate matters send a letter to the Nabob with your proposals, and I will get them signed and send them back to you, with a *sirpah*, elephant and jewels. After this the Nabob will decamp and march to Muxadavad. If you think war necessary acquaint me seriously with your intentions, and I will acquit myself of any further trouble in this affair.

218. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated Camp, 6 February, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have just time to acquaint you that yesterday morning we attacked the Nabob's army consisting of 40,000 men and made a prodigious slaughter. The loss on our side is very considerable, 67 military killed and wounded with 100 sepoys. The officers killed are Captains Bridge and Pye, Captain Gauppe, Lieutenant Rumbold, Ensign Ellis, Kirza Singue wounded, poor Belches is killed.

Now the consequences of this blow. The Nabob has decamped with his whole army, has wrote me a letter that he will comply with all our demands except a sum of money for the inhabitants, *viz.* that he will put us in possession of everything granted by the royal *phirmaund*, liberty to fortify Fort William as we please, and the liberty of a mint. He concludes with desiring me to sign these proposals, and that he will sign and seal them immediately, that he will send me a *seerpah*, elephant and jewells.

ROBERT CLIVE.

219. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated Calcutta, Monday night, 7 February,* 1757.

I am now fully convinced the Nabob's letter was only to amuse us, in order to cover his retreat and gain time till he is reinforced, which may be attended with very fatal consequences. For my own part, I was of opinion that attacking his rear when he was marching off, and forcing him to abandon his cannon, was a most necessary piece of service to bring him to an accommodation; for till he is well threshed, don't, Sir, flatter yourself he will be inclined to Peace. Let us therefore not be overreached by his politics, but make use of our arms, which are more to be depended on, and I dare say will be much more prevalent than any treaties or negotiations. In order to this, I have sent Captain Speke to talk with you on this subject. I think, too, it might not be amiss, were you to consult some of your own officers on the same occasion. You will pardon the liberty I take on this particular, when I assure you, I will do the utmost of my endeavours to assist you.

I am very truly, dear Sir, your most affectionate servant, CHARLES WATSON.

220. *The Treaty as finally signed by the Nawab on the 9th February.*

'*God and His Prophets are witnesses, that I never will deviate from the terms of the treaty I have now made with the English Company, and that I will on all occasions show them my favour, relying on your faith to observe inviolably your part of the treaty.*'

Articles acceded to, signed, and sealed by the Nabob, 9th of February, 1757.

I. Whatever rights and privileges the King hath granted to the English Company in the *phirmaunds* and *husbhalhookums*[1] sent from Delhi shall not be disputed, or taken from them, and the immunities therein mentioned stand good and be acknowledged.

[1] *Hasbal-hukm* = according to command. The initial words of a document issued by royal authority.

Whatever villages are given by the *phirmaunds* to the Company, shall likewise be granted, notwithstanding they have been denied them by former *Soubahdars*, but the *Zemindars* of these villages are not to be hurt or displaced without cause.

I do agree to the terms of the phirmaund.

II. All goods passing and repassing through the country by land or water in Bengal, Bahar and Orixa with English *dustucks*, shall be exempt from any tax, fee or imposition from *Choquedars*, *Gaulivahs*, *Zemindars*, or any others.

I agree to this.

III. All the Company's Factories seized by the Nabob shall be returned. All the money, goods and effects belonging to the Company, their servants and tenants, and which have been seized and taken by the Nabob, shall be restored. What has been plundered and pillaged by his people shall be made good by the payment of such a sum of money as his justice shall think reasonable.

I agree to restore whatever has been seized and taken by my orders, and accounted for in my Sincany.[1]

IV. That we have permission to fortify Calcutta in such a manner as we think proper without interruption.

I consent to it.

V. That we shall have liberty to coin *siccas* both of gold and silver, of equal weight and fineness to those of Muxadabad, which shall pass current in the province, and that there be no demand made for a deduction of *batta*.

I consent to the English Company's coining their own bullion into siccas.

VI. That the treaty shall be ratified by signing, sealing, and swearing in the presence of God and His Prophets to abide by the articles therein contained, not only by the Nabob but by his principal officers and ministers.

I have sealed and signed the articles in the presence of God and His Prophets.

VII. That Admiral Charles Watson and Colonel Robert Clive, on the part and behalf of the English nation and of the Company, do agree to live in a good understanding with the Nabob, to put

[1] Government books (Ives).

an end to the troubles, and be in friendship with him, whilst these articles are observed and performed by the Nabob.

I have signed and sealed the foregoing articles upon these terms, that if the Governor and Council will sign and seal them with the Company's seal, and will swear to the performance on their part, I then consent and agree to them.

Seals of the NABOB, MEER JAFFIER, and RAJAH DULLUB.

221. *Another version of the Nawab's agreement to the proposals of Colonel Clive, 7 February,* 1757.

1st. Article agreed, signed . . . according to former custom.

2nd. Fully agreed to.

3rd. Whatever of the Company's effects are in the Nabob's possession shall be restored.

4th. It's no matter (or it may be done).

5th. English coin shall be stampt in the name of Allenagur.

6th. Five times the Nabob has written an answer to your proposals. When the agreement shall be returned, signed and sealed by the Governor and Council of Calcutta, then these articles shall be signed and sealed in this manner.

7th. If the great Commanders are faithful in their promises undoubtedly they will be put in execution.

222. *The Governor and Council's agreement with the Nabob of Bengal.*

We the English East India Company, in the presence of His Excellency the Nabob Munserood Muluk Serajah Dowlah, *Soubahdar* of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, by the hands and seal of the Council, do agree and promise in the most solemn manner, that the business of the Company's Factories, which are in the jurisdiction of the Nabob, shall be transacted as formerly; that we will never do violence to any persons without cause; that we will never offer protection to any persons having accounts with the Government, to any of the King's *Talukdars* or *Zemindars*, to any murtherers or robbers, nor will ever act contrary to the tenor of the articles granted by the Nabob; we will carry on our trade in the former channel, and never in any respect deviate from this agreement.'

223. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp, 7 February, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—Having received your letter giving it as your opinion that the rear of the Nabob's army ought to have been attacked when he decamped from the last ground, that further attempts will be necessary to bring him to terms, and that you wish I would consult my own officers upon this occasion: in consequence of this I have called a Council of War and copy of which I enclose you.

Be assured sir I am very desirous my conduct should be such as may meet with the approbation of the World.

I am, dear Sir, &c. &c., R. C.

224. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Fort William, 8 February, 1757.*

SIR,—Since I had the pleasure of writing to you last, the Nabob, notwithstanding all his specious pretences to accommodate matters in an amicable manner with us, advanced with his army much nearer our camp than we could reasonably expect.

Messrs. Walsh and Scrafton were sent by the Company and Colonel to settle a few preliminaries with the Nabob, when to their great surprise they found him in a house in the skirts of Calcutta. What passed between them, I make no doubt but Mr. Walsh will by this same opportunity send you a particular account. As soon as he had left the Nabob, he returned to our camp and acquainted the Colonel with the Nabob's situation. The Colonel sent him immediately to me to beg the assistance of 500 seamen, and he would attack his camp the same night, or very early the next morning. Seeing the necessity of this I granted his request. The seamen were sent him a few hours after. In the morning of the 5th instant, about 3 o'clock, the Colonel marched from his own camp, and attacked the Nabob's. The enclosed is Captain Warrick's[1] account of the action, who commanded the body of seamen.

Since this on the 6th instant, the Nabob has thought fit to decamp. He is now removed further off the town to a spot of

[1] See No. 256, p. 253.

ground a little beyond Dum-Duma Bridge. His letter to the Colonel is very specious, but whether we can rely on what he professes and promises has not hitherto proved at all clear. I am afraid we have even yet much reason to doubt his honesty and suspect his designs. His force at present is about 15,000 foot and 10 or 12,000 horse.

The *Cumberland* has not yet joined us, which is an unhappy circumstance in our present situation, more particularly as the squadron is so very unhealthy, and I find myself much out of order with my old complaint. My compliments wait on all friends at Madras, and am with respect, Sir, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

P.S.—The number of seamen killed is 13, and about the same number wounded, of which last is Lieutenant Lutwidge of the *Salisbury*, and some others very dangerously. I don't yet know the Colonel's loss, but by all accounts the enemy have suffered much more.

225. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Omichand, dated 9 February, 1757.*

I desire greatly to see you, and have many things to impart to you. If you can come to me for a short time you may do it with safety. No harm shall happen to you, and you shall be at liberty to return whenever you please in security.

226. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Lala Ranjit Rai, dated 9 February, 1757.*

Your letter with the paper containing our demands and the agreement to be made on the part of the Company I have received with the greatest pleasure. I am surprized that the Nabob and you trifle. I observe that you are not inclinable to agree to our proposals. God is my witness that my actions have been open and generous, and that my inclinations are for Peace. I now send you the articles wrote fair. Let the Nabob sign 'agreed' to each separate article in the manner that I have upon the copy. If this is done there shall be Peace, if not, do not concern yourself further in this affair. War must take its course. With respect to the

agreement of the Governor and Council, they will agree to abide by the *phirmaund* and the above mentioned articles, nor will give protection to any person belonging to the Government, nor will do violence or injury to any person without cause.

227. *Letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated 9 February, 1757.*

The Colonel's letter I have received, with the agreement of the Governor and Council signed and sealed. He desires me to get the articles of the treaty now made, ratified by my great men and principal officers. I have complied with his request. It will be proper likewise for you and the Colonel on one part, and myself on the other, to execute an agreement, that hostilities between us shall cease; that the English will always remain my friends and allies; and that they will assist me against my enemies. For this purpose, I send a person of distinction and confidence who will speak at large the sentiments of my heart, and I hope you will inform him of your disposition towards me. The articles which were sent to me, I have returned, signed by myself, the King's *duan*, my own *duan*, and the *Bukhshi* of my army. I should be glad if you would confirm this treaty by a paper under your hand and seal, as the Colonel has done. I have in the most solemn manner called God and the Prophets to witness, that I have made Peace with the English. As long as I have life *I shall esteem your enemies as enemies to me*, and will assist you to the utmost of my power whenever you may require it. Do you likewise, and the Colonel, and Chiefs of the English Factory swear in the presence of the Almighty God to observe and perform your part of the treaty, and to esteem my enemies as your own, and always be ready to give me your assistance against them: and though you may not come yourself, I flatter myself you will send the aid I shall at any time ask for. God is the witness between us in this treaty.

God and His Prophets are witnesses, that I never will deviate from the terms of the treaty I have now made with the English Company, and that I will on all occasions shew them my favour, relying on your faith to observe inviolably your part of the treaty.

228. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated 9 (?) February, 1757.*

I received the letter you have done me the honour to write me, by Runjet Roy, who has given me the greatest satisfaction by acquainting me with your good disposition towards our nation, and your sincere desire to live with us in the strictest terms of friendship and alliance.

Before this letter can come to your hands, he will have made known to you, how much I agree in the same sentiments; the sincerity of which I hope every day to manifest more and more, that you may be thereby convinced how much the English have been wronged by those who have represented them to you as an ambitious, troublesome people. I trust you will live to see by their conduct henceforward that their character is the very reverse; and that there is not in the world a more peaceable people, when not oppressed; although I confess there are none more ready to draw the sword, when greatly injured.

The paper of agreement to the treaty on my part, I send you herewith, done in the manner you desired it, signed with my hand and sealed with my seal. And I call upon the Almighty, whom we both worship, to bear witness against and punish me, if I ever fail in observing to the utmost of my power every part of the treaty, concluded between yourself and the English nation, so long as you shall faithfully observe your part, which I make no doubt will be as long as you have life. What can I add more but my wishes, that your life may be long and crowned with all manner of prosperity?

I Charles Watson, etc., etc., in the name of His Britannic Majesty, and in the presence of God and Jesus Christ, do solemnly declare, that I will faithfully observe and maintain the Peace concluded on the 9th of February, 1757, between the Soubahdar, *etc., and the English in every part and article thereof. And that so long as the* Soubahdar, *etc., shall abide by his promises, and the articles signed by him, I will always look upon his enemies as the enemies of my nation, and when called upon, will grant him all the assistance in my power.*

229. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 11 *February*, 1757.

According to your desire I have sent the articles signed and sealed by the King's *dewan*,[1] my own *dewan*,[2] and the *Buxey*[3] of the army, the agreement under the hands and seals of the Governor and Council I have received. I make no doubt you will send the other paper as you have promised, ratified by your Excellency and the great man[4] above mentioned. I likewise call God and His Prophet to witness, that there (*sic*) I have made Peace with you and with the English nation, that as long as I live *I will look upon your enemies as my enemies*, and when you write to me that you stand in need of my assistance I will give it you.

230. *Letter from Messrs. Clive, Kilpatrick (&c.) to Select Committee, dated Fort William*, 12 *February*, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—We have received a note unsigned signifying to us the President's desire that we would assemble at a Committee to be held at 9 o'clock this morning or if convenient that we would give our opinions to the following questions.

1. Whether our present strength be not sufficient to force the Nabob into better terms.

2. Whether if (we) were strenuously to insist upon other advantageous articles they would not be granted.

To the 1st question we enclose you a Council of War held before we were certain the present conditions would be granted.

To the 2nd we are of opinion other articles may be asked not demanded, and that a gentleman deputed to the Nabob who understands the language and the customs of the country may not only be a means of getting them granted but likewise be of great use in many other matters both public and private which cannot be so properly done in writing.

Upon the whole we think the conditions highly honorable and advantageous to the Company. It would give us great pleasure as being considerable sufferers ourselves if terms advantageous to

[1] A'azz al-Mulk Mu'yid ud-Daulah Nawayish Ali Khan Bahadur.
[2] Raja Durlabh Ram Bahadur.
[3] Mir Jafar Khan Bahadur.
[4] Admiral Charles Watson.

private persons could be obtained likewise, but our present insignificant strength, the situation of affairs upon the Coast, the absolute recallment of Colonel Clive with the greatest part of the forces, obliges us to give it as our opinion that by insisting upon terms still more advantageous we expose the Company to the risque of losing those already granted them, having neither time nor the means of making the Nabob comply should he retreat. We are the more confirmed in this way of thinking as Rungeet Roy the Seats' *vakeel*, who has through the whole course of this negotiation undertaken the Company's affairs, in his last letter to Colonel Clive declares that if the last articles signed by the Nabob are not satisfactory he will interfere no more in the Company's business but let war take its course.

We are, Gentlemen, &c. &c., R. CLIVE, J. KILLPATRICK, &c. &c.

231. *Letter from M. H. Ribault to Messrs. Frans Adam Carelson and Arnoldus Habick, Amsterdam, dated Hugli,* 13 *February,* 1757.

Peace was unexpectedly concluded the 9th instant between the English and the Moors after a principal battle had happened. The conditions are kept very secret, but it is said they are very advantageous to the English; that among other privileges it is also agreed they shall erect a mint in Calcutta. It seems as if the country would not be in peace, for there are fresh troubles at the capital of Delhy. The victorious English seem to us here to have been supplied by the French, and it is said that the neutrality that has been preserved in the Ganges will not be interrupted, however I hope other thoughts will take place, for that would turn out very prejudicial to the Company.

H. RIBAULT.

232. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 14 *February,* 1757.

I have imparted to Omichand several particulars which he will fully acquaint you with. I desire that when you despatch Mr. Watts to Muxadavad you will send me 25 artillery soldiers with him, and write upon a separate paper their monthly allow-

ance which they shall duly receive from my Treasury with an additional gratuity when I give them their dismission. What more shall I write?

233. *Letter from Mr. Schwendler to Mr. Cornelius Schwendler, Captain at Middleburgh, dated Hugli, 16 February, 1757.*

MUCH HONOURED AND WELL-BORN SIR,—In my last I mentioned the subversion of the English Factory, their being dispersed, and their return with some troops sent to their assistance from Madras, as also their seizing their Factory again. This serves further to advise you, that, since then, they have, with the incredible small force of about 3 or 400 men, not only routed the Nabob's army consisting of 60,000 men, but struck such a pannick into that nation that they, who were so lofty in their writing, have shewn their weakness by making Peace with the English, and that upon so favourable conditions to that nation as they could ever have wished for. They have among others leave to erect a mint, which no one can grant but the King of Delhy, the *Great Mogul*; such permission has been given the Dutch and French; so that most people imagine that this Prince who always preserved this privilege to himself, will never approve of it, and that he will not suffer the English rupees to go current; so that in all appearance the Peace will not last long. A report prevails that the English and French will join, but still 'tis thought they will have nothing more to do with the Moors.

I remain, &c. &c., SCHWENDLER.

234. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Jagat Seth Mahtabrai and Maharaja Swarup Chand, dated 16 February, 1757.*

Omichand has acquainted me that you sent Lalla Rungeet Roy to attend His Excellence the Nabob for the procuring the peace of the country and the re-establishment of the Company's business and in all my proceedings I have never acted without his advice. The treaty has been agreed to and ratified on both sides in the most solemn manner. The signal kindness which you have shown in your endeavours to restore the currency of the Company's trade I have made particular mention of in my letters to Europe.

235. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Mr. Watts, dated* 16 *February*, 1757.

SIR,—The treaty of peace with the Nabob being concluded and ratified, we judge it proper to depute you to the *Durbar* with a copy of the articles which you are to see performed by the delivery of the Honourable Company's Factory of Cossimbuzar with the money, goods, and effects seized by the Nabob's officers. *Perwannahs* are likewise to be taken out for the delivery of Dacca and Luckipore Factories, and for the goods found there and at the other *aurungs* we have traded at, but as many things have been omitted in this treaty, and as some require explaining to prevent future cause of disputes and evasions, we are to direct you will strenuously apply to the Nabob upon the following heads:—

First. You must demand that the *phirmaund*, *husbulhookums* and other royal grants be enrolled in the *Mogul's* Books and that three attested copies thereof be transmitted us, that strict obedience be publickly ordered to the contents thereof, that the Nabob do send *perwannahs* to the *zemidars* of the villages granted the Company by the royal *phirmaund* to deliver those towns to the English, and that he will deduct the amount of their revenues from the *tucksum* or rents.

Secondly. You must get the article of the Mint explained in fuller terms and extend the liberty of coining to all bullion and gold imported into Calcutta by the English.

Thirdly. As the Nabob has consented to our *dustucks* passing in the country without being liable to any tax, fee or imposition from the *chokeys*, we doubt not he will permit us to punish the offenders of this article ourselves without a tedious complaint at the *Durbar*. You must endeavour therefore to obtain his permission for doing it as we esteem it very material.

Fourthly. We think the article of restitution is by the Nabob worded in a very loose manner. On your arrival therefore at Muxadavad, you must desire an exact account of all moneys, goods, and effects entered in the Nabob's *sircarry*. But as the Nabob must be sensible the Company's servants and private inhabitants have lost an immense sum in money and goods, of which no account has been given in his Books, it is but reasonable

and just some restitution should be made them. If this matter is managed with address and properly represented, we flatter ourselves an equitable restoration may be obtained. We shall depend upon you therefore to use your utmost endeavours upon this occasion; but if you find it impossible to procure that satisfaction, you must acquaint him that a large value may by his authority be collected from principal men in his service who have plundered our effects without his knowledge; and as it is probable some of our own servants and people may be found to have defrauded us in the late confusion, you are to apply for liberty to send and bring them or any of our debtors into Calcutta wherever we may find them without the Nabob's interfering. Monnickchund having likewise imposed on our servants and tenants many severe fines, application to have them refunded we think would be proper.

Fifthly. Should private restitution be refused, you must press the Nabob to take upon himself the discharge of all debts due from the English to his subjects or to the natives in general, as his violence and the pillage of his people have incapacitated us from paying those debts.

Sixthly. We think it would not be improper to mention that the Courts of Justice established by His Majesty's Charter should be allowed of, and privilege given us to try, condemn and execute all natives residing within our bounds if found guilty of capital crimes.

Seventhly. Being determined to employ Europeans in future at the *Durbar* the Nabob must promise them a civil reception whenever the Governour and Council think it proper to depute any to attend him; and as the *phirmaund* specifies the payment of an annual *piscash* and no more, we expect in future to be liable to no payment of money or presents on making visits, on petitioning for redress of grievances, or any other pretence whatever.

Eighthly. Could we obtain a promise from the Nabob that he will not erect any fortifications below Calcutta within a mile of the river, it would be very useful but there is no necessity to demand this concession.

Ninthly. As it is probable the Honourable Company may judge it proper to order the re-establishing of their Factory at Patna, we desire you will apply for liberty to repossess it whenever we think

proper, without any expense of presents or money to the *Durbar;* and that the Nabob's officers at Patna be ordered to assist the Company's agents in recovering their debts from the *assammys*[1] at that place.

Lastly. That you desire positive orders be sent to all his officers and people to return all Books, Papers and Accounts that are in their possession belonging to the English.

As Omichund has in some measure been deputed by the Nabob to us, and designs accompanying you to Muxadavad, we leave it entirely to your discretion to follow or decline his advice in the applications to the *Durbar*, and if any particulars omitted by us should occur to you for the benefit of our Employers, we give you full power to act therein as you may think proper.

We are, &c. &c. (*not signed*).

236. *Letter from Mr. C. O'Hara to Council, Fort William, dated Calcutta, 17 February,* 1757.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—Observing your Honour, &c., have been pleased to put the fortifications and other works since the re-establishment of Calcutta under the care of Captain Barker, who is a junior engineer to me in the Service and not belonging to this Settlement, I am humbly to request you will transmitt your reasons to my Honourable Employers for setting me aside, that they may not have cause to conclude from your appointment of that gentleman that I am less capable or deserving such a trust, as they have thought fit to insist on my serving them as an engineer till they shall please to remove me to some other employment. I am the more earnest in requesting this piece of justice from your Honour &c. as you are sensible yourselves that the works now in hand are the same I proposed to you when you sent for me and directed me to join Messrs. Simpson and Lebeaume in concerting some speedy method for the defence of the place against the Nabob, and which I will take upon me to make clear might have been done with as much ease and in as little time as those that were thrown up so greatly against my inclinations, being by far too extensive for the handfull of men then in the

[1] Debtors.

Settlement to defend, but your Honour &c., thinking it impracticable and that it would be running the Company into a needless expence as well as spoiling the town, were pleased to disapprove it at that time and pursue another project. For the truth of this I must appeal to your Honour &c. and depend upon your representation of my conduct when I was employed, by which my Honourable Employers will judge of me and either acquit or censure me as they shall see good.

I am, &c. &c., C. O'HARA.

237. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive,* 10 coss *from Hughly, dated* 18 *February,* 1757.

SIR,—Omichund is returned from Hughley, and has had a meeting with Nuncomar, who is *duan* and in the place of *Phousdar* of Hughly, who informs him, that Seva Baboo, Coja Wazed's *duan,* and Mutrau Mul, Narrain Sing's nephew, arrived yesterday from the Nabob, with a present of a *lack* of rupees from the Nabob to the French Company, with orders to Nuncomar to assist the French with all his force, in case the English should attack Chandernagor, or if the French should attack the English, to assist them in the same manner, that there may be no quarrels or disputes in this country. Omichund upon this advises the attacking of Chandernagor immediately, and not to be apprehensive of the Nabob, and says he is certain that there is not above three hundred matchlockmen in Hughley, that he has concerted measures with Nuncomar, who has engaged to delay matters, so as to prevent any assistance coming to the French from the Nabob for these fourteen days or more, and he says you may depend on it when you are once engaged with the French no one will come to the assistance of either party. Further Omichund has promised in behalf of the English that if Nuncomar keeps neuter, and by his policy prevents any assistance arriving from the Nabob to the French, that we will then make him a present of ten or twelve thousand rupees, and use our interest to continue him in the government of Hughley. If you approve of giving this present, all that you have to say to the bearer of this letter is, *Golaub que Foul,* or 'a rose flower'; with which message Nuncomar will be satisfied that you comply with the agreement made

by Omichund, who says that it is not pleasing to him to acquiesce in such demands, but he thinks the necessity of our affairs require it to prevent our intentions being misrepresented or further jealousies of us instilled into the Nabob, as this is such a venal Government in which nothing is to be effected without money or a very superior force. Omichund and I are of opinion, that this money, if the man proves faithful, (and not till then is it to be paid) will be well laid out. If you think otherwise give the bearer no answer and do not mention the *Golaub Foul.* Omichund says that the French are indebted to Juggutseat's house upwards of thirteen *lack* of rupees, which will of course I imagine prevent their engaging themselves in our interest. Omichund likewise says, that Monickchund and Coja Wazed have obtained this favour for the French in his absence but he hopes when we arrive in camp to overset their schemes. Pray write me by express *cossids,* and if you agree to the terms proposed above, the Bramin who brings this, will carry in future the messages to and fro between you and Nuncomar. I have wrote these particulars to you and no one else, therefore you will make what use of them you think proper.

I have certain advice from Coja Petrus and from two gentlemen I sent on purpose to Chinchura, that the French are sending their effects there, they saw several boats loaded with chests, chairs, pepper, cotton &c. and some carrying on shore; so that you will find nothing but an empty shell. I am informed the Danes give the same protection, but of this you will be able to get better intelligence than I.

I beg you will daily send me advices of your proceedings as it may be useful. Omichund desires his respects.

I am Sir, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

238. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 19 *February,* 1757.

I wrote you a letter yesterday which you will have received. Since that I understand by letters from the French and by the information of their *vakeel* that five or six ships are newly arrived and more shortly expected, that you have only made a peace in appearance with me, but your real intentions are to make war against me in the Rains. This is not acting like a soldier or a man

of bravery, who should be the same thing in heart as in profession. If you mean to keep to your engagements send away your ships to the sea, and put in execution your promises made in your agreement with me; and I will strictly observe my part of the treaty. After having made peace to begin war again no religion can justify. The Mahrattas have no Book of God, yet are just to their contracts. You have the Book of God, if you are not just to your contracts it will be astonishing and unaccountable.

239. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated 19 February, 1757.*

To put an end to the hostilities in my country and dominions I consented and agreed to the treaty of Peace with the English, that trade and commerce might be carried on as formerly; to which treaty you have agreed, and a firm accommodation between us is settled and established. You have likewise sent me an agreement under your own hand and seal not to disturb the tranquility of my country, but it now appears that you have a design to besiege the French Factory near Houghley, and to commence hostilities against that nation. This is contrary to all rule and custom that you should bring your animosities and differences into my country: for it has never been known since the days of Timur that the Europeans made war upon one another within the King's dominions. If you are determined to besiege the French Factories, I shall be necessitated in honour and duty to my King to assist them with my troops.

240. *Letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated 20 February, 1757.*

The letter I wrote to you yesterday I imagine you have received; since which I have been informed by the French *vackeel* that five or six additional ships of war have arrived in the river, and that more are expected. He represents likewise, that you design commencing hostilities against me and my subjects again, as soon as the Rains are over. This is not acting agreeable to the character of a true soldier and a man of honour, who never violated their words. If you are sincere in the treaty concluded with me,

send your ships of war out of the river, and abide stedfastly by your agreement: I will not fail in the observance of the treaty on my part. Is it becoming or honest to begin a war, after concluding the Peace so lately and solemnly? The Mahrattas are bound by no gospel, yet they are strict observers of treaties. It will therefore be a matter of great astonishment, and hard to be believed, if you, who are enlightened with the Gospel, should not remain firm, and preserve the treaty you have ratified in the presence of God and Jesus Christ.

241. *Extract from a letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated 21 February, 1757.*

Your letter of the 19th I was honoured with this morning, and observe that you disapprove of our committing hostilities against the French settled in these provinces. Had I imagined it would have given you any umbrage, I should never have entertained the least thoughts of disturbing the tranquility of your country, by acting against that nation within the Ganges; and am now ready to desist from attacking their Factory or committing other hostilities against them in these provinces, if they will consent and agree to a solid treaty of neutrality, and if you as *Soubahdar* of Bengal will under your hand guarantee this treaty, and promise to protect the English from any attempts made by that nation against our Settlements during my absence.

242. *Letter from Mr. Watts to the Select Committee, dated near Agadeep, 21 February, 1757, 2 p.m.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—Omychaund was yesterday sent for by the Nabob, who told him he heard that the English had broke their agreement, and were marching up the country, to which Omychaund answered 'from whom Sir did you get this information, and what part of the agreement is broke?' To which the Nabob replied and asked if there was ever any fighting among the Europeans before in the river, and that if any complaints were made to him was he not obliged to redress them. To these Omychaund again answered that the English had received intelligence that the

Nabob had given Hughly to the French, that he had presented them with a *laak* of rupees, had promised them the grant of a Mint and great titles; upon these reports the English were much concerned and conferred together about what the French had done for the Nabob to merit such favour; on the contrary when the Nabob wanted their assistance they refused it, whereas the English have agreed and will assist the Nabob to the utmost of their power: and the English are surprised that the Nabob does not consider and reflect on what are the motives and reasons for Monsieur Boussi's coming into this country with a large land force. Omychaund then told the Nabob that he had lived under the English protection these forty years, that he never knew them once to break their agreement; to the truth of which Omychaund took his oath by touching a Bramin's foot: and that if a lie could be proved in England upon any one, they were spit upon and never trusted. Upon this the Nabob was [so] well pleased that though before he had ordered Meir Jaffeir himself to the assistance of the French, and proposed returning himself, he countermanded that order and sent a message by Omychaund to me to write to you that what men he had already sent down was only to garrison Hughly, and that he would give orders we should not be molested.

I am, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

P.S.—The Nabob is 12 miles off. As I have wrote this under a tree in a hurry you will (I flatter myself) excuse any little errors.

243. *Letter from the Select Committee, Fort Saint George, to Select Committee, Fort William, dated 21 February, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—We received with the most sensible pleasure your favor of the 8th ultimo, advising of your being again in possession of Fort William.

But we confess that we felt at the same time much concern on the perusal of the complaints you make on the subject of the authority with which we thought it necessary to invest Colonel Clive during his present command.

In the letter we had the honour to write you the 13th October last, we mentioned many reasons which induced us to invest Colonel Clive with such authority. We shall here recapitulate

those reasons with some concurring circumstances, leaving it then to our Honourable Masters to judge of our conduct, in support of which we can at least aver that we were guided in every step by nothing but a hearty zeal for their service.

After struggling with many difficulties in order to put the expedition upon the most advantageous footing as well with regard to the Company as private sufferers, we drained all the garrisons upon the Coast to strengthen the detachment preparing for Bengal, and to secure to the utmost of our power a speedy success to our designs.

But as we were in daily expectation of war with France, and had reason also from the advices of the Secret Committee to apprehend the appearance of a considerable French fleet, we could by no means resolve to put it out of our own power to defend the certain possessions of the Company on this Coast for the hope of uncertain acquisitions in Bengal.

Therefore, in order to provide for both necessities, to make an effort for the re-establishment of the Company's affairs in Bengal, and still to have in our hands a security for their possessions on this Coast, in case of need, there was no other method but reserving to ourselves the power of recalling our troops.

You may be, and we believe you are, unacquainted, Gentlemen, with the extent and value of the Company's concerns on this Coast committed to our charge; but the Court of Directors are well acquainted, and will we doubt not think we consulted for the Company's interest when we gave them so large a share of our attention.

The reason which you quote from our letter of the 13th October for putting it in Colonel Clive's power to deviate from your plan of military operations is not so weak as you endeavour to represent it. The words of our letter are 'That no division of opinion might prevent our intentions from being carried into execution.' We will shew you, Gentlemen, how much reason we had to fear such a division of opinion, and you shall then be judges if it was not necessary to guard against it. We had before us some letters from Mr. Watts, some from Mr. Holwell, and one from Mr. Becher, each giving a different account of the misfortune, but all agreeing in blaming the conduct of the Governor and Council, or disowning

their authority. It is worthy of remark that Messrs. Watts, Becher and Holwell are three of the four gentlemen who have signed your letter now before us, a letter filled with sentiments so different from the opinions given in their separate letters addressed to us.

After thinking we had sufficient reasons to determine us to give Colonel Clive the independent powers before mentioned, the consigning him the money intended for the services of the expedition was a natural consequence. That money was designed only for the payment of the forces who are at an established allowance, and the particulars of the disbursements we are very confident Colonel Clive will lay before you whenever you apply for it. A separate consignment was made by the President and Council here to the President and Council at Bengal.

Having answered to your complaints, we shall acquaint you briefly with the present state of the Company's affairs on this Coast and the resolutions we have hereupon made.

Far from being able to supply you with more men we have unguarded a great part of the Company's Establishments on this Coast by the large detachment already sent you. Our northern Settlements are at the daily mercy of a French army, which by the last advices was within two days' march of Vizagapatam. The southward provinces assigned to the Company have suffered continual ravages, and are now involved in such troubles that the preservation of them is doubtful; and our own Settlements, not excepting the Presidency, are barely in a state of defence against the present force of Pondicherry, where luckily only two ships have yet arrived, but if we may credit reports many more are expected.

Therefore, Gentlemen, we think ourselves indispensably obliged to repeat our injunctions to Colonel Clive to return here before the season is too late with as many troops as he judges can be spared from the defence of Calcutta, and we request that you will yield him all the assistance he may apply to you for on this occasion.

You insist much upon the number of recruits intended for your Presidency which have been detained here for some years past. Had we confined our supply to the remains of those men, or to the number which would probably have remained at this time if

they had proceeded to you immediately from Europe we may reasonably say that you would not have had half the number which we sent you under the command of Major Killpatrick and Colonel Clive.

We hope the junction of the troops from Bombay will have given Colonel Clive so much success as to open to you some opportunity of coming to terms with the Nabob, for we are of opinion that neither the Company's force nor cash is sufficient to carry on hostilities in Bengal, and be at the same time so prepared to resist the efforts of the French on this Coast as a war between the two nations requires.

We purpose to send you by the ship *Sally* and the *Betsy* schooner four hundred *sepoys*, four hundred barrels of gunpowder, and fifty barrels of musket cartridges, which is all we can possibly spare; and as to every other sort of military stores we left ourselves very bare to find you the supplies which went with Colonel Clive.

We are necessitated to repeat our request that you will transmit us a very particular list of all your guns, gun-carriages, ammunition and stores of all kinds to enable us to assist you as much as may be in our power and leave ourselves equally provided. If you have any guns of 9, 12, or 18-pounders which are not immediately wanted, we shall be glad if they can be sent hither, and should Mr. Watson apply to you to replace the number of shot he may have expended, we request you will answer his demand as far as you possibly can, as we are here barely supplied for the occasion of our own garrison.

We enclose a letter from the Secret Committee for your President, received by His Majesty's ship *Triton*. It was necessary for us to open it that we might determine whether to send down Captain Brohier immediately. Finding the intentions of the Secret Committee to be to lay a plan for fortifying the whole town of Calcutta or the principal part of it, which cannot possibly be set about in your present unsettled condition, and Colonel Clive having acquainted us with the works that have been thrown up round Fort William so as to secure it against the attempts of a country enemy, we resolved to detain Captain Brohier, whose presence is very necessary to finish the works in hand at this

place, untill we have the pleasure to hear you are in such a state of tranquillity as will enable you to enter upon a proper plan of fortification, at which time we shall direct Captain Brohier to proceed to you by the very first conveyance. The letter from the Secret Committee to your Presidency being in cypher, we have taken it out, and send a written copy in its stead.

The terms made with Captain Finley and Captain Dogan are that they each carry down two hundred *sepoys* and two hundred barrels of powder, and diet the *sepoys* on board for three thousand rupees. They have both been fully paid here.


We are, &c. &c., GEORGE PIGOT, &c.

244. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 22 February, 1757.*

However as you have given ear to all the bad stories which have been told you of us by designing and wicked men, that more ships of war are arrived, and that we intend to break the Peace so solemnly sworn to, I do at once declare, I will instantly lay aside all thoughts of attacking the French. Let them enter into a Peace with us in your dominions directly, and do Your Excellency swear that you will attack that party with your whole force who first infringes the neutrality, and the ships will leave the river, and I will return to the Coast.

I call God to witness that I have had your interest lately much at heart, and if this neutrality which you are desirous to have concluded with the French should end in the ruin of this kingdom, I wash my hands of all blame. Your Excellency is answerable for the consequences.

Mr. Watts was sent to acquaint you that it was for our mutual benefit that the French should be attacked, but notwithstanding, I never intended to have marched from this ground till I had your consent. I could have taken the Fort in two days. Your Excellency forbidding me to do it after everything was in readiness has put me to great shame: however as you think the peace of your province will be preserved by it, it gives me great pleasure to comply with your request. If anything prejudicial to your affairs should happen by this favour towards the French, I beg you



CALCUTTA IN 1756—57.

Stanford's Geog.l Estab.t London

will remember this letter. Time will discover which of the two nations is most to be depended upon.

245. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Secret Committee, London, dated Camp, opposite to Barnagul, 22 February,* 1757.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. My last address was by the *Syren* sloop dated 1st instant, when I acquainted you that my force being far short of what I expected I was only in a condition to act on the defensive, that the Nabob was advancing towards us, and at the same time had made some overtures for an accommodation, and that the situation of affairs on the Coast and the pressing instances of the Gentlemen of Fort Saint George for our return made me earnestly wish to conclude a Peace in this province as speedily as possible.

2. On the 3rd instant letters came in from the Nabob proposing to restore our Settlement, and make some reparation for the effects taken, and desiring proper persons to be sent to confer with him on the subject; at the same time the van of his army appeared in sight, and passed along towards Calcutta just without reach of the cannon of our battery to the eastward.

3. Coja Patrus, an Armenian who brought the Nabob's letters, assured me that the Nabob had by his own mouth promised to wait at a place called Gange where he then was till the conference was over, and I directly wrote him testifying my satisfaction at his pacifick intentions, and that two gentlemen would be deputed immediately to treat with him. As it was of great consequence to know the Nabob's real design without loss of time I dispatched Messrs. Walsh and Scrafton to him in the next morning, who after travelling the best part of the way to Gange were informed that the Nabob had passed on to Dum Dumma, on which they followed him, and running through the rear of his army came up with him in the town of Calcutta itself. On their admittance to the Nabob they represented that as they expected to have met him at Gange in a favourable disposition towards a Peace with the English, they could not but be greatly surprized in finding him entered in an hostile manner into their very city, and that unless he would manifest some desire of a Peace by withdrawing his troops from the neighbourhood of Calcutta, they

could not enter upon the business they came about. The Nabob refused to comply with their proposition, and treating them with no small haughtiness they took their leave and returned to me late in the evening.

4. As I now plainly perceived he only meant to amuse us, and that the little opposition he had received served rather to elate his hopes than incline him to moderate measures, I determined to attack him the next morning before day break, while two-thirds of his army were still encamped without the Moratta Ditch, for when they had once passed and got into the streets of the town, it would be too late to attempt it. Another pressing reason for the immediate execution of this enterprise, notwithstanding the smallness of my force, was the sudden distress we found ourselves in upon the approach of the Nabob's army by a general desertion of our workmen, *coolies* and servants, the breaking up of our markets and no provisions to be had but what was supplied from the Fort by water, in which condition we could not have continued long but must have retreated into the Fort with disgrace. I therefore desired Admiral Watson to assist me with five or six hundred seamen, principally for drawing the artillery and carrying ammunition, which he readily complied with, and about 3 in the morning I marched out with nearly my whole force, leaving only a few Europeans with 200 new raised *bucksaries* to guard our camp. About 6 we entered the enemies' camp in a thick fog and crossed it in about two hours with considerable execution. Had the fog cleared up as it usually does about 8 o'clock when we were entire master of the camps without the Ditch, the action must have been decisive; instead of which it thickened and occasioned our mistaking the way. I avoid troubling you with the particulars of this undertaking as they are fully set down in my journal of military occurrences.

5. The next day being the 6th the Nabob decamped and removed to Dum Dumma, and the Armenian was again sent to me with a letter from Rungeet Roy desiring if we meant peace to transmit our proposals to the Nabob who was inclined to comply with them. Accordingly the Select Committee was consulted and the articles agreed on and forwarded, but the Nabob proposing to sign them in an evasive manner, a second copy was

sent to him to execute in positive terms, which he did, at least what were deemed tantamount, and immediately set forward to Muxadavad with all his forces.

6. Just at this time he had received advice that the Afghans had defeated the *Mogul*, and their leader had seized the Government assuming the title of Ahmud Shaw Shahawn Shah. Orders were immediately issued for coins for this province to be struck in the name of the new Emperor, and the Nabob it is supposed is hurrying to his frontiers to make an alliance with his neighbor the Nabob of Lucknapore, sometimes called Owd, for their mutual support in the present disturbed state of the Empire.

7. I have little to observe on the terms obtained from the Nabob except that they are both honorable and advantageous for the Company. The grants of a Mint and the villages hitherto detained from us are very considerable, and the abolishing the duties lately exacted by the *chokies*, as well as confirming the free transportation of goods without customs of any kind, and the rest of the priviledges of the royal *phirmaund* are no small points gained.

8. The Nabob caused inventories to be taken of the goods found at the out-settlements and *aurungs*, and they are to be delivered up accordingly. He intimated privately his intentions of paying three *lack* of rupees in consideration of the Company's other losses. As to ample restitution for what was plundered by his army at Calcutta, it could not well be expected of him as he says himself in one of his letters.

9. The jealousies instilled into him by the French agents made it necessary for us to conclude the treaty with him out of hand, as well to convince him of our moderate views, which he seemed to doubt, as to prevent his union with the French which was then strongly pushed on. As he must now be convinced of the consequence we are of to his affairs and of his advantage and security in a firm and close alliance with us, we may hope the treaty will be complied with to our satisfaction, and that he will not be averse even to granting any further reasonable priviledges that may be required of him in future by the Gentlemen here.

10. Mr. Watts set out the 17th to attend the Nabob's *Durbar*

and press him to the speedy execution of the several points of the treaty on his part, and some gentlemen are likewise gone to the different Subordinates to receive the effects to be delivered over to them.

11. The French having given no answer to the offers of a neutrality we made them, we were in hopes to have prevailed on the Nabob to suffer us to attack Charnagore, since he had solemnly declared in his letters that he would esteem our enemies as his and assist us with forces against them whenever we required it. Rungeet Roy was first discoursed with on the subject upon his arrival with presents from the Nabob on the conclusion of this treaty, but I have reason to think we met with no advocate in him with regard to this point. Omichund accompanyed him back to the *Durbar*, and had particular instructions to sound the Nabob on the subject. He returned with a letter from the Nabob in which he desired us to furnish him with 25 artillery men, and referred us to Omichund for some particulars he had ordered him to impart; which were that he had been informed that Monsieur Bussy with a large army was coming and that some French men-of-war were likewise expected, and that he desired we would prevent the French from entering his kingdom by land or water. As this was construed in some measure a permission for attacking the French in Charnagore, a proper answer was wrote to the Nabob, and Mr. Watts accompanyed by Omichund was sent to urge the point. The next day being the 18th the army crossed the river and encamped opposite to Barnagut and this day I intended to have began my march towards Charnagore; the large ships were to have followed the 25th before which it would be dangerous for them to move on account of the irregular and rapid tides. We were in expectation of receiving very soon further encouragement from Mr. Watts for attempting the enterprise, but yesterday arrived letters from the Nabob absolutely forbidding hostilities against the French and declaring that he should consider all attempts against them as a violation of the treaty, and that he would assist them in such case with his utmost force. At the same time came in a request from the Governour and Council of Charnagore for a neutrality within the Ganges, which the Select Committee taking into consideration thought it

advisable to accede to rather than risque a rupture with the Nabob. Accordingly an answer was returned them that if they were duly impowered to conclude such an act, and could get it guaranteed by the Nabob we would come into it on our part. I wrote at the same time to the Nabob acquainting him of our submission to his orders, but that if by this means the French should hereafter be in such a state as to disturb his country he must lay the blame on himself.

12. All operations therefore are now over, and I may hope in [a] few days to take my passage for the Coast with the satisfaction of having left your affairs well re-established and a general tranquillity in the province. My joy will be complete if I am so happy as to find my conduct throughout has been such as to merit your approbation.

13. Since I had the honour to address you last I have had no further advices from Fort Saint George, nor has the *Cumberland* appeared, nor any of the troops we expected from Bombay. I can therefore return with very few men to the Coast. The importance of this colony is such that I cannot conclude better than by recommending to Your Honours in the strongest manner to send out as large a military force as you conveniently can for its protection.

I am, &c. &c., R. CLIVE.

246. *A General Return of all the troops under the command of Colonel Clive, 22 February, 1757.*

I. EUROPEANS

	Officers and Volunteers on Duty	Officers and Volunteers Sick.	Non-commissioned Officers and Centinels on Duty	Non-commissioned Officers and Centinels Sick	Entertained.	Casualties.
King's troops	7	1	139	14	—	28
Coast Establishment	21	6	314	69	2	126
Bengal Establishment	31	2	153	45	15	17
Train	6	—	99	16	1	25
Total	65	9	705	144	18	196

Killed.

Captain Dugald Campbell	Ensign Charles Kerr
Captain Timothy Bridge	Volunteer Davidson
Captain William Pye.	Mr William Belches

Wounded

Captain Nicholas Weller	Ensign William Rider
Captain George Frederick Gaupp.	Ensign William Ellis
Captain John Fraser	Volunteer Dundass
Captain Thomas Rumbold.	Volunteer Stibber
Captain-Lieutenant Peter Carstairs.	

II. SEPOYS

	Doing Duty	Sick.	Casualties
Coast Establishment ..	923	79	75
Bengal Establishment	458	—	12
Total .	1,381	79	87

247. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated — February, 1757.*

The van of the King of Delhi's army is advancing towards these provinces. Upon this intelligence I design marching towards Patna to meet them. If at this critical juncture you will be my friend and send me assistance I will pay your forces a *lack* of rupees monthly, while they remain with me. Send me an immediate answer.

248. *Letter from Colonel Clive to his father, dated 23 February, 1757.*

HONOURED SIR,—Since my last I have the pleasure to acquaint you the Nabob with 20,000 horse and 30,000 foot appeared in sight of our camp at the distance of about a mile and a half and encamped near Calcutta Town. His situation obliged me to attack him which I did at daybreak in the morning. Our success was very great, being in his camp upwards of two hours in which time we killed 1,300 men and between 5 and 6 hundred horse with 4 elephants. This blow has obliged the Nabob to decamp and to conclude a peace very honourable and advantageous to the Company's affairs, by which means they have a more promising pros-

pect than ever. The Nabob sent me a jewel, Moorish dress and an elephant—the same to the Admiral.

As this success has probably saved the Company, this is a proper time to push my interest I have written to my Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop, Mr. Fox, and my Lord Barrington, Secretary at War, to desire their interest. I have likewise wrote to Messrs. Mabbot, Drake and Payne. I am desirous of being appointed Governor-General of India if such an appointment should be necessary. I have opened myself a little to Mr. Mabbot; however I would have you manage this affair with great prudence and discretion and not mention the word Governor-General without you find it hinted at by other hands. Consult Mr. Belchier and don't make the contents of this letter known to anyone else but the Judge[1] and Mr. King. Consult them.

This expedition is attended with nothing but reputation; the last attack was the warmest service I ever yet was engaged in. 200 men were killed and wounded of which number our battalion consisting of 500 men had 85 killed and wounded; my secretary and aide-de-camp killed by me. I shall send you a journal of our military proceedings and I enclose you the letters to Great Men under flying seals for your perusal and for your delivery, and beg you will not be too sanguine in your expectations or expressions. I have enclosed journals to Mr. Fox and Lord Barrington.

I expect to return very shortly to the Coast as all is over here. I have executed the conveyance you sent me, which you will receive by the *Delawar*. Make an apology to my friends for not writing them. I really have not time. My warmest wishes attend my mother, brothers and sisters, and I am,

Your dutiful and affectionate Son, ROBERT CLIVE.

249. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Payne, Chairman of the Court of Directors, dated 23 February, 1757.*

If I had only consulted the interest and reputation of a soldier, the conclusion of this Peace might easily have been suspended. I know, at the same time, there are many who think I have been

[1] Probably refers to Lord Hardwicke.

too precipitate in the conclusion of it; but surely those who are of this opinion never knew, that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the Company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the Nabob, which was on the point of being carried into execution. They never considered the situation of affairs on the Coast, and the positive orders sent me by the Gentlemen there, to return with the major part of the forces at all events; they never considered that, with a war upon the Coast and in the province of Bengal at the same time, a trading company could not subsist without a great assistance from the Government; and last of all, they never considered, that a long war, attended through the whole course of it with success and many great actions, ended at last with the expense of more than fifty *lacs* of rupees to the Company.

Believe me, Sir, I have constantly had this consideration in view, and my conduct has always been regulated agreeable to it. I can further say, I never undertook an expedition attended with half so many disagreeable circumstances as this: the natural jealousy subsisting between sea and land service has given me much uneasiness; I have suffered many mortifications; the independent power given me by the Gentlemen of the Committee at Madras has created me many enemies; and lastly, that attention which, by my public station, I owe to the interest of the Company in preference to that of the private, has not passed by unreflected upon. I am a very considerable sufferer myself, and I can affirm with great truth and sincerity, that I have left no means untried with the Nabob, when the Company's interest was not immediately concerned, to induce him to consider the unhappy people at Calcutta, and he has often promised to do it.

Nothing harsh, ungenerous, or uncharitable shall fall from my pen: at the same time, in justice to the Company, I cannot avoid expressing my concern at the future prospect of their affairs after the obtainment of such honourable and advantageous conditions. Do but reflect, Sir, that most of the gentlemen in power are become bankrupts by the unfortunate loss of Calcutta. This consideration, I must confess, added to their apprehensions of being dismissed the service, has often induced me to wish the Gentlemen of Madras had taken the entire management of affairs into their hands till the Company's pleasure was known.

It cannot be expected that the princes of this country, whose fidelity is always to be suspected, will remain firm to their promises and engagements from principle only. It is therefore become absolutely necessary to keep up a respectable force in this province for the future. How far this is agreeable to the Company's circumstances, you, Sir, are the best judge. I shall only add, *there never was that attention paid to the advice of military men at Calcutta as was consistent with the safety of the place when in danger—a total ignorance of which was the real cause of the loss of Fort William.*

Our design upon Chandernagore is uncertain. I cannot yet fathom the Nabob's sentiments; the French having in a manner refused a neutrality this day offered it. As the expedition is so far advanced, I have given it my opinion to proceed and invest the place; and, if it should happen, at last, that the Nabob is really against taking it, to accept the neutrality, and make a merit of doing it at his request and in obedience to his order, by which means he will be convinced of our friendship and power at the same time.

I shall conclude this letter with submitting my conduct to your opinion. It would have required greater abilities than I am master of to reconcile and satisfy so many different interests. If I have erred it has not been with design; whenever that can be made to appear, I shall very deservedly forfeit the good opinion and favour of the Court of Directors, to whom I owe everything.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received two letters from the Nabob absolutely forbidding me to attack Chandernagore. I did not hesitate a moment in complying upon the terms which will be made known to you in correspondence with the Secret Committee.

250. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated Camp, 25 February, 1757.*

SIR,—I have just seen your letter to the Committee. How can what the Nabob expresses by word of mouth be confided in when he writes letters with his own *chop*[1] positively forbidding us to attack the French. If he answers my letter immediately and gives me but the least hint that he will not interfere, it is not yet

[1] Seal.

too late: but whilst his letters are extant against us and nothing but a few promises made us, and those too at second hand, what will the world think of our conduct should our design miscarry? I hope to hear that you have seen and discoursed with him yourself.

I am, Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

251. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 23 February, 1757.*

I still remain at the place your messenger found me in, covered with shame at the injunction laid upon me not to molest our enemies. I impatiently wait Your Excellency's final answer, which I shall strictly comply with. It gives me the greatest concern to find Your Excellency daily conferring favours on the French who never merited them. I do request that Your Excellency will judge of the two nations by their actions, not by their words.

252. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Court of Directors, dated Camp near Calcutta, 23 February, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—I can now congratulate Your Honours upon the conclusion of a Peace with the Nabob of this province, such a one I hope as will prove both honorable and advantageous to the Company. I have enclosed copy of the articles of agreement to your Secret Committee, which articles are sealed and solemnly sworn to by the Nabob and some of his principal officers.

I have nothing further to wish than that my conduct throughout the whole course of this affair may meet with Your Honours' approbation, and to assure Your Honors that whenever the necessity of your affairs call upon me to act either in a civil or military station, in any other part of India, I shall with equal readiness embrace the opportunity.

I enclose Your Honors the continuation of our military proceedings and a return of all the forces under my command remarking all casualties.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

253. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Lord Hardwicke, dated Camp near Calcutta, 23 February, 1757.*

My Lord,—The countenance your Lordship was pleased to show me when in England has emboldened me to address a few lines to your Lordship on the subject of the East India Company.

No doubt your Lordship has been acquainted with the capture of the town of Calcutta and of Fort William by the Moors, the principal settlement of the kingdom of Bengal and of the utmost consequence to the East India Company. To give your Lordship some idea of the richness of the place, the loss of private property only is valued at more than two millions sterling.

When this unfortunate news arrived at Madras, the President and Council applyed to Vice-Admiral Watson for his assistance in recovering the Company's rights, priviledges, and possessions in the Province of Bengal, and for the same purpose ordered a large body of land forces to embark under my command, and I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship this expedition by sea and land has been crowned with all the success that could be wished.

The town of Calcutta and Fort William were soon retaken with several other forts belonging to the enemy, and last of all Hughly, the second city in the Bengal Dominions. This news brought down the Nabob, or Prince of the country, himself at the head of 20,000 horse and 30,000 foot, 25 pieces of cannon, with a great number of elephants. Our little army consisting only of 700 Europeans and 1,200 blacks, armed and disciplined after the English manner, lay encamped about 5 miles distant from the town of Calcutta. On the [3rd instant] the Nabob's army appeared in sight and passed our camp at about the distance of 1½ miles, and encamped at the back of the town about the like distance from Fort William. Several parties of horse passed within 400 yards of our advanced battery, but as we entertained great hopes of a Peace from the Nabob's promises we did not fire upon them.

On the [4th instant] agreable to the Nabob's desire I despatched two gentlemen to wait upon him, in hopes everything might be settled without drawing the sword, but the haughtiness and disrespect with which he treated them convinced me nothing could

be expected by mild measures. This determined me to attack his camp in the night time, for which purpose I applyed to Vice-Admiral Watson for 500 sailors to draw our canon, &c., which he very readily complyed with, and at 3 o'clock in the morning our little army consisting of 600 Europeans, 800 black, 7 field pieces and the sailors above mentioned, set out for the attack. A little before daybreak we entered the camp and received a very brisk fire. This did not stop the progress of our troops, who marched through the enemy's camp upwards of 4 miles in length. We were [more] than 2 hours in passing and what escaped the van was destroyed by the rear. We were obliged to keep up a constant fire of artillery and musketry the whole time. A body of 300 horse made one gallant charge, and were received with so much coolness by the military that few escaped. Several other brisk charges were made upon our rear but to no manner of purpose, and we returned safe to our camp having killed by the best accounts 1,300 men and between 5 and 600 horse with 4 elephants; the loss on our side amounted to 200 men killed and wounded including soldiers, sailors, and blacks. This blow had its effect, for the next day the army decamped and the Nabob sent me a letter offering terms of accommodation, and I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship a firm Peace is concluded greatly to the honour and advantage of the Company, and the Nabob entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with them and is returned to his capital of Muxadavad.

As your Lordship heretofore honoured me with your favour and protection, I flatter myself with the hopes of a continuance of it and that if your Lordship thinks me deserving your Lordship will recommend me to the Court of Directors.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

254. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to the Secret Committee, London, dated 24 February, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. Enclosed we transmit you duplicate of our address by Mr. Holwell who returned to Europe on the *Syren* sloop, which vessel we hope has safely imported in England before the arrival of these advices. By this packet we send one copy of our Proceedings, letters, &c., for your perusal.

2. Since the dispatch of the *Syren* the Nabob's forces approached to the outskirts of our town, contrary to a promise he had made the Colonel. Messrs. Walsh and Scrafton waited on him in Omychaund's garden, but being received with indifference and giving no satisfactory answers to the proposals they made him, the Colonel on the morning of the 6th instant beat up his quarters, marched through his camp and killed a great number of men. The loss on our side was not inconsiderable. We have reason to imagine the consternation this affair occasioned both in the Nabob and his army induced him to sue for an accommodation by the intervention of Roy Rungeet, Juggutseat's *vackeel*. The articles of the treaty we have concluded with him are forwarded in the general packet and are such as we flatter ourselves will prove satisfactory, the advantages resulting to the Company being more than sufficient to recompense the heavy loss and charges they have suffered. Whether greater concessions might not have been obtained if demanded, we will not pretend to determine.

3. As some particulars were omitted to be applied for, we have dispatched Mr. Watts to the *Durbar* at Muxadavad to endeavor the obtaining them, and to explain some articles which at present seem liable to be open to evasion.

4. As the French deputies when in Calcutta had declined the tender we made them of our influence with the Admiral to consent to a neutrality within the Ganges, we thought it incumbent on us, upon the conclusion of the treaty of Peace with the Nabob to recommend the attack of Chandernagore by sea and land, which we were given to understand would not be disagreeable to the Nabob, and accordingly ordered Mr. Watts to touch on that subject at the *Durbar*, and obtain if possible his permission to expel that nation out of their Settlements in Bengall.

5. For this end the Admiral and Colonel concerted measures to attack Chandernagore by sea and land, and our troops have crossed the river, but yesterday arrived three letters from the Nabob to Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and Major Killpatrick, forbidding them to commit hostilities within his dominions, to prevent which and procure peace and quiet to his country he had so readily consented to the late treaty. He at the same time declared he should esteem an attack of the French settled here to be an open

and direct violation of the late treaty, and in that case he must in honor and duty to his King assist them with his forces.

6. Yesterday we likewise received a letter from the Director and Council of Chandernagore renewing their proposals for a neutrality within the Ganges. Upon taking this affair under consideration we have thought it advisable not to hazard a second rupture with the Nabob, as the Company's affairs are far from being settled here or well situated on the Coast. In consequence of this determination we have directed Mr. Watts to forbear making any mention of that subject at the *Durbar*, and have wrote to the French Directors and Council that we have no objection to treat with their deputies for a solid neutrality, if they are authorized to conclude one and will apply to the *Suba* to guarantee the said treaty.

7. When Mr. Watts went up to Muxadavad we sent with him 15 artillery men at the Nabob's particular request. From the purport of his letters to the Admiral and Colonel, we have reason to think he is willing not only to live in a good understanding with us, but to engage in a league offensive and defensive. It has been likewise hinted to the Colonel, that he would pay the charges of maintaining 500 Europeans in garrison, on condition he should be assisted when he was invaded by foreign enemys or disturbed by intestine troubles. Whether his sincerity herein may be depended on we cannot yet pretend to determine. We must however beg leave to observe that a strong garrison in future at this Settlement will be absolutely necessary to preserve our acquisitions by the late treaty and prevent the encroachments of the Government.

We are, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, ROBERT CLIVE, RICHARD BECHER.

P.S.—There being some letters in the packet under addresses to Holland we think it would be proper to examine whether they may not enclose letters for France.

255. *Letter from Admiral Watson to John Cleveland, Esq., dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Fort William, 24 February, 1757.*

SIR,—By my last dispatches of the 31 January sent express by Captain King (of which I herewith enclose duplicates) their

Lordships will be acquainted how far I had proceeded in the execution of the service I came here upon. I have now the pleasure to acquaint them a Peace was concluded with the Nabob of this province on the 9th instant, but not till after he had experienced in some little degree the superiority of British forces, notwithstanding the great advantage he had in numbers.

On the 2nd instant, his army was seen marching by our camp, about a mile's distance, towards the town, and when they got into a convenient spot of ground, they there encamped. During this, there was a person with the Colonel from the Nabob, making offers of peace, and two of our gentlemen were sent the next day to the Nabob by his own desire with our proposals, but instead of finding him where it was said he was they were brought within the Bound Ditch of this town to a large well-built house, which they found he had made his head-quarters. A very little conversation discovered the Nabob's intention was only to amuse, upon which our gentlemen pressed for permission to leave him, and came away without doing anything more than expressing their surprise at finding him there, when the person he sent to the Colonel had assured them, he would wait fifteen miles to the northward of our camp to receive them.

Upon their returning and declaring this, the Colonel applied to me to be reinforced with a party of seamen, with a resolution to attack his camp that night. I accordingly sent Captain Warrick with between five and six hundred, with which addition the Colonel had between eleven and twelve hundred *seapoys*. For the particulars of the attack, I beg leave to refer their lordships to the inclosed account of Captain Warrick's which, though not attended with all the success we could wish, it was sufficient to make the Nabob very sollicitous to hasten the business of coming into a Peace, a copy of the articles of which, together with such letters as passed between us on this occasion, I herewith inclose.

Soon after this, I received a letter from the Committee here, acquainting me they had proposed a neutrality to the French at Chandernagore, to subsist within the Ganges, which they declined making any answer to. Thereupon the Committee observing to me that as a Peace was now established with the Nabob, and that he seemed inclinable, in his letters both to the Colonel and me,

to join in an offensive and defensive league with us, it was become a very proper step to the affairs of the East India Company to put His Majesty's Declaration of War against the French in execution in these dominions, which would be distressing the French to the greatest degree, and be of infinite advantage to our own Company. This being the opinion of the Committee, and *my forbearance against the French in this river founded entirely on the interest of the Company*, I summoned a Council of War, wherein it was resolved, Chandernagore might be attacked by land and sea with great probability of success. In consequence of this I gave the necessary orders for preparing the ships and intended to have proceeded up the river the latter end of the Neaps, but having since received a letter from the Nabob, expressing his disapprobation of my committing hostilities against any European Power in his dominions, I thought my going against Chandernagore would be an improper step just now, and therefore assured him, as he looked upon it as a breach of the treaty I had concluded with him, I was ready to decline all views I might have against the French within the Ganges, provided they would enter into a solid treaty of neutrality, and that he would be the guarantee for its being kept strictly after my departure hence.

By our not having had a proper person attending the Nabob's Court in behalf of the English, I am afraid the French have been working themselves into favour, however Mr. Watts (the second in Council here) is now with the Nabob. I hope he will be able to convince him, that whatever has been insinuated to the prejudice of our Company is unjust. The Governor and Council are in daily expectation of a letter from Mr. Watts, which, I flatter myself, will enable us to form some better judgment of the Nabob's sincerity and inclinations towards us. But I already see the finishing this business, so as to leave the Settlement in a state of security, will be a work of time, and I find I shall be under a necessity of staying in the river all this season, which I shall employ in getting the ships repaired in the best manner that can be done here. The *Salisbury*, I believe, I shall attempt to careen, as her leak[1] is very near her keel, and rather increases than not.

[1] See p 194.

In order to lose no time when I sail from hence, if I have an opportunity, I shall send for the provisions and stores lodged at Madras, that I might not be under a necessity of stopping there in my passage from hence to Bombay, where I hope to be some time in next October. I shall there put the ships in the best condition possible for their passage home, and proceed from thence agreeable to their Lordships' order for my returning to England.

I have heard nothing of Mr. Pocock yet, but am in expectation of his arriving in Ballasore Road every day, and can't help being a little surprised at his not being in the river long ago.

When the Peace was settled with the Nabob I had no further use for the bomb vessel the Committee provided for the bombardment of Hughley, therefore I have permitted Captain Warrick to return home, by whom I take the opportunity of sending my dispatches, and beg leave to recommend him to their Lordships' favour.

Inclosed I send you the state of the squadron, and am, Sir, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

256. *Captain Warrick's account of the attack on the Nabob's camp.*[1]

On the 4th February, 1757, at 10 in the evening, received Admiral Watson's orders to take upon the command of a detachment of sailors to join Colonel Clive in order to force and drive the Nabob out of his camp. At one in the morning landed our men at Kelsal's Octagon, which were as follows: 180 from the *Kent*, 173 from the *Tyger*, 120 from the *Salisbury*, 29 from the *Bridgwater*, 37 from the sloop, and 30 from the Indiamen. In all 569 men. About 2 we joined the Collonel, whose troops were under arms and ready to march, on which our men were disposed of to guard and attend the Train, which consisted of 6 field pieces and one howitzer. Soon after this we marched off the ground in the following order—the King's troops and Company's grenadiers in the front, the sailors with the Train next, the battalion after, and the *sepoys* in the rear. At 3, the Colonel altered his disposition, and marched the battalion before the Train. In this order we marched till 5, when our troops in the van were charged by the enemy's horse in their camp, but did not seem to retard our march; and by the time our rear guard was

[1] Enclosed in No 255

entered, the engagement became general from hedges and bushes on which we played, our artillery defending the right and left of our army all the way through the camp, in which we found many dead men and horses. Here our men were diverted by killing their bullocks, camels, and what horses were left in our march, which we continued with great rapidity, driving the enemy before us, till they had lodged themselves in a *tope* near Meter's gardens behind the hedges; from hence they detached a large body of horse with two cannon to the Cross Road of the Bungalo which we soon dislodged with our field pieces after receiving a few shott, and from hence marched into the Fort.

[About a mile from the Bungalo one of our field pieces fell into the ditch and broke the axle tree, another was split in the muzzle, and of no use, both which we spiked up and left behind.][1]

In this action were killed twelve seamen, two Captains of the Company's troops, seventeen private men and ten *seapoys*, the number wounded were about fifteen seamen and fifty soldiers and *seapoys*. Lieutenant Lutwidge of the *Salisbury* the only officer mortally wounded.

The Nabob's army was said to consist of fifteen thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. We have had various accounts of his loss; a Bramin, who was soon after in his camp says thirteen hundred men were killed and wounded, and that twenty one of the former were officers, besides this loss upward of five hundred horse were killed, several draught bullocks, and three or four elephants.

257. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Mr. John Walsh, dated Chunepore, 25 February, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—I received your obliging favour of the 22nd this instant. It gives me the utmost concern to find a stop put to our expedition by the Nabob's letter, but I hope my letter to the Select Committee of the 21st, with the one that accompanies this, will induce them to alter their resolution and request the Admiral and Colonel to proceed on the attack. I have not received any letter from the Committee, therefore as yet I am at liberty to act as I was before ordered. To-morrow I am to visit the Nabob when

[1] Not in the Admiralty copy.

I will endeavour to get a letter from him to the Colonel that he will not assist the French and that his enemies are ours: but if in this I do not succeed I see no reason to be alarmed, for I am assured and believe he will never assist the French; besides if we are expeditious the place may be taken before any assistance can arrive from the Nabob, if he should intend to interfere. I have declared my sentiments very freely to the Committee. I hope they will follow my advice which will if we succeed be attended with great advantage to the nation and Company; besides as *the predominant passion in the Nabob is fear,* the more powerful we make ourselves the greater compliance we shall meet from him, whereas if the neutrality goes on and the squadron leaves us, he will shuffle and delay doing us justice or complying with his agreement till the French have a force arrive, and then probably he will finish his contract with us by joining them and driving us out of the country; *for by what I can learn there is no faith to be put upon either his word or oath. This is the current opinion of all degrees and orders of people.* Whether French faith is to be depended on all Europe knows, neither do I believe they have a power to make any conclusive treaty with us at Chandernagore. If we do not take this place judge you what must be our fate when the squadron leaves us. To me it is evident that as it is the mutual interest of the French and the Nabob to destroy us they will join together to effect it; the one with a design to save returning the plunder he has got and the other with a view of increasing their trade and aggrandizing their nation in future. I beg you would make no apologies; you will always oblige me whenever you will favour me with a line and freely give me your friendly advice.

I am, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

258. *Extracts from a letter from Mr. Watts to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Chunepore,* 25 *February,* 1757.

Omychaund has been here to-day and assures me in the strongest manner, that he is persuaded and certain that no assistance will be given to the French if we attack them, which he by all means advises immediately if we are sure of taking the place, but not otherwise. By what I can learn of the Nabob's disposition there is not the least stress to be laid on his word or

oath, and, when the squadron and troops are gone and his apprehensions of us cease, he will evade complying with any part of his contract. His governing principle or reigning passion is fear, and by that alone is he to be swayed, therefore if we attack and take Chandernagore every part of our agreement will be fulfilled and more indulgences granted us. If we are unsuccessful we shall get nothing, and if a neutrality is concluded with the French no chicanery, artifice, or cunning will be left untried to delay putting us in possession of what the Nabob has assented to. The Nabob marches to Patna in a few days, when we shall be left to demand satisfaction of his *duan*, Moinloll, a most rapacious, avaritious Minister, in treating with whom we shall meet with nothing but obstacles and difficulties. . . . We shall never be able to get a public order or leave to attack the French. If he tacitly acquiesces in it and does not molest us it is all we can expect.

259. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort Saint George, to Colonel Clive, dated 28 February, 1757.*

SIR,—Since closing our letter of the 21st the *Success* gally has arrived with your advices, dated 28th and 29th January, and 6th instant.

We congratulate you on the success of your attack upon the Nabob's camp, and we wish most sincerely it may be productive of a good accommodation. It is needless for us to add to what we have said in our last on the necessity of your returning to the Coast as soon as possible. We are sensible it would be difficult if not impossible for you to come away without the assistance of Admiral Watson, but we imagine nothing but the most absolute necessity will determine him to lay the Rains in the river.

Admiral Pocock remained at Vizagapatam untill the 5th instant when, having received no orders from Mr. Watson, he sailed for this place, and anchored here the 21st. Mr. Bussy's army being very near to Vizagapatam, the Provisional Chief applied to Mr. Pocock for 60 men of the detachment he had on board of Company's troops, which number was accordingly landed, and the remaining 70 we have received on shore here. Mr. Pocock seeing by your letter to us that it was Mr. Watson's desire he should proceed to Culpee, has resolved to sail for that place in two or

three days, but we shall detain the men that are landed here. You are acquainted by our last letter of our necessities, and of the reinforcement arrived at Pondicherry, to which is to be added the loss of near 100 sailors, which will go on board the *Cumberland*. We judge besides that the Bombay detachment must undoubtedly have joined you by this time. Your answer to the demands made to you by the Select Committee of Bengal, in their letter of the 18th January, meets with our entire approbation.

We are, &c. &c., GEORGE PIGOT, &c., Committee.

260. *Translation of a letter from M. Vernet to the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, dated Cossimbazar, 28 February,* 1757.[1]

The day before yesterday the *wakil* came and reported to us that the Nawab had already granted a *parwana* for Mr. Law, Chief of the French here, to summon him to Court, and also that he was about to get an elephant, a dress of honour and a head-ornament, and that the first undersigned stood in a fair way of also being called to Court a few days after, but that no mention was made of what he should get, and whereas during the 20 long years that the Company has been settled in this country, it has always been the custom at all soubras[2] for its Chief to be admitted to Court at a general reception before those of the English and French, and further for them to be sent back, if not with more, at least with equal marks of honour, and that the first article had already been transgressed by the admission of Mr. Law before the first undersigned, besides its being very doubtful whether he should get as many marks of honour as the Chief of the French, we have resolved for the maintenance of the honour and dignity of the Company to avoid the said *Darbar* if possible, and with that view have first sent back the Court messenger to Muxadavad, and have through Messrs. Mahtav Rai and Swarup Chand represented to the Nawab the disregard shewn us; who was, forsooth, at first surprised at the step we had taken, but was afterwards highly satisfied and agreed that the first undersigned should perform the salutation in a couple of months, which to our mind is far better, for now we

[1] Vernet Papers, Hague

[2] This should be probably 'at all *Darbars*' or 'of all *Subahdars*.'

shall have time to see that no slight is put upon the Company by the enjoyment of fewer marks of honour, and the world will look upon the salutation by the French Chief as having been on some private matter, as the French also did really seize that opportunity to enter into a secret alliance, which their Chief also signed and confirmed with the Company's seal, consisting in an offensive and defensive alliance against the English and, if the reports of some of the *Darbar* attendants are to be believed, against all the nations except the Danes. But what is sure is, that the French have entered into an engagement to drive the English out of Bengal, provided the Nawab will assist them with some men and money, which [condition] has been accepted by the Nawab, who has already given orders to 6,000 horsemen and musketeers to betake themselves to Fort Hugli and instantly to march thence on Chandernagor upon the order of the French.

When this letter had been prepared so far, we have been favoured with your Honour's respected secret missive, of the 24th instant, together with the annexed *arzi* of the Honourable Director addressed to the Nawab, from which we have seen that your Honour, in order to be set at ease in regard to the aforesaid *arzi*, would wish it to be presented by the Second. Hereupon we take the liberty most respectfully to lay before you, that it is more necessary in these countries than elsewhere and especially in these times to uphold the prestige of the Company as much as possible, and also that more is to be got now from the Nawab—he being stricken with great fear of the Europeans—by a haughty than by a submissive behaviour. We have therefore considered it advisable to have the *arzi* delivered by the Court courier and not by the Second; for apart from its never having been the practice, it would also be a great folly for the Company to employ a European as the bearer of an *arzi*. Your Honour may, however, rest assured that it will not only be presented to the Prince by our *wakil* in person this day, but also be backed by influential support, the result of which we will communicate to you as speedily as possible, remaining for the rest, with profound respect, &c. &c.

261. *Extract from a letter from Mr. R. Orme to Colonel Clive, dated 28 February, 1757.*[1]

DEAR CLIVE,—I have received two short letters from you dated the 8th and 30th January. Mr. Pigot has been so kind to communicate to me all that you have wrote to him. He appeared sensibly affected at the uneasinesses you have suffered. Believe me I was so too. Our Board highly approve of your conduct, and your zeal for the Service commands the prayers of every one for your welfare. We are in hourly expectation of hearing that you have given the Nabob another blow, which will have made him sick of fighting.

262. *Drafts of (proposed) treaties with the French. Appended to Select Committee Proceedings, 28 February, 1757.*

(*a*) *Translation of Treaty as proposed by the French.*

Treaty made between the Directore General, President of the Council of Chandernagore for the Honourable Company of France, and the Gentlemen of the said Council and Roger Drake Esq., Governour of Fort William, and the Gentlemen of the Secret Committee at Calcutta for the Honourable Company of England.

ARTICLE IST.

The nations shall observe towards each other the most exact neutrality by land and by water throughout the whole extent of the kingdom of Bengal during the course of the present war between France and England according to the orders of the Nabob.

ARTICLE 2ND.

The neutrality shall extend to the False Point off the Palmiras inclusively in such manner that all on this side the said False Point shall be regarded on the same footing as the Ganges.

ARTICLE 3RD.

To render this present treaty more authentick there shall be sent by each of the contracting nations an instrument of it in the

[1] This letter was sent by Mrs. Clive. See letter from Orme to Clive, dated 19 June, 1757

Persian language signed by each to the Nabob of Bengal to have it guaranteed by him and his Ministers.

ARTICLE 4TH.

And to give a still greater validity to the present treaty we shall send an instrument of the treaty to Pondicherry to be there ratified by Monsieur the Commander General of all the French Settlements in the East Indies and by the Gentlemen of the Superior Council.

ARTICLE 5TH.

As soon as the said instrument shall be sent us back dressed in the above form it shall be delivered to the Gentlemen of Calcutta who in exchange shall give us the instrument which they acknowledge to have signed by Mr. Charles Watson, Admiral of His Brittannick Majesty's squadron now riding at anchor in the Road of Calcutta.

ARTICLE 6TH.

Until the exchange of the said instruments be ratified the two nations agree to commit no act of hostility towards each other and to observe the neutrality from this time forward with the utmost sincerity in such manner as has been prescribed by the Nabob of Bengall.

Select Committee, 2 March, 1757.

(*b*) *Treaty as modified by the British.*

We Roger Drake Esq., President and Governour of Fort William, and others of the Select Committee (for affairs of the Honourable United East India Company of England) in Bengall and Peter Renault Esq., Directore General and President of the Council at Chandernagore for affairs of the Honourable East India Company of France, and others the Council there having agreed (for the mutual benefit of their respective employers as well as to prevent the calamities of war as much as in them lays within the Kingdom of Bengall and Provinces of Bahar and Orixa) to execute reciprocally a treaty for binding themselves and their successors to a neutrality between the nations of Great Britain and France during the course of the present war between the Crowns aforesaid, and for that end having contracted and consented to observe a

strict neutrality by sea and land within the limits herein after mentioned, and upon the terms and conditions herein after expressed, we do by these presents contract, agree, and consent to abide by the following Articles on the part and behalf of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, provided the same be exactly observed and performed by the Directore and Council of Chandernagore on the part and behalf of the Honourable East India Company of France, viz. :—

ARTICLE IST.

The contracting parties do agree to observe and preserve towards each other within the limits hereafter specified the most exact neutrality by land and water during the course of the present war between the King of Great Britain and France, and do respectively engage to use their whole endeavours and do all in their power to prevent any infringement of this treaty by the Admirals or Commanders in Chief of ships of war belonging to either nation. They further promise and agree to give no assistance either directly or indirectly to the enemies of either party in case any differences should arise between them and the country Government.

ARTICLE 2ND.

The limits of this neutrality it is agreed shall extend as far as the true point of Palmiras inclusive towards the sea and shall reach and be observed throughout the Kingdom of Bengall and Provinces of Bahar and Orixa towards the land, within which limits and extent no hostilities shall be committed by sea or land by either nation.

ARTICLE 3RD.

To authenticate this treaty it is judged proper that the same should be confirmed and ratified by Charles Watson Esq. Vice-Admiral of the Blue Squadron of His Britannick Majesty's ships and Commander in Chief of the squadron now riding before Calcutta on the one part, and Duval de Leyrit Esq. Governour of Pondicherry and the Superior Council there on the other. And we in consequence thereof do acknowledge to have in our hands the confirmation of Vice-Admiral Watson, which we shall keep and deliver to the Directore and Company of Chandernagore upon receiving from them the ratification of the Governour and Superior Council of Pondicherry.

ARTICLE 4TH.

In order to this the said Directore and Council of Chandernagore do bind themselves to send up immediately to Pondicherry a draft of this treaty and procure without loss of time a confirmation and ratification of the treaty in the fullest manner by the Governour General of the French Settlements in India and by the Gentlemen of the Superior Council of Pondicherry, which ratification they promise to deliver into our hands upon its arrival.

ARTICLE 5TH.

The two nations do agree to commit no act of hostilities towards each other but to observe the strictest neutrality from this time until the ratification shall arrive from Pondicherry and exchange be made on both sides.

ARTICLE 6TH.

To validate this treaty and make it more authenticate, each of the contracting parties do agree to send a Persian form of a guarantee to the *Subah* of these provinces and to use their joint endeavours to prevail upon him and his principal Ministers and officers to sign and swear to the same.

ARTICLE 7TH.

The contracting parties do further agree to refuse protection to any deserters from either side and to deliver them up, on a pardon being promised for the crime. But objections being made by the French deputies to this last Article we agree it shall not be put in force until a ratification of all the Articles be returned confirmed by the Directore and Council of Pondicherry (when) if that with the six foregoing Articles are not confirmed in their true sense and meaning we shall esteem this treaty to be void, notwithstanding our endeavours have been sincere to establish a neutrality.

ARTICLE 8TH.

In order to have the confirmation of this treaty ratified by Charles Watson Esq. Vice Admiral of the Blue and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's squadron in the East Indies, conditionally to the foregoing Articles, the French do on their part consent that they will not send any ship or ships to sea from Chanderna-

gore until the ratification of this neutrality be confirmed at Pondicherry and exchanged with us here, except the ship or vessel Admiral Watson shall permit to proceed out of the river Ganges with the French copy of the treaty of neutrality to be confirmed by the Governour and Superior Council of Pondicherry.

263. *A General Muster of the Troops near Calcutta under Command of Major James Killpatrick.*

Company's	Captains	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Quarter-Masters.	Adjutants	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drum-Majors	Drummers.	European Centinels	Topasses.	Total	Bombardiers.	Gunners	Matrosses.	Total
Capt Grainger Muier... ..	1	1	—	—	—	—	5	6	—	2	15	—	30	—	—	—	—
Capt Lebeaume	1	1	1	—	—	—	6	3	—	2	105	—	119	—	—	—	—
Capt. Frazer ...	1	1	2	—	1	—	7	3	—	3	32	—	50	—	—	—	199
Train	—	2	—	—	—	—	4	1	—	1	—	—	—	8	10	12	38
Voluntiers ..	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13
Total ...	3	5	3	—	1	13	22	13	—	8	152	—	—	8	10	12	250

MEMORANDUM.—*On command at Ballasore:* 2 gunners. *On command from Captain Lebeaume's Company:* 2 centinels. *Officers' names to the Companies*. Captain Muier, Captain-Lieutenant Castairs, Captain Lebeaume, Lieutenant Dyer, Ensign Dallabars, Captain John Frazer, Lieutenant Keir, Adjutant William Gibbons, Ensign Pritchard, Ensign Rider. *In the Hospitall:* 2 serjeants, 2 corporals, 2 drummers.

Seapoy's Company.	Subardar.	Jemindar	Havildar.	Naicks.	Tom Tom	Seapoys.	Total
	—	5	4	3	1	265	278

Errors excepted,
Per P. RD. PEARKES, *Commissary.*

264. *Extract from a letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated — February, 1757.*

The ready obedience I paid to your desire in not attacking the French will, I persuade myself, convince you that nothing but the strongest necessity could make me again apply to you on that subject. I beg you will give your most serious attention to what I am going to say. Immediately on the receipt of one of your past letters I not only gave over all thoughts of attacking the

French, but invited them to enter into a treaty of neutrality and to send people here to settle the terms; but judge what must have been my surprize, when after they were in some manner settled, the French deputies owned that they had no power to secure to us the observance of the treaty, in case any commander of theirs should come with a great power after my departure! You are too reasonable not to see, that *it is impossible for me to conclude a treaty with people who have no power to do it; and which besides, while it ties my hands, leaves those of my enemies at liberty to do me what mischief they can.* They have also for a long time reported that Monsieur Bussy is coming here with a great army. Is it to attack you? Is it to attack us? You are going to Patna. You ask our assistance. Can we with the least degree of prudence march with you, and leave our enemies behind us? You will then be too far off to support us, and we shall be unable to defend ourselves. Think what can be done in this situation. I see but one way. Let us take Chandernagore, and secure ourselves against any apprehensions from that quarter, and then we will assist you with every man in our power, and go with you even to Delhi if you will. Have we sworn reciprocally that the friends and the enemies of the one should be regarded as such by the other? And will not God, the avenger of perjury, punish us if we do not fulfill our oaths? What can I say more? Let me request the favour of your speedy answer.

265. *Letter from the Nawab to M. Bussy, dated — February, 1757.*

Surajah Dowla to the exalted in station, greatest among great officers, the support of friendships, Monsieur Busie Bahauder.

These disturbers of my country, the Admiral and Colonel Clive Sabut Jung, whom bad fortune attends, without any reason whatever are warring against Zubdatoot Toojah, Monsieur Rennault the Governor of Chandernagore. This you will learn from his letters. I, who in all things seek the good of mankind, assist him in every respect, and have sent him the best of my troops that he may join with them and fight the English, and if it becomes necessary I will join him myself. I hope in God, these English, who are unfortunate, will be punished for the disturbances they have raised. Be confident. Look on my forces as your own. I have

wrote you before for 2,000 soldiers and musketry under the command of one or two trusty chiefs I persuade myself you have already sent them as I desired. Should you not I desire you will do me the pleasure to send them immediately. Further particulars you will learn from Monsieur Rennault. Oblige me with frequent news of your health.

266. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated Camp, 1 March, 1757.*

I mentioned to you in my last that bare promises would not signify against letters couched in the positive terms they are. This is the opinion of the Committee and every one here, and a neutrality will be settled to-morrow, to which I beg you will use your interest with the Nabob to guarantee. I cannot be of your way of thinking that the Nabob will not abide by any part of the agreement so solemnly sworn to, as it does not appear that such an opinion is backed by any proofs. If this should be the case other matters must be thought of. I hope by this time you are in possession of Cossimbuzar and that the Nabob has given orders for the payment of 3 lack of rupees.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

P.S.—The Admiral and myself are determined not to be guilty of a breach of faith in attacking Charnagore contrary to the express order from the Nabob.

267. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Colonel Adlercron, dated Camp, 2 March, 1757.*

On the 3rd in the morning the van [of the Nabob's army] appeared in sight. The army took up all that day and the next in passing, and encamped at the —— of Calcutta town about the distance of two miles from our camp. . . . We soon felt the inconvenience of their neighbourhood by all our *coolies* &c. deserting us and a great scarcity of provisions: this as well as many other considerations induced me to attack him, which we did on the 5th of February in the morning, for the particulars of which give me leave to refer you to the enclosed Journal.

The officers and soldiers both King's and Companies' behaved

with great coolness and resolution. Near a fifth part of the military, which did not amount to 500 rank and file, suffered. This tryal in my opinion speaks much in favour of the troops, especially the King's, who never before had been accustomed to oppose such great numbers.

268. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated Camp opposite to Barnagul, 3 March, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—I had but just time to write you a very short letter by the *Success* galley after our attack on the Nabob's camp. The *Delawar* has since sailed for England, and as my advices to the Secret Committee by that ship and the *Syren* sloop, who sailed some days before, were very full and reached as low as the 22nd February, I take the liberty to refer to them for a particular account of occurrences till that time. For want of assistants to draw out fresh copies, I am obliged to transmit to you my duplicates for England open for your perusal, and request you will afterwards forward them by the *Walpole*.

By the conclusion of these advices, you will observe that I had reason to think that all military operations were at an end in this province, and that we might return to the Coast, leaving a suitable force for the defence of the Company's estate here. Accordingly the 24th February, I addressed Admiral Watson on the subject, copy of which letter and his letter are inclosed. Though the large ships were intended to remain here untill September, I hoped to prevail on him to let the King's troops proceed on the twenty-gun ship and sloop, and as soon as I saw the execution of the Nabob's engagements in some forwardness, I intended to have followed with the grenadier company, half the Train and half the *seapoys* embarked on the *Marlborough* and *Protector*.

Fresh difficulties have been daily started about the neutrality with the French, which has occasioned it to remain unconcluded to this time. However, the Articles were at last drawn up by the Committee and sent to Admiral Watson for his approval, and it was expected that every thing would have been concluded to-day,

but in a letter just now received from the Admiral he refuses to agree to any neutrality untill the articles return ratified from Pondicherry, which I imagine will put a stop to the whole negotiation, and make us think of other measures for settling the affairs of this province.

It is some time since we have had letters from the Nabob or even from Mr. Watts who attends the *Darbar*, which leaves me at a loss how far the Articles of the treaty have been fulfilled. As I had last night the pleasure of hearing that the *Mamooda* was already arrived in the river, and that the *Revenge* and *Orixa* with the French prize taken on the Malabar Coast were at Ballasore, I shall always be able to force a compliance from the Nabob, should there be a necessity for it. My concern is that by this uncertainty of his ready performance of all the Articles, I can take no measures for the immediate return of part of the troops to the Coast though the season is so far advanced. A few days I think must set the affair in a clear light, and I hope time enough will be left me in this *monsoon* to dispatch to you whatever men can possibly be spared from hence. Should my hopes of a passage by sea be frustrated, I apprehend a march from Ballasore to Vizagapatam might be effected. In my present situation I can only assure you that I am perfectly sensible of the necessity of our speedy return, and that whatever is practicable with prudence shall not be unattempted on my part.

I have had occasion to make several promotions among the military of which a list is inclosed, and I flatter myself they will meet with your approval and confirmation. Captain Maskelyne and Lieutenant Brooke being in an ill state of health, have leave [to] return to the Coast on this ship.

Enclosed are the Paymaster's accounts for January, also one bill of exchange on the Paymaster for the King's regiment at Fort Saint George for Arcot rupees 3,500 advanced to Captain Nicholas Weller for subsistence to the King's troops on this expedition.

The *seapoys* being desirous of remitting some money for the maintenance of their families on the Coast, I have given bills on the President and Council of Fort Saint George for Arcot rupees 6,945 in favor of Purbud Sing of Fort Saint David, and three

havildars with two *seapoys* now take passage on the *Walpole* to see the right distribution of it.

As I brought none of the *husbulhookums* with the *phirmaund*, I must recommend that some of the copies authenticated by the *Codjee* be immediately forwarded to the Gentlemen here; particularly of those which relate to this *Subah*, and duplicates of them will be necessary for fear of miscarriage. It is not improbable but some difficulties will arise for want of them about the villages to be delivered over to us, as they are not particularized in the *phirmaund*.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

269. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort William, dated 3 March, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have the favour of your letter of yesterday's date, acquainting me the Nabob having signified his dislike to any hostilities being committed on the French within his territories, has occasioned you to alter your opinion of acting offensively against the French within the Ganges, and the French having applied to you to enter into a neutrality you have drawn up Articles for that purpose and desire my sentiments and approbation thereon before you sign it My approbation you always may depend on in everything that will tend to the Company's advantage. How far this neutrality will answer that end you must be the best judges. However as you have desired my sentiments thereon, I have very maturely considered the Articles you have drawn up and am of opinion the treaty ought not to take place till such time it is returned from Pondicherry ratified and confirmed and then upon your signifying to me my observing such a neutrality will be the properest step that can be taken for the advantage of the Company's affairs, I shall upon such a representation have no objection to giving you my promise thereto.

This would be making a neutrality on the surest foundation that can be obtained in this part of the world and indeed upon my hearing the first hints from the French of this design, I did suppose the Committee at Chandernagore was invested with proper powers to make and confirm such a treaty of themselves, otherwise I should not have listened to them as much as I did. But

since I have been assured by the present deputies they have not those powers, but that the Articles must be sent to Pondicherry to be there ratified and confirmed I can by no means think of agreeing to such a neutrality, whereby it is so evident the French will have every advantage and we subject to every uncertainty. Will they not reap immediate benefit by the neutrality as it now stands? and further, shall we be certain of its being complied with till it is returned from Pondicherry ratified and confirmed by the Governor and Council there? This appears to me to be giving so sensible an advantage to the French without even a possibility of benefitting by it ourselves that with regard to myself I cannot think of giving my consent to its taking place till such time as we are certain it will be agreed to by the Governor and Council of Pondicherry.

The sixth Article says in order to validate this treaty and make it more authentic both parties shall send a Persian form of a guarantee to the Nabob and use their joint endeavours to prevail on him and some of his principal officers to sign and swear to the same.

I make no doubt of this being a very proper measure of making the treaty lasting and firm between both nations, provided the objections to the Nabob being properly qualified for such an office were removed. It is now three weeks since the Peace commenced in which many Articles were promised by him. Are they yet complied with? Give me leave to go a little further and ask when they will be complied with? I am afraid it is too difficult a question to be answered with any degree of exactness. Is it reasonable then to suppose if the Nabob should sign this guarantee and swear to the observance of it, that he will pay any more regard to that than he has done to the fulfilling the several Articles of the Peace? or is it the policy of this country to place your confidence in the man who has not observed his word, though bound by the most solemn protestations. If it is you could not pitch upon a more proper man to guarantee this treaty than the man you have chose. But as you have desired my sentiments on this matter, I must beg leave to tell you, that I by no means think the Nabob ought to be addressed on this subject, till he has faithfully fulfilled all the Articles of the Peace, and that appears to me to be the most

necessary business to be hastened, and I think as short time as possible should be given him for the completing it. If he intends peace and to continue in friendship with us he will comply, if not he will deal evasively to gain time, till he thinks himself strong enough to return here again. Therefore it is my opinion you should acquaint him unless the Articles are complied with by such a time you should esteem him as an enemy and act accordingly.

This, Gentlemen, from the best reflections I have been able to make is my sincere opinion of the subject you desired.

I am, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

Inclosed I return you the deputies' answers to articles.

270. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 4 March, 1757.*

Your friendly letter upon the occasion of your affairs with the French I have received and taken due notice of the contents. I shall never give any assistance to the French. If in defiance of all former customs they ever attempt to occasion any disturbance in the King's dominions, I will punish them for it, and put a stop to their commerce in the country. Upon my being informed of your intention of attacking the French factory I wrote to you what was necessary upon that occasion. The forces which I sent that way were for the protection of the royal territories, not for the assistance of the French. It has given me the utmost satisfaction that you have wisely considered and reflected upon what I wrote you, and that you paid a due regard to the established customs in desisting from your design against the French. I have likewise wrote to the French and made use of all necessary means to engage them to consent to make peace with you, which I make no doubt of their complying with. I shall send a trusty person for both your agreements which I will preserve among my own papers.

Wrote in the Nabob's own hand.

The advanced forces of the new King are endeavouring to make an erruption into Bengal and I purpose marching to Azimabad.[1] If you will join me upon this occasion and go with me, I will

[1] Patna.

allow you every month a *lakh* of rupees during the time you continue with me for the maintenance of your army. Write me speedily an answer to this.

271. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated* 4 *March*, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—As Mr. Watson has declined accepting the two expedients proposed to him by us, in refusing either to attack Chandernagore immediately or enter into such a neutrality with the French as we have recommended to him and which we think greatly for the benefit of the East India Company both in these Provinces and on the Coast of Coromandel, I think he has taken the consequences of all miscarriages upon himself as in so doing, if I am not misinformed, he runs counter to His Majesty's instructions, which require that he should give attention to all representations made to him by the Company's Agents in India for their service.

This leads me very seriously to consider the situation of the Company's affairs on the Coast, and the positive orders I have received from the President and Committee of Madras to return at all events, with as great a part of the forces under my command as could possibly be spared. This, Gentlemen, you are fully acquainted with and must be sensible nothing can induce me to risque any longer my return to the Coast (now rendered very uncertain by the lateness of the season) but the immediate attack of Chandernagore, become in my opinion absolutely necessary if the neutrality be refused. Do but reflect Gentlemen, what will be the opinion of the world of these our late proceedings? Did we not in consequence of a letter received from the Governour and Council of Chandernagore making offers of a neutrality within the Ganges, in a manner accede to it by desiring they would send deputies, and that we would gladly come into such a neutrality with them? and have we not since their arrival drawn out Articles that were satisfactory to both parties and agreed that such Articles should be reciprocally signed, sealed and sworn to? What will the Nabob think after the promises made him on our side and after his consenting to guarantee this neutrality? He and

all the world will certainly think that we are men of a trifling, insignificant disposition, or that we are men without principles. It is therefore incumbent on us to exculpate ourselves by declaring the real truth, that we were entirely ignorant of Mr. Watson's intentions to refuse the neutrality in the manner proposed and settled by us, and that we always thought him of a contrary opinion to what his letter declares. I am persuaded these must be the sentiments of the Gentlemen of the Committee, or they never would have gone such lengths as must expose them to the censure of all reasonable, conscientious men.

You may be assured the instant the French find their offers of neutrality refused, they will immediately assist the Nabob in all his designs against us, if he has the least intentions of not complying with the late Articles of Peace; it may then be too late to wish Mr. Watson had been pleased to pay more attention to our representations.

Give me leave, Gentlemen, further to represent that though Mr. Watson has done everything that could be expected from a brave and gallant man and has been greatly instrumental towards settling the affairs of this Province, that our future operations against the Nabob will chiefly depend upon the land forces, and the officers of such forces must certainly be the best judges of what can be effected by land; and I do take upon me to give it as mine and my officers' opinion that success against the Nabob and the French together will be very precarious, notwithstanding the arrival of the Bombay troops which fall short in real strength of the detachment on board the *Cumberland*. I must therefore request you will join with me in desiring Mr. Watson a third time to ratify the neutrality in the manner agreed upon, and if he refuses, to desire he will attack Chandernagore by water immediately, as I am ready to do by land with the forces under my command; if he refuses this likewise he becomes responsible for every misfortune that may happen to the East India Company's affairs.

This done I propose leaving all the forces I can possibly spare for the defence of the Company's Settlements, rights and privileges in Bengall and return with the rest immediately to the Coast, agreeable to the positive orders received from the President and

Committee of Madras, and I must request you will order proper conveyances for that purpose.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

272. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated* 4 *March*, 1757.

I answered your letter of the 20th of last month some days past. I suppose you have ere now received it, and are thereby fully convinced of the falsehood of the French *vackeel's* informations of my intention to break the Peace. If you still want further proofs of the sincerity with which I made it, and the desire I have to preserve it, you will find them in my patience, which has not only suffered your part of the treaty to be thus long unexecuted, but has even borne with your assisting my enemies the French with men and money, contrary to your faith pledged to me in the most solemn manner, 'that my enemies should be yours.'

'*Is it thus that soldiers and men of honour never violate their words?*' But it is now time to speak *plain*, if you are really desirous of preserving your country in peace and your subjects from misery and ruin, in *ten days* from the date of this, fulfil your part of the treaty in *every Article*, that I may not have the least cause of complaint: otherwise, remember, you must answer for the consequences: and as I have always acted the open, unreserved part in all my dealings with you, I now acquaint you that the remainder of the troops, which should have been here long since (and which I hear the Colonel told you he expected) will be at Calcutta in a few days; that in a few days more I shall dispatch a vessel for more ships and more troops; and that I will kindle such a flame in your country, as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish. Farewel: remember that he promises you this, who never yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever.

273. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated* 6 *March*, 1757.

If the Nabob should not give his consent to our attacking the French, I will desist, provided the gentlemen of the Committee strongly represent to me that it will be more for the Company's

interest that I should not undertake anything against the French; for, as the Declaration of War is an order to all officers under the King to distress the enemy as far as it is in their power, the Committee here should take it upon themselves the concluding a neutrality; but I will take upon me to give my word, that I will not commit any hostility against the French here, unless the Governor-General and Superior Council of Pondicherry will not consent to a neutrality within the Ganges.

274. *Extract from a letter to the Directors, dated Isle of France, 7 March, 1757. No Signature.*[1]

The Nawab of Bengal has succeeded in driving the English from all their settlements in Bengal. The Factory of Golgotha[2] held out for three days only. The Governor of that place embarked the second day of the attack with the women and two hundred of the best troops. This treachery was the cause of so much confusion, that the ships, which were undermanned, have for the most part run ashore and fallen into the hands of the enemy who found immense booty in them, the English having put on board considerable sums deposited with the Governor by the lords in revolt against the Nawab. These same treasures which the Prince had reclaimed were the cause of the war. After the flight of the Governor there remained in the Fort at Golgotha about 150 English, who in several attacks gave signs of their great courage, but want of discipline caused their destruction. They were made prisoners and thrown into a dungeon so small that the next morning 124 were suffocated. The town also was given up to pillage. Many Christians were put to the sword. Many women were drowned in the Ganges whilst trying to save themselves from the Moors. The sack of this unhappy town lasted more than a month.

275. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 7 March, 1757.*

The letter which you did me the honour to write to me I have received. I was very inclinable to enter into a neutrality with the French, but I found upon endeavouring to treat with them, they

[1] Archives Nationales, Paris [2] Calcutta

had no powers to make a peace with us till it was confirmed at Pondicherry, which could not be effected in less than three months. It gave me great concern to find you so strongly insist on the neutrality with the French, which is attended with all the advantage on their side and most prejudicial to us. What we agree to will be immediately binding, but what they agree to will be of no signification till ratified by the Governor of Pondicherry, and whilst all our forces are employed in assisting you against your enemies, Monsieur Bussy may come and attempt to destroy our Settlement. In the last war between us and the French, the Nabob of Arcot ordered the English and French not to commit hostilities in his dominions, and a neutrality was agreed on, which was faithfully observed on our part, but the French when they were strongest attacked and took from us Chinapatam. This you must have heard of. How can we put any confidence or reliance in their agreement to a neutrality? To give you a convincing proof of my sincerity, by that time you receive this letter, I shall be as far on my way as Chandernagore, where I will wait without committing any hostilities against the French, till I receive your letter, which I hope will be satisfactory. If Your Excellency will but seriously consider that by going to Patna with you I submit everything to your pleasure, it cannot leave you the least doubt of my intention of sharing with you your good or bad fortune. By the blessing of God you will overcome your enemies.

276. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Nandkumar, dated* 8 *March,* 1757.

I am now in peace and friendship with the Nabob, and agreeable to his desire am marching with my army to join him at Muxadabad. I write this that you may not be alarmed at my approach. Rest assured that I have given the strictest orders that no person in my army shall in any wise molest your tenants, and that any one that shall be found guilty of any offence towards them shall be punished in the severest manner. Do you on your part give orders to all the tenants within your jurisdiction to attend with a *buzar* to furnish my army with a plenty of provisions.

277. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to the French Council, Chandernagore, dated 8 March, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—Messrs. Fournier, Nicholas, and Le Conte delivered us 7 letters of the 23rd February. We are sorry it was not in our power to expedite the treaty of neutrality those gentlemen came to negociate with us. The delay was owing to some difference in sentiments with Vice-Admiral Watson. That gentleman has now consented to ratify the treaty provided another Article be inserted by which you oblige yourselves to send no ships abroad till the arrival of the ratification from Pondicherry. We doubt not your Honours &c. will acquiesce to that Article as expressed in the treaty which we have executed and now transmit to you by Richard Becher Esq. one of our body, whom we have directed to deliver it into your hands upon receiving from you the counterparts of the treaty duly executed and sworn to. We are with esteem, &c. &c.

278. *Letter from Mr. Vernet to the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, dated Cossimgbazar, 9 March, 1757.*[1]

The *Holi*[2] festival having come to an end yesterday the *wakil* this morning personally presented His Honour the Director's *arzi* to the Nawab, but he had no sooner let him read it, than he grew very angry and gave vent to much abusive language, asking the *wakil* whether the Dutch were playing the fool with him, at the same time ordering him to be pinioned and to have him *shambocked,* which, however, upon the advice of Raja Durlabh Ram and Jagat Seth was not carried out. He, however, had him locked up in the *Munshi Khana* till this very evening when he sent him the inclosed *parwana* with orders to inform the first undersigned that the said *parwana* must immediately be forwarded and a reply thereto be speedily sent. He has also sent a gold-stick bearer to the first undersigned to show him Your Honour's *arzi* torn into little pieces, and to say that the Prince always acts thus with such like impertinent letters, and [to ask] who we thought we

[1] Vernet Papers, Hague.

[2] A Hindu festival, during which the Hindu clerks would not be expected to do any work.

were in our conceit in daring to make such a demand. To which we replied that we had asked nothing that we did not consider fair, and that it appeared to us that a nation like ours, that brought so many treasures into the kingdom surely deserved to enjoy more privileges than the French, who brought at most from four to five *lakhs* into the country, and that what we requested bore no comparison to what the English had enjoyed, who at best could not be placed on more than an equal level with us, whereupon the said messenger took his departure in a very off-hand manner. Messrs. Jagat Seth and Raja Durlabh Ram were not remiss in saying much in our favour to the Nawab, but to no purpose.

We request a speedy answer to the *parwana*, whilst we name ourselves with great respect, &c. &c.

279. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the French Council, Chandernagore, dated Camp, 9 March,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I am under no apprehension of any accident that may happen to the fleet of boats, as I have taken proper care to have them out of danger. I very sincerely declare to you, that at this present time I have no intention to attack your Settlement. *If I should alter my mind, I shall not fail to advise you of it.*

I am sorry you give me so much reason to complain of your ungenteel behaviour in inticing away our soldiers and sailors. We have taken one of your people in the very fact, and you may be assured he shall suffer the punishment he deserves, and that neither the Admiral nor myself shall ever be satisfied, till every man of them is delivered up to us.

I have no intention of acting offensively against your nation at present; whenever I have, you may be assured I shall frankly acquaint you with it.

You will please to observe that this practice of decoying our men was made use of even when the negotiation was in agitation.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c., R. CLIVE.

280. *Letter from Mr. Watts to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Moorshedabad,* 10 *March,* 1757.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS,—I addressed you the 3rd, 6th, and 7th. By the first and last went letters from the Nabob to

the Admiral and Colonel, to which answers are with impatience expected.

I am just returned from visiting the Nabob. He has ordered Juggutseat to pay me twenty thousand gold *moors*,[1] who waits till he receives it from the Nabob's treasury, and which he hourly expects; part of the money I hope to receive to-morrow; the Nabob has positively ordered his *mutsuddies*[2] to be expeditious in delivering over the goods and effects he has in his possession, and his writers to write *perwannahs* agreeable to his agreement; he desires according to the terms of the *phirmaund*, you will send for the *Zemindars*, purchase, content them and take possession of the 38 villages; if they should apprehend the Nabob's anger for selling them, acquaint me and I will get them the Nabob's order; the Nabob says you may coin *siccas* in Calcutta whenever you please, and swore this morning before me by God and his Prophet he would comply with every part of his contract.

The Nabob said he could not write, but desired I would inform you that if you was determined to attack the French, he would not intermeddle or give them the least assistance, he only requests to be informed of your sentiments three or four days before you begin upon action.

I desire you will send me a particular account of what treasure there was in the Factory when the place was taken, and what other goods and effects belonging to the Company exclusive of what you found there, and also an account of the money, jewels and effects belonging to private persons, as also a particular account of what was out of the Factory in the several houses.

I desire you will send up to me the *gomastahs* of the several *aurungs*, both those belonging to the Company and private people or tenants of Calcutta, that from them I may learn what was taken by the Nabob's people, and what by others, with the names of the villages, *Zemindars*, *Subadars*, &c. Be assured I shall exert myself night and day to recover what I can for everybody.

Omichaund mentioned to the Governor, Colonel and me, that Rungeetroy, as acting as *vacqueel* in getting the three *laak* of rupees, expected the same allowance of 10 *per cent.* as they used to get on payment of all money to the Nabob, to which if I

[1] Worth at that time about sixteen rupees each. [2] Clerks.

remember right we assented to; however lest I should be mistaken, I request your immediate directions. If we consented to his taking the 10 per cent. he must have it; if we did not I think it advisable to comply with his request. He is a man of sense and weight, and in great favour with the Nabob, and has it much in his power to expedite our business, without whose assistance we shall meet with many obstructions and obstacles from the Nabob's Ministers. I desire you will answer this expeditiously.

I am, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

281. *Letter from the Nawab to Admiral Watson, dated* 10 *March*, 1757.

Your obliging answer to my letter I have received, wherein you write that your suspicions are at an end, and that on the receipt of my letter you forbore attacking Chandernagore and sent for their people to make peace, and wrote out the terms of agreement; but when they were about signing them, they declared that if they signed the Articles, and any other commander should arrive, they could not be answerable for his adhering to them: and that on this account there was no Peace. You also write many other particulars, of which I am well acquainted. It is true, if it is the custom of the French that if one man makes an agreement, another will not comply with it, what security is there? My forbidding war on my borders was because the French were my tenants, and upon this affair desired my protection: on this I wrote you to make peace, and no intentions had I of assisting or favouring them.

You have understanding and generosity: if your enemy with an upright heart claims your protection, you will give him his life, but then you must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intentions; if not, whatever you think right, that do.[1]

282. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Orme, dated* 11 *March*, 1757.

Pray remit all the money of mine in your hands to Bengal time enough to get bills by the September ship. These are dangerous times.

Apply to Pigot for news. I am going to Patna, or Dilly, or somewhere.

[1] It was this paragraph that encouraged the Admiral and Colonel to proceed in their attack of Chandernagore.—*Ives*

283. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 11 *March,* 1757.

By your letters to Nuncomar I learn your intention of coming to visit me at Muxadavad which gave me great satisfaction. I am very impatient to have the pleasure of seeing you, and our friendship shall never cease, but be always encreasing.

284. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp,* 11 *March,* 1757.

SIR,—I have received your favour by the hands of Mr. Walsh, I fear it will be impossible for the Fort to furnish sufficient ammunition, particularly powder for the battering cannon, and that we must be obliged to you for assistance. Plank &c. we can provide.

If the place should be attacked, you may be persuaded nothing in my power shall be left unattempted to enfilade the line of guns to the river side, and take off as much fire as possible, for which purpose it will be necessary to attack the town at least 3 days before your arrival, in order to master it, to make a proper disposition and to erect batteries.

I return you many thanks for sending the 20 gun ship to protect our boats, this will prevent our dividing for the present, and I can encamp to-morrow between Charnagore and Chinsura, which will frighten away all the *coolies* and other assistance, and at the same time hasten the withdrawing the Nabob's forces which Nuncomour's *vakeel* has absolutely promised. If the promise is fulfilled, I shall look upon the Nabob's consent as obtained. This with the encouragement from Mr. Watts, the tranquillity upon the Coast, and the fresh supply of force on the *Cumberland* ought in my opinion to be a strong inducement for our attacking the place. The Major[1] and I propose addressing the Committee on that head early to-morrow morning.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you, that the Gentlemen on the Coast are sending 400 more *seapoys* on Rinna.[2]

Our *hircarras* inform that half the Nabob's are already set forward for Patna, and that he is to march with the other half to-morrow. Omichund is then to return to us.

I am, &c. &c., R. CLIVE.

[1] Major Killpatrick. [2] Possibly this should be 'on the *Orixa*.'

285. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the French Council, Chandernagore, dated Camp,* 11 *March,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received the letter you did me the honour to write.

It will answer no purpose writing on these subjects till something final is determined. Though you are pleased to say you have refused many deserters, I believe few of them were soldiers. I am not ignorant of the number of deserters belonging to us in your garrison.

The innocent man you mention was taken in disguise, had invited a sailor to drink some country beer in which was infused a quantity of *arrack;* he had too an interpreter with him who spoke English, and wanted to intice him into a boat stationed at Barnagul for that purpose; however as it was a sailor, who was concerned, I have sent Monsieur Jarden to the Admiral. If you have anything to say in favour of the unfortunate man, please to address the Admiral.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

286. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Pigot, dated Camp,* 11 *March,* 1757.

SIR,—Having just heard that the *Walpole* is still in the river, I am in hopes that this will reach you. Since my last the *Cumberland* is arrived, by whom I received your favour of the 1st instant.

I have already acquainted you of the revolution which has happened at Dilly, since which the Nabob writes me he has received advices that the Afghans are marching towards his Provinces. He has desired me in the strongest terms to join him, and has offered to pay a *lack* of rupees *per* month for the maintenance of the forces. The Gentlemen here as well as myself are of opinion the offers are too advantageous to be refused; indeed, our late treaty binds us to assist him, and I need not represent that if this plunderer get into the Province there will be an end to the Company's affairs for some time. Part of the Nabob's army are already marched for Patna, and he himself will leave Muxadabad very soon with the rest.

I began my march on the 8th, and am close to Chandernagore.

The Nabob testifies some reluctance at our attacking this place; however, I am in hopes we shall not leave it behind us. The large ships I believe will move up on Monday. The arrival of the Bombay troops, with those on the *Cumberland*, and the *seapoys* coming from the Coast, will render our force considerable, and I hope all these disturbances will be at an end time enough for me to be with you in September, before which I had very little hopes of seeing Madras had nothing of this kind happened.

Cassimbazar Factory with a considerable quantity of goods are restored, and I believe the rest of the Articles will very soon be complied with; the 3 *lacks* will be paid in a day or two.

The Gentlemen of the Committee will excuse my not writing them, having but just time to finish this.

287. *Letter from Admiral Watson to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Fort William, 12 March, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have received your favours of the 21st and 28th February by the *Cumberland*, who arrived in Ballasore Road the 7th instant.

I am much obliged to you Gentlemen, for your congratulations on the success of His Majesty's squadron, which I hope will in some degree be the means of establishing the Company in this Province on better terms than they ever yet have had. The present circumstances of the Nabob makes it appear very probable that he will be greatly attached to the interest of the English; at least thus far may be depended on, so long as our troops can be of use to him no doubt but we may be assured of his friendship and good offices. The alarm he has lately had from the Afghans who it is said, have taken the *Mogul* prisoner and are marching towards these Provinces, has made him apply for the assistance of our troops, which he has been promised, provided he will grant his consent to our attacking the French, which some time ago, when it was resolved it should be undertaken, he signified his dislike of such proceedings, and was determined to join with the French against us. However now he wants our assistance, his protection of our enemies begins to decline, and by all that can be learnt from him he seems inclinable to favour the expedition, which is so

fair an opening that the neutrality which has been long debated upon here, is now no longer talked of; but this day I have received an application from the Committee to assist with the squadron in endeavouring to take and reduce Chandernagore, which service I shall readily undertake the moment the pilots will move the large ships, which I expect will be the day after to-morrow. The Colonel is already near Chandernagore with the view of harrassing the enemy, and driving away all their *coolies*, which will I suppose in some measure distress them.

In your letter of the 21st February you seemed to place some dependance on the directions you have sent to Colonel Clive to return to the Coast before the season is too late, with as many troops as can be spared from the defence of Calcutta, and also in the request you have made to me to provide for the security of their passage.

You must be sensible from the present situation of affairs in this Province it is utterly impossible to part with a man, but if that was not the case, it is already too late for the squadron to get out of the river this season, and as I find I am under a necessity of remaining here now till August or September, I have thought it necessary, in order to get to Bombay as soon as possible when I leave this place, to send Captain James of the *Revenge* to Madras together with a ketch for all the provisions and stores lodged there for the use of the squadron, and I must desire you will give Captain James all the assistance you possibly can in shiping them off.

I have, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON.

288. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated* 12 *March*, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received your favour of this day's date, acquainting me with your motives and reasons for altering your sentiments in relation to your conduct with the French, and now desire the assistance of His Majesty's squadron to attack Chandernagore.

You may be assured that I shall most readily give you all the assistance I can in this enterprise, and am heartily glad, in the

present circumstances I am in of having received His Majesty's Declaration of War against France with orders from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to put the same in execution, that this step is judged a right measure.

The moment the pilots think it safe to move the large ships I shall proceed up the river, and am, Gentlemen, your most obedient, CHARLES WATSON.

289. *Letter from Colonel Clive to M. Renault, dated Camp, 13 March, 1757.*

SIR,—The King of Great Britain having declared war against France, I summons you in his name to surrender the fort of Chandernagore. In case of refusal you are to answer the consequences, and expect to be treated according to the usage of war in such case.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and humble Servant,

R. CLIVE.

CAMP, 13*th March*, 1757.

TO PETER RENAULT, ESQ.,
Director and Governor of Chandernagore

290. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to M. Vernet, dated 13 March, 1757.*[1]

We are glad to see from your secret communication of the day before yesterday that the Nawab after sleeping off his ill-temper had awoke in a better humour and inclined to be more favourably disposed towards us.

To strike the iron while it is hot, we hereby commission you, either direct or through the intermediary of persons whom you may trust, to enter into negociations with him in order to add stress to the demands made by us, for the furtherance of which you may waive out of the spent madrasa[2] moneys to the amount of 40,000 florins, and as for the promise of assistance, we will use our utmost interest with their Worships[3] to be enabled to do so,

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague. [2] ? Madras.
[3] The Council-General in Batavia

and if we succeed therein, we shall not be disinclined to assist His Excellency against all public enemies of the country, but not against some one or other who might chance to fall into disfavour, nor against those European nations with which our State is living in peace and amity.

With a favourable issue of this business you stand to obtain honour, and the wished for fine things for the children of Tellusjint's heirs[1] shall be forwarded as speedily as possible by those, who with greetings remain, A. BISDOM, R. H. ARMENAULT, M. TSINCK, Js. BACHERACHT, S. DE HOOG, M. BASTIAANSE, Js. CROMBON.

291. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp, near Chandernagore,* 14 *March,* 1757.

SIR,—I marched into the town by the westward this morning with the largest part of my force, chiefly with a view of reconnoitring their batteries and fixing on a proper station. We took possession of an outward battery, but their inward one they maintained with a very brisk fire, having a considerable party of men there; in some sorties they made among the neighbouring houses, they lost some men, it is computed not less than 30 Europeans, besides some blacks. On our part Volunteers Tooke and Turner with two privates of the King's were wounded. 1 *subedar*, 1 *jemmidar*, and 3 *seapoys* killed and 8 wounded: a detachment still continues at the outward battery with orders to attack the inward at 3 o'clock in the morning. A strong party was detached at noon to take possession of the southward of the town, who are to endeavour to get within their batteries to-night. I shall likewise march to the southward early in the morning.

I hear that two ships filled with mud were sunk opposite the Prussian Factory yesterday, and 4 more were to be sunk to-day; to-morrow I may expect to be better informed.

I intend if possible to be at the Octagon, from whence I shall have a prospect of the Fort, and be near the river.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

[1] ? The family of Jagat Seth

292. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 15 *March,* 1757.

As the revolution at Delhi had fully determined me to march to Patna I therefore wrote you to come to me, since which some particular affairs, as also on account of troubles subsisting between you and the French, I deferred for some few days my departure to Patna. I therefore write you that you put a stop to your coming, and whatever place you are at that you return from thence towards Calcutta. Whenever I go to Patna and it becomes necessary, I shall, in reliance on the strong friendship between us, write to you to come to me, and I desire you will settle matters with the French, that there be no war in the Ganges. You are a prudent and foreseeing man, and I doubt not but you act as is best for mankind.

293. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 15 *March,* 1757.

By the blessing of God I have now letters of peace from Ahmad Khan Abdally, and I have also wrote him answers, and the resolution I had taken of marching to Patna is altered. I look on this blessing as the effect of my friendship with you. I therefore write that you need not give yourself the trouble of coming. I have great pleasure in your friendship. Since on a single letter of mine you were ready to come to my assistance I make no doubt that whenever I shall desire you to come and assist me, you will be ready to join me. I now write that you need not give yourself the trouble of coming.

294. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Nandkumar, dated* 16 *March,* 1757.

The many deceitful wicked measures that the French have taken to endeavour to deprive me of the Nabob's favour, (though I thank God they have proved in vain, since His Excellency's friendship towards me is daily encreasing) has long made me look on them as enemies to the English. But I could no longer stifle my resentment when I found that notwithstanding the danger they were in from me, they dared to oppose the freedom of the English trade on the Ganges by seizing a boat with an English *dustuck* and under English colours that was passing by their town. I am therefore come to a resolution to attack them.

I am told that some of the Government's forces have been perswaded under promise of great rewards from the French to join them against us. I should be very sorry at a time when I am happy in His Excellency's favour and friendship that I should do any injury to his servants. I am therefore to desire you will send these forces an order to withdraw, and that no other may come to their assistance.

295. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hoogly, to M. Vernet, dated Hugli,* 16 *March,* 1757.[1]

The French, who are now being besieged by the English, having sunk some vessels in the river below their Fort and thus blocked the passage hence to sea, it seems to us in your request as to Bankibuzar to be likely to prove a fine arrow in the quiver[2] to show the inconvenience of our present residence and to insist upon a different one. It might also perhaps be of use to you in proving the precedence of our nation to mention the highly valued right that we have always had up to this very hour of laying and removing the buoys at our pleasure, an advantage that we would willingly cede to others, but that, meanwhile, argues a kind of mastery over the river and a superiority of interests in matters relating to trade.

We remain with greetings, &c. &c.

296. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp,* 18 *March,* 1757.

The only artillery officer[3] at Charnagore is come over to us. He gives a very favourable account of matters. He shall wait on you, whenever you think proper.

297. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 20 *March,* 1757.

I beseech Your Excellency that my enemies may not by their evil insinuations and false stories rival me in Your Excellency's friendship, nor make you determine (that for so small a place,

[1] Vernet Papers the Hague. [2] A conclusive reason.
[3] Lieutenant De Terraneau.

already more than half conquered, and that must be mine in a day or two at farthest) my honour and reputation shall be called in question, I who till this day have by the blessing of God been victorious in every battle I have fought and have had a happy issue to all my undertakings. Be assured you will always find me sincere in my attachment to you.

298. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Raja Rai Durlabh, dated 22 March, 1757.*

I hear you are arrived within 20 miles of Hughly. Whether you are come as a friend or an enemy I know not. If as the latter say so at once, and I will send some people out to fight you immediately. If as the former, I beg you will stay where you are, for we can conquer the enemies we have to deal with here if they were ten times stronger. I have always had the greatest friendship for the Nabob ever since this treaty has been concluded, and I have ever since been resolved to fight for him against all his enemies. If he breaks his agreement with us, which he has solemnly sworn to, and to which you have put your seal as well as several other great men, the fault is his, for the agreement is mutual which says that our enemies shall be his, and his ours. I now declare to you the French are our greatest enemies, and I will destroy them. It would give me great concern to see these troubles begin again which must be fatal to one party, which God above knows. Now you know my mind.

299. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 22 March, 1757.*

Mutramul carries my answer to your several *perwannahs* that I received with great pleasure. By him you will be acquainted of my sincere attachment to Your Excellency. If you are determined to march this way I cannot forbid it, but I should be very sorry to see the troubles renewed. As I persuade myself you will have pleasure in hearing good tidings from me, I therefore write this to inform you that hitherto I have only made use of musketry against the French, but to-morrow early I shall open my batteries, and the ships will begin their fire, so that by the blessing of God I hope the place will be our own to-morrow. I this day heard of

Roy Dullub's march. I am much obliged to you, but in this case have no occasion for assistance. I pray that Your Excellency may be ever victorious over your real enemies, and that God may bless you with health and prosperity.

300. *Letter from Mr. Vernet and Council, Cossimbazar, to the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, dated* 23 *March*, 1857.[1]

It appears that as long as the English have not yet taken Chandernagor the Nawab is still fed with the hope of driving out the English, he having, the day before yesterday upon receiving intelligence from Monsieur Renault that since the late encounter many Englishmen had perished and only one on their side, given orders to the Chief of the Horse Raja Durlabh Ram, Mir Madan and the *Daroga* of his artillery Mir Rasan Ali, as also to two chiefs of musketeers Nauwl Hazarie and Kadm Hassan Khan to leave immediately with their men and the necessary artillery, as they have already done, and will most probably arrive towards evening at Manaripa (?). The Nawab is energetically pushing on the construction of a bridge before Kotwa,[2] but, as the rumour runs at the *Darbar*, the Nawab's army will upon Mr. Law's advice march direct on Calcutta to compel the English to break up the siege and go and defend Calcutta, when the French will join the Nawab, and though all the grandees at the Court seek to turn His Highness from his purpose, he is not to be prevailed upon to swerve from his intent, but has even presented Rajah Durlabh Ram with a dress of honour as an encouragement, a *palanquin* ornamented with gold, in which the Nawab himself was wont to ride and a *naubat*,[3] so that we have been obliged to send our congratulations to the said Rajah Durlabh Ram together with one gold and 5 silver rupees, or 31.10 florins.

All the above circumstances are also the reason that we have as yet gained nothing by our solicitations, for the Nawab will listen to nothing now and God knows what he will do if he succeed in his enterprise, which, however, is not at all likely; partly on account of the fear that is still strongly felt among his men, and partly

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague.

[2] This town lay on the route from Calcutta to Murshidabad, and was captured by Clive a few days before the Battle of Plassey [3] The royal music

because, from the tidings that have reached us from private sources, the English at Calcutta are strong enough to resist the Nawab without being obliged to break up the siege.

After taking much trouble to gain possession of a copy of the contract between the Nawab and the French, we have succeeded in getting the promise of one for the sum of florins 15 (?) as to which we request your Honour's orders.

We have the honour to sign ourselves with much respect.

301. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 23 *March*, 1757.

I thank God that to-day the 4th of the week and the 2nd of the Moon Rajup at 2 *gurries*[1] day, we began our fire on the French. By His blessing and the influence of your favour I was in possession of their fort at 6 *gurries* day. As I am perswaded you will be pleased at my success, therefore I thought proper and necessary to send you the particulars of this victory. My heart is earnest in your interest, and shall be always ready with my own life and that of my whole army to drive away your enemies. I hope that by Your Excellency's favour all our enemies in your country will fall into our hands.

302. *Translation of a Letter from Mr. Ross*[2] *to M. Vernet, dated Hugli*, 23 *March*, 1757.[3]

Chandernagore having been invested for seven days by the English, who during this time in spite of the heavy and continuous firing and bomb shelling by the French, only undertook defensive operations and employed themselves in constructing eight batteries each of nine twenty-four pounders, being ordered by Colonel Clive and the Admiral to do nothing until eight[4] ships would be able to get abreast of Chandernagore, this was at length effected at half-past six yesterday morning, the ship *Tyger* (commanded by Admiral Pocock who alone had been waited for) leading and Admiral Watson[5] and the *Salisbury* following. On their arrival they saluted Fort Orleans with three vollies each, whereupon the

[1] A *ghari* is a period of 24 minutes.

[2] Johannes Matthias Ross, second book-keeper in the mint at Chinsurah

[3] Vernet Papers, the Hague.

[4] ? Three

[5] On the *Kent*

Admiral hoisted the red flag, the signal for a general attack both on land and by the ships, which actually began with such a fearful cannonade that it really seemed as if both heaven and earth were doomed. This lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes, when the French hoisted a white flag, opened the gates and surrendered themselves at discretion, hiding from the first fury [of the enemy] in the warehouses. Fugitives from the French Factory (being deserters from the English) assert that in the Fort over five hundred Europeans perished besides the *topasses* and *sepoys*, and that there was already a breach and that both points[1] had been destroyed by the artillery.

Further reports mention a pitiful scene—the French ladies[2] in ignorance of what had become of their husbands and relations and whether at the taking of the Fort all of them would not be put to the sword.

Herewith, with friendly salutations to yourself and Miss Vernet, I have the honour to subscribe myself, &c. &c., J. M. Ross.

P.S.—To-day the head *cossid* has been here and told me that no *cossids* are to be had for fear of the Nawab who, according to rumour, is on his way here. I have just received your Honour's highly esteemed favour of the 19th instant. The orders contained therein shall be carried out by me as in duty bound, and, amongst other things, I will forward you to-morrow the barrel of wine and the lead-lines. The French are allowed to go where they please on their word of honour[3] but not higher [up the river] than Hugli. The free men[4] will have their property restored to them. The Fort is to be razed. Messrs. Re[nault] Fromaset, Chambon, &c., have come to reside here temporarily. Of the French two Captains and about 200 common soldiers were killed, of the English the Lieutenant of the Admiral's flagship and 142 men. The behaviour of the English is extremely generous. It is said the English are going to push on to Mursidabad and it is asserted that Major Kilpatrick has already been ordered to march on ahead with 500 Europeans and 100 *sepoys*.[5] Press of

[1] i e , bastions

[2] The French ladies were at Chinsurah and Serampore.

[3] ? Parole

[4] Apparently this means the Europeans

[5] A body of *sepoys* was sent to pursue the fugitives from Chandernagore. This gave rise to the rumour of an immediate advance on Murshidabad.

business from morning till 9 o'clock at night prevents my accepting the kind invitation of the English to assure myself (personally) of the truth; however I will write to your Honour this evening or to-night more circumstantially and will continue [my account] in that [letter].

The barque *De Ryder* is to set sail within 8 days.

The 24th evening.

303. *Translation of Articles of Capitulation proposed by the Director and Council for the French East India Company's affairs at Chandernagore to Vice-Admiral Watson; with his answers, 23 March, 1757.*[1]

ART. I.—The lives of the deserters shall be saved.

Answer.—The deserters shall be absolutely given up.

ART. II.—All the officers of this garrison shall be prisoners on their parole of honour; and shall have liberty to carry with them all their effects, and go where they please, on promising they will not serve against His Britannic Majesty during the present war.

Answer.—The Admiral agrees to this.

ART. III.—The soldiers of the garrison shall be prisoners of war, so long as the present war continues; and when Peace is made between the King of France and the King of England, they shall be sent to Pondicherry, and till then be entertained at the expence of the English Company.

Answer.—The Admiral likewise agrees, with this difference only, that instead of sending the soldiers to Pondicherry, they shall be sent to Madras, or to England, as the Admiral shall hereafter think proper, and that such foreigners, who are not of the French nation, and chuse voluntarily to enter into the English service, shall have liberty.

ART. IV.—The *sepoys* of the garrison shall not be prisoners of war; they shall have leave, on the contrary, to return to their own country on the Coast.

Answer.—The Admiral agrees to this.

ART. V.—The officers and men of the Company's European ship, *Saint Contest*, shall be sent to Pondicherry in the first English ship, which goes to the Coast.

[1] Broome's *Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army*, Appendix G

Answer.—The officers and men of the European ship shall be upon the same footing as the soldiers, and be sent to Madras or to England as soon as possible.

ART. VI.—The French Jesuit fathers shall have liberty to exercise the functions of their religion in the house which has been assigned them since the demolishing of their church; the silver ornaments and everything that belongs to the church shall be given them, and also their effects.

Answer.—The Admiral cannot agree to any Europeans residing here, but the French Jesuits may go to Pondicherry, with all the ornaments of their church, or wherever they please.

ART. VII.—All the inhabitants, of what nation or quality soever, as Europeans, *Mustees*,[1] Christians, Blacks, *Gentils*, Moors, and others, shall be put in possession of their houses, and of all in general as shall be found belonging to them, either in the Fort, or on their estates.

Answer.—This article to be left to the Admiral, who will do justice.

ART. VIII.—The Factories of Cassimbuzar, Dacca, Patna, Jeuda,[2] and of Ballasore, shall remain at the command of the Chiefs who direct them.

Answer.—To be settled between the Nabob and the Admiral.

ART. IX.—The Directors, Counsellors, and those employed under them shall have leave to go where they please, with their cloaths and linen.

Answer.—The Admiral agrees to this.

The Admiral expects an answer by three o'clock this afternoon, and that the British forces may take possession of the Fort by four.

The above-mentioned propositions have been accepted of by the Council; in consequence of which we have delivered up the fortress of Chandernagore to Admiral Watson.

P. RENAULT, FOURNIER, A. CAILLOTT, LA PORTERIE, F. NICHOLAS, PICQUES.[3]

Chandernagore,
The 23rd March, 1757.

[1] Persons with a slight admixture of Indian blood. [2] Jugdea

[3] Broome gives this as 'Sugues,' evidently a mistake. I have also corrected the spelling of La Porterie.

304. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated Murshidabad, 26 March, 1757.*

SIR,—I have received your favours of the 23rd and 24th this afternoon with the letter for the Nabob, which the moment he received, he sent for me, and desired I would immediately write to you not to send the Major up, as he was going a hunting, after which the *Poonea* would come on, or the time for paying in the annual revenues, which would be a busy time with him; this would be over in about a month, when he would send a *dustuck* and proper people to escort the Major up; the Nabob likewise desired I would mention that there were enemies on both sides who want to break the peace between the English and him, therefore he is apprehensive if the Major sets out without a *dustuck*, some of these peace disturbers may possibly put some affront on the Major, which may be imputed to him and put him to shame; the Nabob told me the French had petitioned him for his colours which he had sent them, but said whatever you requested concerning them should be complied with. This accompanies a letter of congratulation from the Nabob on your victory; accept likewise of mine. I hope we shall soon feel the good effects of it. Business now goes on briskly, we are daily receiving goods; besides the three *laak*, I have received fifty thousand, and one hundred thousand more is in Juggutseat's house which will come in to-morrow morning.

Omichund is indefatigable in the service of the Company, and if ever man deserved their favour he does; he is always with me, and as I am convinced of his superior understanding I always consult him, and am persuaded he is sincere and hearty in the cause of the English; and if our advice is thought worthy to be listened to, I do not doubt we shall be able to be of advantage to the Company and particulars; hitherto I think we have not erred.

I send this express; to-morrow I shall again address you.

I am, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

P.S.—The Nabob desires you will send for Nuncomaur and assure him that he or the tenants of Hughly need be under no apprehensions, and that you will give him any assistance he wants.

Your treating Nuncomaur kindly will have a good effect, as his letters are of weight here, and he has been of great service to us already.

305. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 26 *March,* 1757.[1] *Received* 29 *March,* 1757, *at* 8 *a.m.*

The particulars of your victory at Frankedongy which I had long been impatient to hear, gave me inexpressible pleasure. I thank God that your enemies so easily fell into your hands, and that their great place is fallen into your hands. You have no longer any uneasiness on their account. It has pleased God to make you and all your friends happy in this great victory. It is now proper that you should give strict orders forbidding any of your people molesting the inhabitants in and about Hughly, or they will run away and the revenues will suffer greatly. Give Nuncomar such assurances as his heart may be at ease, and that he may collect the revenues without fear. I have told *Zubdatoot Juja,* Mr. Watts, many particulars which you will learn from his letters.

306. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London, dated* 26 *March,* 1757.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. The transactions in Bengal since the retaking of Fort William being of the greatest importance to your affairs, we have judged it proper to dispatch advices of them *viâ* Bussorah to prevent the consequences of a disappointment should the *Delawar* not arrive in time. Enclosed is copy of our address by that ship with a translate of the Articles of Peace concluded with the *Subah.*

2. You will observe in our above mentioned letter we advised of haveing wrote the French that we had no objection to treat with them for a neutrality within the Ganges if they were authorized to conclude one. In consequence of this, the deputies from the Director and Council at Chandernagore arrived at Calcutta. The questions we judged it necessary previously to ask, with their answers in writing annexed, are enclosed in this packet for your observation. When the whole was near settled and the treaty methodized and engrossed, we transmitted a copy of our proceed-

[1] For date, see reference in Mr Watts' letter of the 26th, on p. 294.

ings herein to Admiral Watson, and requested his confirmation of the neutrality agreeable to the 6th Article of the treaty. Copy of his reply we likewise enclose by which you will observe he refused his assent to the neutrality for reasons set forth in his letter.

3. We then addressed Mr. Watson a second time, and urged him to confirm the treaty which we esteemed the most beneficial step that could be taken for the Company's affairs in these Provinces: but if he persisted in refusing that confirmation, we then made it our request that he would assist us with his squadron to attack Chandernagore immediately, as our waiting till answers arrived from Pondicherry without concluding any thing decisively, would prove very prejudicial to the Company's affairs in general, but more particularly so on the Coast, where it was absolutely necessary some of the troops should return as soon as possible. Copy of his reply to this request of ours is likewise enclosed in this packet.

4. The next day we received a letter from Mr. Watts intimating that he believed the Nabob would not interfere in our disputes with the French if we attacked them. The same *cossids* brought letters to the Admiral and Colonel requesting their assistance against a body of Pytans, which he had notice were marching to invade his territories. This being esteemed a favourable opportunity to obtain his consent for making an attack upon Chandernagore, the question was put in the Committee whether Admiral Watson should a third time be urged to confirm the neutrality immediately, or that treaty suspended for a time and another tryal made to get the Nabob's consent for attacking Chandernagore? The majority of the Committee were for suspending the neutrality, of which we advised the Admiral, and requested his assent to the treaty in case the Nabob persevered in his resolution to allow of no hostilities between the English and French in his country. Mr. Becher being of a different opinion, his dissent is entered at large upon the face of our Proceedings.[1]

5. Colonel Clive immediately after marched up and encamped near Chandernagore. On the 12th March we received a letter from Mr. Watts wherein he expressly writes the Nabob had ordered him to inform the Admiral and Colonel that if we were determined to attack Chandernagore he would not intermeddle. At the same time letters came from the Nabob himself to them repeating his

[1] See Select Committee Consultations, 6 February, 1757.

request for our assistance, and assuring them that he would not assist the French. These letters, and some other circumstances induced us to address the Admiral, giving him our reasons for the alteration of our sentiments in respect of the neutrality, and desiring the assistance of his squadron to reduce Chandernagore. Copy of this letter with his answer are likewise enclosed Mr Becher declined signing this address as contrary to his way of thinking.

6. The place was accordingly invested by the land forces, soon after which the squadron moved up the river, and having surmounted the obstacles laid in their way by the sinking of some ships and vessels in the channel, they began the attack of the Fort early on the 23rd instant, and we have the pleasure to advise of its being surrendered to Admiral Watson the same day.

7. A reinforcement of *seepoys* with some military stores are arrived from Madrass, but they have detained Mr. Brohier till they hear of our being in a state of sufficient tranquility to carry on the works he may plan for the defence of our Settlement against an European enemy.

8. We have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the Company's Subordinates are all delivered up, that the goods and effects taken in them are likewise delivering, and that there is a probability of the Company's being but small if any sufferers.

We are, &c. &c., SELECT COMMITTEE, Bengal.

307. *Extract from a letter from the Select Committee, Fort William, to the Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated* 26 *March,* 1757.

In our last letter we advised you that we were upon the point of concluding a neutrality with the French, since which things have taken a different turn, and the Admiral having refused his assent to the neutrality, Chandernagore was attacked by land and water. We have the pleasure to advise you that the Fort surrendered on the 23d instant and is now in our possession. As the consequence of this capture may be an attempt upon our Settlement by the French as soon as the squadron leaves the river, we are to desire you will request Mr. Brohier to set out for Bengal immediately, and give his directions for such works as he may judge necessary to be executed to put the Settlement in a proper posture of defence against an European enemy.

SELECT COMMITTEE, Bengal.

308. *Translation of a letter from M. Renault to M. de Leyrit, dated Chandernagore,*[1] *28 March, 1757.*[2]

SIR,—I will not enter into any details of the sad catastrophe which has just happened to the factory of Chandernagore, not being able to add anything to what you have been able to learn from the subjoined letter, in triplicate, to the Council. The whole colony is dispersed, and the inhabitants are seeking asylums, some —it is there the greatest part have gone—at Chinsurah, others with the Danes and at Calcutta. This dispersion is caused only by the misery to which all our French people have been reduced. Their poverty, which I cannot alleviate, draws tears from my eyes, the more bitter that I have seen them risk their lives so generously for the interests of the Company and of our nation.

M. Fournier is the only one who has signed with me my letter to the Superior Council, all the other Councillors are still at Chandernagore. M. Caillaud, who was wounded in the naval attack, has remained in his house. I have nominated MM. Nicolas and Picques to assist in making the inventory which the English have to draw up, although the English have taken much property out of the warehouses. They have also taken the artillery without including it. I intend to write about this to Admiral Watson.

They are looking for our pilots, and I am informed the Admiral has given orders to Mr. Boddam, Chief of Balasore, to send people everywhere to prevent any of them from escaping. I have every reason to fear for those who were there.

I shall have the honour to write to you more fully when opportunity offers to do so safely. I am in the most extreme distress and without any resources.

309. *Letter from Council, Chandernagore, to the Syndics and Directors General of the India Company (viâ Surat), dated Chinsurah, 29 March, 1757.*[3]

GENTLEMEN,—You must have seen from our despatches with what eagerness we have tried to pacify the troubles in Bengal, and

[1] Should probably be 'Chinsurah,' where M. Renault was staying at this time.
[2] Archives Coloniales, Paris
[3] *Ibid.*

to have the neutrality of the Ganges recognised by a definite treaty with the English, and you will have seen at the same time how our efforts to this end have been fruitless. Far however from being discouraged by the many contradictory circumstances to which we have been subjected, being firmly persuaded that peace and tranquillity are the greatest advantages we could procure for the Company, we did not hesitate to try and renew these negotiations, which for some time promised favourably, so that we expected every moment to see the affair finished and the treaty signed. But the Admiral, after having gained considerable advantages and completed a glorious treaty with the Nawab, apparently changed his mind; all was broken off, and we soon saw ourselves besieged by land and water. The 14th of this month their army attacked one of our outposts. Although this was only a small redoubt mounting three guns, and though it was attacked by the whole English army, our troops defended it with the greatest courage, and the companies of volunteers, of grenadiers, and of marine, which were sent there in succession, maintained themselves without much loss from 3 a.m. to 7 p.m., repulsing three attacks, but as all were wearied out and as, considering our small number, we could not have despatched fresh troops to stand the night attack which was expected, the general opinion was in favour of taking advantage of the cessation of fire and the darkness of night to withdraw our troops, which was accordingly done. The enemy entered the town next morning and tried to profit by the advantage given them by the proximity of several houses (though we had pulled down many of them) to establish batteries, but luckily their efforts were vain for a long time, at least as soon as any appeared they were dismounted. Thus the time passed till the 19th when a strong squadron of six vessels appeared and anchored in sight of the town but out of range of our cannon. The commander, Admiral Watson, immediately summoned us to surrender. As we had always recognized the impossibility of defending ourselves against a naval force, we had sunk four of our vessels before the siege in a rather narrow passage by which it was necessary to pass in order to reach the Fort, which made it very difficult, but we thought as the Admiral had come so far it was not without the certainty of being able to pass. Accordingly we tried to come

to terms and to ransom the place, engaging the English to retire in return for a sum of money. The Admiral refused to listen to this proposal. He insisted on our surrendering and the troops taking possession of the Fort, promising however that everyone should keep his own property. There was not a man amongst us who did not prefer to run the risk of whatever might happen rather than surrender in this fashion, without having as yet suffered any material damage, and everyone was willing to risk his own interests and defend those of the Company. Everyone promised to do his best to defend the colony. The enemy recommenced their fire at 6 p.m. and more fiercely than ever, but without greater effect in spite of the number of the shells which they poured upon us. This continued until by the aid of a strong south wind, and the high waters of the Equinox, the strong tides of which moreover had displaced the sunken vessels, the squadron set sail, and the three largest vessels, the *Tiger* of 60 guns commanded by Mr. Pocock, Vice-Admiral, the *Kent* of 74 commanded by Mr. Watson, and the *Salisbury* of 50, easily forced the passage, and came before the Fort within pistol shot. They bombarded us with all their artillery, to which was added all that of the land forces. Accordingly for three hours the fire was as hot as we had ever seen. To reply, at least to that of the vessels, we had only the two bastions on the Ganges, each of which mounted five guns. These were soon dismounted, especially those of the Pavillon,[1] which had been only recently constructed. Everything threatened to crumble away and to make a breach, which the exhaustion of our people and the small number which remained to us prevented us from hoping to defend, for in the three hours of the attack by the ships we had 200 men put *hors de combat.* Seeing the impossibility of holding out longer, I hoisted a white flag and the capitulation was signed that evening.

The chief articles of the treaty, after the surrender of the place, are that the garrison and the marine remain prisoners of war, the officers on *parole*, the Council, Company's servants and, in general, all the inhabitants have permission to retire where they please with their clothes and property. Almost all are at Chinsurah with the Dutch. But before letting us go, and having once

[1] The north-east bastion

become our masters, they have forced us to sign a paper engaging not to serve directly or indirectly against His Britannic Majesty or his allies during the present war in Europe. As regards the subordinate Factories nothing has been settled. The Admiral explained that he would settle this with the Nawab.[1] Accordingly there is reason to fear that he will force that Prince to make them over to him. M. Law has been written to to do his best to parry this blow, and to hinder the Nawab from allowing the commission of such an act of violence under his very eyes. One cannot tell what will be the result of this action, so frightened is the Government of the English arms. However it will be of the last importance to keep him in the same good disposition as he is in at present towards our nation, than which we could have wished nothing better. Besides in proportion to the disgraceful nature of the conditions of peace imposed upon him by the English the more has he been alienated from them, and believing himself no longer strong enough to resist Europeans he has tried in every way to conciliate our friendship. As a proof of the good will he had for us he promised to restore the 3 *lakhs* which he took from us in June 1756, and even gave us 1 *lakh* on the spot on account, which enabled us to make the resistance we did. In our total exhaustion of funds, not having received any money from the Coast for eight months, it would have been impossible to make any preparations for war. In sending this money he granted us also very advantageous privileges—the one allowing us to mint *sicca* rupees in Chandernagore, which would have freed us from all the worries of the *tanksaal* at Murshidabad, and the other allowing all Frenchmen to trade freely throughout the country on the same footing and on the same terms as the Company, a privilege which is the cause of the brilliant state of Calcutta. He had also allowed us to fortify ourselves as we liked, not merely in the Fort but also in the town (*aldée*), and on the representation we made him of our fear of being besieged by the English he forbade them to commit any act of hostility within his peace [*i.e.* dominions] and sent 2,000 of his soldiers to our succour. He was also about to take a much more important measure when he received a letter from Colonel

[1] The word used is 'Cabale,' which in the English accounts is rendered either as the Nawab or his *Darbar*.

Clive, commandant of the English forces, which informed him that since he did not wish him to make war on the French he was about to retire and leave us in peace. The very day upon which this letter was despatched we were attacked, and Siraj-ud-daula not knowing what to think of the news which we sent him, delayed sending off the reinforcements which otherwise would have arrived in time. The force consisted of more than 5,000 men, and with it we could have forced the English to abandon the siege. We think this duplicity on their part will do much to make their real character known to the Government and that they will soon have it on their backs, if we once find ourselves in force. The resistance we have made, which has surpassed the expectation of every one, must convince the whole country of the valour of our nation. We have the satisfaction of seeing not only those who are dependent on us, but even the enemy doing us the fullest justice. Also they must have suffered a great loss, as on the two ships of the Admirals there were 194 men *hors de combat*, amongst whom is the Vice-Admiral and his Flag-Captain.

We have the honour to be with respect, your very humble and obedient servants, RENAULT, FOURNIER, CAILLAUD,[1] PIQUES, LAPORTERIE.

310. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Pigot, dated 29 March, 1757.*

I make no doubt but the forces are impatiently expected at Madras. It is a very great blow which has detained them—no less than the attack and taking of Chandernagore: of more consequence to the Company, in my opinion, than the taking of Pondicherry itself. It was a most magnificent and rich colony; the garrison consisted of more than five hundred Europeans and seven hundred blacks, all carrying arms; three hundred and sixty are prisoners, and near one hundred have been suffered to give their *parole*, consisting of civil, military, and inhabitants. Nearly sixty white ladies are rendered miserable by the loss of this place. However, nothing has been wanting, either on the Admiral's part

[1] Caillaud, as is mentioned in the previous letter, was wounded in the naval attack. His signature is in a shaky hand, which shows he was still suffering.

or mine, to render their condition supportable: their clothes, their linen, and almost their everything has been suffered to go out.

I must refer you to the Committee's letter for many particulars. I fear I shall not be able to send a list of military and artillery stores by this conveyance, which are very great, and will abundantly supply Calcutta. By the Nabob's letters, you will find of what a wavering pusillanimous disposition he is. However, I am in hopes this last stroke will fix him. He has already performed almost every article of the treaty; paid Mr. Watts the three *lacs* of rupees; delivered up Cossimbazar, and all the other Factorys, with the money and goods therein taken. The Gentlemen write from thence that little or nothing is wanting.

Our stay till August, which is now become unavoidable, will, I hope, settle everything here in the most advantageous manner for the Company, and perhaps induce the Nabob to give up all the French Factorys. This will be driving them out root and branch. I am well informed, without Chandernagore, the Islands[1] must starve, and Pondicherry suffer greatly.

My inclinations always tend towards the Coast; and I hope to be with you, with a very considerable force, in September. The lateness of the season makes the passage very uncertain; and the length of it would certainly cause the loss of a great part of our forces

It was with great reluctance Mr. Watson consented I should sign the articles of capitulation, though drawn out in his name, notwithstanding it was impossible the Fort could ever have been taken without our assistance. We attacked the enemy six or seven days before the ships, and drove them from eleven batteries, one of which was by the river side, of very heavy metal, under which was sunk four or five ships and vessels to prevent the passage of the squadron, which could never have been effected without mastering that battery. We erected one of five twenty-four-pounders within a hundred yards of the south-east bastion, and another of three twenty-four-pounders within a hundred and fifty yards of the north-east bastion; besides which, we manned all the tops of the houses, and kept up such a fire of musketry

[1] The islands of Mauritius, etc

that the enemy could not appear either on the ramparts or bastions, by which means the fire was insignificant to what it would have been.

I have just this instant received a letter of congratulation from the Nabob, copy of which I enclose you.

311. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 29 March, 1757.*

It was almost impossible that there could be a lasting peace in your kingdom while there are two such powerful nations in it, because whenever a war breaks out between our two Kings they would not fail to extend the effects of it to these parts, endeavouring to drive each other from their Settlements in Bengal. . . . All these circumstances make it absolutely necessary that Your Excellency should deliver up to us the persons and effects of the French at Cossimbazar, and their other out-Settlements, as being our enemies. We shall then be without rivals, and our whole force ready to obey your commands, and assist you in punishing all those who dare to molest the peace of your kingdom.

312. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 29 March, 1757.*

If you want the French Factory it is well. Whatever they paid into the treasury, write to Mr. Watts to make good here, and it is very well then you keep possession of the Factory. But if it be agreeable to you, it will be showing yourself a man of a great mind to give it up to them that they may carry on their trade as before.

313. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 30 March, 1757.*

I have just now the honour of your obliging letter, and agreeable to your desire have deferred sending the Major; and as I shall always make it my endeavour to shew you my sincerity and firm adherence to the treaty in all my actions, so (as it is your desire) I will in a very few days, as soon as places can be got ready for them in Calcutta, withdraw the greatest part of my

troops. The remainder shall keep at Chandernagore as being the more healthy place, and also that Calcutta is in too ruinous a condition to receive my whole army. As I have never yet deviated in the least point from the friendship, I am amazed Your Excellency should give ear to my enemies as to think I had any ill intentions in moving with my army to the northward of Chandernagore. I once more swear by the God that made me, that I ever will be true to all that I have promised, and that I have nothing more at heart than that the friendship between Your Excellency and the English may last for ever. I hope I shall find Your Excellency's heart the same, and that you will shortly fulfil all your engagements, and that the English from your goodness and justice will have ample restitution of all their losses, and by once more sitting themselves down to trade, contribute to the increase of the revenues, and to make your kingdom flourish. There wants nothing to fix the peace of your kingdom, but that you would deliver up to us the French with their effects, wherever they are to be found in your dominions; for remember my words Sir, let them take deep root in your mind, that whenever there are two such powerful peoples, the peace of your country cannot be lasting. Cast your eyes on the Decan and Carnatic country, and see what thousands of the *Mogul's* subjects, what sums of money, what populous and magnificent cities have been lost by their taking opposite parts in the wars there. Your Excellency has now an opportunity of preventing the same unhappy scene ever passing in this country by entirely driving them out of it, and it will be always in our power to keep them so. What matters it whether the revenues of your country proceed from the trade of one or two nations, so that the amount be but the same? I have just received your letter of the 8th of the moon. Surely Nuncomar must have wrote you long e'er this, that I never intend the least injury to the inhabitants of Hughly.

Is there a single subject of yours can prove the English army has done him the least injury? However, not to leave the least room for complaint, agreeable to your desire the greatest part of my army will remove to Calcutta very soon; the ships are already moving. As to Chandernagore we do not want further possessions in this country, being well satisfied with what we already have.

We mean only to prevent the French, who are your enemies as well as ours, from ruining this country. For which purpose we mean utterly to destroy the fortifications of Francedongy, and then give the place up to your orders to do as you think proper, providing you never restore it to our enemies.

314. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort Saint George, dated Camp near Chandernagore, 30 March,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—Since my dispatch of the 3rd instant, I am favoured with your letters of the 21st and 28th February with the duplicates and triplicates by the ships *Sally* and *Betsey* schooner.

I acquainted you that the neutrality with the French was not likely to be concluded. I continued encamped on the same ground, and the 7th instant received a letter from the Nabob, desiring me to join him against the Afghans, the van of whose army was attempting an irruption into this province. Accordingly I began my march the next morning, and thinking it a convenient opportunity to prevail on him to suffer us to take Chandernagore, I wrote him word of our having endeavoured to conclude a neutrality with the French, but that the Director and Council were not invested with proper powers for that purpose; that whilst we were engaged at a distance, assisting him against his enemies, the French, joined by Monsieur Bussy, might make an attempt on Calcutta; and that therefore I should wait off Chandernagore in hopes of receiving his leave to attack it. Accordingly the 11th I encamped at the back of it within a mile of the Fort, and the 12th the Admiral receiving a letter from the Nabob, the purport of which was that we might act as we pleased with respect to the French, and having intelligence at the same time that the troops he had sent to their assistance were withdrawn, I summoned the place to surrender that night, but received no answer. The next morning I attacked their western battery which they defended very briskly the whole day, but at night abandoned it. A detachment I sent about noon to the southward took post in a garden near the Fort, and within some of their batteries. The loss they had sustained at the western battery, and the apprehension of their retreat being cut off by our detachment, made them

likewise desert that night all the works to the southward, among the rest a strong half moon on the river side mounting heavy mettle, and a battery of three guns playing down the channel, both which must have annoyed our ships greatly in their passage up. The batteries to the northward were all quitted at the same time

On the 19th the King's ships got to the Prussian Gardens about a mile from the Fort, but it was the 23rd before they attempted to pass the vessels which had been sunk by the enemy opposite to the half moon. They weighed at daybreak, and in less than an hour were abreast of the Fort. A 13 inch mortar of ours with several cohorns and royals had played incessantly the whole night, and when the ships weighed we opened two batteries very near the walls, one of four pieces of cannon, the other of three, all four-and-twenty pounders, and kept a continual discharge of musquetry from the adjacent houses. In short, the fire from the ships and the shore was so great that they capitulated in three hours. Copy of the terms granted them is inclosed. You will observe the surrender is made to Admiral Watson, but common report will be just in publishing how great a share the land forces had in this conquest.

There were above 500 Europeans in the Fort, 250 *seapoys* and 400 *topasses*, *mustees*, &c., bearing arms. Of the Europeans about 125 have given their parole of honor, 300 sick and well are prisoners, and the rest were either killed in the siege, or made their escape.

I cannot at present give you an account to what value has been taken. The French Company had no great stock of merchandize remaining, having sold off most of their imports, and even their investment for Europe, to pay off in part the large debts they had contracted. With respect to the artillery and ammunition we found, I cannot as yet transmit you the inventory, but they were not indifferently furnished. There is likewise a very fine marine arsenal well stocked. In short, nothing could have happened more seasonable for the expeditious re-establishment of Calcutta than the reduction of Chandernagore. It was certainly a large, rich and thriving colony, and the loss of it is an unexpressible blow to the French Company.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the Nabob has wrote

me a letter of congratulation on our success, and that this enterprise, so far from enraging him, has served to attach him more firmly to us. I am now using all my endeavours to prevail on him to deliver up, or suffer us to seize, the French and their property at all their out-Settlements, in order effectually to root them out of this Province, if possible.

I should before have mentioned that during the siege I received letters from the Nabob acquainting me that he had accommodated matters with Ahmud Shaw, the Afghan, and therefore desiring we would stop our march as he had no further occasion for our assistance. He has fulfilled most of the Articles of the treaty made with us. The three *lack* of rupees are already paid and goods and money to a considerable amount delivered up to us at our several Subordinates, and I make little doubt but that all his engagements will be duly executed. On the whole, I may affirm to you that the Company's affairs in this Province wear a very prosperous face.

By the *Betsey* schooner, who called at Bandermalanka, we have information that Monsieur Bussy had lost 200 Europeans, besides many blacks in taking some Rajah's fort in that neighbourhood. If this news be true, he will find it difficult enough to maintain himself in Golcondah without detaching either to the northward or the southward.

The season now is so very far advanced that the voyage to Madras, if to be effected at all, must be long and painful to the troops. I therefore think it most advisable to remain with them till August, by which time all matters may be completely finished in this kingdom, and I may then return to you with a considerable body of men.

Inclosed is a Journal of military operations, with a Return of all the forces under my command. You will observe I have been joined not only by the Bombay detachment, but by the four companies of *seapoys* from the *Betsey* and *Sally*, and the King's troops from the *Cumberland*.

As we have been a good deal unsettled of late, what with marching and the siege, and some of my assistants have been indisposed, I must defer sending my February Rolls and Accounts. They shall be forwarded overland with those of March. I propose

in a few days striking off all *batta*, and retrenching every article of expense I possibly can

The *King'sfisher* sloop is on her dispatch to Europe, by which I am about to acquaint the Secret Committee of our success, and the happy situation of their affairs in Bengal.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

315. *Letter from Messrs. Watson, Pocock, Clive, and Kilpatrick to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Chandernagore,* 31 *March,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—Having taken into consideration the disposal of the Fort of Chandernagore we imagine it will be for the interest of the Company and of the nation that it be demolished. For should the Nabob from the capriciousness of his disposition once again turn his arms against [us] or should the French be able to send a force into this Province two garrisons will be more than we can well maintain, especially after the departure of the squadron and return of the Madras troops. We should be glad to know your sentiments on this subject, and are, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON, G. POCOCK, R. CLIVE, J. KILLPATRICK.

316. *Letter from Admiral Watson to John Cleveland, Esq., dated H.M.S. 'Kent,' off Chandernagore,* 31 *March,* 1757.[1]

SIR,—Soon after the date of my last letter of 24th February dispatches arrived from Mr. Watts, the second in Council of Calcutta, who is attending the Nabob's Court at Muxadavad. By his letters the Nabob appeared not so strongly attached to the French interest as we had reason to apprehend when I addressed you last No pains was spared to improve this alteration from the resolution he had before taken, and the circumstance of some troubles approaching the northern part of his kingdom by the Afghans, who it was said had chose a person named Abdallah to be their General, and that he had taken Delly and made the *Mogul* prisoner, and had coined money in his own name. The apprehensions the Nabob was under from this sudden revolution in the Empire made him very sollicitous to be re-

[1] Duplicate of letter to Lord Holdernesse of same date (Admiralty Records)

inforced by our troops, who he offered great rewards to for their service. But I represented to him how imprudent it would be to send all our force from our garrison, to march with him a considerable distance into the country and leave behind us our enemies the French, who agreeable to his desire I had been endeavouring to enter into a neutrality with, but upon discovering, (when the business was near concluded), that they were not vested with proper powers to make such a treaty, I declined entering any farther into a negotiation of that nature with people who had no authority to do it, and that I made no doubt he perceived the uprightness of my intention in endeavouring to comply with what he had recommended relating to the business of a neutrality, and that he was too reasonable to expect I could assist him with the forces he required till such time we had reduced the French, so as to leave no enemy behind us. This wrought such an effect on the Nabob, that though he could not be brought to give his full consent in writing to our attacking the French, yet he explained his sense of the matter sufficient to be understood he would not interfere or know of any thing done between us and them.

As I had not totally given over the thoughts of attacking Chandernagor, I kept the squadron in readiness to proceed up the river whenever the pilots would take charge of the ships, and upon receiving such favourable hints from the Nabob I fixed the time for sailing. Before that came the Bombay troops arrived at Calcutta, amounting to three hundred men, and marched directly to the camp to join Colonel Clive, who by this reinforcement had with him 700 Europeans and 1,600 blacks. Immediately after he was joined by the Bombay detachment he marched to Chandernagore, where he had not been long before he took possession of all the enemy's out-posts, except one redoubt, situated between the river side and the walls of the Fort, wherein were mounted eight cannon, 24 pounders, four of which pointed down the river. Two days before I sailed, an officer of the *Cumberland* brought me letters from Mr. Pocock, acquainting me of his arrival at Ballasore Road. Had this happened a few days sooner, the reinforcement of her seamen and the troops she had on board would have been a very considerable advantage to us, but there was no waiting three or four days without losing the

opportunity of the Neapes, and, before the proper time of tides would have offered again, great changes might have happened by the artful insinuations of the French at the Nabob's Court. I resolved therefore to proceed with the few men I had, and sailed the 15th instant with the *Kent*, *Tyger*, and *Salisbury*. The twenty gun ship and sloop, I ordered up the river some days before to cover the boats attending on the camp. On the 18th I anchored about two miles below Chandernagore and observed the French had done every thing in their power to obstruct our passage up, by sinking two ships, a ketch, a snow, a hulk and a vessel without masts, all directly in the channel within gun-shot of the Fort, and laying two booms moored with chains across the river. This caused some delay, till the booms were cut adrift and I could discover by sounding in the night a proper channel to pass through, which the pilots found out, without being at the trouble of weighing any of the vessels as I expected we should have been obliged to do; but before this could be sufficiently known to venture through Mr. Pocock came up to me in his boat, and hoisted his flag on board the *Tyger*. On the 23rd at six o'clock in the morning, I weighed and sailed up in the following order, the *Tyger*, *Kent* and *Salisbury*. At ten minutes after six the enemy began to fire from the redoubt, which was abandoned as soon as the leading ship got a breast of it. At three quarters after six, the ships were placed, when I caused the signal to be made for engaging, which continued very briskly on both sides till a quarter past nine. The enemy then waved over their walls a flag of truce, and desired to capitulate. I have inclosed a copy of the Articles they proposed with my answers, which the Governor and Council agreed to and signed within the time prescribed them. In consequence of which I sent Captain Latham (of the *Tyger*) ashore to receive the keys and take possession of the Fort. I beg leave to congratulate their Lordships on the success of His Majesty's arms on this occasion.

Colonel Clive marched in with the King's troops about five in the afternoon. There were in the Fort 1,200 men of which were 500 Europeans and 700 blacks, 183 pieces of cannon from 24 pounders downwards, three small mortars, and a considerable quantity of ammunition.

Besides the ships and vessels sunk below to stop the channel up, they sunk and run ashore five large ships above the Fort, and we have taken four sloops and a snow. The enemy had killed in the Fort 40 men and 70 wounded. We also have suffered in some degree, the *Kent* had 19 men killed and 49 wounded, the *Tyger* 13 killed and 50 wounded. Among the number killed was my First Lieutenant Mr. Samuel Perreau, and the Master of the *Tyger*. Among the wounded was Mr. Pocock slightly hurt, Captain Speke and his son by the same cannon ball, the latter had his leg shot off, Mr. Rawlins Hey, my Third Lieutenant, had his thigh much shattered, and is in great danger, Mr. Stanton, my Fourth Lieutenant, slightly wounded by splinters, but the greater part of the wounded have suffered much, being hurt chiefly by cannon shot; several of them cannot possibly recover. I must do this justice to all the officers and men in general, to say, agreeable to their usual bravery, they behaved with great spirit and resolution on this occasion, as did also the land forces who kept a good and constant fire the whole time from two batteries of four and two guns, they had raised very near the Fort.

I am fearful the *Kent*[1] has suffered so much in her hull, I shall be under a necessity of leaving her behind, it being I believe impossible to repair her, which their Lordships will better judge of by the inclosed account of her defects. Those of the *Tyger* may be repaired, there being some masts and a quantity of other naval stores at this place.

Since my being here, the Nabob has acquainted me he has made a Peace with his enemies, and that he shall now have no occasion for the assistance of our troops, so that how they will be employed the remaining part of this summer is not yet determined. The ships must infallibly remain here now till August, when I shall endeavour to proceed to Bombay with all the dispatch possible, without calling at Madrass, having sent for the provisions and stores belonging to the squadron to be brought here.

By the arrival of the Bombay ships, I received their Lordships' order of the 18th May 1756 with twelve copies of His Majesty's declaration of war against France, which I have delivered agree-

[1] The *Kent* was condemned, and apparently broken up in Calcutta

able to their direction to the several Captains under my command with orders accordingly.

Their Lordships' order for my returning home the latter end of this year, is impossible for me now to comply with, but I hope to get away from Bombay time enough to arrive in England in August or September 1758, and though my stay will be something longer than they expected, I hope my proceedings in the circumstances I have been under will meet with their Lordships' approbation.

By letters from the Committee at Fort Saint George, I am informed of the *Triton's* arrival at Anjingo on the coast of Malabar the 27th December last, and landed a packett from the East India Company for their Governor and Council at Fort Saint George, but no account where she went to from thence. I suppose she is gone to Bombay and it is very probable I may not see her till June or July, which makes me uneasy, as I imagine her Captain is charged with orders of some consequence for me.

An opportunity immediately offering by a sloop going from hence to Bussero, I take the chance of these letters arriving safe, as I imagine the most early notice of this intelligence at home may be of some consequence to our affairs in this part of the world.

I am, &c. &c., CHAS. WATSON.

I beg the favour you will forward the inclosed.

P.S.—Out of the 500 Europeans said to be in the Fort we have only 300 prisoners.

317. *Letter from the Nawab to the Distinguished of the Empire, the Sword of Riches, the Victorious in War, Monsieur Busie* Bahaudar, *dated — March,* 1757.

I have with great pleasure received news of your being arrived near the Orissa country with a powerful army of soldiers *Telingas*, &c, to the assistance of the commander of Chandernagore. I promise myself great pleasure of seeing you; a meeting will confirm the great friendship between us. I have ordered the *Naibs* of the *Subah*, the *Phousdar* and *Zemidars* of Midnapore, to wait on you and assist you in your march.

318. *Letter from the Nawab to Monsieur Busie Bahauder, &c., dated — March, 1757.*

I am advised that you are arrived at Echapore, this news gives me pleasure, the sooner you come here the greater satisfaction I shall have in meeting you. What can I write of the perfidy of the English, they have without ground picked a quarrel with Monsieur Rennault and taken by force his Factory. They want now to quarrel with Monsieur Law your Chief at Cassimbuzar, but I will take care to oppose and overthrow their proceedings. When you come to Ballasore I will then send Monsieur Law to your assistance, unless you forbid his setting out. Rest assured of my good will towards you and your Company, and to convince you of my sincerity I now send *perwanahs* to Didarally and Ramagee Pundit and to Rajaram Sing, that as soon as you may enter the Province that they may meet and lend you all possible assistance, and not on any pretence impede your march. Both at Cuttack Rajah of Ballasore and Midnapore.

319. *Letter from the Nawab to Rajaram Sing, dated — March, 1757.*

You write me that Monsieur Busie is arrived at Echapore six days' journey on this side of Chicacul, and six days on the other side Cuttack, this letter I have received, you must obtain good intelligence and employ proper *hircaras*, and so soon as Monsieur Busey is arrived in your limits, receive him in the politest manner so that he may be well pleased and satisfied with you. The moment Monsieur Busie arrives present him the enclosed *perwanah*. Enquire diligently and inform me whether he has passed the Chilka. I have wrote to Didarally and Ramagee Pundit that when Monsieur Busie or his army arrives they do not impede them.

320. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to the Assembly of Seventeen, dated 2 April, 1757* [1]

To the Honourable Directors,—The reason of this interim despatch is the passing of Fort Orleans at Chandernagore into

[1] Bengal Correspondence, the Hague.

the possession of the English, who began the attack on the 14th of last month and captured it on the 23rd, after the besieged, relying on the strength of their works, had offered a vigorous resistance; but however strong and well made their bastions may have been, they were no match for the fearful fire of the three men-of-war which Admirals Watson and Pocock brought into position on the aforesaid date, whereby the matter was decided in two hours' time, the fortress capitulating and the besieged being most handsomely treated, and allowed, *inter alia*, to repair hither with all their private property, so that we shall be saddled with them for some time to come.

This misfortune is, forsooth, as nothing compared with that to which we should be exposed in the event of a rupture with France or England, for as we took the liberty of stating under date of the 22nd of January last, our Fort is a nest that would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the enemy for as many hours as the French have days, and now the English have destroyed the imaginary[1] neutrality within the Ganges, the stronger party will in the future, no doubt, always assail and ruin the weaker, unless the parties at variance can find a means to reconcile their clashing interests.

If this forecast of coming events should be realized, we are sure to be always pulling at the shortest end, for it is an indisputable fact that we have most to lose, nay, perhaps more than all the others put together, and no power in the world to safeguard it. The Nawab who was perfectly aware of our impotence, has not only extorted from us the immense sum referred to in our respects of 2nd of January, but has since then, in reply to our annexed request for restitution of the said moneys, had the audacity to threaten to bastonade us with bamboos (the greatest insult that can be offered to anyone here), if we do not keep quiet; an affront that we should be able to pay him out for, if we could put an army of from 14 to 15,000 men in the field, as the British have done, who have now made him so tame, that the mere sight of an English flag is sufficient to drive him out of his mind with fear.

[1] i e , not ratified by any actual treaty, and depending only on custom.

321. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 4 April. Received 8 April, 1757.*

I received your letters and observe what you desire in regard to the French Factories and their goods. I address you seeing you are a man of wisdom and knowledge, and well acquainted with the customs and trade of the world, and you must know that the French, by the permission and *phirmaund* of the King, have built them several Factories and carried on their trade in this kingdom. I cannot therefore, without hurting my character and exposing myself to trouble hereafter, deliver up their Factories and goods unless I have a written order from them for so doing, and I am perswaded that from your friendship for me you would never be glad at anything whereby my fame would suffer, as I, for my own part, am ever desirous of promoting [your good]. Mr. Renault, the French Governor, being in your power, if you could get from him a paper under his own hand and seal to this purpose, 'That of his own will and pleasure he thereby gave up to the English Company's servants, and empowered them to receive, all the Factories, money, and goods belonging to the French Company without any hindrance from the Nabob's people,' and would send this to me, I should be secure by that from any trouble hereafter on this account. But it is absolutely necessary you come to some agreement about the King's duties arising from the French trade: for this reason that there may be no loss to the King. I shall then be able to answer to his servants, 'That in order to make good the duties accruing from the French trade, I had delivered up their Factories into the hands of the English.'

322. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated Murshidabad, 5 April, 1757.*

Sir,—The moment I received your favours of the 26th, 29th, and 31st, accompanying letters [to] the Nabob, I despatched them to him.

On being advised that the French were erecting batteries, and digging a ditch round their Factory at Cossimbazar, I applied to the Nabob, who ordered one hundred *bildars*[1] there who have demol-

[1] Diggers.

ished their works; since which I am informed they have collected together from Chandernagor, Dacca, Jugdea, &c., 150 Europeans and 100 *Tellingees*. I applied to the Nabob to have them delivered up to me, but could only obtain an order on them to turn all their new comers out of their Factory, and to remain only with those soldiers they had before our attack on Chandernagore. Nazir Delul and Kissoresing an *hircarra* are gone to see these orders put in execution. As the French are so strong here and as I am apprehensive the Nabob may entertain them, I have promised a pardon and service to all their soldiers that will engage with us, except Frenchmen. I hope this will meet with your approval.

From the advices received it is generally believed the Pytans are marching down this way. It is said they have concluded a treaty with the Morattoes, and are to be joined by Baulluray, Bojuray's son; if this news is true I expect the Nabob will soon apply to you for assistance.

If you have found any of the Nabob's letters to the French that will be of use, I should be obliged to you for copies of them.

The Nabob requests that if a Peace should be concluded with the French, you will not let them enter the Province till they have first concluded a Peace with him.

By bribery all the Nabob's *hircarras* are our enemies, and are continually writing and giving false intelligence, which would be entirely [successful] if Nuncomaur's letters did not contradict those reports; therefore if you think proper when he comes to you again, you may tell him the *Golaub que Foul* is fresh and flourishing, Omichund and I are of opinion it is better not to let him smell it yet, but keep him in hopes, and acquaint him if he keeps firm to his agreement made with Omichund, he may depend on your fulfilling your promise. We are endeavouring to get the *phousdarry* of Hughly for him; in which if we succeed, I hope to reap for the Company some advantages.

I beg you will send me a copy in Persians of all the Persian letters you write.

This serves to enclose two letters from the Nabob, that from his *Aomnah*[1] is so trifling, that I thought it unnecessary to send an express *cossid* with it.

[1] *Amlah* a superior subordinate official

I request you will write to Juggutseat and desire him to send his *gomastah* to Calcutta, where he may depend on meeting with all favour and protection, and that he will likewise order his *gomastah* Bigenaut to Hughly, assuring Juggutseat Bigenaut may reside there with the utmost security and safety, that you have some little complaints to make against him, wherein in some affairs you think he has not acted altogether rightly, but when he, Juggutseat, is acquainted with them you do not doubt but they will be immediately rectified.

Bigenaut I am informed bought many of our Calcutta goods at half price. If I can get the particulars I shall send them, when I think we may ask, though not demand, the difference between the price he bought those goods at and their real value.

The Nabob is very dilatory in parting with the ready money. The reason I imagine is the French give him hopes of soon having a large force here. Yesterday they wrote the Nabob they had certain advice of seventeen men of war, three thousand soldiers, and four thousand *caffrees*[1] arrival at Pondicherry.

Mr. Collet applied to the Dutch here for some powder and muskets, but Mr. Bisdom positively ordered them not to lend us the least assistance.

I have not been able to get our cannon yet. Omichund desires his respects.

I am, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

323. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 8 *April*, 1757.

I had the honour of Your Excellency's letter, wherein you observe that as the French had by the King's *phirmaund* built their several Factories in this Kingdom you could not without injuring your character deliver up their Factories and goods unless you had a written order from them, but that if I could send you an order from Mr. Renault you would have no trouble afterwards to apprehend on this account. That it was also necessary to come to some agreement for making good the duties arising from the French trade. All the Europeans agreeable to the King's *phirmaund* have settled their several Factories in the different

[1] Negroes

provinces of the Empire. The French and we are almost continually at war together. In any of the Provinces when any place belonging to the French has been taken by the English, or if the French possessed themselves of any place of ours, the Governor of that Province never offered to detain the Subordinate Factories or goods belonging to either, nor ever required a written order for the delivery. Now that I have granted terms to Mr. Renault, and that he is under my protection, it is contrary to our custom after this to use violence, and without it how would he ever of his own will and pleasure write to desire you to deliver up his master's property. Weigh the justice of this in your own mind. Notwithstanding we have reduced the French so low, you, contrary to your own interest and to the treaty you have made with us that my enemies should be yours, you still support and encourage them. But should you think it would hurt your character to deliver up the French Factories and goods, Your Excellency has only to signify to me your approbation and I will march up and take them. You must be sensible that there never will be peace and security in your province while the French continue in it, as they will ever be raising disturbances, which must end in the ruin of your country and its inhabitants. On the first intimation that you stood in need of my assistance Your Highness cannot forget how ready I was to obey your commands, and to set out to join you against your enemies. How different is your conduct in protecting my enemies from your professions of favour and kindness to me Chandernagore being their chief Settlement, to which all their other Factories are subordinate, I expected that after having taken it and made their Governor prisoner that you would have delivered the rest into my hands, and till such time as the Factories and goods belong to the French are delivered into my hands, whatever we have hitherto done will avail us but little, and therefore Your Highness will consider well that I will not do things by halves. I never have nor ever shall deviate from the Articles of my agreement, and I am far from desiring the King's revenues shall be lessened. To prevent this I shall consult with the Admiral, Governour, and Council, and write you the result. What else I had to say I have told to Nuncomar, who will communicate it to you.

324. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugh, to Mr. Vernet, dated 9 April, 1757.*[1]

Your having refused the request of the Chief of the English Factory at your place for a small barrel of powder and twelve firelocks meets with our approval as also your declining the urgent solicitation on the part of Fettussen's heirs[2] for the storage of some goods of the French that they have taken in pawn for debt, since to do the former would be in violation of a strict neutrality, without considering your small supply of muskets and powder, and the latter would lead our allies to imagine that we concealed goods belonging to their enemies.[3] This must be absolutely refused the said heirs under pretext that there is no room in the Company's Factory, and whatever else you may think necessary to convince them of our not being able to oblige them.

325. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 10 April, 1757.*

I wrote Your Excellency a day or two ago, wherein I represented to Your Excellency how contrary it is to the established custom of European nations to force Mr. Renault to do what is disagreeable or hurtful to his Company and their affairs. As you are a man of great sense you will at once see the unreasonableness of this request, and be satisfied with my engaging to make good to Your Excellency the King's customs arising on the French trade, and taking care that the Empire suffer nothing by the taking of Chandernagore, and the delivery of the French, their Factories and effects. This I promise to do as long as they are kept out of your country. I went to Calcutta yesterday on purpose to settle this matter with the Admiral, Governour, and Council, and to convince you how much I have your reputation and interest at heart. Thank God this business is done, and Your Excellency may be easy on that account. It gives me great concern to find there is so much delay in fulfilling the Articles of Peace. It is a long time

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

[2] The Seths, to whom the French were heavily in debt As it was probable that the English would obtain from the Nawab the property of the French at Murshidabad, the Seths thought it would be safer to place what they held in the hands of the Dutch, who were neutral.

[3] The English did so accuse the Dutch

since Your Excellency promised to fulfil everything in fifteen days; twice that time is passed, and most of the material Articles as far from being put into execution as ever. Every day I receive complaints on this subject. I therefore take the liberty of putting down in writing what parts of the treaty so solemnly sworn to I desire may be complied with.

1st. That the guns and ammunition taken at Cossimbazar and the other Subordinates be restored.

2nd. *Parwannahs* through the country, especially at Dacca, for the currency of our business.

3rd. *Parwannahs* for the currency of *siccas* coined at Calcutta *alias* Alianagore.

4th. *Parwannahs* for the thirty-eight villages.

5th. *Parwannahs* for returning everything taken at the different *aurungs* and Factories.

I now call upon Your Excellency in the name of God and His Prophet to fulfil the Articles, and I further call upon Your Excellency in the most sincere manner to put an entire confidence in the English, and to believe that they will never forsake you. Things are now come to such a pass that the French must be expelled your Province, or the English can never be assured of your friendship. I conclude this letter with declaring before God and His Prophet Jesus, that if you will comply with the contents of this letter and be a true friend to the English, that I will in all respects act conformable to your wish and join you against all your enemies.

326. *Extracts from a letter from Council, Fort William, to the Court of Directors, dated* 10 *April*, 1757.

Paragraph 2. We have acquainted Your Honours of our having sent several of your servants to the different Subordinates to receive the Factorys, books, papers, goods, moneys, &c., which were taken there, and which by the treaty were to be returned. By the copies herewith transmitted of the letters received from the Gentlemen at Cossimbazar and Dacca, you will observe what progress has been made in the delivery of your effects, and the opinion of the Gentlemen at those places, that Your Honours are likely to be

little or no sufferers there. From Balasore we learn the same good news, and hope Mr. Watts will be able very shortly to procure a full restitution of what was taken in Fort William and our *aurungs*.

Paragraph 7. In our former letters we omitted to inform Your Honours that the extraordinary good behaviour of your junior servants during the siege of Calcutta, and their great forwardness to lend their assistance for the retaking of it, induced us to give several of them commissions on our Establishment. Mr. William Ellis was one of them, and has had the misfortune to lose his leg in the skirmish of the 5th February. His gallant behaviour both before and upon that occasion entitles him to Your Honours' notice, and we beg leave to recommend him as very worthy of your favour, especially as the unfortunate circumstance above mentioned may possibly oblige him to return to Europe. Mr. William Tooke was wounded at Chandernagore, and died the 24th March.

We are, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, R. BECHER, W. FRANKLAND, W. COLLET, W. MACKETT, P. AMYATT, Calcutta.

327. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated Murshidabad, 11 April, 1757.*

SIR,—The Nabob is very dilatory in complying with refunding the ready money part of his contract. I am now only settling the Subordinate and *aurung* accounts, but when I come to demand what was seized by him at Calcutta I shall meet with many difficulties; almost every individual of the Nabob's Ministers are our enemies from our not having gratified them; this they resent, and as they have but little regard for the Nabob, they care not what rash measures they precipitate him into; they are always raising his apprehensions of us, and affirm that when we have got what we can we shall in the Rains attack him; they are also continually crying up the French power; sometimes Bussy with a large army is entering the Province, at others the French are arrived before Pondicherry with 17 ships of war, 3,000 soldiers and 4,000 *Caffrees*, and yesterday Rogeram from Midnapore writes that he has advices from Ballasore that there are forty ships gone to attack Bombay. As the Nabob credits and is guided by five or six of these low

people, these idle stories that they report to our prejudice he believes, therefore to have our contract soon fulfilled and get his confidence, Omichund and I after many conferences are of opinion it is adviseable to be at some expence to gain over these people, which we think will be attended with many advantages, in getting Nuncomaur *Phousdar* of Hughly, when by his representations we hope to get instead of the 38 villages, many of which lie at a distance from Calcutta, a much larger extent of country contiguous to Calcutta. Meer Godau Yar Cawn was designed *Phousdar* of Hughly, but a stop at present is put to this promotion. I have not wrote upon this subject, either to the Council or Committee. I chose to have your opinion first. If it coincides with ours I shall then address them. Be assured I shall be as frugal as possible in this expence. When we have once gained over these people to our interest I hope all affairs will be soon settled.

As Omichund has a superior understanding and as I am persuaded it is greatly for his interest that we should be successful, I therefore consult him on all occasions, which I hope you will approve of.

Omichund and I have had many conversations on a subject I did not know how to address you about. I opened myself to Scrafton and from him learn that Omichund's and my endeavours for yours and the Major's service will not be disagreeable.

It is hinted to me as if it would be proposed to the Committee for our army to march this way, but hope no such proposal will be listened to, as it will be violating our treaty with the Nabob, who is complying with his part of it, though not so expeditiously as we could wish; it will be throwing the country again into confusion, and probably prevent the Company's getting an investment for another year, the consequences of which may be fatal to them; nothing but an open and an apparent breach by the Nabob in his contract ought to induce us to rekindle the war in this Province; however if such a measure should be thought advantageous, I should think it would be prudent first to withdraw all our effects from the Subordinates.

The 10th of March I wrote to the Committee to send up the *gomastahs* of the several *aurungs;* but not one has as yet appeared, which prevents our settling any of those accounts, as I know not

what was seized from these several places; for these delays the Nabob blames us, and says as soon as we have finished these accounts he will deliver over what was brought to his account in Calcutta.

Enclosed is copy of an acquittance or clearance for the Admiral and you to sign, which you cannot do till you are advised I have received everything that was taken. The Nabob is very earnest for this acquittance, to which he is advised by the people about him, who have stole and made away with a number of goods and things of value, which they are afraid of being called to an account for, and hope if they can get this acquittance they shall be secure. As you may with the greatest security depend on me on every occasion, I hope to be favoured with your confidence and advice, being with the greatest esteem, Sir, your, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

I think the Admiral and you giving me authority to sign the acquittance will be fully sufficient.

328. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Peter Renault, Esq., &c, French gentlemen who have given their parole, dated Camp, 12 April, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—Give me leave to represent to you, that I think a *parole* of honour either given verbally or in writing to be the most sacred thing on earth; such who receive this indulgence are always esteemed gentlemen of unquestionable reputation, who being actuated by principles of honour only will not make use of the liberty granted them of being prisoners at large in any shape to the disadvantage of that nation whose prisoners they are. Now I am informed you have meetings and carry on a correspondence with the country Government and your Subordinate Factories. If there be any truth in this report, that you make use of that liberty granted you in any shape to the disadvantage of the English nation, you will be no longer looked on as men of honour or entitled to the advantage you now enjoy. I could wish, gentlemen, to give satisfaction on that head, that you would separate, some go to Serampore, the Danish Settlement, some to Calcutta, and some may have liberty to stay in the town of Chinchura and in Chandernagore.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

329 *Letter from Mr. Luke Scrafton to Colonel Clive, dated Cossimbazar, 12 April, 1757.*

SIR,—I sent my compliments to you by Mr. Walsh, reserving the honour of writing to you till I had paid my respects to the Nabob which I did last night, and a very humorous visit it proved. He had enquired in the morning who I was and when in describing me they touched on the shoulder knot he immediately cried out 'that's the garden chap, let him come.' I went with Mr. Watts at four, and as the Nabob was not ready to receive us curiosity led us to pay a visit to the son of Shah Hassum, who made his escape after Nadir Shah had cut his nose off and he now wears a clay substitute; he fled here on a Dutch ship, and was kindly received by old Alyvherde who allowed him 10,000 Rupees *per annum* which is continued to him; he seems a plain honest man, of no very bright parts. From him we went to the Nabob, who no sooner saw me than he fell a laughing and shaking his head. I thought as much as to say 'it was a damned comical trick, but I shall remember you for it'; I returned his laugh very heartily to the no small surprise of the solemn faces at his *Durbar*.[1] He cried 'give him a horse and a dress; no let it be an elephant.' I went to put on my dress and somebody dissuaded him from the elephant so I only got a horse. He made me a compliment on the appearance I made in a Moor's dress, asked me if I had had my health well, and as there was too full a *Durbar* to talk of our affairs he dismissed us. So much for this trifling affair which may possibly amuse you. There is great probability that the French have taken service with the Nabob; this at least is the Dutch report and to confirm it we saw in the Nabob's palace a French officer with two *choupdars* before him. The Admiral's and your letter on the subject arrived late last night; what effect they have and what seem to me at least the properest measures to be taken at present I will write in cypher to Mr. Walsh, for the miscarriage of such a letter might be attended with fatal consequences.

Cossimbuzar if the silk were wound off out of the Factory would furnish quarters for 300 Europeans.

I have desired Mr. Watts to buy you 20 oxen, which he has

[1] It is not clear to what incident this story refers, possibly to the escape of Messrs Walsh and Scrafton after their visit to the Nawab, on the 4th February, in Omichand's garden.

done and they will be sent to you immediately. If you like them you may have any number ã 25.

Dusmahmud Khan is like to die of his wound, and Monickchund is restored to favour at the expence of 10½ *laacks*.

The weather gives room to suspect the Rains will set in very early, so that the Nabob is under no apprehension of the Afghans this year.

You may render Nun —— suspected if you mention his name in your letters to the Nabob.

I heartily wish you health and happiness and am, &c. &c., LUKE SCRAFTON.

330. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Adrian Bisdom, Esq., Governour of Chinchura, dated Camp, 13 April, 1757.*

SIR,—As there is the strictest friendship and alliance subsisting between the two nations, it would give me infinite concern to make use of force, or any other methods which might be disagreable, for the delivery of all French gentlemen now residing at Chinchura, and who are under *parole* of honour not to act directly or indirectly against the English nation. I have therefore sent an English officer to wait upon you, and to demand them in the Admiral's and my name; and I flatter myself that you will be kind enough to have them escorted out of your bounds, where proper persons will be ready to receive them.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

331. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Peter Renault, Esq., late Governor of Chandernagore, and to the gentlemen late of Council there, dated Camp, 13 April, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—By virtue of your *parole of* honour I summon you in the name of His Britannick Majesty to render yourselves at Chandernagore the 14th April at 10 o'clock in the forenoon.

Dated at the English Camp the 13th April 1757.

ROBERT CLIVE.

332. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Adrian Bisdom, Esq., dated Camp, 13 April, 1757.*

SIR,—I have received the honour of your letter of this day. Persons on their *parole*, such as the French gentlemen at Chin-

chura in general are, must surrender themselves whenever formally required. What they pretend as to the Capitulation having been made in the name of Admiral Watson is nothing to the purpose. They surrendered the Fort themselves to an officer of His Britannick Majesty, and gave their *parole* conformably, by virtue of which any officer belonging to that Crown can afterwards call upon them to deliver themselves up. I have already summoned them as an officer belonging to His Britannic Majesty, and in his name shall do it again; if they still refuse to comply, I must consider and treat them as enemies at open war with us, and flatter myself you will afford them no kind of protection, but order them immediately to leave your bounds. You will please to observe, that it is on their *parole* of honour, and that only, that I call upon them to surrender themselves. Let me repeat that the Capitulation has nothing to do in this case.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

333. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Camp, 13 April, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I must refer you to the Admiral's letter and sundry papers for my proceedings in relation to the French gentlemen on *parole*. To-morrow morning the Governor and Council will set out for Calcutta, and I must request you will get them the best accommodations you can.

This is striking at the root of the evil, and I am persuaded you will back my proceedings with the Admiral, well knowing how beneficial they may be to the Company. To-morrow morning all the other gentlemen on *parole* are to be at my quarters, and I shall take care to put it out of their power of doing any more harm to the Company. Not a Frenchman shall be left at Chinchura.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

334. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp, 13 April, 1757.*

SIR,—A few days ago I informed you of my suspicions that some of the gentlemen on *parole* had been acting a very base part,

which suspicions I have now brought to proof; the enclosed is the report of a Frenchman whom we took in Chinchura; he is not a deserter, and declared everything of his own free will. Part of his evidence is confirmed by the Governour's own servant, who affirms that five days ago six Frenchmen who escaped came to the Governour and stayed with him some time; that on coming out they had money in their hands, and that the Governour ordered him, one of the servants, to conduct the six men to La Vigne, the Europe Captain's house; which he accordingly did: and that in the evening six more prisoners came, whom the French Governour ordered to be carried to La Vigne's likewise; there are many other particulars too tedious to mention, which shall appear hereafter. The above base behaviour of Mr. Renault and some others occasioned my taking the steps which will appear by the enclosed papers. It was with some difficulty Mr. Bisdom could be prevailed upon to order all the gentlemen on *parole* out of Chinchura, which he at last after many consultations did. This evening the Governor and Council came to my quarters, when I acquainted them that to-morrow morning they must set out for Calcutta, with which I have acquainted Mr. Drake, that he may get accommodation ready for them. I hope my proceedings in this affair will meet with your approbation. I have consulted Captain Martin in everything, who approves of all that has been done. Be assured, Sir, that without this step our business would have been but half done. A Governour and Council, which you will observe they call themselves in their letter to me, must always have great influence with the Nabob, and capable of doing many things highly detrimental to the Company's service, and I really think if some of them were sent home by the *King's fisher*, it is no more than they deserve, Laporterie and Le Conte in particular. The inhabitants are to be with me to-morrow. The lowest of them, and such as are no gentlemen, and have no pretensions to a *parole*, I shall send to prison; the others I will quarter to the southward, and exact such a *parole* as will leave it out of their power to do any more mischief.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

335. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Adrian Bisdom, Esq., dated Camp, 14 April, 1757.*

SIR,—The French gentlemen on *parole* have leave to return to Chinchura to settle their family affairs on promise of leaving it by the 17th in the morning. They complain of having advanced six months' rent for houses at Chinchura. If any relief can be given them I am persuaded your humanity will occasion you to interest yourself in their behalf. I am very sensibly obliged to you for the trouble you have taken in this whole affair, and shall take the first opportunity of my paying my respects to you and returning you thanks in person.

I have the honour to be with respect, Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

336. *Extracts from a letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 14 April, 1757.*

Your letters in relation to the French goods and their Factories; that you was far from desiring there should be any loss to the King, have reached me. I have observed the contents. For your satisfaction, and in observance of this that your enemies are mine and mine yours, I have ordered Mr. Law and his people out of my *Subaship*, and have wrote expressly to my *naibs* and *phousdars* never to let these people, whom I have turned out, to reside in any part of my province. . . .

I observe whatever you have written concerning the French Factories and goods. The French are indebted to my subjects *lacks* of rupees. If I act as you desire what answer can I give to their lawful creditors? Do you who are my well-wisher consider this well, and write me that I may act accordingly.

337. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Mr. Walsh, dated Murshidabad, 14 April, 1757. ½ past 11 p.m.*

DEAR SIR,—Your letter gave me almost as much pleasure as the sight of Ithaca did Ulysses, after a ten years' absence.

The French are not so numerous as I imagined; they have about 70 Europeans and 80 *Tellingees*, with about 50 country *sepoys*; we

have about 45 Europeans in our Factory, and 50 Rajepouts who are learning their exercise, but we have no powder or ammunition.

This accompanys a letter from the Nabob, by which you will observe he has ordered the French out of his dominions, and will keep their effects to pay their creditors; he again swears he will comply with his agreement and assist us with his whole force if the French should attempt to enter his Kingdom again, but since receiving the above I am informed by one I can trust the Nabob has entertained Mr. Law, the French and *Tellingees* in his service, and that they are going to Patna to assist the Nabob's *naib* there against the My Rajah; this news is confirmed by my *jemmadar* who went to the French Factory and pretended he wanted service, when the officer of the *Tellingees* told him he was sorry he did not come yesterday when a list was taken of them and the French, and carried to the Nabob, who had entertained them in his service. I shall have a meeting with Runjeet Roy and Omichund in the morning, and shall visit the Nabob in the afternoon, when I hope to put a stop to this proceeding.

This afternoon I received your favour of the 11th, and immediately sent the Colonel's letter to the Nabob, an answer to which is not yet returned.

The Nabob before our success against Chandernagore threatened in the presence of Runjeet Roy and others to impale or cut off my head, and yesterday repeated those threats in the presence of Juggutseat, Monickchund, Coja Wazeed, Meer Abdul Caussim, Runjeetroy, and Omichund. I write this for yours and the Colonel's notice alone, and desire no public affair may be made of it, for I despise what the Nabob can do to me, and would not have you desist from any vigorous measures you may intend to pursue on my account.

Enclosed is the form of a letter for the Colonel to write the Nabob if he approves of it.

I shall write you more particularly to-morrow night if I can get a conference with the Nabob. Be assured I shall use my endeavours to get the French in our power, though the Nabob at present seems determined not to deliver them up. Fear is the only means to prevail with him. Enclosed is two notes from Mr. Collet in regard to my enquiries; determine nothing till you hear from me

to-morrow, except sending the above letter to the Nabob; I sincerely wish you all happiness and am, dear Sir, &c. &c., W. WATTS.

P.S.—Send me copy of the letter in Persians and let the letter be forwarded by Nuncomar.

338. *Extract from a letter from Dacca to Mr. Roger Drake, dated 14 April, 1757.*

In consequence of an express order from Surajud Dowla to our Nabob, Jussuraut Cawn, the following persons who have long been in confinement here at Dacca were this day embarked, and under a guard of two hundred *buxerries* and *peons* dispatched for Muxadavad:—Ammeny Cawn, Meerjee Meerza Mogul, Suckoroola Cawn, Aga Babboo, and another young lad, being the five sons of Suffrage Cawn. Besides these Guzzupher Hassein Cawn, son of Mahmud Tookey Cawn, and Jussuraut Jung, brother of the late Poornea Nabob Salabut Jung;[1] their families they have all carried with them. An event this as somewhat extraordinary in itself, we thought not altogether unworthy of your notice. The French garrison of about twenty-five Europeans left this place some days since, and we hear they have joined Mr. Law at Cossimbazar.

339. *Extracts from a letter from Admiral Watson to John Cleveland, Esq., dated 14 April, 1757.*

The *Tiger* I ordered to follow me, after her guns &c. were taken out, but in passing between the wrecks sunk below Chandernagore, she stuck fast on one of them near four hours; however neither of the ships[2] have received any damage from these accidents.

As the Company will not have a sufficient number of troops to garrison Fort d'Orleans at Chandernagore, it has been judged necessary to blow it up, and the mines are now preparing for that purpose. What further measures will be taken against the French in their out-Settlements of Cossimbuzar, Dacca and other places in this Province is not yet determined. I have been solliciting the Nabob to deliver them up into our hands, but I have not yet received any answer. It is said he is upwards of a hundred miles

[1] Should be Shokat Jang.

[2] The *Kent* also ran aground

to the northward of Muxadavad, where he is gone it is supposed on purpose to be out of the way of doing business, in order to evade and put off as much as possible complying with the most essential articles of the late Peace concluded with us. The French have undoubtedly been very busy at his Court, and have said everything in their power to create a dissension between us and draw off his attachment from the English, by making him believe there is a large force arrived at Pondicherry, and that he may be assured they will soon be here, which I believe is in a great measure the cause of his backwardness in not performing his engagements with us, imagining the French should join him with the force they talk of, that then he would be able to expel the English out of his dominions. But this opinion must not be suffered to rest with him, for unless we can establish a lasting friendship and alliance with him, notwithstanding our late success, it will be impossible for the Company to preserve their rights and privileges granted them in this country, and nothing but a well-built citadel with a proper number of land forces, always quartered here, can put them on a respectable footing with the Nabob, the shameful neglect of which brought on them all the misfortunes they lately suffered by the loss of this Settlement, a warning I think sufficient for the Company to guard against the like ever happening again.

340. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 15 *April*, 1757.

I have been favoured with Your Excellency's two letters of the 6th and 11th of April. In my last I acquainted you with the several Articles of the treaty you made with us still unexecuted, which I desired might be speedily complied with, and I hope it is in great measure by this time. I likewise informed you that I had got the Admiral and Governour and Council to consent that in case you delivered up the French, their Factories and effects, we would engage to make good the King's customs arising on their trade, and take care that the Empire suffered no loss by the taking of Chandernagore and its subordinate Settlements as long as the French should be kept out of your country. Your Excellency's compliance in this matter will give the English a certain

proof of the sincerity of your friendship, and attach to you a sett of people faithful in their alliances, and ready to fight your cause against all enemies whatever. I have talked seriously to Nuncomar about the debts due from the French to your subjects. In war we cannot be supposed to be answerable for the debts our enemies have contracted. The half you so generously decline may be applied to that purpose, and Mr. Watts will be empowered to settle this matter. I am not a little surprized however that any difficulty about these effects should have prevented those persons who escaped from hence being delivered into my hands. Let me only assure you that if you permit them to go to Patna they will certainly join your enemies the very first opportunity. Think well of this and let them be put into my hands, as I before desired you, and they shall never do you any mischief. The French gentlemen, whom I had permitted to retire to Chinchura, and to whom I had shewn much kindness, abused this favour by encouraging the escape of the soldiers and common people and providing means of going to Cossimbazar, and committing besides many other wrong practices. I therefore surrounded Chinchura with my troops to prevent their escape, and demanded of the Dutch Directore that they should be delivered up to me, which was accordingly done. To put it effectually out of the power of these French gentlemen to hurt us again, I have sent Mr. Renault and his Council to Calcutta, and the other gentlemen I have permitted to live at Chandernagore under my eye. With regard to my request about the money and goods Monickchund and others secretly plundered at Calcutta should be delivered up to the English, I am perfectly sensible that this is not directly included in the treaty, but I had heard that you were calling Monickchund to an account for what money and goods he had clandestinely taken to himself instead of bringing them to the account of the *Sircar*. Your Excellency, who is endued with good sense and strict justice, must allow that though Monickchund was unfaithful to the *Sircar* yet the loss in fact was to the English. Your justice can only decide in our behalf. We repeat that we have no absolute claim on you through the treaty. Be assured we shall always abide by that, and never require more than our right. Those who break through such a solemn treaty as that

which is made between Your Excellency and the English must never expect to be successful in their undertakings.

In a paper apart.—I shall be very happy if we have any timbers[1] or plank fit for your purpose. I have desired Nuncomar to send some of his people to look at what we have got, and to take whatever they may find proper for your service.

341. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 15 *April*, 1757.

Your obliging letter, desiring the restitution of the guns &c. taken by me at Cossimbazar and the other Factories, and *perwannahs* for the currency of the Company's business as formerly, for coining *siccas* in Calcutta Alianagur, and for the thirty-eight villages, that I should return all the money and goods taken by me at your Factories and *aurungs*, I have received and observe the contents. Having occasion for fifty large cannon I shall look upon it as a mark of your friendship if you'll send them to me, else agree to receive the value of the guns taken in Cossimbazar; but if you will do neither, write me that I may return them to Mr. Watts. The *perwannahs* for the currency of the Company's business as usual have been delivered to Mr. Watts before the receipt of your letter. It is a wonder you have not as yet received advice of this. I have also sent the *perwannah* for the Mint in Calcutta. Regarding the thirty-eight villages, the *jemidars*, the *Puniah* now drawing nigh, at present are all busy in collecting their rents. God willing when the *Puniah* is past, I'll give orders to all the *jemidars' vacqueels* about this business. You are to pay the value and satisfy the *jemidars* for whatever villages you take, and for such villages a *perwannah* shall be given, seeing in the *phirmaund* it is mentioned you must satisfy the *jemidars*. I am firm and steady to my treaty and never will depart from it.

Mr Law I have put out of the city, and have wrote expressly to my *naib* at Patna to turn him and his attendants out of the bounds of his *Subaship*, and that he shall not suffer them to stay in any place within it. If anybody represents this affair to you in a different light don't believe him.

[1] Referred to in Nawab's letter of April 6, not included in this selection

Translation of the message sent by the Nabob to Mr. Watts by Ranjit Rai and Mir Bakr, and wrote in Persians from their mouth.

For your satisfaction I have turned the French out of Muxadabad, and wrote an order to Rajaram Narrain[1] Bahadre, my *naib* at Patna, to turn them out of his bounds. If after this the English troops should come in order to fight them the Peace and Articles we have agreed to will no longer subsist. If you hearken to what these two men shall say 'tis well; if not depart from hence.

342. *Letter from Colonel Clive to his father,*[2] *dated Camp near Calcutta, 26 February, 1757, with postscript of 16 April, 1757.*

HONOURED SIR,—No doubt you have been acquainted with the capture of Calcutta and Fort William by the Nabob (the principal Settlement in the kingdom of Bengall and of the utmost consequence to the East India Company. To give you an idea of the richness of the place the loss of private property only is valued at more than two millions sterling).

When this unfortunate news arrived at Madrass the President and Council applied to Admiral Watson for his assistance in recovering the Company's rights and possessions in the Province of Bengall, and for the same purpose ordered a large body of land forces to embark under my command, and I have the pleasure to inform you this expedition by sea and land hath been crowned with all the success that could be wished.

The town of Calcutta and Fort William was soon retaken with several other forts belonging to the enemy. This news brought down the Nabob or Prince of the country himself at the head of 20,000 horse and 30,000 foot, 25 pieces of cannon with a great number of elephants. Our little army, consisting only of 700 Europeans and 1,200 blacks armed and disciplined after the English manner, lay encamped about 5 miles from Calcutta.

On the 4th[3] of February the Nabob's army appeared in sight and past our camp at the distance of a mile and a half and encamped at the back of the Town. Several parties of their horse

[1] Should be Ramnarain

[2] This letter very closely resembles one in Walcot (vol. xi.) addressed to the Lord Chancellor, Philip, Lord Hardwicke, dated February 23. There is none like it addressed to Clive's father in the Clive Correspondence at Walcot

[3] 3rd in the Walcot letter to Lord Hardwicke.

past within 400 yards of our advanced battery but as we entertained great hopes of a peace from the Nabob's promises we did not fire upon them.

The next day[1] agreable to the Nabob's desire I despatched two gentlemen (Mr. Walsh and Scrafton) to wait upon him in hopes everything might have been settled without drawing the sword, but the haughtiness and disrespect with which he treated them convinced me nothing could be expected by mild measures. This determined me to attack his camp in the night time, for which purpose I applied to Vice-Admiral Watson for 500 sailors to draw our cannon which he very readily complied with and at 3 o'clock in the morning our little army consisting of 600 Europeans, 800 blacks, 7 field-pieces and the above mentioned sailors set out for the attack. A little before daybreak we entered the camp and received a very brisk fire; this did not stop the progress of our troops, who marched through the enemy's camp upwards of four miles in length. We were more than two hours in passing and what escaped the van were destroyed by the rear. We were obliged to keep a constant fire of artillery and musketry the whole time. This was the warmest attack I ever was engaged in; our battallion consisting of 500 men had 85 killed and wounded; my secretary and Aid de Camp killed by me; a body of 300 of the enemy's horse made a gallant charge but were received with great coolness by our military so that few [of them] escaped. Several other brisk charges were made upon our rear but to no purpose, and we returned safe to our camp, having killed by the best accounts 1,300 men and between 5 and 600 horses with 4 elephants. This blow had the desired effect, for the next day the army decamped and the Nabob sent me a letter offering terms of accommodation, and a firm Peace is concluded greatly to the honour and advantage of the Company, and the Nabob hath entered into an alliance offensive and defensive and is returned to his capital at Muxadavad.

Postscript, Camp near Charnagore, 16 *April,* 1757.

Since my last we have attacked and taken Charnagore, the principal Settlement belonging to the French in the Province of

[1] On the 4th (Walcot letter).

Bengall; the garrison consisted of upwards of 500 Europeans and 600 blacks. The enemy had 60 killed and about as many wounded; on our side by sea and land blacks and whites 54 killed and 130 wounded.

The damage done the French is immense; eight large ships are lost besides a number of other vessels [and] great quantities of warlike stores. This blow will in all respects be as severe to the French as the loss of Madras was to us in the last war.

343. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to William Mabbot, Esq., dated Camp near Chandernagore,* 16 *April,* 1757.

You will observe I was very unwilling with our small force to undertake anything that might disoblige the Nabob, but the arrival of reinforcements from Bombay and the Coast, the Admiral's refusing to accept a neutrality, a kind of a half consent from the Nabob and many encouraging letters from Mr. Watts who resides at Court induced me to attack the place in conjunction with Mr. Watson, which attack has happily succeeded and will I hope prove a very fortunate event to the Company. As the Nabob is a very weak prince and entirely actuated by fear, a respectable force in these parts will always make him cautious how he undertakes anything against us.

344. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive* (?), *dated* 16 *April,* 1757.

The French left their factory and marched through the city to-day. They had about 100 Europeans, 60 *Tellingees,* 30 *hackerrys* and 4 elephants with them. I have sent two spies into their camp to entice away as many soldiers as they can.

345. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Secret Committee, London, dated Camp near Chandernagore,* 16 *April,* 1757.

HONORABLE SIRS,—I addressed you fully by the *Delawar* the 22nd February, and by a conveyance which offered for Bussorah I wrote a short letter dated 31st March, just to acquaint you with the taking of Chandernagore, and inclose copies of my advices to Fort Saint George of the 3rd and 30th of March, of which fresh

copies are now transmitted, as they contain circumstantial accounts of my proceedings to the time they reach.

2. I continue encamped about a mile to the northward of Chandernagore, to which ground I found it necessary to move to put a stop to the disorders among the military by the too easy procurance of *arrack* in the town, and at the same time I intended by this small advance northwards to strike some awe into the Nabob and facilitate our business at the *Durbar*.

3. Under pretence of being engaged on a hunting party, which lasted some days, he was very dilatory in answering our demands, both with respect to the French Subordinates and the Articles of our treaty, which remained uncomplied with, and what letters at last came seemed in great measure trifling and evasive; however I have since wrote to him in very strong terms, to which I have hitherto received no answer, but Mr. Watts' letters give me hopes that matters will be concluded to our satisfaction. Possibly before this despatch is closed I may be able to give you an account of it.

4. The Nabob in some of his letters had started a difficulty as to driving the French out of the Province, on account of the injury it would be to the *Mogul's* revenues. Upon which the Select Committee agreed that if the French Subordinates were delivered up to us, the English Company would annually make good to the *Sircar* the loss of Custom on the French trade, so long as they should be kept out of the country. Before the Nabob was acquainted with this resolution, another difficulty was started about the debts owing by the French to his subjects, which I have likewise endeavoured to obviate by an offer of half of what may be found at their Subordinates, and have recommended to Mr. Watts to compromise the matter as well as he could, for I am entirely of opinion that the whole property, the French may at present have, is no ways a consideration for interrupting the great work of rooting them entirely out of Bengal. I must take the liberty to refer you to my Book of Country Letters for a more particular account of what has passed on these matters. Those from the Nabob will in great measure discover how weak and capricious a prince we have to deal with. The spring of most of his actions seems to be fear, and the French and their agents, well

knowing his weakness, have given no small interruption to our business by reports of a French squadron and Bussy's army.

5. By the Nabob's dilatory conduct I have been prevented from putting the troops into quarters, which I had fully intended to have done by this time to prevent the heavy expence of *batta* and other charges attending a camp. I proposed to have sent the Bengal and Bombay troops to Calcutta, who would be full as many as could be accommodated there, and to have kept the King's and Madrass detachment at Chandernagore. But till we have finally settled with the Nabob it would be highly improper to decamp, for from such a disposition as his we should certainly meet with greater impediment in our business by a step of that kind.

6. A small march to the northward I am persuaded would forward our affairs in the same degree, but I am unwilling to do any thing that looks like an infraction of the Peace, unless absolutely necessitated to do it by repeated willful delays on his part.

7. What with the Company's servants and military withdrawn from Dacca and Judgea, fugitives from hence, and English deserters, the French are able to muster at Cossimbuzar about 150 Europeans and 100 *seapoys*. It is said they have a design of retiring to Patna, and that they have applied to the Nabob for his permission. What his intentions may be in regard to them I cannot yet discern. He has assured me he has no thoughts of entertaining them in his service, but I am nevertheless something suspicious of it. It is certain that he keeps their Factory invested, and that he has demolished some mud works they had begun to raise for its defence; and by a letter received that night from Mr. Watts dated 12th instant, I am advised that the Nabob had promised to send him Mr. Laws, the French Chief, the next day, to settle the terms of his capitulation with the English. Mr. Watts added that from what had passed in a conference between the Nabob and Omichund, he hoped every thing would end well, and that he should write me fully the next day, which letter I very impatiently expect.

8. It was agreed in a Council of War that it was proper for many reasons to demolish Chandernagore fortifications, and the

Select Committee concurring in the same opinion it was determined on; and I shall take care to see it put in execution.

9. A bomb having fallen into the Secretary's office during the siege, many books and papers were burned, and the rest (together with those of the other offices which were contiguous) were carried out and thrown promiscuously into a warehouse where they still remain locked up, ready to be delivered to the Gentlemen of Calcutta.

10. I now transmit you an inventory of the ordnance and military stores taken in Chandernagore, the greatest part of which will be very necessary for your garrisons of Calcutta and Cossimbuzar.

11. I likewise inclose a list of the vessels which were sunk by the French to hinder the passage of our ships up the river, or scuttled and ruined to the northward of the Fort. Out of these last the greatest part of the articles not liable to damage by water, such as *cowries*, butter, &c., have been saved; but none of the vessels could be got off. You will observe how heavy a loss the French have suffered in their shipping alone, and as they were mostly loaded with provisions for the Islands, they must undergo some distress there for want of them. In short when Chandernagore is considered as the granary of the Islands and Pondicherry, as mistress of a great trade to Europe and round India, as a large and opulent colony already, and which seemed to promise to increase, the loss of it must be acknowledged a very severe blow to the French Company and nation.

12. The Governor and Council of Chandernagore with the rest of the gentlemen on parole having retired to Chincura, I had certain information that they not only harboured the French prisoners who escaped from us but furnished them with money, guides, and even arms for their march to Cossimbuzar. The *padres* and other engines were employed to promote their escape, and not less than 50 marched off one night from the Hospital, most of whom were dispatched to Cossimbuzar, first receiving money and guides for that purpose from the Governour himself. In short as I found it very prejudicial to your affairs to let them remain any longer at Chincura, particularly the Governor and Council who began to assemble and act as a body, and by their

correspondence kept up the spirit of Laws and his party, and intimidated the Nabob with reports of Bussy's army being near, I summoned all the French on *parole* to repair to camp, and after acquainting them what unjustifiable practices had been carried on by them, I insisted that the Governour and Council should remove to Calcutta, and that the rest should live at Chandernagore, or anywhere to the southward of Chincura, so that they were immediately under our inspection. The Gentlemen of Council pleaded that they were not prisoners of war by the Capitulation, and made some difficulty in surrendring themselves till the Dutch Directore, in compliance with our demand, ordered them to leave his Bounds. When they appeared they pretended to be ignorant that they had given their *parole* not to act directly nor indirectly against His Brittannick Majesty or his allies, and affected a surprize when I shewed it them under their hands. As for the Capitulation which they lay hold of, it is very certain they forfeited all benefit from it by opening their gates and letting out some officers and above sixty Europeans, and burning and destroying a large quantity of valuable goods while the Capitulation was in treaty, and even after it was agreed on and signed to by us.

13. The last advices from Fort Saint George were of the 9th March, when all was quiet in the Carnatick. Two French Europe ships, the *Duc de Berry* and *Le Siècle*, arrived at Pondicherry the 3rd February, bringing about 200 military with ammunition and warlike stores and a good deal of treasure, which they were in much want of. They gave out that four Europe ships had stayed behind at the Islands on account of the sickliness of their crews.

14. By an English vessel which touched at Bandamalanka about the middle of March, we have an account that Monsieur Bussy had taken some Rajah's fort in that neighbourhood, but that it had cost him 200 Europeans and many blacks. It is said that among the rest Monsieur Law was killed.[1] I could wish that the Chiefs of the Northern Settlements had taken opportunities of writing me what passed relating to Monsieur Bussy as I am at a loss what weight to lay upon the intelligence I receive from other hands.

[1] Jacques Francois, the younger brother of M. Jean Law, of Cossimbazar.

15. With respect to the Afghans who have entered Agra, and the apprehension of their marching this way begins to be renewed, though the Rains[1] which are soon come on must prevent their designs for the present.

16. Before I conclude this letter I shall remark that, considering the quiet situation of the Coast and the service already done and still to do in this province, it is very happy for your affairs that the troops remained here.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

346. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Mr. Walsh, dated Cossimbazar, 18 April, 1757.*

DEAR SIR, — Though you have not yet acknowledged the receipt of the cyphers I sent you yet I will venture this letter, for it would be extraordinary indeed if both should miscarry and fall into the same hands. Omichund has been very ill within these two or three days. I went to see him last night and sat about one hour with him. He told me the present posture of our affairs is thus, the Nabob thinks we shall never forgive the injuries he has done, and that it is impossible we should be sincere; fear will make him keep firm to his pretended friendship; in consequence of this principle he has very idly sent to stop the mouth of the Murcha river on a notion that we should go round by Dacca with the King's ships. This step, the army he keeps on foot, his conduct with regard to the French, Jagutseat, Runjeetroy, and several others have told Mr. Watts that when he has taken leave of the Nabob he has turned about and said, 'I will have your head yet,' all contribute to render him suspected, and that whenever the French have a force he will certainly join them, that nothing but the entrance of the Afghans can keep him firm to us. He pretends they are actually in the way; that the people of Benares are running to Patna and the people of Patna are getting boats ready to run down here; that if this proves true he does not doubt but the Nabob will place intire confidence in us and even trust all his treasures to us. Should not this happen

[1] The early or small Rains (*Chota Barsât*) at the end of April or beginning of May

and the Nabob should in any respect deviate from his treaty we should break with him and set up another Nabob; that Luttee is a proper man, of a very good character and supported by Juggutseat, and would join us with two thousand good horse, Monickchund with what he could; that all the great men wish him dead. Omichund has a very good scheme to procure us a full equivalent for the thirty-eight villages, which is instead of them to procure us by the means of Monickchund and Nundcomar a very considerable extent of our Bounds. Colonel's and Major's losses will be fully paid when desired. 15 days will decide and there will be time enough before the Rains set in; for by that time we shall have more certain news of the Afghans. Omichund's behaviour to us deserves the utmost commendation. I never saw his equal for attention and attendance on business. Watts is a simpleton. Nundcomar will continue. The French marched through the city the day before yesterday, drums beating, colours flying, in regular order, about 80 soldiers and 20 gentlemen and 60 *sepoys;* they have encamped to the Murcha side of the city about 4 miles. No one can guess their route; many of their men have deserted to us and the whole would, did not their *Tellinghees* keep a sharp look out. They have only a writer[1] in their Factory, no colours flying. Should a second rupture happen, I rely on your interest for my former station. I avoid hitherto all posts in the service, have even declined any application for the Chief-ship of Luckypore, given to one far my junior, till I can see what turn affairs take. Politicks and Power are my —— I think the Company's affairs are like to go on well at all events. There are good horses to be bought here. I shall sell mine in a few days. If you like my old horse you are welcome to him at 500 rupees, but you only. My very respectful compliments to the Colonel and Major. Remember me kindly to John Power and believe me truly and heartily,

Your, &c. &c., LUKE SCRAFTON.

If we conceive resentment for his behaviour regarding the French it ought to be concealed for the present.

[1] M. Bugros

347. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 18 April, 1757.*

I really ask pardon for omitting to acquaint you that I had a meeting with Mr. Law and five or six of his officers at the Nabob's, but not in his presence, when I offered them their cloaths, plates, and furniture, and liberty to retire either to Calcutta, Chincura, or Chandernagore, upon their *parole;* these terms Mr. Law refused accepting of; and upon this the Nabob ordered them out of his dominions; whether the French are in the Nabob's pay or not I am not certain. Juggat Seat and Manickchand say they are not, but other intelligence affirms the contrary.

348. *Letter from Admiral Watson to the Nawab, dated 19 April, 1757.*[1]

I am honoured with your letter of the 14th of this month, acquainting me with your having received at several times the letters I lately wrote you. Your forbearance, and not writing to me, hath not the appearance of that friendship you would persuade me you have for my countrymen; and with regard to myself, I must take the liberty to say I was more particularly entitled to a speedy answer to my letters from my high rank and station; and I cannot help looking upon your neglect in this respect, but as a slight offered to the King my master, who sent me into India to protect his subjects, and demand justice wheresoever they were oppressed.

I observe in your letter the following particulars, *viz.*: 'That for my satisfaction and according to our mutual agreement to look upon each others enemies as our own, you have expelled Monsieur Law and his adherents from your dominions, and given strict orders &c., &c.' My brother Mr. Watts who is entrusted with all the Company's concerns always writes me the particulars of your intended favours towards us: but I have never found that what he writes is put in execution, neither do I find that what you wrote me in your letter dated the 1st of Rajub (22nd of March) is yet complied with. You therein assured me, that you would fulfill all the Articles you had agreed to by the 15th of that Moon. Have you ever yet complied with them all? No. How then can

[1] After this letter the correspondence ceased on the part of the Admiral.—*Ives.*

I place any confidence in what you write, when your actions are not correspondent with your promises? Or how can I reconcile your telling me, in so sacred a manner, you will be my ally, and assist me with your forces against the French? when you have given a *perwannah* to Mr. Law and his people to go towards Patna in order to escape me, and tell me it is for my satisfaction, and in observance of the mutual Agreement, you have taken this measure. Is this an act of friendship? Or is it in this manner I am to understand you will assist me? Or am I to draw a conclusion from what you write, or from what you do? You are too wise not to know when a man tells you one thing and does the direct contrary, which you ought to believe. Why then do you endeavour to persuade me you will be my friend, when at the same time you give my enemies your protection, furnish them with ammunition, and suffer them to go out of your dominions with three pieces of cannon? Their effects I esteem a trifling circumstance, and as far as they will contribute to do justice to your people, who are creditors to the French Company, I have no objection to your seizing them for their use, for money is what I despise, and accumulating riches to myself is what I did not come here for.

But I have already told you, and now repeat it again, that while a Frenchman remains in this kingdom I will never cease pursuing him: but if they will deliver themselves up, they shall find me merciful, and I am confident those who have already fallen into my hands will do me the justice to say, they have been treated with a much greater generosity than is usual by the general custom of war.

If you will reflect upon the oath you have taken, you cannot but join with me in what follows:—As soon as Cossimbuzar is properly garrisoned, to which place our troops will speedily begin their march, I desire you will grant a *dustuck* for the passage of two thousand of our soldiers by land to Patna. You may be assured they will do no violence, nor commit the least injury to the natives: the only design of sending them is to seize the French, and restore tranquillity and perfect peace in your Kingdom, which can never be truly established in these dominions, while a war continues between us and them. If you are apprehensive of any injury arising to your subjects from the march of our troops to

Patna, send some of your trusty *hircars* to go with them, with orders to acquaint you from time to time of their transactions, and I dare answer you will find their reports agreeable to what I now write you.

Instead of sending Mr. Watts only ten guns, why did you not deliver up all that belonged to the Company? I will not write you what is not conformable to our agreement, and which you suppose was by the instigation of self-interested and designing men. I must take the liberty to say I never yet have written a syllable contrary to our Agreement, and the oath and promise I have made: and be assured it is not in the power of any artful or designing men to make me write anything inconsistent with my honour. I ask nothing more than your fulfilling the Articles of your Agreement, and abiding by the oath you have taken. This I have strongly urged you to do, because you have been very slow in the execution, and this surely I have a right to demand, so long as you neglect to perform it. If it is disagreeable to you to hear these things, put it out of my power ever to ask again, by your immediate compliance; and as you have desired me when I write, to look upon our Agreement, and take that for my guide, let me request you to compare my letters with my agreements, and with what you have promised, and when you find me differ from that, or ask anything contrary to it, then tax me therewith; point out to me expressly, wherein I have deviated from this rule, and you shall find me ready to confess it as an error: but till then, you must excuse me for insisting on your having charged me wrongfully, and which, upon an examination of my letters, I make no doubt will appear too plain to you to be contradicted.

Let me again repeat to you, I have no further views than that of peace. The gathering together of riches is what I despise; and I call on God, who sees and knows the spring of all our actions, and to whom you and I must one day answer, to witness to the truth of what I now write: therefore if you would have me believe that you wish peace as much as I do, no longer let it be the subject of our correspondence for me to ask for the fulfilment of the treaty, and you to promise and not perform it, but immediately fulfill all your engagements: thus let peace flourish and spread throughout all your country, and make your people happy

in the re-establishment of their trade, which has suffered by a ruinous and destructive war. What can I say more?

349. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to the Governor-General and Council at Batavia, dated* 20 *April,* 1757.

The French Director and Council at Chandernagore, after sending us a Manifesto, on account of the approach of the English troops, that was inserted in the resolution of the 8th of last month, have approached us to request our intercession to prevent the neutrality that has existed time out of mind in these parts from being cancelled by the English, but very late in the day and when the aforesaid troops had already approached their barriers, as appears from their letter in the resolution of the 12th, in conformity with which determination, we to show our sense of duty and with an eye to their preservation, forwarded a written communication to the English Vice-Admiral on the subject, but without any result, His Excellency, meanwhile, apologizing for not receiving our Commissioners on account of press of business.

Subsequently the English on the 14th of last month commenced the attack of the French Colony and their Fort Orleans, which the latter by reason of their strong and well manned bastions contrived to hold until the 23rd, when Vice-Admirals Watson and Pocock, the latter having arrived shortly before in the river from Madras with a large number of men, bombarded the said place so fiercely with three men-of-war arrived at sunrise (though it was at first deemed impossible, the French having sunk three vessels in ballast in the narrow part of the river just below their Fort), not to mention the batteries from which Colonel Clive also played upon it with his 24 and 32 pounders, that the French after a two hours' fight were constrained to capitulate and surrender, a copy of the Articles of the said Capitulation accompanying this among the appendices for your Worships' consideration.

Some one or other who, maybe, envied us our peace and quiet, having reported to the French a few concocted lies, *viz.*, that we had sent provisions and ammunition to the English army and prepared heavy ordnance to assist their enemies, etc., the French protested against such a course on our part, but we have shown them in serious terms the falsehood of all these charges and

forwarded them a contra-protest, whereupon those friends did, it is true, apologize, but having afterwards assailed us with some mischievous and invented practices, apparently not without ulterior views, we have not failed to point out to them the impropriety thereof in conformity with our resolutions of the 18th and 21st of March.

Shortly after the conquest of Chandernagore the French came and took up their quarters in our village, where their women and children according to our latest respects to your Worships of the 6th ultimo had already taken up their residence, but on receiving a written summons thereto on the 13th instant from Colonel Clive, we were constrained to call upon the French Director and Council to quit our territory, as they subsequently did, repairing by Colonel Clive's order to Calcutta, and later to Chandernagore and Friederichsnagore,[1] the Danish Settlement.

Considering that in case of a rupture with the French we should be exposed to the same fate as has now befallen them, and having seen during the siege of Fort Orleans the great use of heavy guns on the bastions for destroying the batteries of the besiegers, we respectfully request your Worships, provided you approve of our place being fortified, to be pleased to provide us with a number of 24 pounders or at least 18, the former computation having been proportionate to the present Points, which with a shot from a twenty-four pounder would probably collapse.

350. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 20 April, 1757.*

Yet your Highness's not delivering up Mr. Law and his people to me and suffering them to go away is not very kind. Although I hold Mr. Law in very little consideration, yet nevertheless it could never be for your good to set my enemies, however inconsiderable, at liberty, for be assured that should either the Mahrattas or Pattans, as they are now meditating, or any other enemies invade your country, they will certainly join them against you. I must therefore request Your Excellency will allow me to send a part of my forces after them to take them prisoners, or else that Your

[1] Serampore

Excellency will do it yourself. I must further desire you will remember the conditions, on which we promised to make good the King's duties on the French trade, were that you delivered into our hands all the French, their Factories and effects, and while they were kept out of your kingdom. . . .

It is universally known that the conquerors are never answerable for the debts of the vanquished. . . .

Though the French effects were worth *lacks* I would not regard them, but I will never consent that one European among them shall get away. Depend upon this. Yet if they agree to terms they may be assured that no harm shall be done them.

351. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Mr. Walsh, dated Murshidabad, 20 April, 1757.*

DEAR SIR,—Young minds cannot keep resentment long concealed; his heart broke out to-day. When our *vacqueel* went to him, the instant he saw him he ordered him to be turned out of the *Durbar;* as the fellow was going he overheard him say, 'I will destroy them and their nation.' Meer Jaffer was ordered to march and he would follow himself; when asked the reason he said 'they are always writing me to deliver up the French; I will receive no more of their letters.' But for God's sake let us pacify him for the present; things are not ripe. Omichund is gone to Jaggutseat. I know the intent of his sending for him beforehand; it is to communicate to him his desire that we should set up Lattey. I do think I am actuated by a sincere public spirit. Give me but power and I dare swear that in ten days I could settle that you shall be joined by a large force as soon as you have marched two days north. Send me your terms and my life on it I do my part well. I was to have seen Lattey this night but this has prevented it. I hope the Colonel will pardon my impertinence if I offer to present what I think would be the terms we should make:—Ample restitution to the Company for all their losses and ten *laack* for the charges of the war; the country south as far as Culpee on condition we keep up a body of a thousand men or more to be employed in his service; ten *coss* of land on the province of Chittagong whereon to settle a factory; the French never to resettle; restitution to all English, the Seats and

Omichund; the guilty in the affair of the Black Hole to be given up to us, &c., &c., &c., Omichund is returned damned glum from the *Durbar;* the affair seems to proceed from our frequent demands of the French; irritated by Monickchund on account of our last letter. To turn our *vacqueel* out of the *Durbar* was to be sure the greatest affront he could put upon us, but he sent for him again presently after, but the *vacqueel* was come away. It is now morning and His Excellency is sorry for what is done. Forty Frenchmen are arrived from Chinsura and are near reaching, oh I forget, have reached it. Our affairs are like a sore in a man's body, that is healing without but has matter and corruption within; we must act like good physicians and open the wound again and cleanse to the very root. I would not have Watts know anything of what I write touching the powers I want, only send me a letter for Omichund wherein you desire him to act in concert with me; let it be kept very private and take care that the Admiral and Colonel are unanimous, and do not let the Committee know anything of the matter. The Nabob has wrote a letter to assure he will join with us against the French whenever they have a force come into the country. Write him a letter of thanks and let that be all the notice you take of our affairs at present. He will not permit the *vacqueel* to utter the least word about the French at present. Be cool till we are ready; it will be only a few days.

My respectful compliments to the Colonel. I look on writing to you the same as writing to him; only you will have the plague of decyphering. Remember me to John Power and believe me truly and sincere, dear Sir, &c. &c., LUKE SCRAFTON.

Send your answer by *cossids* to arrive in 5 *par.*[1] or two days; *viâ* Kistnagur will be safer.

The Nabob expects news every hour of a battle between the Nabob of Patna and a revolted Rajah, the Maiu Raja. We have nothing new of the Afghans since my last. I think the Governour and Council ought to delay for some time the resettling Patna; and the garrison here ought to be sent down immediately with the goods here. They are 50 or 60 strong. Let us strike slow that we may strike sure. In the height of his passion the Nabob said 'the French are mine and shall I destroy him?' As time presses

[1] *Par=prahar*=a period of six hours.

so much I have told Mr. Watts all that I think necessary to be done; therefore write him to consult with me, but write stronger to Omichund.

352. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Mr. Walsh, dated* 21 *April*, 1757, *at Noon.*

DEAR WALSH, — My mind is continually on the stretch. Politicks interrupt my sleep and give me a downright fever of thought. Watts acts like a man who is conscious of the ill state of his affairs and keeps his books back that his imagination may have some room to flatter him, but that wont do with me. I do not fear the worst. The horse frets and bites and cannot bear the bit. How glad would he be to fling his rider, and give him a kick that might give full swing to his unruly passions uncontrolled. What farther proofs would we have? The army is daily increasing. In the fit he was in two days ago he ordered Meer Jaffeir to march, and promised him six *lack* the instant he advanced beyond their present encampment, and to make it ten if he was victorious; the next day he starts at the danger, countermands the march, sends for the *vacqueel* and gives him *beetle.* Omichund's sent for at night. 'What shall I do to satisfy the English? let me know their demands and I will comply with it; for I want to march to the northward.' If this was his real mind he keeps the Frenchmen in his service to join him in the expedition. As it is impossible our demands should be stated nothing could be concluded under many days, so much the better for us. I believe there's a damn'd flat gust of wind come from the north, which he must meet, but neither will he take us with him nor place the least confidence in us; his mistrust of us is carried to extreme. He is cutting down Placy grove to stop the river that way, and he is flinging up the sand to prevent the water entering this river, at any rate least our ships should come up. Oh the fool! Finish he must before he goes, so that he will either pay or fight us in few days. We should be much on our guard below. He cannot bear my name. His head Minister, one Narraing, has been four times with Watts and always asks him what I have to do in the City. 'Why does not that *metichut*[1] of a

[1] A foul term of abuse

Garden Chap go to Dacca?' 'Sir,' says the *vacqueel*, 'he is only waiting to get the ballance of his Dacca affairs.' 'Let him have it immediately,' says he, 'that I mayn't have that fellow here. The order is given and I expect the money to-morrow. He cannot bear that anybody should interfere with Watts in the English affairs. Suffrage Cawn's five sons are all on the way from Dacca; it is imagined he will end them. Be damn'd complaisant for the present; we can be no losers by it. This letter is but a preparative to a very long one I shall write you the day after to morrow. All shall end well for us yet. Monickchund is in high favour with the Nabob and damnably averse to us. Omichund and the *vacqueel* have both been highly honoured to-day with dresses.

Compliments to the Colonel, Major, and friend Power, and believe me truly and sincerely dear Walsh, &c. &c., LUKE SCRAFTON

If I vary in my letters about the Afghan expedition it is that the Nawab's mistrust of us daily increases.

353. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mohan Lal, dated 23 April, 1757.*

The Nabob's late proceedings and his message to Mr. Watts with many other particulars surprize me much, and have given me great concern. It appears to me as if this rich and fair country was to feel the fatal effects and desolation of war. For my own part I have in all my letters endeavoured to convince the Nabob of the sincerity of my intentions, but if he will put no confidence in them he must answer the consequences. Your great abilities and the great favour you enjoy with the Nabob have induced me to write my sentiments, that if possible his or our ruin may be prevented, for the fate of one of us it must be if the war begins again. If when the Nabob was before Calcutta I was able to encounter his army, I am not the less so now that my army is become strong again. Let me request it as a mark of your friendship that I may now fight for the Nabob and not against him. To fight for him is what I desire above all other considerations. Remember that where confidence is wanting there can be neither peace nor friendship. One *vacqueel* being turned away, and the threatening message sent to Mr. Watts, has put me upon my guard, and I am assembling all my forces in order to march your

way, if the Nabob be resolved to set aside all his former promises and break through his Agreement.

In the Colonel's own hand.—As the Nabob gives great attention to what you say, I desire you will give him such advice as is consistent with his honor and the good of his country. In so doing you will gain the character of a faithful servant and make the English your friends

354. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 23 April, 1757.*

The Nabob is in heart our bitter enemy, and you may be assured will join with what French he can collect together and attack us, whenever he is disengaged from the apprehensions of the Pytans and the My Rajah. The former by letters dated the fifth of April are eighteen *coss* on this side of Agrah, at a place called Sucktrabad, with Gazood Cawn and two of the King's sons at their head. Their intentions are against Bengal. Omichund assures me this news is to be depended on. The Myrajah and the Nabob's forces are near Patna within seven *coss* of each other, a battle is daily expected. Though I am sensible how absolutely necessary it is to have a Nabob attached to our interest, (which this man will never be), in order to keep the French from resettling in this province, yet I think we ought to temporize and pacify the Nabob for the present, and appear to give over all thoughts of war till the French are marched to a distance, till the Pytans are advanced nearer and till some schemes which Omichund and I hope to effect are ripe for execution, which we shall advise you of, but you may have your carriages, oxen and all necessaries privately prepared to be ready to march at an hour's warning. I wish you could send us up privately as goods, some powder, ball and granades, but it must be done very secretly, or it will give great umbrage; a good experienced officer and four or five men at a time to strengthen our garrison may be of use. If the Nabob or the greater part of his forces should be obliged to march to the northward to resist the Pytans, you will then be able to take the city and the Nabob's treasure with great ease.

Since writing the above Omichund has by my desire had a meeting with Meir Godau Yar Cawn Laitty, who has engaged

that whenever the Nabob breaks with us he will join us as soon as possible with his whole force on condition of our making him Nabob; in recompense for which he will grant the Company a large extent of country near Calcutta, and a sum of ready money sufficient to satisfy the navy, military, and all the inhabitants of Calcutta; that we shall enter into a league together offensive and defensive against all enemies whatever. He requests you will write a soothing letter to the Nabob, which may entirely allay the apprehensions he has of us and induce him to march northward, which he will the moment his fears of us cease. Omichund and Godau Yar Cawn Laitty both assure me the Nabob will break his agreement with us, that he has entertained the French in his service, and that they will not go beyond Patna. All that we have to do is to lull him into security, and by that means induce him to march northward. You must be sensible what great honour will accrue to you from this project and how much secrecy is necessary. Excuse me in recommending to you to have your spies abroad and being on your guard, for there is no dependance on the Nabob. I have agreed to have an answer to this in six days, therefore I beg you will write me your sentiments as soon as possible. I have now five people with the French, and shall send a trusty person with them as far as Patna to give me daily intelligence of their motions.

355. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated 23 April, 1757.*

If Mr. Law and all the gentlemen could be prevailed upon to let the common men be made prisoners, and themselves to be free on condition of their going to Pondicherry, it would be better than letting them traverse the country.

356. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Collet, Camp, 23 April, 1757.*

SIR,—I think it necessary to advise, that at a Committee held here this day, it was agreed in consideration of the uncertainty of the Nabob's disposition, to withdraw the money and effects from the Subordinates as fast as possible, and that no more than a corporal and six men with the *bucksaries* should remain at Cossimbuzar; the rest to return here with the treasure. I shall send up

by boat two of my officers and 20 *seapoys* with some spare arms and ammunition to escort the treasure likewise, as most of your people are deserters, and I am uncertain if with arms. You will please to get the treasure properly packed up, and provide boats as well for that as the men of the garrison who are to come. No particular secrecy is to be used in this matter, but to be transacted in the usual manner.

I am, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

357. *Extract from a letter from the Nawab to Nandkumar, dated 23 April,* 1757.

Concerning the French the case is this. It is not the custom of the head of the kingdom of Hindostan to bind and deliver up the weak, because by so doing I should have a bad name through the whole world. Nevertheless I have turned Mr. Law away from hence, and wrote expressly wherever I have any authority that they should not suffer them to abide there, but send them to the other side of the River Carummassar.[1]

358. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 24 April,* 1757.

I have received with great satisfaction Your Excellency's letter desiring fifty pieces of cannon to be furnished you, and acquainting me that after the *Punah* is over you will give orders about the thirty-eight villages, on our satisfying the *jemidars* agreeable to what is expressed in our *firmaund*, and assuring me that you remain firm and steady to the treaty and will never depart from it, and that you have put Mr. Law out of Muxadavad, and wrote to your *naib* at Patna to turn him and his attendants out of the boundaries of your *Subaship*, and not to suffer them to stay in any place therein.

I have likewise received from Mr. Watts a Persian writing containing the message you sent him by Rungeet Roy and Meer Baker, as taken from their own mouths, also a copy of Rajaram Sing's letter to Your Excellency which you desired might be transmitted me. I do not well understand the meaning of Rajaram Sing's letter, but must imagine from the falsities he

[1] The boundary westward of the Nawab's dominions.

would make Your Highness believe that he designs to disturb our peace and friendship. I declare we have no more than sixty men at Ballasore and no forces have arrived but those I informed you of.

I am sorry to find by the message to Mr. Watts and other particulars which have come to my ears that Your Excellency harbours some displeasure against the English. As I set a great value on your friendship, any decrease I perceive in it gives me the highest concern. I can solemnly swear that I bear the best intentions towards you and your Government. My readiness to undertake a long march to assist you against your enemies, and indeed all my actions ought to have convinced you of this. What passed before the treaty of the Peace is entirely forgot on our parts, as if it had never happened, and I perswade myself from Your Excellency's good sense and justice that it is the same with you.

I have made no use of the large army under my command but to beat the French, and I shall not on any account be the first to break the Peace with Your Excellency, but if you think proper to begin hostilities against us, I shall not at all be apprehensive for the consequences. God forbid that any difference should again arise between us; it shall not be my fault. It is in your power to have us for firm friends or formidable enemies.

If I have so often desired the French to be delivered up to us, it was as much to secure the peace of your country as to benefit the Company's trade. Should you be still resolved not to send them to us I shall depend upon your word that they are expelled out of your *Subaship*.

It will be best that Your Excellency be supplied with the fifty cannons you desire from this place or Calcutta, as those of Cossimbazar will be wanted for the fortifications of that place, and I hope you will order them to be delivered to Mr. Watts. It will be Your Excellency's fault if you do not receive signal proofs of the friendship of the English in this or any other occasion you may have for it.

I think it necessary to acquaint you that I now send one officer, four or five soldiers and twenty *Tillingees* to Cossimbazar to bring away some of the money and effects we have there.

In the Colonel's own hand.—Your behaviour to our *vacqueel* has given me great uneasiness; however that is over and forgotten. Trust me and I will be faithful unto you to the last, but remember that if you have given ear to my enemies and are resolved to break through the Articles of Agreement, you will become responsible for all the blood that shall be spilled, and all the mischief that shall be done.

359. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Colonel Clive, dated Cossimbazar, 24 April,* 1757.

SIR,—I have hitherto addressed myself on public affairs to Mr. Walsh, but this letter is of so important a nature that it induces me to take the liberty of addressing it to you immediately, and to advise that its contents may not go beyond the Admiral, and even there but tenderly and cautiously because there is a long train of confidents, and Walsh. You will find that all my letters to Mr. Walsh have tended to convince you of this, that we cannot place the least confidence in the Nabob, that he never will forgive us but take the first opportunity of joining the Frencl and driving us out of the country, whenever his courtiers from a fear of refunding their plunder; many like his young brother in hopes of cutting him off—stir up his resentment. He is all violence, turns our *vacqueel* from his *Durbar* and orders his army to march. Whatever he may write be assured he will never give up the French. He is in daily expectation of a French force; that's the reason he keeps his army out and will keep the French somewhere about Rajamahal within call. You will observe though he has paid us a great deal, it is still mostly in his power at Cossimbuzar and Dacca. Watts has never dared to write all this, and when I told him my mind he told me I wanted to embroil affairs, but now it is too apparent to be concealed. Omichund was glad to find one that has spirit to think of resistance. Omichund's mind is big with some great project. He told me yesterday he was bound to secrecy, but to keep ourselves in readiness and when matters were ripe he would let you know. I can give a pretty good guess; it is in conjunction with Juggatseat to set up Lattee. There is to be a hundred men to be at Cossimbuzar who are to join Lattee and

storm the Nabob, while at that very instant you are to begin your march, and when you come near the army you will be joined by some of the principal *jemidars*. Omichund wants to have the whole honour to himself and cannot bear that anyone should interfere; but I think it is trusting too much to him, and I beg you will send an immediate answer to this, by *cossids* to come in 5 *parr*, with a letter to Omichund desiring him to communicate the whole plan to me, and I will keep a light boat ready and be with you in three days. I tell you, Sir, you have everything to apprehend from Watts's timidity. In other affairs he is a just and worthy man. Now Sir I have a very important request to make for myself. By devoting myself to the public affairs I am obliged to neglect that important duty I owe to my creditors of settling my accounts at Dacca; therefore I expect you will write to the Committee that I came down by your desire, and that I may hereafter have liberty to go to Dacca, and that my attendance on you may not prejudice me in the service; for I really have declined any application for the second best post in the Service, the Chiefship of Luckypore, merely on this account. The army is daily increasing, everything looks like treachery. Dont send copies by Nuncomar. It puts it out of Mr. Watts's power to conceal the letter if necessary, which was the case yesterday. Compliments to Mr. Walsh, the Major, and John Power.

I am, &c. &c., LUKE SCRAFTON.

Vernet the Dutch Chief has behaved with infamous partiality to the French throughout the late scene. Many letters for the English by *cossids* have been taken out and sent to the French. Some days ago when the French were going off Mr. Collet sent people to stop their letters. His people stopped a Dutch *cossid* and opened the letters and returned them with an apology to Mynheer Vernet, who in return has sent people to stop all our *cossids*, and yesterday stopped your letter of the 20th to the Nabob. Pray shew your resentment. I hear Roy Dullub has stopt some boats with ammunition coming here. *Tant mieux.* The letter to me need contain no more than 'come.'

360. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Camp, 26 April, 1757*

GENTLEMEN,—As I have some publick business for Mr. Luke Scrafton to transact at Muxadavad, I have desired him to remain there, and I request you will permit him so to do without any prejudice to his proceeding to Dacca, as soon as the service he is engaged in is over.

I am with respect, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

361. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 26 April, 1757.*

I received with pleasure your agreeable letter. You desire in it that I would fulfil the Articles of Agreement. As I am a well-wisher to mankind, I remain unalterably firm to my treaty. There neither is nor shall be any deviation from it on my side. The Articles of Agreement with the Company are all complied with. Whatever money and goods belonging to the Company that were taken by me at Cossimbazar and Dacca, have been delivered back to Mr. Watts. The several *perwannahs* for the currency of the Company's business, which are wrote agreeable to Mr. Watts's desire, together with that for erecting a Mint in Calcutta Alianagur have been also put into his hands, of which you have no doubt been informed by his letter. I wrote you before in regard to the cannon and shall act to this conformable to your answer. Though in the Articles nothing is mentioned relative to the Calcutta affairs, for your satisfaction however I have got from Monickchund the Calcutta accounts. His *mutsiddies* and those sent on the part of the Company are now examining them with the Company's papers: when this is finished that business will be likewise settled. Whatever broadcloth etc. small articles have been taken for my use shall be paid for at the current price when Mr. Watts lays that before me. As to what you have wrote regarding Mr. Law, that it was very improper to set him at liberty, and that they would join with my enemies against me, therefore your forces would follow them, and you desired they might meet with no opposition from me, it is not the custom of Hindostan to bind or deliver up to their enemies the weak, and those who have begged their protection I have turned Mr. Law out of my dominions. How should he

ever dare to join with my enemies or yours; yet should this war happen while I have such a man as you for my friend and assistant, God willing, by joining together we should punish him as he deserved. It is neither proper nor adviseable for you to send forces after Mr. Law, seeing the *zemidars* of Behar *subaship* are very quarrelsome and mischievous. Should they have any difference with you, it would have a very bad appearance and occasion the ruin and devastation of the Province. As a friend I have faithfully acquainted you with this. Regarding the French Factories the affair stands thus. Their creditors are constantly applying to me for their debts. It is not the custom, neither does it become judges to shut their ears to the just demands of those who apply to them. You yourself came to this part on the complaints of your Company's servants. Consider this within yourself, and then judge fairly. Munsuram, when he arrives, will explain these things separately to you.

By the favour of God peace has been agreed upon betwixt Achmud Shah Abdally and me. By repeated advices I am informed of his returning by continued marches from Delhi to his own country, and that he had got as far as Paniput and Suniput. As I look upon Abdally's returning at this time in the light of a victory, for your pleasure and satisfaction I have acquainted you with it. It is very improper to send forces after the French. I have this day had advice that Mr. Law was got beyond the hills, and was continuing his march with all expedition. By the time your forces could arrive at Muxadavad they will be past the Carumnassar. You can neither expect nor will you gain any advantage by sending these troops, except that of distressing the Kingdom, and the consequence, if you take this step, will be the breaking the treaty.

362. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive (enclosed in letter of 26 April, 1757).*

As the treaty was solemnly sworn to and the Articles signed by both parties, I have therefore no such designs, neither do I desire, while I possibly can avoid it, to break the treaty on my side. You desired Nuncomar to write that you intended to march this way, and that you had already sent 500 soldiers and 500 *Tellingis*

He adds that your troops were continually going into Hugley, which occasioned much disturbance and loss to the inhabitants. This is no ways warranted by the Agreement.

As by your army's marching this way the treaty must be infringed and the Kingdom suffer; on this account I write you, so that if you do send an army this way, it is you who break the treaty, and I am blameless. I have directed my generals, when they receive accounts of your having begun your march, to set out to meet you.

363. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated Camp, 26 April,* 1757.

SIR,—I have this instant received your favour. As to what Mr. Renault says about the testimony of a deserter it is entirely false; the man has a wife and family, and 'twas the latter consideration which induced him to refuse Mr. Renault, when he insisted upon his going to Cossimbuzar. He came of his own accord, and gave the evidence before related, and never asked to be entertained in our service till some time after.

As to what Mr. Renault alledges about being obliged to sign the *parole* is entirely false; he and everyone else signed the *parole* of their own free will. I am sure it was never meant, either by you or me, that the Company's servants should be free to go where and do what they pleased. They broke through the Articles of Capitulation by suffering so many men to escape out of the Fort, and setting fire to sundry goods at a time when Captain Buchanan desired they would give him admittance, which was absolutely refused.

Their having kept their *parole* in not leaving Chinchura is another falsity, for Monsieur Saint Martin, a French officer, who gave his *parole* and received his effects, went to Cossimbuzar and is now with Mr. Law, as are, I am persuaded, many more.

To have a good opinion of Mr. Renault would be doing him more justice than his countrymen ever did; his suffering the inhabitants to enter the warehouses and take out a number of gold watches and conceal them in their chests was a very dirty action, and an infringement of the Capitulation.

I should be very glad to pay you my respects at Calcutta, but

the critical situation of the Company's affairs will not admit of my quitting the camp on any consideration. The last letter I wrote the Nabob, he tore in a violent passion, and ordered our *vakeel* out of the *Durbar*. He sent for Meer Jaffeir, and offered him ten *lack* of rupees if he would march down and destroy us, and he has been often heard to say he would extirpate the English. The next morning he was sorry for what he had done, sent for the *vakeel* and gave him a dress. I have not received a letter from him this many days. In short there is such confusion and discontent at Muxadavad from the Nabob's weak conduct and tyranny, that I have received certain advices of several great men, among whom are Juggut Seat and Meer Jaffeir, being in league together to cut him off, and set up Murgodaunyer Cawn Luttee, a man of great family, power and riches, supported tooth and nail by Juggut Seat.

I must request, Sir, you keep within your own breast this intelligence. By this you will judge I cannot stir from hence. We are all ready for fear of the worst. Coja Wazeed will be here in two or three days to avoid the danger which is carrying on. By him I shall learn more particulars.

You may be assured, Sir, some great revolution will happen before long and I hope much to the advantage of the Company.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

364. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 26 April, 1757.*

This accompanies duplicate of my last, since when there are advices that the Pytans are marched northward and that the Nabob will not leave the city, which makes the [pacifying letter] I desired you to write now unnecessary. I request you will convey letters to the Nabob by no other hands than mine, as the *Durbar* affairs may be so circumstanced as to make it improper to deliver them.

As you observed, the Nabob's behaviour makes it very difficult to know what measures to persue—Juggutseat, Rungeet Roy, Omichund and others, in short all degrees of persons, are persuaded he will break his Agreement and attack us whenever he is disengaged or our forces are weakened by your leaving us and the departure of the men-of-war, or whenever he can be assisted by the French. On the other side he is complying with his contract,

grants us *perwannahs* and whatever we ask within the compass of his Agreement. Our attacking the French I take it has nothing to do with our Articles of Peace, neither is he bound thereby to deliver them up. He writes to you that your enemies are his and his yours, but this[1] is only a private letter and not mentioned in the Agreement, on the contrary it says we shall not war in Bengall while he continues firm to his Agreement. But when we consider there is no dependance on the Nabob, that he is secretly our enemy, and that we have almost positive assurances of the French being in his way, and have great reason to believe he will join them on the first occasion, which junction must be fatal to our affairs here, prudence certainly requires us to guard against such an accident. Meir Jaffeir two days ago sent for Petrus privately and told him the Nabob was generally disliked, that he ill used and affronted every body, that for his part whenever he went to visit him he expected assassination, therefore allways had his son and forces in readiness, that he was persuaded the Nabob would not keep to his Agreement, and says he only waits till Munloll[2] is well and for some forces that are expected from Patna in eight or nine days, to attack us. Meir Jaffier therefore sent for Petrus and desired him to tell me that if you are content he, Raheem Cawn, Roydoolub, and Bahaudar Ally Cawn and others, are ready and willing to join their forces, seize the Nabob and set up another person that may be approved of. If you approve of this scheme which is more feasible than the other I wrote about, he requests you will write your proposals of what money, what land you want, or what treaties you will engage in. When I receive your answer I shall endeavour to have a meeting with him, and inform you of the particulars of his scheme, proposals and demands.

This incloses copy of two letters, one from Nuncomar the other from Mutremul which has put the Nabob all in a flame. It would appear that if we propose coming to a rupture, our business is at present to amuse, lay aside all appearance of war while we concert of measures with the principal *jumidars*, and that before we show our intentions of any act of hostility or motion of the forces north-

[1] Viz, the promise to have the same friends and enemies as the English.

[2] It was said that Mohan Lal was poisoned by his enemies so as to deprive the Nawab of his advice at this critical juncture.

ward, a necessary step to be taken is the withdrawing the Company's goods and people from all the Subordinates, as you must be sensible the neglect of that will throw them entirely at the Nabob's mercy, from which little is to be expected after breaking with him.

I request you will answer my letters in cypher. A *peon* of mine is now returned, and brings advice the French are arrived at Rajamaul on their way to Patna.

365. *Extract from a letter from Nandkumar to the Nawab (enclosed in Mr. Watts's letter of 26 April).*

Yesterday the 22nd of April at midnight the Colonel's *munshie* came to me and Mutteramul and told us the Colonel called us for some business of moment. As I supposed it was to talk about the French affair, and therefore I returned the *munshie* this answer 'that I was not then at leisure, being occupied about your business, but would come when it was finished.' The Colonel being informed of this by his *munshie*, sent again another person to me and Mutteramul an hour before day, who told us the Colonel &c. were come out and then standing on the plain; that he had some things which he must tell me, and desired I would step there for a moment. Finding it impossible to avoid going, as he might put a bad construction on it, Mutteramul and I therefore went and found the Colonel, Major and Mr. Roger Drake and others of the Council standing all together and observing the whole army and artillery (which were drawn up in Chandernagore plain to the northward of Taldangy garden) 'go through their exercise. They spent two hours and a half in this amusement. Asking leave after this to go away, he desired us to go with him for a little while into the garden. Having got there, and in private, he then told us, that 'you had contradicted all the favour you had professed for them and had used very harsh expressions to Mr. Watts and the *vakeel*, and told them plainly not to come any more into your presence: by which it appears to me the Nabob has been listening to my enemies I shall therefore begin my march to-morrow towards the Nabob and do you acquaint him with it.' As Mutteramul and I were quite ignorant of what had passed between you and Mr. Watts, according to my weak under-

standing I made this reply, that in every *perwannah* received by me your kindness for them seemed to increase daily, why should he proceed so hastily. 'God willing, whatever the Nabob said he would do for you will be soon fulfilled.' Though we repeated this again and again, yet he seemed far from being convinced.

366. *Letter from Mathura Mal to Babu Sahib (enclosed in Mr. Watts's letter of 26 April).*

The news of this place I have wrote you before, I have just now further learned that eleven boats are gone loaded with cannon, ammunition, and muskets to Cossimbazar. Two *Tellingis* were going by land. From them I learned that 500 choice soldiers and 500 *Tellingis* will set out for that place this night, and I hear there are three [hundred] *seapoys* assembled at Cossimbuzar. I therefore write you it is very necessary to be upon your guard, and to send spies who may bring you certain intelligence. As you are a man of sense I trust that you will make this known to the Nabob, that he may order a strong guard at his door, who may be ready with their arms night and day, and send some *hircarras* to me. I am very attentive to my business; nothing passes but I inform you of it. Above all keep a strict eye on Cossimbuzar, as soldiers and *seapoys* are going that way daily. It is my duty to acquaint you, and I constantly write you what happens. You will send *hircarras* to Raja Dulub Ram Bahadre that he may be also on his guard, seeing it is proper all should be on the watch and prepared and not negligent. It is good to be watchful. You will request the Nabob not to think himself too secure. I shall continue to advise you of what may further occur.

367. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Scrafton to Colonel Clive, dated 28 April, 1757.*

I think the last time I had the honour to write you the Nabob was just repenting of the affront he had put on the *vackeel;* since then he has broke out again on receiving letters from Mootromul and Nuncomar that you was sending up a body of men and ammunition.[1] In this fit he grosly affronted Omichund, ordered

[1] See previous letter from Matheral Mal to Babu Sahib

Meir Jaffier to march, and even his own tent was carried out and stayed out the whole day, dispatched orders to recall Laws and swore destruction to us. In the evening came a letter from you and all was countermanded.

368. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated Camp, 28 April, 1757.*

SIR,—I wrote the Nabob a letter a few days ago which I hope will reconcile him and calm his resentment. I have sent Captain Grant to bring down the money, the Gentlemen being in want of it to carry on the investment. The military we ordered down likewise. I observe the contents of your letter of the 23rd.

If the Nabob is resolved to sacrifice us, we must avoid it by striking the first blow. You should enquire if Luttee be a man of interest. Is he a Moorman? May not all be overset by the Afghans if they come? Has Luttee any interest there? You should consider the honour of the nation, and if possible avoid engaging us in any executions.

I hear Meer Jaffier wants to get rid of the Nabob. I hope it is true.

The military from Cossimbuzar are deserters and cannot be trusted. If I hear the plot thickens, I shall slip some of the King's best men in their room with ammunition &c. All is ready for marching.

Remember me to Omychund and believe me, Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

369. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 28 April, 1757.*

The Nabob will not keep to his Agreement; this you may depend on. Meer Jaffeir advises for a few days to be quiet, (during which time we will endeavour to collect in as much of the Company's affairs as we can) not to send any *Tellingees* or soldiers this way and to send only *peons* with what boats you may have occasion to send to and fro, and what goods and treasure we have here I intend to send down under the charge of *buxerries*, for which I wait your orders; there is little water in the river. The *Tellingees* you ordered up I can get no leave for their coming, and there is orders gone that if any ammunition is found in our boats to cut

off the nose and ears of the soldiers and people belonging to them; on this account I have sent for *cossids* to forbid Captain Grant and his party to come up, but to return immediately. Meir Jaffeir advises to send no ammunition up at all. Boats are strictly searched. His proposals of joining us I beg you will answer immediately, when I shall make a firm agreement; therefore send me your proposals, and when you receive my letter then be ready to march, when I shall proceed to Meir Jaffeir's or he will send a thousand men to defend our Factory. Depend on it I shall act for the best, and you may be assured I am under no apprehensions for myself, and that I will never suffer in my reputation. All I want is your favour and good name. You may depend upon it likewise I will agree with Meir Jaffeir agreable to your desire. Suspend your resentment for a few days and I will with despatch settle all matters[1] Do not by any means send any ammunition as everything is searched, and the Nabob in his house says he will give back our Agreement and take his. The French are kept at Rajahmaul. The Pytans are returned and the troubles with the My Rajah are over. Upon this the Nabob is very uppish. The three fourths of the army are his enemies. When the agreement with Meir Jaffeir is settled we cannot have a man more powerful. There is none equal to him One day will determine everything, and we shall not have more to do, but it is our business to follow his advice. What I write I beg you will keep an inviolable secret and talk of nothing else but merchandize, and whatever Monyckchund has taken in Calcutta, out of the Fort or otherwise, enquire and send an account as soon as possible. I request you will order your army to Calcutta and keep only a garrison in Chandernagore, and appear to give over all thoughts of war, and send your people no where but keep all quiet.

W. WATTS.

370. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Camp, near Chandernagore, 29 April, 1757.*

I have just received your letter of the 28th. The stile and purport of which I must confess to you surprized me. You surely

[1] Clive's letter, referred to here, appears to be missing.

forgot, Gentlemen, that at a Committee held here so late as the 23rd I laid my letters before you, consulted with you on the general measures to be taken in the conduct of our affairs with the Government, and was desired to manage a certain secret correspondence at the *Durbar*. What has since come to my knowledge I have communicated to the President, and indeed I cannot think I have ever been deficient in acquainting you with all particulars, and advising with you whenever the subject was important enough to require it.

It will not be improper to send an European of capacity and secrecy as you observe to Mr. Watts, but if you mean thereby that nothing on so nice a subject is to be committed to writing, you may have occasion to despatch many such persons before the negotiation is concluded. Let me observe to you a correspondence by cyphers as now practised is not less secret, and doubtless it is much more expeditious, which is of great moment in particular conjunctures.

371. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Pigot, dated* 30 *April*, 1757.

DEAR SIR,—I dare not write you a long letter or enter into particulars of what has happened since I last wrote you. Mr. Drake has refused me the Company's cypher.

The most of the articles of Peace are complied with; yet, from the tyranny, cowardice, and suspicion of the Nabob, no dependance can be had upon him. No consideration could induce him to deliver up the French: it is true he has ordered them out of his dominions, and they are at some distance from his capital, but he has retained them secretly in his pay, and has certainly written to Monsieur Deleyrit and Bussy, to send men to his assistance. One day he tears my letters, and turns out our *vakeel*, and orders his army to march; he next countermands it, sends for the *vakeel*, and begs his pardon for what he has done. Twice a week he threatens to impale Mr. Watts. In short, he is a compound of everything that is bad, keeps company with none but his menial servants, and is universally hated and despised by the great men. This induces me to acquaint you there is a conspiracy carrying on against him by several of the great men, at the head of whom is Jugget Seit himself, as also Cojah Wazeed. I have been applied

to for assistance, and every advantage promised the Company can wish. The Committee are of opinion it should be given as soon as the Nabob is secured. For my own part, I am persuaded, there can be neither peace nor security while such a monster reigns.

Mr. Watts and Omichund are at Muxadavad, and have many meetings with the great men. The last letter I received from Mr. Watts, he desires that our proposals may be sent, and that they only wait for them to put everything in execution; so that you may very shortly expect to hear of a revolution which will put an end to all the French expectations of ever settling in this country again. The Patans, who were coming this way, have been pacified by a sum of money, and are returning to their own country. Had they approached near, everything would have been overset in this country, for three fourths of the Nabob's army are against him. It is a most disagreeable circumstance to find that the troubles are likely to commence again: but the opinion here is universal, that there can be neither peace nor trade without a change of Government.

You may depend upon my despatching advices over land to the Committee when anything material happens.

This comes under the Dutch cover which I have trusted to Mr. Bisdom's care, who is a man of an excellent character and has shewn the greatest zeal for the English nation.

I am, dear Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

372. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 30 April,* 1757.

Before my letter reached Captain Grant he was in his *palenkeen* on his way up and was stopped at Plaisey by Roydulub and returned back to Cutwah where his boats were.

373. *Letter from the Nawab to Monsieur Law (supposed to be written the latter end of April,* 1757).

I send you ten thousand rupees for your expences. Remain quiet at Rajahmaul. When Monsieur Bussie Bahauder &c. comes on this side Cuttack, I will then send for you.

374. *Letter from the Nawab to Abdulla (supposed to be written the latter end of April, 1757).*

I have sent Monsieur Law 10,000 rupees. Do you countenance and assist him at Rajahmaul, and when I write for him to come here do you accompany Monsieur Law. Write the purport of what I now inform you of to Mahomed Nazam.

375. *Extract from Fort William Select Committee Proceedings of 1 May, 1757. (Reasons for the Revolution.)*

The Committee then took into consideration, whether they could (consistently with the Peace made with the Nabob) concur in the measures proposed by Meer Jaffir of taking the Government from Souragud Dowla, and setting himself up. The arguments in favour of such a step and the objections against it were maturely weighed and debated; when the Committee were unanimously of opinion that there could be no dependance on this Nabob's word, honour, and friendship, and that a revolution in the Government would be extremely for the advantage of the Company's affairs. But as a proceeding of this nature ought to be supported with good and substantial reasons, the most material of those which influence the Committee to this step are here subjoined *viz.* :—

First. It is evident the Peace he made with us was merely to extricate himself from the danger which at that time threatened him, his life and Government being exposed to imminent peril. To be convinced of this we need only examine his conduct since his getting out of our reach; the delay in performing the Articles, some of which are at this hour as far from being complied with as they were four months ago; the evasion for giving us satisfaction for our losses in Calcutta, by alledging that the agreement does not specify nor extend to his calling Monnickchund or others to an account for mal-administration in their offices; the small sum of money, which is pretended to be given credit for in his *Sircarry* books, being scarce a tenth part of the loss sustained by the Europeans alone; his insolence in directing the Admiral to leave the river, with several other parts of his behaviour, give us the greatest room to think the necessity of his affairs and the danger of his situation inclined him to make the Peace he did.

Secondly. We can have no dependance that he will abide by the treaty he has made; on the contrary we have reason to believe he will break it upon the first occasion. We are confirmed in this opinion from his whole conduct; the evasion he shewed to our molesting the French, his espousing Mr. Law and his party after Chandernagore was taken, the almost certain intelligence we have received of his inviting Monsieur Bussy into the country, his keeping Mr. Law and the French with him in his pay, the works he is actually carrying on at Cutura, the removing of Suffras Cawn's family from Dacca, his apprehensions of our advancing up the country, and the general opinion of all sorts of men, that he will break his agreement with us, affords us the strongest proofs of his dislike, and leaves us no room to doubt that upon the first favourable opportunity he will throw off the mask under which he at present conceals an implacable resentment and determined resolution to ruin the English and extirpate them his country; common prudence therefore obliges to prevent our own ruin, which cannot be so effectually done any other way than that of divesting the Nabob from all power of doing us mischief.

Lastly. The Nabob is so universally hated by all sorts and degrees of men; the affection of the army is so much alienated from him by his ill usage of the officers, and a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable the step will be attempted (and successfully too) whether we give our assistance or not. In this case we think it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and unconcerned spectators of an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the person designed to be set up we may benefit our Employers and the community very considerably, do a general good, and effectually traverse the designs of the French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions; this we have reason to expect as our assistance is courted, and the support of our troops wanted to countenance and settle the new *Subah* in his Government.

376. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 2 May*, 1757.

From what I have wrote Your Highness in my last, and from the advices you must have had from Munseram, who has seen

every thing, I am perswaded you are fully satisfied of the falsity of what has been wrote you from this quarter. That Your Highness may have no longer any suspicion or doubt of the truth of what I have often declared to you, that I desire nothing so much as to live in peace and friendship with you and to make your kingdom flourish by extending our trade, I have ordered the greatest part of my army to Calcutta, and the rest to Chandernagore, and I expect to hear Your Excellency has ordered your troops to return to Muxadavad. It has given me great concern to hear Your Excellency had given so great credit to false informers and my enemies as to insist on searching our Factory at Cossimbazar.[1] What you discovered there will be a sufficient proof how little reason you had to suspect us of any such underhand practices. I know not what may be the custom in this country, but I assure Your Highness I am above acting so false a part. My resolution once taken I act openly and fairly. Your Excellency must perceive there never can be that mutual confidence and cordial friendship betwixt us, which is so greatly to be desired for the good and prosperity of both, while you will believe whatever is told to my prejudice by men void of character and truth. I have, therefore, long wished that a person of truth, wisdom, and reputation, from Your Highness might remain with me, who, being made sensible of the goodness of my intentions and fairness of my actions, might thoroughly convince you that it is my desire and aim that the English should ever possess your favour and friendship, and be always regarded and depended on by you as your firmest support, which they ever will prove while Your Highness trusts to them.

377. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated 2 May, 1757 (enclosing proposals for treaty with Mir Jafar).*

SIR,—Yours of the 29th is come to hand: everything is settled with the Committee, enclosed are the proposals, and if there be any other Articles which you and Omychund think necessary to

[1] Since writing the above the Nabob hearing there were five hundred men in our Factory at Cassimbazar, sent a person to examine into the truth of it, who found only forty Europeans besides *buxerries*.—*Letter from Mr Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 29 April, 1757.*

be added, you have full liberty so to do, or to leave out any which you think may hurt our cause or give disgust. As for any gratuity the new Nabob may bestow on the troops, is left to his generosity and to your and Omychund's management. Now for business.

To-morrow morning we decamp, part of our forces return to Calcutta, the other will go into garrison here: and to take away all suspicion I have ordered all the artillery and tumbrells to be embarked in boats and sent to Calcutta. I have wrote the Nabob a soothing letter, this accompanies another of the same kind to Moon Lol agreeable to your desire. Enter upon business with Meer Jaffier as soon as you please. I am ready, and will engage to be at Niesaray in twelve hours after I receive your letter, which place is to be the *rendezvous* of the whole army. The Major, who commands at Calcutta, has all ready to embark at a minute's warning, and has boats sufficient to carry artillery, men, and stores to Niesary. I shall march by land and join him there, and we will then proceed to Muxadavad or the place we are to be joined at directly.

Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing, that I will join him with 5,000 men who never turned their backs, and that if he fails siezing him, we shall be strong enough to drive him out of the country; assure him that I will march night and day to his assistance, and stand by him as long as I have a man left. I am in great want of draught bullocks; you must send some at all events when you hear I am upon the march.

378. *Proposals for a treaty with Mir Jafar.*

1. An alliance offensive and defensive against all enemies, country or Europeans.

2. The French fugitives to be taken and delivered up to us. All their Factories to be delivered up to us in order to be destroyed. The French never to be permitted to resettle in this *subahship*. In consideration of which, the English Company will annually pay the amount of duties usually paid into the King's Treasury on the French trade, or a sum not exceeding 50,000 rupees annually.

3. Restitution of the Company's whole loss by the taking of Calcutta and their out Settlements; also restitution for the losses

of all Europeans by ditto, as may be fairly stated by Admiral Watson, Governor, Colonel Clive, William Watts, Esq., Major Killpatrick and Becher. Blacks and Armenians are not included.

4. That the whole of our *phirmaund* be complied with, and all other grants ever made to us, particularly in the treaty with Ser Rajah Dowlat.

5. That we have liberty to fortify and garrison our Factories of Cossimbuzar and Dacca as we think proper, and a sufficient esplanade be granted round each. That convoys to and from one Settlement to another be permitted to pass without interruption or molestation.

6. That the Moors shall erect no fortification within twenty miles of the river side from Hughly to Ingellee.

7. That the Bounds of Calcutta to extend the whole circle of the Ditch dug upon the invasion of the Morattas, also six hundred yards without it for an esplanade. The inhabitants dwelling within the Bounds to be entirely subject to the English laws and Government.

8. That a tract of land be made over to the English Company, whose revenues shall be sufficient to maintain a proper force of Europeans and *seapoys* to keep out the French and assist the Government against all enemies.

9. That whenever the English troops are called to the assistance of the Government, that the extraordinary expences of the campaign be made good by the Government.

10. That an English gentleman in quality of envoy be permitted to reside at Court, have audience whenever required, and be treated with due respect.

379. *Extracts from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 3 May, 1757.*

I shall consider the honour of the nation and without your direction and advice shall conclude nothing. I hope this will find you in quarters, which will be a step quite agreeable to the Nabob and allay his apprehensions of us. Scrafton whom I desired to persuade you to this measure was stopt by Roydulub, but an order is gone for his release.

I am informed that Seve Babboo, *gomastah* to Coja Wazeed has

been introduced to you by Luckeiconder. As his master has devoted himself to the service of the French and has from the beginning been their principal protector and agent at the *Durbar*, and author of the false reports raised with regard to the French force and power, whose bravery and courage he has so greatly exaggerated . . . in short he has been, and continues, our most bitter enemy, and has been the occasion of great part of the troubles we have had with the Nabob, and constantly raises his jealousies of us and alarms his fears. I am therefore firmly persuaded Seve Babboo is only gone down as a spy, whatever he may pretend, and as he is an insinuating fellow he will endeavour to get out of us, our *banians* or servants, what he can, and examine into every particular and then return to his master full fraught with matter sufficient to incense the Nabob against us. He and his master are inveterate against 20[1] and me and would if possible destroy us. Therefore 20 and I earnestly request you will caution all your people not to say anything before him and his servants, but dispatch him as quickly as possible.

Shaikh Aummenolah is ordered *Phousdar* of Hughly, with whom Coja Wazid goes down.

The Nabob has sent a Bill of Exchange for 10,000 rupees to Law for the support of his troops.

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380. *Letter from Mr. Drake to Colonel Clive, dated* 3 *May*, 1757.

SIR,—It may be necessary I advise you that one of my emissaries from Muxadavad, and who was with Rajah Kissenchund confirms the discontent among the Nabob's officers; that Meir Jaffeir on being ordered to hold himself in readiness, spoke aloud, complaining that the Nabob never gave them rest, that he had ruined his country, was destroying all mercantile affairs, and what signifies, says he, his returning the effects to the English, he prevents their being sent from Cossimbuzar, I will lift my hand against him. This I mention as report only brought me, you will therefore give such credit to it as you judge right. His —— Kissenchund the Nudea Rajah has been long discontented and used ill by the Nabob. I hear further the Nabob

[1] Probably refers to Scrafton.

intends to move as to-day, it being the anniversary when he set out last year for Rajahmaul, and afterwards came to Calcutta; as he then was successfull, this he accounts his lucky day.

I am, &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUN.

381. *Translation of a Letter from Monsieur Law to Monsieur Bugros, Chief of Sydabad, dated Camp at Champanagar, 4 May, 1757.*

I have just received a letter from the Nawab by which he orders me to return to Murshidabad. He wishes, he says, to join us in order to fall upon the English. I have also received a letter from the Sieur Changeau[1] which gives me very good news. I am surprised that you have not written at all to me, for I cannot think that you are altogether ignorant of what is happening. I am sending M. Sinfray to the Nawab, with whom he is charged to negotiate. He has orders to remain in our Factory. As he is your senior, you will be so kind as to recognize him as your Chief, and to obey him as such. Possibly I shall be coming to you soon.

I have, Sir, &c. &c., LAW.

382. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 4 May, 1757.*

Monseram has been with me and the Admiral; he will inform Your Excellency of what he knows. I have desired him only to tell the truth, which is all I expect from him.

I almost despair of enjoying Your Excellency's friendship while you listen to the idle stories and falsities of men of mean extraction. For my own part I despise them, being perswaded that for the sake of a few rupees they will say whatever they are bid. If a man of family and good name was near me, you then would soon be convinced of the English truth and justice.

Yesterday my army broke up their camp; more than half is gone to Calcutta, the rest remain at Chandernagore. Calcutta is become a place of such misery since your army has almost destroyed it, that there is not room for more soldiers without endangering their lives by sickness. However, farther to satisfy you, I shall

[1] Probably the same as M. de Changey, whom Law mentions in his Memoir as being sent to him 'en qualité de Major' from Pondicherry.

order down to Calcutta all my field cannon. I expect to hear that your army has retired likewise to Muxadavad, and that you have been as expeditious in performing what you promised as I have.

I hear you have stopt Captain Grant. This surely is not an act of your friendship or agreeable to the Agreement. When Your Excellency gave up Cossimbazar with all its guns, &c., you could not expect it should have neither guns or ammunition in it for its defence. I am sure this was not so in your grandfather's time, neither did you find it in that condition when you obliged Mr. Watts to deliver it to you. I shall reside at the French Garden, a very convenient and pleasant house to the southward of Chandernagore.

383. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 5 *May,* 1757.

Since my last Mr. Scrafton is arrived, from whom I have learnt many particulars. . . . Omychund in consideration of his services should have all his losses made good by an express Article in the treaty. . . . If you think you and the gentlemen at Cossimbazar can be safe with Meer Jaffier or in the Factory, it is well. If not I will provide for your retreat by way of Jaggipore.

384. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 6 *May,* 1757.

I have let Omychund into the scheme, and am afraid he will startle when he hears it as he has no opinion of the *Gentoos.* However I will conclude nothing without consulting Omychund and hope soon to have a meeting with Meer Jaffier and finish everything.

385. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 10 *May,* 1757 (*received* 16 *May*).

The intrepid Sheik Amrula, who has served me for many years, on whom I place great confidence, I have now promoted to be *naib* of Hugley district, and he will arrive there very soon. You

will speak to him as to what may concern the Company's business in that quarter. I have talked to him myself on this head, and he will act accordingly.

386. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 10 *May,* 1757.

The fate Captain Grant's party met will convince me the Nabob will never suffer any number of forces to proceed to Cossimbazar, and therefore agree with you it would answer no other end of sending them than that of alarming the Nabob a second time. As to the detaining the men which are at Cossimbazar, if you mean to throw yourself into the Fort to keep them for your security and can depend upon Meer Jaffier's assisting you with a garrison you are right, but in any other case be assured you are only sacrificing so many men to the Nabob's resentment; neither the Fort, number of men, or ammunition will admit of one day's defence. . . . You need be under no concern about Seva Babboo. I have received him very politely, but neither he nor Luckicondore can write the Nabob anything to our prejudice, without the former has picked up some intelligence from Mr. Drake, with whom he has been at Calcutta, is returned, and tells me he is going to Muxadavad by the Nabob's orders on account of advising the English not to decamp. Watch him.

387. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 11 *May,* 1757.

Mr. Drake writes me one Meecrum has been with him pretending himself a servant to one Roy Govindroy, a servant of Balaroy the Moratta General, who tells him he has letters of a secret nature to send or deliver to him, but to be speedy because he must return to the Deccan country. This Meecrum told Drake that 70,000 Morattas were ready to enter the country and that letters were come to all the Nabob's Ministers and Generals except Monickchund, Mohun Loll and Rajaram. The absurdity of the Morattas entering the country when the Rains are so near, that circumstance of letters to the Nabob's ministers and generals makes me suspect Narransing had some notion of what is going

forward and this to sound us. Be you easy. Nothing shall escape and I will find out the bottom of this. Acquaint Meer Jaffier of this, and that a report will be put about that Bussy is entering the country, to cover our real designs. Do you the same and make use of the *Salisbury's* going down the river as if in consequence of this news; but tell Meer Jaffier &c. the truth. . . .

388. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 12 *May,* 1757.

The enclosed is just come from Mr. Drake. Tell Meer Jaffier the English have no opinion of the Moratta Government. If he will be bold and firm I will stand by him to the last. Let him see this letter and make what use he pleases of it.

389. *Extract from a letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated between* 9 *and* 13 *May,* 1757.

Coja Wazeed is disgraced. He sent word by Omichund to desire I would secret him in our Factory. He says the Nabob has wrote frequently pressing letters to Bussie to request he would march with all expedition. These letters he says he has seen, for when in favour he was always consulted. Rungeet Roy has been out of favour this month and now goes not near the *Durbar.* . . . Two of my spies are come in, who left Laws five days ago at Chumpanagore, five *coss* on this side of Bogglepore, where a eunuch, a *soutabardar* and four *harcarras* arrived with orders from the Nabob to stay there till they heard further. The spies came in company with a French officer whom Laws had despatched to the Nabob.

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The Nabob has certainly sent Laws a Bill of Exchange of 10,000 rupees for the support of his troops.

390. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 13 *May,* 1757.

I know not how to refrain from shewing my resentment at the Nabob's bad faith in not withdrawing his army. Let him intoxicate himself with his hopes. When he is giddy the sooner he'll

fall. The Rains are near; should they set in the opportunity might be lost. . . . Seva Baboo's second visit has quieted me of my apprehension on his score, and I heartily wish it were in my power to serve his master.

391. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated* 14 *May*, 1757.

It is with great concern that I daily hear of Your Excellency's infringing the treaty. These reports are confirmed to me by your stopping the Company's treasure and goods coming from their Factory at Cossimbuzar. If the English are your enemies you are in the right to forbid the currency of their trade and free passage through your country, and if after the receipt of this you persevere in stopping them, I shall look upon it as a declaration that you do not chuse the English for your friends; the more so that after the most solemn promise of withdrawing your army as soon as I ordered mine into quarters, yours still continues in the field to the great detriment of trade and ruin of your country: for the consequences must be, if they continue in camp many days longer, that my troops must again take the field. Your Excellency has taken no notice of many letters I have lately wrote you expressing the strongest inclinations to peace and friendship. Were you as anxious to see the trade of your country flourish as I am, you would be more desirous of peace, and your subjects happy.

In a paper apart.

I hear a report of the Marattoes having a design to enter the country. Your Excellency may be assured of my best endeavours to prevent their coming in, and that if you fulfil the treaty with the English you shall always find me your best friend.

392. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 14 *May*, 1757.

I received a letter two days ago from Mr. Scrafton wherein he writes Omichund that you have agreed to give him 5 *per cent.* on whatever money he may receive on the new contract. As I by no means think he merits such a favour or has acted so disinterested a part as I once imagined, I have not mentioned the 5 *per cent.* to him. The particulars relating to him that are come to my know-

ledge are these:—when our treaty was concluded with the Nabob and the 20,000 gold *mohurs* agreed to be given in consideration of the plunder of Calcutta, the Nabob had agreed with Rungeet Roy and Omichund to pay 20,000 gold *mohurs* more, which they told the Nabob was to be given among the leading men in Calcutta for assenting to the treaty; besides which the Nabob agreed to give two *lack* of rupees, half of which Omichund agreed Rungeet Roy was to have, 25,000 rupees he was himself to have, and the other 75,000 rupees was to be disposed of to whom Omichund thought proper to favour. These particulars I had from Omichund himself and from very good authority have been lately informed that on the Nabob's arrival here Rungeet Roy was very pressing with him to comply with his promise of paying the 20,000 *mohurs* and the *lack* of rupees in hopes of getting possession of the *lack* of rupees which the Nabob was not inclinable to pay. This Omichund observed and, in order to gain favour, at a proper time he told the Nabob that if Rungeet Roy was suffered to interfere in our affairs the Nabob would be obliged to pay the above sums, but if he disgraced him he would save the money. This advice the Nabob followed, and Omichund in consideration of this advice got *purwannahs* and orders to the several *aurungs* to have his money, goods, and effects delivered up. To corroborate what I have been informed of, I this day asked Omichund if I should apply to the Nabob for the money, but he advises me strenuously against it, saying it was a secret contract and by no means proper for me to mention, but he would himself think of means to get it. I shewed the Articles you sent up to Omichund who did not approve of them, but insisted on my demanding for him 5 *per cent.* on all the Nabob's treasure, which would amount to two *crore* of rupees, besides a quarter of all his wealth, and that Meir Jaffier should oblige himself to take from the *zemindars* no more than they paid in Jaffeir Cawn's time. To secure Roy Dolub to his interest he proposed giving him a quarter part of whatever they could dupe Meir Jaffeir out of. These and many other Articles, in which his own ambition, cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives, he positively insisted on and would not be prevailed upon to recede from one Article. Perceiving his obstinacy would only ruin our affairs and that we should alarm the jealousy and lose the good

opinion of all people, and that the accomplishment of his treaty (if agreed to) would take some years, Meir Jaffeir likewise having expressed an utter distrust and disgust at his being anyways concerned in the treaty, and as delays are dangerous, I therefore with Petrose had a meeting with Meir Jaffeir's confidant,[1] who sets out to-day with the accompanying Articles, which he says he is sure Meir Jaffeir will comply with. If the Admiral and Committee therefore approve of them I request you will get the Articles wrote on large thin paper in cypher, the sheet to be divided into two columns. On the first division the Agreement to be wrote in cypher which is to be signed by the Admirals, you, the Committee and Council, affirming in the name of God and our Saviour that you will abide by this Agreement. In the second division I shall write the Agreement in English and on the third it will be wrote in Persian. The two last I shall sign and seal when the Articles are agreed to. Meir Jaffeir desires to know your opinion with regard to the operations of war. He thinks it advisable for you to write to the Nabob that agreable to his desire and on promise of his doing the same you had withdrawn your forces; that while his continued in the field the Company's business must continue stopt, and that they could not think of risquing their money to the *aurungs* while neither a boat nor European could pass without molestation; you therefore request him either to comply with his promise of recalling his troops to the city or let you know his real sentiments that you may take proper measures accordingly. If the Nabob should comply, Meir Jaffeir will acquaint you with his sentiments how further to proceed. If he refuses, other measures must be pursued. I declare solemnly before God that what relates to Omichund is strictly true and the information of him relating to Rungeet Roy I had from good authority; but I request you will for the present keep it an inviolable secret; you must be sensible the critical situation of our affairs require it.

393. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive; dated* 16 *May*, 1757.

Since my last Meer Jaffier has sent a blank paper with his seal upon it in order to have the Articles wrote upon it the same as those

[1] Omar Beg

I sent you, so that you may depend upon everything being fixed on his part. Therefore, if you approve of them, I entreat you will send them me with the utmost haste, when I will finish everything in two hours' time. You are very sensible how dangerous delays are.

394. *Extracts from the Proceedings of the Select Committee, Fort William, 17 May, 1757, referring to Omichund.*

The article in favour of Omichund the Committee think should be totally left out as his behaviour rather merits disgrace and punishment at our hands than such a stipulation in his behalf.

It was then considered how we might deceive Omichund and prevent a discovery of the whole project, which we run the risque of should we hesitate or refuse to insist on the unreasonable gratification he expects and demands, and on the other hand it would be highly improper to stipulate, much more to demand with any obstinacy, such extravagant terms from Meer Jaffeir for a person who can be of no service in the intended revolution. So on the other it would be dangerous to provoke a man of Omichund's character by seeming to take no care at all of his interests, and slighting his weight and influence, which might prompt him to make a sacrifice of us and ruin our affairs entirely.

For these reasons we think it will be necessary to form a double Treaty, both to be signed by Meer Jaffeir and by us; in one of which the Article in favour of Omichund is to be inserted, in the other to be left out, and Meer Jaffeir is to be informed of that which we design to abide by and esteem authentick with our reasons for taking such a step.

395. *Proposed articles of agreement between Jafar Ali Khan Bahadur and the Honourable East India Company.*[1]

First. That he will confirm all the grants and privileges ceded to the English by the Nabob Serajah Dowlat.

Second. That he will enter into an alliance with the English

[1] Accepted, signed, and sworn to by Mir Jafar on the 15 Ramzan or June 3, 1757

offensive and defensive against all enemies whatever, either country powers or Europeans.

Third. Whatever Frenchmen are in the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, to be delivered up to the English with all their goods, Factories and effects, and that they never be permitted to settle again in any of the said Provinces.

Fourth. In consideration of the heavy losses the English Company sustained by the destruction of Calcutta by Serajah Dowlat, and also on account of the expences of the war they shall receive the sum of [one hundred *lack* of *sicca* rupees].[1]

Fifth. For the losses sustained by the Europeans by the taking of Calcutta, they shall receive the sum of fifty *lack* of *sicca* rupees.

Sixth. The *Gentoos* shall receive on the same account the sum of twenty *lack* of *sicca* rupees.

Seventh. The Armenians shall receive on the same account the sum of seven *lack* of *sicca* rupees.

And such sums as are paid on account of this and the two proceeding Articles shall be distributed by the two Admirals, and the gentlemen composing the Select Committee, as shall appear to them or the major part of them just and equitable, without their being liable to any appeal from them or their authority disputed.

Eighth. That Omychund shall receive the sum of twenty lack of sicca rupees.[2]

Ninth. Whatever ground there is within the Calcutta Ditch belonging to the *jemidars* to be given to the English and 600 yards without the said Ditch all round.

Tenth. That the country to the south of Calcutta, lying between the river and the lake and reaching as far as Culpee, shall be put under the perpetual government of the English in the manner as now governed by the country *jemidars*, the English paying the usual rents for the same to the Treasury.

Eleventh. Whenever the Nabob requires the assistance of our army, the extraordinary expences to be paid by him.

Twelfth. The Moors shall not fortifie the river below Hughley.

[1] This was left blank, to be filled in by Mir Jafar himself (see letter from Clive, May 19).

[2] Omitted in the real treaty.

Thirteenth. That these Articles be complied with within thirty days from the day Jaffier Ally Cawn Bahadar shall be acknowledged Nabob at Moorshedabad or anywhere within the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa.

Fourteenth. On condition Jaffier Ally Cawn Bahadar solemnly ratifies and swears to fulfil the Above Articles, We the underwritten do for and in the behalf of the Honourable East India Company declare, on the Holy Evangelists and before God, that we will assist Jaffier Ally Cawn Bahadar with our whole force to obtain the *Subaship* of the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, and further that we will assist him to the utmost against all his enemies whatever, whenever he calls upon us for that purpose, provided when he becomes the Nabob, he fulfils the above Articles.

CHARLES WATSON, ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, ROBERT CLIVE, WILLIAM WATTS, JAMES KILLPATRICK, RICHARD BECHER.

396. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 17 *May*, 1757.

I firmly adhere to whatever I have agreed to. Neither have I nor will I ever deviate from it. I consider your enemies as mine, and at any time should you want my assistance, on advising me I will send it, and should I ever have occasion for your army I shall demand your assistance.

By the favour and goodness of God Abdally is returning by continued marches to his own country. We have been in peace with the Morattoes these seven years past, and are in strict friendship with them. They are very sincere in their contracts and will never break their agreement. I have their treaty ratified and sealed on their part and they have mine. They will never depart from this treaty or ever come this way; whoever told you that news told you an untruth. My troops continue at Plassy and Daodpore, because in the City the inhabitants suffer greatly from them. The most of my forces remain without the City. You may with great confidence continue to carry on your trade; none will ever make any opposition to it. What I have wrote I will stand by, and request you will always consult that when you write me. As our business is only this to observe punctually whatever we

have mutually agreed to, it cannot concern you whether I withdraw my army or keep my force in the field. You may very safely carry on your trade.

397. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 17 May, 1757.*

I have received your several favours of the 5th, 10th, and 11th; if you approve of the Articles sent and will return them in cypher signed and sealed, or if you will send a blank sheet with your seals to it, I will get the Articles wrote in Persians here, which will be better as I wrote before. Meer Jaffer has sent a blank sheet with his seal affixed for his friend to write the Articles on, which he shewed me; when yours arrives there will be no further delay, but the means of executing our project will be thought on. Meer Jaffeir is determined he will by no means trust Omichund. If I had followed the interested councils of the latter, all affairs would have been overset, and all confidence in us lost. Contrary to Petrus and my advice he went yesterday to the Nabob and told him he had a secret of great importance to communicate to him, which if discovered he should lose his life; the Nabob promised secrecy, on which he told him the English had sent two gentlemen to Ganjam to consult with Bussie, that we had made a peace together, and that he was coming here to join us; by this lye, by which he himself aquainted me he had gained the Nabob's favour, who has granted him a *perwannah* on the Burdwan Rajah for the paying him 4 *laack* of rupees which he owes him, as also express order for the payment of the ready money the Nabob had taken of his and for the delivery of the remainder of his goods, he was till 10 p.m. receiving them; this lye of his I am apprehensive will alarm the Nabob and prevent his withdrawing his army which will be very detrimental to our scheme, and for this reason Petrus and I advised him positively against this measure when he proposed it but self-interest overruled; we are outwardly great friends and it is necessary to appear so. I sent you thirteen oxen many days ago and sixteen afterwards, eighteen more will be despatched to-day; it is now too late to assist Nuncomar, a *Phousdar* is appointed; the pretended Mahrattas letter to Drake is all a trick of the Nabob's I am persuaded; Coja Wazeed desires his respects

to you, he is so strictly looked after that he cannot write; from him I have learnt many particulars relating to Omichund, too tedious to mention at present but they will astonish you.

W. WATTS.

398. *Letter from Mr. Collet to Colonel Clive, dated Cossimbazar, 17 May, 1757, 7 p.m.*

SIR,—This you will receive by the hands of Tay Sing, a man arrived but a few days from Bussi's camp, he will inform you of any particulars you desire to know.

I despatched to you the 5th thirteen oxen, the 9th sixteen and to-morrow shall despatch eighteen more. Roy Doolub and Mier Jaffer continue in their respective camps as before advised you, nothing material since except the latter having collected a few boats and a quantity of bamboes as if he designed a bridge, though the river where he is is not two *covits*[1] deep. I shall not fail to advise you of all their motions; in my own opinion they will not return to quarters, nor proceed forward.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, M. COLLET.

399. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated French Gardens, Chandernagore, 18 May, 1757.*[2]

GENTLEMEN,—Enclosed you will receive the real and fictitious articles of Agreement, which you will please to sign; the Admiral promised me to do the same by the real one, but not the fictitious one; if he makes any scruple send it without and we will sign it for him in such manner that Omichund shall not discover it; you will see despatch is necessary by Mr. Watts's last letter, copy of which I now enclose you. There is no alteration made excepting leaving it to Mr. Watts's discretion either to insert 100 or 50 *lack* on account of the Company as he finds Meer Jaffeir's inclinations, and adding another Article which is as follows.[3]

ROBERT CLIVE.

[1] About a cubit or ell.

[2] *Orme, India*, X, loose sheet. Apparently an autograph

[3] See last article of the treaty No. 385.

400. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens, Chandernagore, 19 May, 1757.*[1]

SIR,—I have your last letter including the articles of Agreement. I must confess the tenor of them surprized me much. I immediately repaired to Calcutta, and at a Committee held, both the Admirals and Gentlemen agree that Omychund was the greatest villain upon earth, and that he now appears in the strongest light what he was always suspected to be, a villain in grain; however to counterplot this scoundrel, and at the same time give him no room to suspect our intentions, enclosed you will receive two forms of Agreement, the one real and to be strictly kept up to by us, the other fictitious; in short, this affair concluded, Omychund shall be treated as he deserves; this you will acquaint Meer Jaffier with. As it is for the interest of the Company, and for Calcutta in general, that Meer Jaffier may conceive a good opinion of our moderation, a blank is left for the Company's demand, and the rest is moderated as you will observe, and as delays are dangerous I am to acquaint you it is determined that there be no alteration in the enclosed Articles unless Meer Jaffier thinks them too extravagant; in that case they must be moderated. The Committee having taken the oath of secrecy upon the Bible, have agreed that Meer Jaffier's private engagements be obtained in writing to make them (the Committee, in which you are included) a present of 12 *lack* of rupees, and a present of 40 *lacks* to the army and navy over and above what is stipulated in the Agreement. Having very maturely considered the approach of the Rains, and the little prospect there is of your seeing Meer Jaffier to concert about a plan of military operations, the Committee have unanimously agreed to send Scrafton to endeavour at getting a private confidence with Meer Jaffier. The plan we propose pursuing to avoid the Nabob's suspicions is this, I shall write the Nabob a letter, informing him, I have sent Scrafton to him on an affair of the utmost consequence, and therefore I request he will give instant orders to Roy Dulub and Meer Jaffier not to detain him a moment; as soon as he arrives he is to acquaint the Nabob with the proposals the

[1] This letter is not dated, but Mr. Watts, in acknowledging receipt, says it is of May 19

Morattas have made us. In his way he will pursue the route of Meer Jaffier's camp, where in all probability he will be stopt, till the Nabob's order comes, and by that means may get a personal conference with Meer Jaffier, when a plan of operations may at once be determined on; however if he should not succeed, probably in his return he may, when I am perswaded the Nabob will be induced to put more confidence in us by the important news we have communicated to him. I desire that in this you will be perswaded that there is not the least intent to take from you any part of the reputation of conducting this affair, Mr. Scrafton having orders to follow your instructions; the shortness of the time as well as many other considerations require that we bring this affair to a speedy conclusion.

Flatter Omychund greatly, tell him the Admiral, Committee, and self are infinitely obliged to him for the pains he has taken to aggrandize the Company's affairs, and that his name will be greater in England than ever it was in India. If this can be brought to bear to give him no room for suspicion, we take off 10 *lack* from the 30 demanded for himself, and add 5 *per cent.* upon the whole sum received, which will turn out the same thing.

I am, Sir, &c &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

401. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 20 *May*, 1757.

You are endued with great sense and a mature judgment. Consider then within yourself why unless I desired to see you again carry on the Company's trade in my Kingdom do I, agreable to your Articles, restore to them all the goods &c. seized in their Factorys. Never conjecture that I will retreat from my Agreement and renew the war from any insinuations of self-interested and designing men. Shuffling and insincerity is a most shamefull stain in a soldier, and no less unbecoming is it in men of birth and fortune to recede without cause from the contract they have made. This however is most certain, till such time as I receive a discharge witnessed by you and the Admiral for such Articles of Agreement as I have fulfilled, and while you decline carrying on your trade as you agreed to do, they will ever be representing things to your prejudice.

402. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 20 May, 1757.*

This accompanies a *perwannah* from the Nabob by which you will observe he is determined not to withdraw his army. Omichund's lye about Bussie I am afraid has done us no good. I wait with the utmost impatience for your answer to the proposals sent the 14th. and 16th. For God's sake make haste; you are very sensible how extremely dangerous the least delay may be.

W. WATTS.

403. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 20 May, 1757.*

Mr. Scrafton, the bearer of this, will communicate some particulars of great consequence. Remember I tell you once more if you do still persist in mistrusting the English you must be in secret with their enemies, and have not forgiven them what has happened at Calcutta and Chandernagore. The miseries they suffered by their expulsion from Calcutta no pen can describe, and what they did for the recovery of their losses is no more than what you yourself would have done in the like case. I make this last effort to obtain your confidence and good opinion, and to convince you it is for my interest to assist you against all your enemies, for without peace there can be no trade, and without trade the Europeans cannot subsist or your dominions flourish. Though you promised to withdraw your forces, they still remain in the field; the consequences of which are the great merchants of Muxadavad will not come down to Calcutta, or trust their money or effects abroad, neither dare we trust our money to the *aurungs* or carry on our investment. The navigation of the Ganges is entirely at an end; your people seize and make prisoners everybody either going up or coming down. If you have the trade of your country at heart, consider well of these things, and do not drive the English to the sad necessity of believing you are determined to destroy them whenever you have an opportunity.

404. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to M. Vernet, dated 20 May, 1757.*[1]

We do not know what to think of the Nawab's fickleness and infirmness of purpose in regard to us, an instance of which is again

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague.

found in your letter of the day before yesterday. The sending of strong escorts to your Honour's counting-house, proportionate to the capital they have to convey and to the danger attending the journey from here to your place, is nothing new, but has often been done before, without the Government even having objected to it, let alone ever requiring *machalkas* of us, wherefore we hope that by continuous solicitations you will contrive to get us relief from that burden. But necessity knows no law; they are able to make it so hot for you, that you may not be able to set at naught such an unreasonable demand, and in such a quandary we do not know what other advice we can give you than of two evils to choose the lesser, which does not, however, seem to be the abandonment of the Factory with all the property of the East India Company.

We remain, &c. &c.

405. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 21 *May*, 1757.

This accompanys two letters, one from the Nabob, the other from Moinloll. Notwithstanding what they assert they owe us four *lack* of rupees on the Cossimbazar Dacca and *aurung* accounts, and six *lack* of rupees on the Calcutta account, besides what more we can prove Monickchund has stole. Enclosed is a copy of a discharge for the Admirals, you and the Committee to sign. The preposterousness of this demand is too apparent for me to say anything about it.

406. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 21 *May*, 1757.

Everything taken by me at the different Factories has been delivered to Mr. Watts; a little only remains which I have set aside and reserved till I shall receive a discharge in full. Yet notwithstanding this Mr. Watts refuses to give me an acquittance, importing that he has received in full everything taken by me. On this account I address you, seeing that after Articles have been agreed and signed to, and agreeable thereto I have returned all the money and goods, the refusing to give me an acquittance is contrary to the rules and practice of trade. Till such time as this arrives, and the Company's business goes on as formerly, how can I rely on the treaty, or trust in your friendship? Be judge of this yourself

and send me speedily a discharge in full under the Company's seal and the seals of the Council, attested by you and the Admiral. By this I shall perceive your intentions are sincere and your friendship well rooted.

407. *Letter from Roger Drake, Junior, to Colonel Clive, dated Calcutta, 21 May, 1757.*

SIR,—Your letter to the Committee, where you mention I had wrote Mr. Watts that Kissenchand had power to treat, gave me much astonishment, and in such points you should be more careful in transcribing the Cypher, as such an error, if I was not able to prove the contrary might prejudice me greatly. If you will again look at Watts' Cypher you will find it is Scrafton he has mentioned instead of Kissenchand: therefore I doubt not but you will rectify your mistake in a letter to the Committee.

I am, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR.

408. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 23 May, 1757.*

The Nabob wrote some time ago to Sujait Dowlah, Nabob of Owd, to request his assistance against us; accordingly a considerable person is arrived from him to settle the terms of agreement, when his army which is at Elibass under the command of Mahomed Kuli Cawn will march down. This news is to be depended on.

The Nabob has wrote to Bussi and promised him 20 *lack* of rupees in case he would come to his assistance, from whom he has lately received this answer that his business in Golconda detains him there, that he is no servant of the French Company's, and cannot come. On this the Nabob wrote to Mr. Laws (whose forces are in the Nabob's pay at 10,000 rupees *per* month) directing him to stay where he is and prepare to return upon the first advices. These two last pieces of intelligence I had from Coja Wazeed who has promised to get me a copy of the Nabob's letter to Mr. Laws.

Meir Jaffeir is uneasy and anxious to the last degree at not hearing whether his proposals are accepted of or not. His family will leave Muxadavad in a day or two to join him. I am sure he is to

be depended upon and has no treacherous views. If you have any confidence or repose any trust in me I earnestly request you will engage in no new scheme concerning this contract without advising me, as it may be reasonably supposed by being on the spot I must be better acquainted with the tempers of these people, whether such scheme may be carried into effect and the properest means of going about it, for at this critical juncture one false step may overset our whole scheme.

Since writing the above I have received yours of the 19th, with the Articles, which I have not yet had an opportunity of shewing to Meir Jaffeir's confidant. We shall either deceive Omichund as you mention, or pretend to have dropt the scheme and leave him entirely out of the secret, whichever on consultation we judge the most sure. I shall finish affairs now as soon as possible. This encloses copy of a letter which Omichund sent to Nuncomar to be transcribed fair and sent as wrote by him to the Nabob. These means Omichund takes to get the 20,000 gold *mohurs* for the applying for which he has before got Rungeet Roy disgraced. I only send you this to let you further into the nature of the man.

409. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Colonel Clive, dated 25 May, 1757.*

It is with much concern that I acquaint you that after having got within a few miles of Meir Jaffeir's camp I was stopped by a guard of *harcarrahs* and obliged by them to turn off to Plassey. I arrived here the night before last and this morning had audience of the Nabob. The effect these letters have produced is quite different from what was expected; the answer he made to them was that he would immediately order Meir Jaffeir in, and, as soon as you had wrote to him that you would use no treachery towards him, he would withdraw his army under Roydulub and he has wrote to all his commanders in the different countrys to be on their guard against the Marrattoes. To counterplot this scheme of his to withdraw Meir Jaffeir only, which would be very bad for us, Mr. Watts proposes sending to him by no means to come, and I propose to get my letters from the Nabob for you to-morrow night, [see] Meir Jaffeir the next night, settle everything, carry down the papers, and Mr. Watts is content for his own safety to fling him-

self into Meir Jaffeir's camp. I hope the whole will be wound up within five days, for by that time Cassell's party which left Cossimbuzar to-day will have got out of danger.

410. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab, dated 25 May, 1757.*

I cannot help reminding Your Excellency that though the *Puniah* is long since over, I do not find that any measures have been taken for putting us in possession of the thirty-eight villages, nor do I hear that Mr. Laws is far advanced on his route to the Caramnassar. Your Excellency will give the English an effectual proof of the sincerity of your friendship by fulfilling these points of your promise.

411. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated 27 May, 1757.*

I am now well assured, and it appears plainly to me from what Mr. Scrafton has told me, that mischievous people have hitherto been endeavouring to set us at variance, yet neither of us have deviated from our Agreement. On this consideration I have wrote express to our brother, the redoubtable Rajah Dulumbram, to the redoubtable Meer Mahmud Jaffeir Khan, and to Meer Muddun to return hither with their armies as soon as possible. They will accordingly speedily be with me. It becomes you on your part to act agreable to our treaty, to endeavour that there may not be the smallest deviation from it, and that our friendship may encrease. With confidence also go on with the Company's business so that the merchants as well as the poor may be benefited thereby.

412. *Extracts from a letter from Admiral Watson to Colonel Clive, dated 29 May, 1757.*

I have just received your favour of yesterday's date[1] . . . and as you desire two hundred seamen I will use my best endeavour to

[1] Clive asked for 100 sailors to accompany him on his march, and 200 to garrison Chandernagore.

collect such a number . . . but I must desire that those who accompany you on your march may not be made use of as *cooleys*, for I have too much reason to fear it would occasion a mutiny among the seamen, who made great complaints at the fatigue they underwent when they marched through the Nabob's camp. . . . I do not think your letters carry the most promising appearance of success; you cannot therefore be too cautious to prevent a false step being taken, which might be of very fatal consequence to our affairs.[1]

413. *Extract from Fort William Public Consultations*, 30 *May*, 1757.

Yesterday we received a letter from the gentlemen at Cossimbuzar dated 27th instant advising of their having dispatched Lieutenant Cassels on the 24th with all their military &c. &c.

414. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated* 29 *May*, 1757.

I have received your favour and am greatly obliged to you for your promise of assisting us with two hundred seamen: you may be perswaded nothing shall be requested of them but fighting our artillery or making use of their small arms as occasion may require; nothing but meer necessity obliged us to make use of them before in the manner you mention, which is now entirely removed by the number of draught bullocks we are in possession of. . . .

* * * * *

We have discovered a great scene of villany amongst several of the military. It seems a boat has constantly come in the night time from Chinchura to receive stolen goods, and at last one Trenchard was catched in the fact of stealing a small cohorn. One had been missing before and a small brass field-piece. A General Court Martial has sentenced two of them to be hanged, which is to be put in execution on Friday morning. One belongs to the King's, and other to the Company.

[1] The same evening Admiral Watson wrote to Clive that all he could do was to send men to garrison Chandernagore, but from a letter from Clive, dated June 10, it appears Admiral Watson changed his mind, and gave him at least fifty sailors to accompany his army

415. *Letter from Mr. Scrafton to Colonel Clive, dated* 31 *May*, 1757.

A variety of unexpected circumstances have detained me here till now. I saw D this morning, his confident sets out with the Articles to-morrow. Nothing can detain us a moment after his arrival. B is along with me.

(*N.B.—D. is Meir Jaffeir, and B. Omichund.*)

416. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 31 *May*, 1757.

This encloses a note from Meer Jaffeir which Mr. Scrafton was to have carried with him. Mirza Omarbeg is gone from me. He promises to get the Articles drawn out and signed to-night or to-morrow at furthest, and he will carry them down to you the day after. The reason of the delay in getting the Articles is Roydoolub's not being arrived. He commands a large part of the army and is closely connected with Meir Jaffeir, who does not chuse to finish so important an affair without consulting the former, lest he should take umbrage at it; though I am persuaded Omichund will invent a thousand lies to endeavour to alarm your fears and suspicions.

417. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 1 *June*, 1757.

By a letter I have received from Mr. Cassels I hear that you intend coming away in a boat. I hope there has been nothing done that makes you fear Meer Jaffier will prove treacherous.

418. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens,* 2 *June*, 1757.

Having settled a plan of operations and the Articles being sent to me by Mirza Omar Bey, you will please to await my appointing the time for you to secure yourself and the gentlemen of Cossimbuzar. Mr. Scrafton is just arrived.

419. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 3 *June*, 1757.

Our scheme with Meer Jaffeir is overset, and there is reason to believe that Omichund's four hours' visit to Roydulub at Plassy

has been the cause of it; the latter arrived at five yesterday, when Meer Jaffeir sent Mirza Omar Beg to him with the Articles, on the perusal of which he agreed to several of them, but made an objection to the money stipulated, saying there was but a small sum in the Treasury, and if that should be plundered where should he and Meer Jaffeir be able to raise such a sum as two *crores* and a half in a month's time; in lieu thereof he proposed giving us half of what might come into his and Meer Jaffeir's possession after the Nabob's death. I have sent to him to know if he and Meer Jaffeir will sign and seal such a contract immediately with the rest of the Articles inserted and send them down by Mirza Omar Beg for your approval. This proposal of Roydulub's is much the same as what was made me some time ago by Omichund; therefore if you'll strictly examine him I imagine you will find it a concerted scheme between him and Roydulub. If it is and Roydulub expects a commission on what he may get for us, or such a proportion of our part, I think it may be greatly advantageous for the Company and public to comply, for by all accounts the Nabob is worth forty *crores*. Meer Jaffeir appears only a tool in the hands of Roydulub, therefore if we can agree with the latter all affairs may yet end well. I do not find Meer Jaffeir has so many *jemidars* on his side as he boasted of. He will be turned out and Coja Haddy made *Buxey* to-morrow. We can expect no more assistance than that they will stand neuter, and wait the event of a battle If we are successful they will reap the benefit, if otherwise they will continue as they were without appearing to have been concerned with us; if you think you are strong enough I am of opinion we had better depend on ourselves, and enter into no contract or have any connection with such a set of shuffling, lying, spiritless wretches. Whenever you are determined I am ready for a run. I shall write you again in a few hours; therefore request you'll come to no resolution till you hear from me again.

W. WATTS.

420. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 4 June, 1757.*

I proposed making my escape on horseback with the rest of the gentlemen to Nudea, which was my reason for desiring Mr. Cassels

to wait there to escort us down from thence. I am under no apprehensions of treachery. I left it to Meer Jaffeir and Roydulub's opinion either to give us half of what they might get, or stand to the old agreement; they have chose the latter, and give me the strictest assurances of getting the contract to-morrow morning, when if there should be no more delay (as there is no such thing as hurrying these people) I shall swear Meer Jaffier to them and despatch Mirza Omar Beg with the utmost expedition. Roydulub says he has engaged Meer Murdan. I have received yours of the 2nd. The army is all withdrawn and the road is now clear; therefore for God's sake send for me down the moment you receive the Articles, suspense being the greatest of torments. Before I received yours I proposed setting out the day after Mirza Omar Beg.

421. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens, 5 June, 1757.*

You assured Mr. Scrafton, that Omychund once gone, you had no further obstacle to a conclusion, then why this delay? Surely you are deceived by those you employ, or you have been deceiving me, and all your aim was to get away Omychund. The affair is now publickly talked of, and if it does not take place within a short time after the receipt of this, I will set it aside, being determined not to undertake it in the Rains.

422. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 5 June, 1757.*

The Articles are wrote and sealed to by Meer Jaffier. I will endeavour to see and swear him to them in the evening, and likewise to get from him a plan of operations, or at least know how far we may depend on his assistance in the day of battle.

423. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens, Chandernagore, 5 June, 1757.*

SIR,—Though I have not seen the Committee I will venture to judge their opinion will be mine, which is that I find you have been duped throughout the whole. You have now no more to do



MR. WATTS CONCLUDING THE TREATY WITH MIR JAFAR AND HIS SON MIRAN.

than to get the Articles back again which you have been so imprudent as to trust in their hands, for I will not embark in any undertaking with such a sett of cowardly rascals.

I am, Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

424. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 6 June, 1757, 9 a.m.*

I went last night in a close *dooly*[1] to see Meer Jaffeir, when he signed to the Articles sent by you, and swore upon the Koran and his son's head to keep firm to the Agreement made between him and the Company. Mirza Omar Beg will set out with them to-morrow morning. Regarding the operations of war Meer Jaffeir can form no farther resolution at present than that if the Nabob took the field and Meer Jaffeir was in the van he would on your approach beat his drum, shew his colours, march off and join you to the right; if placed on either of the wings he will then endeavour to secure the Nabob; if in the rear the same, which when performed the signal will be a white flag; if the Nabob should keep the city he will then endeavour to seize him on our army's approach. Will not Mirza Omar Beg's arrival with you (which cannot be kept secret) alarm the Nabob, and make our escape more difficult? I should therefore think it adviseable for us to follow him soon. I only wait your orders.

W. WATTS.

425. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens, Chandernagore, 6 June, 1757.*

SIR,—I have received your two letters, one of the 3rd (as I imagine, for it is without date) and the other of the 4th. The first you may conclude gave me no small uneasiness, which I must confess is not well removed by the latter. The Articles you say are agreed to, and will be dispatched to me; but am I to be joined in the enterprize, and how, and when, and by whom? Be assured till I am well satisfied in these points, I will not stir a step. Mr. Scrafton went up with the view particularly of settling the plan of operations, but was baffled by one means or other of a

[1] A primitive kind of palanquin

thorough conference with Meer Jaffeir on the subject. He is dismissed you tell me from his employ as *Buxey*. I cannot help suspecting some discovery has been made by the Nabob, and that Roy Dulub is treacherous towards Meer Jaffeir and us.

I am, Sir, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

426. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 6 *June*, 1757, 6 *p.m.* (*received* 8 *June*).

Rungeet Roy informs me that Juggatseat has secured Luttee, who will act in conjunction with Meer Jaffeir Roydulub has confessed that Omichund has been tampering with him and told him that if we were once permitted to march this way, we should not quit Muxadavad these three years; in short no devices has that cunning serpent left unessayed to mar our affairs, because he has not had the management of them himself. Permit me to request expedition or Gazoody Cawn[1] and the King's son, who are expected here in two months, will endanger our schemes not being carried into effect. I think we may depend on the sincerity of Meer Jaffeir. If we listen to Omichund we shall lose a substance by grasping at a shadow. We wait with impatience for your permission to come away. There is no other means of escaping but by horse.

W. WATTS.

427. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 7 *June*, 1757. (*Received* 10 *June.*)

Mirza Aumee Beg went away this morning with the Articles. I only wait for advices from you to proceed down with the gentlemen of the Factory. We have no other method of escaping but on horseback. Our scheme, I hear, is publickly known in Calcutta, therefore must be soon discovered here, the consequences of which must be our destruction. I therefore most earnestly request you will send us orders to come away immediately. Write duplicates for fear of miscarriage.

(*Enclosed in above.*)

This encloses the Articles of Agreement, as also the separate Articles for the army, navy, and Committee. It will be delivered

[1] The *Wazir* of the *Mogul*

by Mirza Aumee Beg, in whom Meer Jaffier places the greatest confidence. You will please to treat him civilly and take care to provide a house for his family. I recommend him particularly to your protection. He seems to have sense and spirit, and I hope you will find him very useful. If he should want money or any assistance, you will be so kind as to supply him and keep his secret if possible.

428. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 8 *June*, 1757.

This morning I received yours of the 5th. The Articles went away by Mirza Omar Beg yesterday morning.

Omichund's visit of four hours to Roydulub at Plassy occasioned a delay of two days in getting the Articles. I have not been deceived and have more honour and generosity of temper than to deceive any man. I hope you will now be convinced that you have been too hasty in your suspicions of me. I wish Omichund's insinuations and addresses may not have prejudiced me in your favour.

We all wait with impatience for your permission to come away.

W. WATTS.

429. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 8 *June*, 1757.

I have not been duped as you must know by this time and be convinced Omichund has been the occasion of the delay. As a further proof I enclose you copy and translate of a letter from him to Petrus.[1] Please to send for Petrus's brother and ask him upon oath if Omichund did not dictate and he write such a letter to his brother. If this will not satisfy you and Omichund's address has more weight than my proofs, I will send you the original letter with his own signing. Let me beg of you to comply with this request not to divulge what I have inclosed or wrote you to Omichund till I am in a place of security, as he is implacable in his resentments and may be induced to discover everything by writing up here in order to sacrifice Petrus and me to his resentment. The Nabob and Meer Jaffeir are at open variance and it's apprehended troubles between them will soon ensue. The latter is

[1] See No. 437.

supported by Laittee, Roydullub, Jaggatseat and others, but of this I shall write you more certainly in the evening.

W WATTS.

430. *Letter from M. Law to Fuckerootajah, [Coja Wajid] 20th of the Moon Shavan*[1] (8 *June*, 1757).

I have received a *perwannah* from the Nabob to the following effect: 'That the English are again meditating some treachery against me: wherever this may find you, you are to return from thence.' I am arrived at Bogglepore at a great expense, wherefore I cannot move at present but send my deputy, Monsieur Sinfray, that he may write me the reason of my being called, and then I will go there. As you always show me great favour therefore I write to you to desire you will let me know the cause of the rupture between the Nabob and the English, and what has the Nabob sent to me for I hope you will oblige me in answering these particulars. Monsieur Sinfray is going there. If you have any orders for him send for him, and acquaint him with them, and you will oblige me.

431. *Letter from Mirza Sali*[2] *to Fuckerootajah.*[3]

I have received a *perwannah* from the Nabob to the following effect: 'That the distinguished of the Empire, the sword of riches, the victorious in war, Monsieur Bussy is coming to assist Monsieur Renault the Governor of Chandernagore; that I am not to oppose the passage of Monsieur Bussy's forces, that I must go to meet him, and shew him respect and send him your way.' As yet I hear nothing of his coming this way, but agreeable to the Nabob's order I have wrote to all the *jemadars* and *jamendars* on that side the country, that if Monsieur Bussy should march this way not to impede their coming, and to give me immediate advice of his coming that I may go to meet him, court his friendship, and send him that way.

[1] Made over to Clive by Coja Wajid, evidently a translation from the French or Persian

[2] Nawab of Cuttack

[3] Made over to Clive

432. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 9 *June*, 1757.

Affairs here are very near come to a conclusion. Meer Jaffier is turned out of the Nabob's service. Threatening messages continually pass between them. The former held consultation last night with some of his *jemadars*, wherein it was agreed either to take the field and wait your coming up or surround the Nabob. To-night they will determine which of these measures they are to pursue. On the other side we hear the Nabob is ready to fall on Meer Jaffier. Whether we interfere or not it appears affairs will be decided in a few days by the destruction of one of the parties.

433. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated French Gardens, Chandernagore,* 10 *June*, 1757.

SIR,—I send you the enclosed letters from Mr. Watts by which you will observe everything is concluded. I expect Mirza Omar Beg with the Articles this evening and propose beginning our march early on Monday morning. I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will send the 100 sailors—those who are to march with us—some time on Sunday evening. I have desired Major Killpatrick to wait on you and acquaint you with further particulars.

If you can spare the twenty-gun ship to lay off Hughly she will awe the *Phousdar* of Hughly greatly, and prevent his stopping our communication by water.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

434. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated* 11 *June*, 1757.

If we can get away we are under a necessity of setting out to-morrow evening at farthest. Motramul has wrote the Nabob we and Meer Jaffeir are joined together; this the Nabob declared before Rojebullub, who sent for my *banian* and told him of it and advised us to decamp immediately; this likewise does Meer Jaffeir and all that are in the secret. Let me advise you to march immediately, as the least delay now may ruin our affairs. When we are gone Meer Jaffeir proposes publishing by beat of drum that the English are joined to him. I am informed he daily increases in strength. W. WATTS.

435. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Watts, dated French Gardens, 11 June, 1757.*

If no accident has happened to Meer Jaffier and you judge we may safely proceed in our scheme, set out immediately on the receipt of this. I march Monday morning. I heartily wish you well down.

436. *Letter from Mr. Watts to Colonel Clive, dated 11 June, 1757.*

I have this moment received yours of the 10th. Meer Jaffeir and the Nabob continue with their forces armed night and day. Roydullub is faithful. Many *jemidars* have sworn to join Meer Jaffeir in case of an attack. Upon its appearing that you favour Meer Jaffeir's cause, I imagine the Nabob will be deserted by most of his people, and you will have little else to do than the trouble of a march. As we hourly run the risque of a discovery, and of course being then at least made prisoners, and as there is no depending upon the arrival of *cossids*, your last being three days in the way, if I do not hear from you to-morrow I am determined to set out the next day. We are already suspected of wanting to run away; this the whole town talk of. Meer Jaffeir has sent to me [to] get away as soon as possible.

437. *Omichund's letter to Petrus.*

Omichund's compliments to Petrus. There's letters gone for Mr. Watts to forbid his coming down till permission is given from hence. You and I are one; let us consider what is for our own interest, and act so as to make it pass that we have had the whole management of this affair. If our friend is not set out keep him a few days; affairs are not yet settled here; hereafter I will write you the particulars. You have a good understanding, therefore there's no occasion to write you much. Our success depends upon each other. All my hopes are in you. W. WATTS.

438. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Sheikh Amir Ulla,*[1] *dated 12 June, 1757.*

I am now marching to Muxadavad in order to see the Articles of the treaty complied with, which have been long delayed.

[1] *Faujdar* of Hugli

Keep yourself quiet in Hugly and nobody shall molest you, but if you make the least [movement] depend on it I will send people to destroy your town. Behave as a friend to the English and you will find them such to you. Do not you interfere, but wait the event, whether our differences with the Nabob are to be settled in an amicable manner or by a battle.

439. *Letter from Sheikh Amir-ulla to Colonel Clive, dated 12 June,* 1757.

Your letter in which you write me that, the Nabob delaying the execution of the treaty, you are marching to Muxadavad, and that I should not leave Hugley, I have received and am acquainted with the particulars. While I was near the Nabob I saw nothing but what bespoke the most friendly intention towards the English, and earnest desire to finish the treaty with the English, and it is only the great importance of the affairs that has occasioned the delay It is not proper that on the misrepresentation of bad men, you should take such an immediate resolution to march to Muxadavad. As soon as your letter arrived I despatched it to the Nabob by express *cossids*. By the blessing of God you will soon have an answer. Delay your march till you have an answer from the Presence. I am here for the Nabob's business agreeable to his orders. The Nabob when he sent me here ordered me to do nothing to dissatisfy you. Whatever you order I am ready to obey.

440. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Nawab,* 13 *June,* 1757.

It was in consideration of the fame of your great character as being the greatest Prince, the greatest Nabob, and the greatest soldier in the Hindostan Empire, that I was induced to enter into a Treaty of Peace with you in hopes the Company's business would increase and flourish; and therefore it was I passed by the loss of many *crores* taken in the plunder of Calcutta, and was satisfied with what you agreed to restore me. The event has been that I find you have not been true to your treaty. It has given me great vexation that having had a thing of so great consequence in your power as is our friendship that you should have neglected

it, and not have known the true value of it. It was agreed between us that your enemies should be mine and mine yours. When Your Excellency called me to your assistance against the Patans, I swear before God that it was my firm intention to assist you with my whole force, and that I esteemed it the greatest happiness to have such an opportunity of testifying my friendship for you, whereas Your Excellency chose your friends from among my enemies as evidently appears from this, that we have certain knowledge from Decan of the letters you have wrote to our enemy Monsieur Bowsie. I refer you to the copies of your own letters. If you do not chuse to shew me your copies, I will wait on [you] with those I have. You often have assured me that you had sent Monsieur Law and his people out of your country over the Carumnassar, whereas they are still by your orders at Bogglipore, and they receive a monthly allowance of 10,000 rupees; as an instance of which they received a bill on the Seats' house at Rajamaul for 10,000 and continue to receive the same monthly. What you have wrote to him and his answer I am well acquainted with. You have discouraged the Company's business beyond what I am able to express, but I will only touch on a few particulars. Four months are elapsed since the treaty, and many times that you have fixed on for the full execution of the treaty passed by, yet very little advance is made towards fulfilling it. Of the great sums paid into your Treasury taken at Calcutta you do not consent to pay me above a fifth part, and yet expect I should send you a full discharge. You promised to pay a further sum of gold *mohurs*, even desired a receipt as if you intended to pay it immediately, and as a further proof you ordered Juggut Seat to pay the sum intended in silver. It was then deferred till the ships were gone. The papers relating to these things Omichund now has, and now you deny the whole, and Omichund is sent down under pretence of having deceived us in the whole affair, and that you never made any such promise. It is not the money that gives me concern but to see you so often deviate from your word. You well know what mistrust you have shewn the English and the troubles you have given them. You have accused us of sending to Cossimbuzar quantities of ammunition, of having a large force concealed there with some treacherous design, and [even

threatened] if we did not comply with having our Factory examined, you would immediately break the Peace. The English have been ill-used in their passage to Cossimbuzar, and even stopt and forbid going there. You have shamefully driven our *vaqueel* from your presence. How can I bear the weight of so many injuries? It is therefore the sentiments of all who have the charge of the Company's affairs that I go to Cossimbuzar, put our disputes to arbitration before Juggut Seat, Rajah Mohun Lal, Meer Jaffeir Khan, Rajah Roy Dulub, Meer Murdun and the rest of your great men, and if it shall appear that I have deviated from the treaty I bind myself to give up all my demands. But if it should appear Your Excellency has deviated from it, I shall demand satisfaction for all our losses, and all the charges of the navy and army. The Rains being daily encreasing, and it taking a great deal of time to receive your answer, I therefore find it necessary to wait on you immediately, and if you will place confidence in me no harm shall come from it. I represent this to you as a friend. Act as you please.

441. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Sheikh Amr-ulla, dated 13 June, 1757.*

I have received your answer to my letter, but I do not find it so clear and express as I expected, therefore I write you again that I send a ship to Hughly. If you oppose the passage of our boats or supplies coming to us, or commit any other hostilities I shall destroy Hughly. It is necessary that you should give me a clear answer to my letter of yesterday that I may act accordingly.

442. *Letter from Sheikh Amr-ulla to Colonel Clive, dated 13 June, 1757.*

I have received your answer to my letter. You write that you have sent a ship to Hughly, that if I commit any hostilities the city will suffer for it, and that I should write a plain answer to your letter. I am, conformable to the Nabob's orders, to comply with what you please to direct. I do not offer to oppose the passage of your ships or boats, nor to appear as an enemy in any respect, but am always ready to appear as a friend. I am here on the Nabob's account. I gave a particular answer to your letter

yesterday, and I now repeat in that I shall not stir from hence, nor oppose the passage of your boats or people.

443. *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to M. Vernet, dated* 13 *June*, 1757.[1]

In reply to your secret letter of the 1st instant, we look forward with impatience to a favourable result in respect to the negociations with the Nabob, the more so now the army of the English is already marching on Muxadabad, and having this morning passed our settlement both on water and on land, it has become high time for us to reckon with the fact that if you have not yet succeeded in this matter according to your desire, nothing whatever is likely to come of all the negociations.

We recommend you to be on your guard, as the English are approaching, and remain, after friendly greetings, &c., &c.

444 *Mr. Sykes's Account of his Escape from Mandipoor in company with Mr. Watts in June*, 1757.[2]

The plan of operations against the tyrant Suraja Dowla whom it was resolved to depose, being now complete, it became necessary for Messrs. Watts, Collet and Sykes, the Chief, Second and Third of Cossimbuzar factory to think of providing for their safety; the other servants of the Factory had been called down sometime before on various pretences, but it was thought proper that these three gentlemen should continue to the last, both for the sake of lulling the Nabob's suspicions and also to assist in promoting the great work then in agitation. In what manner they were to escape was yet undetermined. They called a Council to deliberate thereon, when Mr. Watts proposed fleeing to the camp of Meir Jaffeir at Jellinghee as the most advisable measure; Mr. Collet persuaded their taking refuge with the Dutch; but Mr. Sykes differed in opinion from both. Being convinced that a retreat to Meir Jaffeir would immediately bring to light their secret negotiations with that commander and consequently ruin both him and themselves, and no less sensible how utterly unable the Dutch

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

[2] Enclosed in a letter, dated Mootajeel, 25 March, 1767, endorsed, as received per *Albany*, 28 September, 1767.

were to afford them any protection against so powerful an adversary as the Nabob, he advised the purchasing of horses and proceeding in the best manner they were able to join Lord Clive then on his march upwards. This proposal, though not without its difficulties, prevailing, five horses were accordingly bought, and Mr. Watts waited on the Nabob to obtain his leave to hunt on the plains of Moidipore, which was a diversion usual with these gentlemen.

In the evening they set out from the country seat, attended by a *Mogul* servant, a few *peons*, and their greyhounds, having previously left directions with their servants to provide a supper, telling them they should return and entertain the Dutch that evening. It was dark before they arrived at Daudpoor though they travelled with all possible expedition. On the plain near that place was encamped Roydulub, an officer of the Nabob's, with a very large force. Here they were exposed to imminent danger, falling unawares on the outposted guards, but the darkness of the night favoured their escape. By striking off into the plain and taking a circuit of the whole camp they regained the road and arrived about one o'clock in the morning at Augurdeep, where a second misfortune threatened their destruction. They unexpectedly found themselves in the midst of a body of horse, which had been stationed there to prevent the passing or repassing down or up the country of any Europeans. The first notice they had of this danger was the neighing and kicking of the horses about; their riders luckily were asleep. At this place they quitted their horses, and embarking on two open boats which they had the good fortune to seize, proceeded down the river. Next day about three in the afternoon they met Lord Clive at Changdack which is near ninety-five miles from Cossimbuzar. It is remarkable that the purpose of the English and also the march of Lord Clive, with many other particulars, were known and talked of publicly at the city before the departure of these gentlemen.

445. *Letter from the Nawab*[1] *to Admiral Watson, dated 25th of Ramazan* (13 *June*), 1757.

According to my promises and the agreement made between us, I have duly rendered everything to Mr. Watts, except a very small

[1] His last letter to the Admiral —*Ives.*

remainder, and had almost settled Monickchund's affair. Notwithstanding all this, Mr. Watts and the rest of the Council of the Factory at Cossimbuzar, under pretence of going to take the air in their Gardens, fled away in the night. This is an evident mark of deceit, and of an intention to break the treaty. I am convinced it could not have happened without your knowledge, nor without your advice. I all along expected something of this kind, and for that reason I would not recall my forces from Plassey, expecting some treachery.

I praise God that the breach of the treaty has not been on my part. God and His Prophet have been witnesses to the contract made between us, and whoever first deviates from it will bring upon themselves the punishment due to their actions.

446. *Letter from Mr. Vernet and Council, Cossimbazar, to Mr. Bisdom, dated 14 June, 1757.*[1]

Diverse troubles which have arisen between the Prince and his cavalry and especially with his great uncle-in-law Jafar Ali Khan (*alias* Mir Jafar) shortly after the despatch of our respectful missive, have made the Nawab so sullen and gloomy, that nobody whatever has been bold enough to speak to him about any other business as yet, so that our solicitations in reference to the said *darkhast*[2] are still in the same stage. Nevertheless Festussons' heirs and Mohan Lal have assured us that in spite of those troubles, they would seize a favourable opportunity to get the Nawab to sign the points mentioned in our letter of 1 April last, but Mr. Brebsjent (?) has sent word to the first undersigned that, though the Nawab were to sign the *arasdast*, it would yet bear no fruits unless Mohan Lal and the other *Darbar* attendants were got over with a few *douceurs*, the amount of which we cannot as yet tell and which it will not be possible to calculate till the proper moment comes. We therefore ask your Honour's orders on the subject.

To return now to the dissensions between the Nawab and his cavalry, it must be stated that they have arisen owing to the great 'superbness' of Mohan Lal, who now looking upon himself as as

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

[2] Letter or petition.

great as the Nawab, would have all the grandees and chiefs come to him to salute him, which they have also been ordered to do by the Nawab and which has been opposed by Jafar Ali Khan and his supporters, which made the Nawab so angry that he ordered him to be dragged from his house. But the afore-mentioned Jafar Ali Khan had the *chobdars* and *gorabadars*[1] sjambocked and driven away, and has left with his men, which has rather upset the Nawab. However, the affair remains in that state without one's knowing what turn it will take.

The flight hence of Messrs. Watts, Collet, Sykes and a doctor, that took place the day before yesterday has also caused great consternation at the Muxadavad Court, and yesterday, after an extraordinary Secret Council, the Nawab gave orders to keep the carts with tents and other baggage in readiness, and he is also effecting a concentration of all his troops, of whom many cavalry soldiers have refused to march out, which suggests the idea that it is a little put-up job concocted with the English.

How things really stand, time alone will show.

We are with much respect, &c. &c.

447. *Letter from the Nawab to Colonel Clive, dated* 15 *June*, 1757.

Almost everything in conformity to the treaty has been delivered back to Mr. Watts : a very little only remained. The affairs also with Monickchand were settling as fast as could be. Notwithstanding this Mr. Watts and the rest of the Council at Cossimbazar, going to the Gardens on the pretence of a party of pleasure, have retired from thence in the night, which appears to be done with a very deceitful design and intention to break the treaty. For certainly without your orders and directions Mr. Watts would never have acted in this manner. It was the consideration that something of this kind was contriving that hindered me from recalling the army from Plassy, for I know some trick was intended. I thank God, however, the treaty has not been broke on my part, and as it was so solemnly sworn to before God and His Prophet He will doubtless punish him who has first violated it.

[1] *Query* trumpeters

448. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Cutwa, 15 June, 1757, at noon.*[1]

GENTLEMEN, — I arrived last night at Cutwa, and as the *seapoys* who came by land are a good deal fatigued, I shall only proceed to Mirzapore to-day, where I shall disembark the cannon, &c., and I hope to reach Agoa Diep in two days, to which place I shall order all the small boats. Mr. Watts with the gentlemen of Cossimbuzar joined me yesterday afternoon, also Coja Petrus and a Moorman from Meer Jaffeir. I have desired Messrs. Watts and Sykes to accompany me. They left the city the 13th at night, and acquaint us Meer Jaffeir's party daily encreases. The gunners and Laittee Cawn have joined him, so that there is the greatest probability of a happy issue to the expedition.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

449. *Military Returns.*

(*a*) EXTRACT FROM A GENERAL RETURN OF ALL THE TROOPS UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLIVE, 10TH APRIL, 1757.

Detachments.	Officers and Volunteers doing Duty	Officers and Volunteers Sick	Non-commissioned Officers and Centinels doing Duty	Non-commissioned Officers and Centinels Sick	Total of Columns 3 and 4.
King's .	7	4	199	39	238
Madras	24	1	294	52	346
Bengal .	25	7	299	30	329
Bombay .. .	9	—	263	31	294
Train ...	9	4	166	24	190
Total	74	16	1,221	176	1,397

Extract from a General Return of the Sepoys.

Establishments	On Duty	Sick	Total
Madras	1,399	32	1,431
Bengal . . .	515	21	536
Total	1,914	53	1,967

ROBERT CLIVE,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

[1] The same to the Admiral

(*b*) EXTRACT FROM AN EXACT RETURN OF THE TWO BATTALIONS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLIVE, JUNE 15TH, 1757

	Detachments	Officers	Volunteers	Non commissioned Officers	Drummers	Centinels		Train	Total of Columns 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
						Europeans	Topasses		
1st Battalion	King's troops	9	—	15	6	194	—	—	215
	Bengal troops	21	3	21	11	120	48	—	200
	Train	9	—	8	2	—	—	84	94
	Total	39	3	44	19	314	48	84	509
2nd Battalion	Madras troops	19	7	40	14	218	—	—	272
	Bombay troops	8	1	17	4	81	43	—	145
	Train	8	—	8	1	—	—	87	96
	Total	35	8	65	19	299	43	87	513
	Grand total	74	11	109	38	613	91	171	1,022

N.B —The Sepoy Sergeants are not returned in the above Return

JOHN FRASER,
Major of Brigade

450. *Letter from Mr. Vernet to Mr. Bisdom, dated* 16 *June,* 1757.[1]

Upon receipt of Your Honour's respected secret missive of the 13th inst. which reached us the 15th, we engaged a few footmen to keep watch at the enclosure, the more so as the Nawab is already on the march with his whole army, and as we have information from a reliable source that in union with the English treason is being contrived against the Nawab, and in which Festusjint's heirs, Rajah Durlabh Ram, Mir Jafar, Khodadad Khan Latty and Boerabeek (?) are said to have a hand. And whereas the Nawab is always in a bad humour on account of all these vexations, so that he can hardly be approached, we greatly fear that Mohan Lal will not be able to fulfil the promise he made to seize the opportune moment to get the Prince to sign the points of our *arasdast,* as he has, forsooth, already given us to understand.

We have the honour to be with respect, &c. &c.

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

451. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive, dated* 16 *June*, 1757.

I received your obliging letter the 28th of the Moon Ramazan on Thursday in the fourth year in the afternoon, at which I was extremely pleased. I understand that you marched the 25th agreeable to your contract. I broke the claim of service. On the news of your coming the Nabob was much intimidated, and requested at such a juncture I would stand his friend. On my part, agreeable to the circumstances of the times, I thought it advisable to acquiesce with his request, but what we have agreed on must be done. I have fixed the first day of the moon for my march. God willing I shall arrive. I hope till we meet you will write me of your health, and what else occurs, as I will you. You will take care to send trusty people that our secret may not be divulged.

452 *Letter from the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, to M. Vernet, dated* 17 *June*, 1757 (*secret*).[1]

As the march of the English army to Muxadavad and the troubled state of things at the Court, make the time seem anything but auspicious for us to direct our thoughts, in pursuance of your favour of the day before yesterday, towards an expenditure of money for the purpose of insuring the success of our solicitation in reference to the points mentioned in your letter of April 7th, it will be advisable first to wait a little and see what turn affairs will take.

Due notice having been taken of the other matter contained in the aforesaid letter, we remain with kind greetings, &c. &c.

453 *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Pattlee,* 17 *June*, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—Enclosed is a letter just received from Meer Jaffeir, which I am satisfied by many circumstances is genuine, but it has not removed my opinion of the situation of his affairs being less favourable than had been represented to us. A party of 200 Europeans and 500 *seapoys* set out to-day to seize Cutwa town and fort, and to-morrow I shall march the army there. The

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

killidar,[1] in answer to a letter wrote him, has promised to be our friend. I understand there is a large quantity of grain in the place, and its situation makes it convenient to us in every respect. Our intelligence is confirmed of the smallness of the Nabob's forces. I have not wrote Mr. Watson, not doubting but you acquaint him with my advices.

454. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Jafar Ali Khan, dated Pattlee, 18 June, 1757.*

I have received your letter which has given me the utmost satisfaction after the great pain I have suffered by your silence. I have sent a party to possess themselves of Cutwa fort and town, and shall move with my whole army there to-morrow. I believe I shall march from thence the next day and hope to be at Moncurra in two days, but my motions will in a great measure depend on the advices I receive from you. Write me what you intend to do and what is proper for me to do. On mutual intelligence depends the success of our affairs, so write me daily and fully If I meet the Nabob's army, what part will you act, and how am I to act? This you may be assured of that I will attack the Nabob within twenty-four hours after I come in sight of his army. Of all things take care of yourself that you be not undone by treachery before my arrival.

455. *Letter from Nandkumar to Colonel Clive. No date. Received 19 June, 1757.*

I arrived here the 30th of the Ramoozan and paid my respects to the Nabob, and afterwards I told him the cause of your coming and your demands. Upon the affair of Monickchund, the Nabob swore by God and His Prophet, that what the Colonel said that Monickchund paid into the Treasury above 17 *lack* is wide from the truth; whoever told him so it is without foundation, and Omichund knows this well. If you chuse to have this affair settled, return to Chandernagore. By the blessing of God all the Articles will be fulfilled. Send Omichund here that he may finish the affairs as soon as you desire. Reflect on this and do not delay. Till I meet you let me hear of your health. Excuse the paper, I had not better.

[1] Commander of the Fort.

456. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Mirza Omar Beg, dated 19 June, 1757.*

I thank God that you are safe and still alive; the *hircarrahs* are looking out for you. Your servants and letters are continually coming in to me. There are *chokeys* all round; for God's sake don't continue to do so. Monday and Tuesday it was in agitation to destroy me. The guns and fire arrows were all ready against me, and the people were in arms day and night. Mr. Watts's news was known early on Monday. This startled the Nabob; he thought it absolutely necessary I should be soothed; he came to me himself. On Thursday eve the Hughly letter arrived that they were marched. I was to be with him. On three conditions I consented to it. One, that I would not enter into his service; 2ndly, I would not visit him; lastly, I would not take post in the army. I sent him word that if he agreed to these terms I was ready. As he wanted me he consented. But I took this writing from all the commanders of the army and artillery: 'That when they had conquered the English they should be bound to see me and my family safe wherever I chose to go.' By the blessing of God I shall pray on the Eade day at Cutlee mosque, and shall then join the army, and shall be a mile to the right or left; then I shall know the situation the different commanders are in. I have sent an answer to the Colonel 'sewed up in slippers.' The *seapoys* are very discontented and as yet none of them will agree to leave the city. The more expedition the better. Don't you think of coming to me. Mohunloll is proposed for the van and I myself to be with him, but I shall never consent to this. You sent a letter sealed; where is the use of a seal? You should not mention the affair of Bahadre Ally Cawn but in the most private manner. My *salaam* to all the commanders. The Nabob pitched his tent at Ammoney Gunge and staid a day there. Now he is near Tarrackpore at Porcarrah. The artillery and *seapoys* are not yet gone out. I beseech you for the Prophet's sake to be more careful of your letters. If our secrets should be known the ill consequence will fall heavy on me. The Nabob looks out for you, and is much your enemy. 'That chap,' he says, 'is gone on scheme.'

457. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Jafar Alı Khan, dated Cutwa,* 19 *June,* 1757.

I wrote yesterday that I should march to Cutwa, and accordingly am now arrived there with my whole force, the fort having been taken by the detachment sent against it. It gives me great concern that in an affair of so great consequence to yourself in particular that you do not exert yourself more. So long as I have been on my march you have not yet given me the least information what measures it is necessary for me to take, nor do I know what is going forward at Muxadavad. Surely it is in your power to send me news daily; it must be more difficult for me to procure trusty messengers than you; however the bearer of this is a sensible intelligent man, and in whom I have great confidence. Let me know your sentiments freely by him. I shall wait here till I have proper encouragement to proceed. I think it absolutely necessary that you should join my army as soon as possible. Consider the Nabob will encrease in strength daily. Come over to me at Plassy or any other place you judge proper, with what force you have. Even a thousand horse will be sufficient, and I will engage to march immediately with you to Muxadavad. I prefer conquering by open force.

458. *Letter from Jafar Alı Khan to Colonel Clive, dated* 19 *June,* 1757.

Health, &c., to Sabut Jung Bahadre, the day of the Eade. Your note from Colsannie is arrived. I have perused the contents. To-morrow the day of the Eade by the blessing of God I shall march. I shall have my tent fixed to the right or left of the army. I have hitherto been afraid to send you intelligence. After I am arrived in the army mutual intelligence will be easier, but here the Nabob has fixed *chokeys* on all the roads. Your letters come too open to me. I hope that till our affairs are publicly declared you will be very careful.

459. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Cutwa,* 19 *June,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—The party I sent has taken Cutwa town and fort. Both are strong, notwithstanding which I feel the greatest anxiety at the little intelligence I receive from Meer Jaffeir, and if

he is not treacherous, his *sangfroid* or want of strength will I fear overset the expedition. I am trying a last effort by means of the Braminy to prevail upon him to march out and join us. I have appointed Plassey the place of *rendezvous*, and have told him at the same time without he gives me this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his intentions, I will not cross the river. This I hope will meet with your approbation. I shall act with such caution as not to risque the loss of our forces, and whilst we have them, we may always have it in our power to bring about a revolution, should the present not succeed. They say there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about this place; if we can collect 8 or 10,000 *maunds* we may maintain our present situation during the Rains, which will greatly distress the Nabob, and either reduce him to terms which may be depended on, or give us time to bring in the Beirboin Rajah, Marattas, or Gazoody Cawn. I desire you will give me your sentiments freely how you think I should act, if Meer Jaffeir can give us no assistance.

460. *Letter from Captain Eyre Coote to Colonel Clive, dated Cutwa Fort, 19 June, 1757.*

SIR,—This morning about seven o'clock took the Fort of Cuttwa by storm. The timidity of the defenders gave me an easy entrance. The particulars I will let you know when I have the pleasure of seeing you, which I hope will be soon, and am, &c. &c., EYRE COOTE.

461. *Letter from Roger Drake, Junior, to Colonel Clive, dated Calcutta, 21 June, 1757.*

SIR,—I received your letter to the Committee of the 19th instant with the papers mentioned to be enclosed. I beg leave to acquaint you it is needless your writing in Cypher, since some of your assistants mention to their correspondents everything that occurs. Mrs. Warwick had the whole I hear from Mr. Johnston.

I am, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR.

462. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Assaduzama Muhammad, Raja of Beerboom, dated Cutwa, 20 June, 1757.*

The letters you wrote to the Governor of Calcutta and to Mahmud Newaz I have well considered, and the strong friendship

you expressed gives me great pleasure. By continued marches I have reached Cutwa, and the fort, which had a great force in it, by the blessing of God fell into my hands in a very short time. If you are firmly inclined to join me call God and your Prophet to witness your sincerity, and send 2 or 300 good horse to march day and night to join me in the time of battle, and I shall look upon your affairs as my own, and end them happily for you; and your country shall not be injured, nor shall any collector be put over you; and whatever may be the charge of the forces you send me I will make the Government pay you. My real meaning is that I will content you, if your people arrive in time. Send me an immediate answer.

463. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Cutwa, 21 June, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—Enclosed are copies of two letters received last night. I likewise transmit the sentiments of a Council of War[1] held this day, whether or not it was proper without the assistance of some country Power to attack the Nabob. I wait only for some encouragement from Meir Jaffeir to proceed, which must be the issue unless the Nabob makes very fair offers of accommodation.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

464. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Cutwa, 21 June, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—Since my last another letter has been delivered Meir Jaffeir and no answer returned in writing but the inclosed[2] discourse past between him and the bearer. I am really at a loss how to act at the present scituation of our affairs, especially should I receive a confirmation by letter of Meir Jaffeir's resolution to stand neuter. The Nabob's forces at present are not said to exceed 8,000 men but a compliance with their demands may easily encrease them. If we attack them it must be entrenched, and ourselves without any assistance. In this place a repulse must be fatal, on the contrary success may give the greatest advantage. The Nabob's apprehensions at present are great, and

[1] See Captain Coote's Journal under date 21 June, 1757, and First Report Parliamentary Commission, 1772, p 153

[2] Of no importance, and not included in this Selection

perhaps he may be glad to grant us an honorable Peace. The principle of fear may make him act much against his private inclination and I believe that has been the case ever since the capture of Chandernagore. There still remains another expedient of sending an embassy either to Gazoody Cawn or the Morattoes to invite them in. I beg you will let me have your sentiments how I ought to act at this critical juncture.

I have the honour to be, gentlemen, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

465. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive. No date. Received 22 June, 1757, at 3 p.m.*

I have received your letter advising the taking of Cutwa and was highly pleased. Sunday I marched from the city and reached Ammony Gunge and staid a day there to collect my people. The Nabob marched to-day from Tarrackpore and has pitched his tent at Moncurra near the bridge. By the blessing of God to-morrow I shall march from hence Tuesday, and shall have my quarter to the left at a distance. The Nabob's intention is to have his intrenchment at Moncurra, therefore the sooner you march to fall on him the better before his design can take place. As yet you are now only designing, but it is not now proper to be indolent. When you come near I shall then be able to join you. If you could send two or three hundred good fighting men the upper road towards Cossimbuzar, the Nabob's army would of themselves retreat. Then the battle will have no difficulty. When I am arrived near the army I will send you privately all the intelligence. Let me have previous notice of the time you intend to fight.

466. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Jafar Ali Khan, dated Cutwa, 22 June, 1757.* (*No.* 1.)

I am determined to risque everything on your account, though you will not exert yourself. I shall be on the other side of the river this evening. If you will join me at Placis, I will march half way to meet you, then the whole Nabob's army will know I fight for you. Give me [leave] to call to your mind how much your own glory and safety depends upon it. Be assured if you do this you will be *Subah* of these Provinces, but if you cannot go

even this length to assist us I call God to witness the fault is not mine, and I must desire your consent for concluding a Peace with the Nabob, and what has passed between us will never be known. What can I say more than that I am as desirous of your success and welfare as my own.

467. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Jafar Ali Khan, dated 22 June, 1757.* (*No. 2.*) *Despatched at 6 p.m.*

Upon receiving your letter I am come to a resolution to proceed immediately to Placis. I am impatient for an answer to my letter by the trusty man.

468. *Fort William, Select Committee Proceedings, 23 June, 1757.*

At a Committee, present the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq., President, Charles Manningham and Richard Becher, Esq.

The proceedings of the 15th instant, being wrote fair were now read, approved and signed.

Received three letters from Colonel Clive dated at Patlee the 18th, 19th, and 20th instant. The first informs us that he had not then heard from Meir Jaffier, which made him apprehend his affairs were not so favourable as we were made to believe; that he should wait there and take his measures according to the intelligence he received; that spies were sent to Cutwa and if the fort was to be mastered, he should attempt it, as it would be a convenient hold for us on many accounts; that their *harcarras* informed them Mohunlol and Monickchund were come out of the city with a few men and that the Nabob and Meir Jaffeir would continue within. The second enclosed a letter just received from Meir Jaffeir, which he was satisfied from many circumstances was genuine, but that it had not removed his opinion of the scituation of Meir Jaffeir's affairs being less favorable than had been represented to us; that a party of two hundred Europeans and five hundred *seepoys* set out that day to seize Cutwa town and fort, and that the next day he should march the army there; that the *kiladar* in answer to a letter wrote him has promised to be our friend; that his intelligence of the smallness of the Nabob's forces is confirmed. The last letter informs us that the party sent has taken

Cutwa town and fort; both are strong, notwithstanding which he feels the greatest anxiety at the little intelligence he receives from Meir Jaffeir, and that, if he is not treacherous, his cautiousness from our want of strength will (he fears) overset the expedition; that he is trying a last effort by means of the Braminy to prevail on him to march out and join us; that he had appointed Placy the place of *rendezvous* and has told him at the same time without he gives this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his intention our army would not cross the river; that he hopes this will meet with our approbation; that he shall always act with such caution as not to risque the loss of our forces, and that whilst we have them we may always have it in our power to bring about a revolution should the present not succeed; that they say there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about the place; that if he could collect 10,000 *maunds* we might maintain our present situation during the Rains which would greatly distress the Nabob, and either reduce him to terms which may be depended on, or give us time to bring in the Beirboin Rajah, Morattoes or Gazoody Cawn; that he desires we would write him our intentions freely how we think he should act if Meir Jaffeir can give him no assistance.

The Committee, having maturely considered the purport of the foregoing letters, were of opinion that the Colonel's apprehensions were not well grounded, since he had received intelligence from Meer Jaffeir but the day before he wrote the last letter; but if contrary to our expectations no further advice has come from Meir Jaffeir yet we presume no thoughts can be entertained of making a fresh treaty with the Nabob, nor do we think it could be depended on if made; therefore if our strength is esteemed sufficient and a favorable opportunity presents itself, the Committee are of opinion it would be best to put the issue of our affairs on a decisive engagement as the only alternative we know of after engaging so far as we have done in the present undertaking, delay being fatal to our affairs as we shall daily diminish in our numbers while the Nabob will be able to increase his army by calling in forces from all quarters; but though the Committee are for trying a decisive engagement, they would not recommend that step without a pretty good prospect of success

and a security of making a safe retreat in case we miscarry in the field.

Resolved we reply to the above mentioned purpose and recommend to the Colonel a decisive engagement as the only alternative we think there is left us, provided he thinks there is a good prospect of success, which we have no doubt of if it's attempted without delay. At the same time it must be remembered when we engaged in the confederacy to change the Government in favour of Meir Jaffeir we were informed that Roydolub, Jugget-seat and others had likewise entered into it: we think therefore that we should not act of ourselves only, unless we find no assistance can be expected from them, in which case we must conclude the whole is united against us.

ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, RICHARD BECHER.

469. *Message from Colonel Clive to Jafar Ali Khan, dated Placis, 23 June, 1757. Dispatched at 7 a.m.*[1]

Whatever could be done by me I have done, I can do no more. If you will come to Daudipore I will march from Placis to meet you, but if you won't comply even with this, pardon me, I shall make it up with the Nabob.

470. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive. No date. Received 23 June, 1757, at 5 p.m.* (*No.* 1.)

Your note is arrived. I was in the Nabob's presence on this plain, and observed that everybody was intimidated. He sent for me and flung his *turband* off before me, and one day he made me write on the side of the Koran so that I cannot come over to you. By the blessing of God you have the better of the day. Meer Murdun was wounded by a ball and is since dead. *Buxshee* Hazarry is killed, and ten or fifteen horsemen are killed and wounded. Roydullubrum, Luttee Codair Cawn, and myself are moved from the right to the left. Make a great and sudden discharge and they will run away and we shall do our part. The Colonel, the Rajah, Cawn, and myself, we four men, must absolutely consult together on the proper measures to be taken.

[1] Sent by Omar Beg.

We will certainly finish the matter; the *bildars* and *beldears* (gunmen and pioneers) have acted according to their agreement. I swear by my Prophet that the above is fact. Attack him at 3 in the morning; they will run away, and then will be my opportunity. The forces want to return to the City. Attack him in the night by all means. We three shall be to the left of the Nabob. Coja Haddee will remain firm to the Nabob. If you come you may have an opportunity of seizing [him]. We three are ready for your service and will see you by and by. The *buxshee* is killed and Sangaram is disabled. The commanders of the foot and of the swordmen have left the intrenchments, leaving the guns there. I have mentioned but a small part of the loss that the part of the army commanded by Meer Murdun has sustained. Had you taken that opportunity to advance with your army there had been nothing more to do. It grieves me that I was then at a distance. Your man was present while the above passed. Coddum Hossein, Meerun, Meer Cassim, Luttee Cawn, and Raja Dulubrum all send their *salam* to the Colonel and the rest of the gentlemen.

471. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive (no date, received 23 June, 1757) (2).*

Your note is arrived. Your trusty man is taken. I congratulate you on executing your design. Mirza Aumar Beg or Mr. Watts or Coja Petrus, send one of them to me. I am here on the banks of the lake agreeable to your desire.

472. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Mirza Omar Beg (enclosed in No. 449).*

I congratulate you. I am on the banks of the lake. If Mr. Watts would come to-night the affair would be over. If Mr. Watts does not come bring Petrus with you. The Nabob is gone from hence and will arrive in the city at 12 at night. Agreeable to the Colonel's writing I am upon the banks of the *nulla*.[1] I therefore call you that we may take proper measures. I send you this by my servant that you may come immediately, that I may march in the morning.

[1] Ditch or ravine.

473. *Military Return.*

(*a*) A RETURN OF THE KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING OF THE TWO BATTALIONS UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLIVE, 23 JUNE 1757.

	KILLED					WOUNDED							MISSING		
	Sergeants	Corporals	Gunners	Matrosses	Total	Lieutenants.	Sergeants	Corporals	Centinels	Bombardiers	Gunners	Matrosses	Total	Centinels.	Total of the Whole
1st Battalion															
King's troops	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	4	—	4
Bengal troops	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	—	—	—	4	2	6
Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	—	3
Total	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	5	—	—	2	11	2	13
2nd Battalion															
Madras troops	—	1	—	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	4
Bombay troops	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	3
Artillery	—	1	1	1	3	1	—	1	—	2	1	—	5	—	8
Total ...	—	2	1	1	4	1	4	1	—	2	1	—	9	2	15

JOHN FRASER,
Major of Brigade.

(*b*) GENERAL RETURN OF SEPOYS KILLED AND WOUNDED, JUNE 23RD, 1757.

	KILLED			WOUNDED							
	Jemidars	Sepoys	Total	Subadars	Jemidars	Havildars	Narcks	Colour Men.	Sepoys	Total.	Grand Total.
Coast Establishment	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	14	19	22
Bengal Establishment	1	12	13	—	—	—	2	—	15	17	30
Total . .	2	14	16	1	1	1	3	1	29	36	52

N B.—Three Sepoy Sergeants of the Bengal Establishment wounded.

JOHN FRASER,
Major of Brigade.

474. *Letter from Mr. Vernet to the Dutch Director and Council, Hugli, dated 24 June, 1757.*[1]

The purport of this is only to inform you, that the English army having encamped the day before yesterday in the groves of Plassey, being attacked yesterday morning by the vanguard of the Nawab, consisting of 15,000 men, commanded by Mohonlaal, Meer Modum, Manik Chand, Coja Haddie, and Nauwe Singh Hazarie, the English offered such a vigorous resistance that the Moors were compelled to quit the field and retreat to Mangor Parra where the Nawab had pitched his tents. The English lost but few men and were, therefore, encouraged to resume the attack without leaving the foe much time for consideration, in which they succeeded so well, that the Nawab's entire army was completely routed. The Nawab arrived with his defeated hordes, after a hurried and disorderly flight, at Moorshedabad about midnight, but Jafar Ali Khan, Rajah Durlabh Ram and Khodadad Khan Latty have joined the English, so it is said, with the view of besieging the Nawab who holds Mansurganj (which he has had fortified) and to proclaim Jafar Ali Khan Nawab.

In the first attack there were sixty Frenchmen and several Portuguese, commanded by Monsieur St. Frais, late Secretary of that nation, and an officer at the head of the army, of whom until now but twenty common soldiers have come in. The others are supposed to have been killed, and taken prisoners. Of the Chiefs of the Nawab's army Mir Madan and Nouw Singh Hasarie have perished, Mohan Lal, Manikchand and Coja Haddie have been wounded.

We have the honour to be, with great respect, &c., &c.

475. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Jafar Ali Khan, dated Daudpur, 24 June, 1757 (by Mr. Scrafton).*

I congratulate you on the victory, which is yours not mine. I should be glad if you would join me with the utmost expedition. We propose marching to-morrow to compleat the conquest that God has blessed us with, and I hope to have the honour of pro-

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

claiming you Nabob. Mr. Scrafton will congratulate you on my part. From him you will know how much I am yours.

476. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Daudpur, 24 June,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I wrote you last night[1] of the victory we had gained over the Nabob. I am now more at leisure to give you a particular account of the action. About 6 in the morning, the whole army appeared marching towards us from Daudpoore, inclining their march to the right of Placis Grove, as if they intended to surround us: they took possession of the adjacent eminences with their cannon, which appeared to be regularly supported by their horse and foot. A detachment of their army commanded by Meer Murdun, and supported by about thirty Frenchmen with several pieces of cannon took possession of a Tank within musquet shot of us. From thence, and from the rest of their artillery then up, consisting of twelve pieces of cannon, from twenty-four to three pounders, they cannonaded us very briskly, and had their cannon well pointed. We played only three field pieces against them, but were so happy as to kill Meer Murdun, Badre Ally Cawn, Mohun Loll's son-in-law, the commander of the *Belears*, and several other officers of distinction. This loss had such an effect on them, that they abandoned the Tank, which we advanced and took possession of immediately. Mohun Loll and Monickchund were the first to retreat, and were presently followed by the Nabob, Meer Cossim and others, but the French, making a stand at a breastwork that was part of the fortification of their old camp, put some courage into their troops again, and drew up within their old camp and in front of the Grove, and their musquetry supported by their horse took possession of a bank within musquet shot of the Tank, from thence and from their old camp they kept a continual fire on us, and made many attempts to bring their cannon on, but we kept so brisk a fire that they could not get their *coolies* and oxen to advance. At about 4 the grenadiers and *seapoys* stormed both these places; at the same time their ammunition blew up; after which the enemy fled with the utmost

[1] See No 481.

precipitation, and we pursued them till night. We have taken about forty pieces of cannon, and the roads are strewed with *hackaries* and baggage of all kinds; the loss of the enemy I conceive to be about 500 men. We had about 20 Europeans and 30 *seapoys* killed and wounded. During the warmest part of the action we observed a large body of forces composing the left wing of the army marching towards the right of Placis Grove; these proved to be Jaffeir Ally Cawn and his party, but as they made no signals to testify their being friends, we fired on them and made them keep their distance. I have the pleasure to inform you, *Meer Jaffeir came to me this morning*, and made many expressions of gratitude to the English, and assured us he would be faithful to his treaty; his forces are about 3,000 men, and he tells me the principal *jemidars* have promised him the Nabob shall not escape. He is now on his march to the city. As the troops have undergone much fatigue, I cannot expect to get further than Moncura to-night. I have no further intelligence of the Nabob than that he made the best of his way to the city. I hear he has destroyed our Factory at Cossimbuzar.

477. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan, to Colonel Clive, dated 25 June, 1757, at 8 a.m.*

About 11 at night he fled: at 12 I was advised of it. I have sent people after him. By the blessing of God he will be taken. Wherever you are continue. When I write you, proceed.

478. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive, no date (received 25 June, 1757, at 6 p.m.).*

By Rungeet Roy I sent you word that his fortune was changed, and he has run away, but he is at his house. Mohun Loll he has dispatched to Purneah with his women and many treasures. I hope in God to take them all. Sir, I hope on receipt of this you will oblige me by advancing with your army to Chunacolly. On your arrival to-morrow Surajah Dowlat will be either taken or killed. Arrive soon. Do not delay.

479. *Letter from Jafar Ali Khan to Colonel Clive, dated* 26 *June,* 1757.

I have had the honour of your note advising me you was on your march, and that you would stay at Moidapore. Mohun Loll and his son are now brought back here prisoners. Twenty-five *hackeries* and some elephants belonging to his *beteri*[1] are also taken. Narrain Sing and all the other *hircarahs* are arrived. I have dispatched part of my army in pursuit of Surajah Dowlat whose fortune has now changed. With God's assistance they will soon bring him back prisoner. Of this you need make no doubt.

480. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Mandipore,* 26 *June,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received a letter from Mr. Drake in answer to my letters[2] to the Committee, which is very unusual on such important occasions and I cannot help thinking that had the expedition miscarried you would have laid the whole blame upon me.

As there are several very important mercantile affairs to be settled, and as Mr. Manningham is a very proper person for that purpose, his assistance must consequently be of great service to the Company. I therefore desire the favour you will send him here immediately.

481. *Fort William Select Committee Proceedings,* 26 *June,* 1757.

At a Committee. Present the Honourable Roger Drake Esq. President, Messrs. Charles Manningham and Richard Becher.

This instant we received the following letter from Colonel Clive *viz.*

To Charles Watson Esq. and the Gentlemen of the Committee of Fort William,

GENTLEMEN,—This morning at one o'clock we arrived at Placis Grove, and early in the morning the Nabob's whole army appeared in sight and cannonaded us for several hours, and about noon returned to a very strong camp in sight, lately Roydoolub's, upon which we advanced and stormed the

[1] Retinue [2] Probably refers to No 461.

Nabob's camp, which we have taken with all his cannon and pursued him six miles, being now at Doudpoor and shall proceed for Muxadavad to-morrow. Meer Jaffeir, Roydoolub and Luttee Cawn gave us no other assistance than standing neuter. They are with me with a large force. Meer Muddun and five hundred horse are killed and three elephants. Our loss is trifling, not above twenty Europeans killed and wounded.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

Doudpoor, 23 June, 1757

Ordered the Secretary to wait upon Admiral Watson with the before-mentioned letter.

482. *Letter from Messrs. Watts and Walsh to Colonel Clive, dated Muxadavad, 26 June, 1757.*

SIR,—We waited on the Nabob this morning and went through the ceremony of his *Durbar* for full two hours, when he and Roy-Dulup retired with us, but instead of Juggat Seat's advancing the money, Roy Dulup with his whole stock of *Gentue* rhetorick endeavoured to persuade us that the Treasurer had been examined, and it appeared there could not be above a *crore* and 40 *lack* in the Treasury, and added that Juggat Seat could not advance *crores* of rupees; we were not acquainted with facts sufficiently to contest the matter well with Roy Dulup, but desired we might talk with Moonloll and carry him to visit Saabat Jung, which with some difficulty, on Roy Dulup's part, was consented to. When we asked Roy Dulup at what time he and Monickchund proposed setting out for camp, he answered till this affair was settled he could not think of going. In short he appears to pride himself in shuffling and tricking, and we are persuaded, whilst he is Minister, our affairs will meet with all the interruption that *Gentue* cunning can raise.

We should be glad you would *interrogate Omichund* and let us know his sentiments of the Nabob's wealth. He told Mr. Watts he knew all the places where the treasures were hoarded; for hoards there are and many by the information we have had. He would certainly be a necessary person here, if he was not always so full of taking care of himself.

The violent rain this afternoon prevents our waiting on you with Moonloll as we intended, but we shall set out to-morrow morning. We expect a visit from Monickchund and from Juggat Seat's brother, from whom we may be able to learn many particulars. The latter is just coming, so we conclude.

We are, Sir, &c. &c., WILLIAM WATTS, JOHN WALSH.

483. *Letter from Colonel Clive to select Committee, Fort William, dated Cossimbazar, 27 June,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received your letter of the 23rd instant,[1] the contents of which are so indefinite and contradictory that I can put no other construction on it, than an intent to clear yourselves at my expense, had the expedition miscarried. It puts me in mind of the famous answer of the Delphic oracle to Pyrrhus, '*Aio te Claude Romanos vincere posse.*'

The chicanery and villany of Roy Dulub obliges me to go to-morrow to the City to prevent the ill consequence that attends the great power lodged in his hands, so prejudicial both to the Nabob and the Company, as also to hasten the execution of the treaty, to which he would otherwise be a great obstacle, as he pretends the whole ballance in the Treasury is but one *crore* and forty *lack* of rupees. I shall see the Nabob and Juggut Seat to-morrow, and consult with them on what measures to be taken to get Serajah Dowlat into his hands, and to fix the government on a solid foundation.

484. *Letter from Messrs. Watts and Walsh to Colonel Clive, dated 27 June,* 1757. 1 *p.m.*

Rungeet Roy is despatched to us by Juggatseat to desire that you will not come into town this afternoon for treachery is intended you. A consultation was held last night between Meerum, Roydulup and Cossim Hussain Cawn about cutting you off at your visit to the Nabob. You may return on pretence of illness if you are on the road, but it will be necessary to write of it. Juggatseat will then visit you to-morrow morning. He begs

[1] I have not been able to find this letter, but its nature may be judged from the Proceedings of the same date. See No 468

you will not mention a syllable of this intelligence as you value his life. The Nabob's jewels and treasures have been taken and privately sent to Goodagurry. What we hear further we will either write to you or tell you by word of mouth.

485. *Letter from the Admirals and Select Committee to Colonel Clive, dated Fort William, 29 June, 1757.*

SIR,—We have received your several letters of the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th instant, and with great pleasure observe and congratulate you on the rapid success therein mentioned. The revolution effected by your gallant conduct, and the bravery of the officers and soldiers under you is of extraordinary importance, not only to the Company but to the British nation in general; that we think it incumbent to return you and your officers our sincere thanks on behalf of His Britannic Majesty and the East India Company for your behaviour on this critical and important occasion.

Although in your last letter Jaffier Ally Khan is stiled Nabob, yet we have not ventured on that authority to make any public rejoicings for him as *Subah* of these Provinces. We should be glad therefore to be informed in your next letter if he has been proclaimed in form, and is in possession of the government. This will add very much to our satisfaction, and give us a proper opening to address him as the *Subah*, proclaim him such in our town, and salute his accession.

We have, &c. &c., CHARLES WATSON, GEORGE POCOCK, ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR, CHARLES MANNINGHAM, RICHARD BECHER.

Fort William, 29 June, 1757.

486. *Letter from Roger Drake, Junior, to Colonel Clive, dated Calcutta, 29 June, 1757.*

SIR,—Your agreeable favour to the Committee of the 26th arrived this instant. The *Kent*, *Tiger* and Fort fired 21 guns at noon. When we are certainly informed that Meer Jaffeir is proclaimed we shall make a whole day of rejoicing. Pray be so good, as I have bad Persian writers here, to get Omichund or some other to draw up a copy of a letter for me to write Meer Jaffeir, and send it

me as soon as possible. I depend on you for this, and for further friendly acts you have greatly in your power to confer on him who is with great truth and regard, &c. &c.

ROGER DRAKE, JUNIOR.

487. *Letter from Mr. Vernet to Mr. Bisdom, dated 29 June, 1757.*[1]

The army of the English was no sooner arrived here than Mr. Watts betook himself to the *Darbar* to demand the observance of the conditions stipulated, and whereas it has come to our knowledge that they are seeking to gain possession of the district of Kutwa or Santipur, the revenues of which would enable them to maintain two thousand military in this direction for the support of the Nawab, we have instantly ordered the *wakil* to go and point out to Rajah Durlabh Ram how injurious it was, not merely for us, but also for the King's revenues to give any *aurungs*, however small they may be, in ownership to the English, besides that not being the right way to keep the land in peace, for that it was to be expected that our Masters who are much more powerful than the English in these countries, seeing that that nation acquired such great privileges by force of arms, would also wish to try to do the same, but that on the contrary, if the Nawab showed us, who were the oldest and greatest traffickers in his territories, similar favours, we did not doubt, but what our Masters and Superiors would send troops to assist the Nawab just as well as the English. We have also ordered him to again broach the question of the points of the afore-mentioned *darkhast*.

We have the honour to be with respect, &c., &c.

488. *Description of the Battle of Plassey.*[2]


Messrs Boddam and Sykes must have carried to Calcutta the situation of the army at Catua on the 20th instant. The 22nd in the morning we crossed the river, and at 4 afternoon marched. After a fatiguing march of twelve or fifteen miles the van arrived at Plassey Grove (twenty miles from Muxidevad) at 11; the rear hardly came up before 3 in the morning. We had advice that night,

[1] Vernet Papers, the Hague

[2] Endorsed, 'A narrative of the battle near Muxidavad,' and dated 'Cossimbazar, 29 June, 1757'

that the Nabob was advanced as far as Doudpoor, within four miles of us ; but the accounts were afterwards contradicted, that it was only Raydoolab with an advanced guard. In the morning of the 23rd. our advanced picquet perceived the enemy in possession of a camp, which Raydoolab had fortified with an entrenchment, within a mile of us, along the banks of the river, but as it may enable you and any other of your friends to conceive a better idea of it, I enclose you a sketch of the field of battle.[1] About 7 from the top of the brick house we perceived the enemy moving out of their camp, some few advanced along the bank of the river, but their main body as you see marked in the plan ; at this time our two battalions lay upon their arms, as they did all night, their front towards the river and their right towards the brick house, without the Grove *fronting the Nabob's camp ;* the *sepoys* most in the Grove, our picquet with two pieces of cannon to the northward of the Grove, fronting the Nabob's camp. We were likewise informed that the body of the enemy which was in sight, had no cannon with them. On thus seeing them in motion, we formed our whole line a few yards to the northward of the Grove, our left close to the brick house, and our right extending beyond the Grove. We were scarcely drawn up in this manner, when a 24lb shott from their camp, bounding along, and carrying off the arm of one of the King's granadiers, convinced us that their cannon was come up. Finding we were thus exposed to their heavy artillery, at a distance too great for ours to annoy them much, the battalions and *sepoys* were ordered to retire and lye upon their arms within the bank of the Grove, fronting the enemy as before and drawn up in the same order. Our houbitz was advanced about half way to the first Tank, and our eight guns properly divided in the intervals, betwixt the battalions and *sepoys*, but advanced a little distance without the banks of the Grove. In this situation our men lay in pretty good security from the cannonadement, and as the enemy advanced out towards our right, which they now begun to do in vast multitudes, our artillery played upon them pretty [very] briskly, though the distance was still too great. The enemy's cannon moved along, and in front of their main body, in such a

[1] This appears to be a copy of a sketch which is to be found in the Madras Records, and which is ascribed to Clive himself See under date in Historical Introduction.



PLAN OF THE PLASSEY GROVE (Ascribed to Clive).

Stanford's Geog.l Estab.t London

manner that their whole front was almost covered with the bullocks that drew them. They filed off to their left till they covered the ground you see marked in the plan, and every now and then made a halt to turn their artillery upon us, then proceeded small bodies advanced to the two Tanks, and they brought some of their cannon down along the banks of the river, and from thence played very briskly. We perceived amongst them numbers of Europeans, and as we afterwards found about fifty French had possession of that part. In this situation we continued cannonading till 2 afternoon; the artillery being most exposed suffered considerably. About 12 a heavy shower of rain came on, we had some apprehension that the enemy would take advantage of this opportunity, and make a push with their horse, but our guns continued to play very briskly, prevented any such motion. The enemy's guns during the rain which lasted half an hour did not fire a shott. The enemy whether from the smartness of the fire from our guns, or some of their chiefs being killed, or what other motive, begun at this time to retire, and withdraw their cannon within their entrenchments. The opportunity of attacking them in such a situation was too great to be neglected. Accordingly Major Kilpatrick advanced to the first Tank with two pieces of cannon, covered with the King's granadiers, and three platoons from the right of the battalion. The few of the enemy who possessed it soon retired from this advantageous post; our two guns put them in some disorder, but notwithstanding they filed off again to their left, and brought such of their cannon out of their camp as they had retired. They extended their line still further to their left than they had done before, which gave us reason to apprehend they had intentions to enter the Grove to the southward, but our *sepoys*, moving to our right, put a stop to it. The enemy's cannonadement beginning afresh the Colonel moved up with two pieces of cannon more to the Tank. A little before this our whole line moved out some distance on the Plain, but finding they did not attempt any push on the Tank, they were again ordered to retire into the Grove, to save them from the enemy's cannon. Our four guns from the top of the Tank, being a rising ground, played upon the enemy, who covered the Plain with their numbers and at no very great distance, with vast success. They had got posses-

sion of the second Tank with horse and *burgundasses* or gunmen, (as many as it could hold or cover themselves from our cannon behind it), and from thence with their musquetry wounded several of our men: amongst them Lieutenant Cassells and Holts of the Train, but slightly. The body of the enemy stood in this manner exposed to our guns; they endeavoured to use theirs but as we perceived them turn them towards us, we took care to fire on those parts, which put their bullocks in such confusion that we received but few shott; their cannonadement slacked gradually and ours rather quickened. It seemed now time to possess ourselves of the second Tank, though the fire of musquetry from thence was very warm. The detachment at the first Tank with some *sepoys* in front (being ordered) accordingly rushed on, fired on the enemy when they got to the top, and drove them off with such precipitation that their whole army, (seeing the fury with which we advanced and they not following) abandoned their guns, took to their heels, and left us masters of the field and their entrenchments. We pursued as close as order could permit, by which means the pannick so seized the Nabob and most of his army that before 12 that night he and them arrived at Muxidavad, leaving behind them scattered on the road most of their carriages and baggage. They left us forty-two pieces of cannon, mostly large and the bullocks in the draught. Thus we obtained a victory with about 1,000 military, a third hardly Europeans, and 2,000 *sepoys*, without the assistance of the expected junction of Jaffer Ally Khan, against 40,000 Gunmen and 20,000 Horse, as we are since informed by Monloll the Nabob's Prime Minister and *dewan*. We had killed and wounded Europeans and *sepoys* 80, and by Jaffer Ally Khan's own account the enemy had 500 killed, and as many wounded, amongst them several chief *jemidars*. The Nabob made his escape next morning from Muxidevad and Jaffer Ally Khan waited on Colonel Clive, and is now proclaimed Nabob.

489. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated 30 June, 1757.*

Surajah Dowlet was taken by one of the Nabob's *jemidars* and suffered to escape for a bribe of 30,000 gold *mohurs*. As all his

treasures have been taken from him I don't think he can do much harm. Ram Narain, the Nabob of Patna, is confirmed and will scarcely risque his place for a man who has not wherewith to bribe him.

490. *Letter from Colonel Clive to the Select Committee, Fort William, dated Muxadavad, 30 June, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I entered the city yesterday morning with a party of 200 Europeans and 300 *seapoys*, and *took up my quarters at Moraud Baug near the palace.*[1] In the afternoon I waited on Jaffeir Ally Cawn, being escorted to him by his son. As I found he declined taking his seat on the *musnud*,[2] I handed him to it; and saluted him as Nabob, upon which his courtiers congratulated him and paid him the usual homage. As this was a visit of ceremony, we could enter very little upon business. I only attempted to convince them, that it was not the maxims of the English to war against the Government, but that Surajah Dowlat not only would not fulfil the treaty he had entered into with us, but was taking measures by calling in the French to destroy us; but it had pleased God to overthrow him, and that as the present Nabob was a brave and good man, the country might expect to be quiet and happy under him; that for our parts we should not anyways interfere in the affairs of the Government, but leave that wholly to the Nabob; that as long as his affairs required it, we were ready to keep the field, after which we should return to Calcutta and attend solely to commerce, which was our proper sphere and our whole aim in these parts.

On my return home I had a visit from Juggut Seat with whom I had a good deal of conversation. As he is a person of the greatest property and influence in the three *subahs*, and of no inconsiderable weight at the *Mogul's* Court, it was natural to determine on him, as the properest person to settle the affairs of this Government; accordingly when the Nabob returned my visit this

[1] From this and other passages it may be seen that Clive did not take up his abode in the Nawab's palace, whereas a French writer (M Louis Herman, *Histoire de la rivalité des Français et des Anglais dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1847) asserts that he was under the same roof as Siraj-uddaula when the latter was murdered

[2] The cushion or seat used by Oriental sovereigns in place of a throne.

morning, I recommended to him to consult Juggut Seat on all occasions, which he readily assented to, and immediately proposed, that as the money in the Treasury fell short of his expectations, and was not sufficient to satisfie his obligations to us, and leave him wherewithal for his necessary expences, Juggut Seat should likewise mediate that matter between us; which proposal was too agreeable to me to decline, for, as I had sufficient reason to think great sums had been secreted and made away with by his Ministers, it would have been both a difficult and invidious task for me to have sifted into this affair. *Accordingly we agreed to visit Juggut Seat* immediately, that all subject for heart burnings on this account on either side might be removed out of hand; which being put in practice, Juggut Seat after a long but friendly debate settled the point as follows:—that we should be paid one-half of our demand immediately, two-thirds in money and one-third in jewels, plate and goods, and the other half should be paid within three years at three yearly and equal payments. When I consider the state of the Treasury as it appeared to us, and that a sufficiency must necessarily be left to the Nabob for payment of his troops, to whom long arrears were due for services under the late Nabob, I cannot say but the terms exceeded my expectation.

As it was absolutely necessary to satisfy Roy Dulub, who is the principal Minister, and through whose hands our affairs must pass, I thought it not improper to admit him to a commission of 5 *per cent.* and Juggut Seat representing that he had been a sufferer of seven *lack* by the French, and as he was joining in measures for their extirpation, it was probable he should never be paid; I agreed, provided you approved of it, that he might take what goods of theirs should be found at their out-Settlements and *aurungs*, and the ballance should be made good by our Company, provided he could not recover it from them. After which he assured us, that we might be persuaded of his best services, and rest satisfied that he would get the present Nabob confirmed from Delhi, represent our transactions in the fairest light, and procure for us any *phirmaund* we may have occasion for. His advice to the Nabob in general was to replace Allyverdi Cawn's officers in their old posts.

It was agreed that letters should be wrote by the Nabob and myself to the *Naib* of Patna with offers of friendship, and

desiring him to deliver up Surajah Dowlat or drive him out of the Province, as we understood he had taken his route that way.

That for fear of refusal we should keep ourselves in readiness to march northwards, and that the My Rajah should be desired to prepare to march into the province of Patna on his side.

If you can prevail upon the Admiral to fit out and mann two sloops-of-war, and let them proceed immediately to Patna, it will be very agreeable to the Nabob and of great service to the general cause

I must request the favour to forward to me immediately Persian copies of the treaties with Surajah Dowlat and Jaffeir Ally Cawn and the *perwannahs* and *dusticks* given us by the former. If the translations are ready, I should likewise be glad of them, as I have brought none of my papers with me.

491. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Muxadabad, late at night,* 30 *June,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—I wrote you a letter this evening since which I have received a note from the Nabob informing me that Surajah Dowlat is taken and that he has dispatched his son to secure him. I congratulate you on this happy news.

492. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort Saint George. dated Muxadavad,* 2 *July,* 1757.

GENTLEMEN,—Sometime since I acquainted the President by a letter, despatched under a Dutch cover, of the necessity there was to overset Surajah Dowla. I have now the happiness to inform you that great event is completely brought about. He still delayed under different pretences to fulfil the grand points of the treaty, such as delivering us the villages, making good the Calcutta ballance and admitting the currency of our *siccas.* At the same time we found him designing our ruin by a conjunction with the French; pressing invitations were sent to Monsieur Bussey to come into the province and Monsieur Law's party (then in his pay at 10,000 rupees *per* month) was ordered to return from Patna, of all which we had certain knowledge by authentic copies of his own letters. At this juncture some principal officers of his army

made overtures to us, at the head of whom was Jaffir Ally Khan who had long been *Buxey*, and was a man as generally esteemed as the other was detested. We soon entered into a private treaty to make him Nabob, and, having prepared everything with the utmost secrecy, the army consisting of 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 *seapoys* with eight pieces of cannon marched from Chandernagore the 13th in the morning and arrived the 18th at Cutwa Fort which was taken without opposition. The 22nd in the evening we crossed the river and landing on the island[1] marched straight for Plassey, where we arrived by 1 in the morning. At daybreak we discovered the Nabob's army, consisting of about 15,000 horse and 35,000 foot with upwards of 40 pieces of cannon, moving towards us. They approached apace and by 6 began the attack with a number of heavy cannon supported by the whole army, and continued to play upon us very briskly for several hours, during which our very advantageous situation saved us greatly, being possessed of a large *tope* surrounded with a good mud bank. To succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they were planted in a manner round us and a considerable distance from each other; we therefore remained quiet in our post in expectation of a successful attack upon their camp at night. The enemy retiring to their camp about noon with their artillery we sent a detachment and two field pieces to take possession of a Tank with high banks from whence they had considerably annoyed us with some cannon which were managed by Frenchmen. This brought them out a second time, but as we found they made no great effort to dislodge us we proceeded to take possession of one or two more eminences lying very near one angle of their camp, round which run a ditch and breastwork, from whence and an adjacent eminence, still in their possession, they kept a smart fire of musquetry upon us. They made several attempts to bring out their cannon, but our field pieces played so warmly and well upon them that they were always drove back. The Horse exposed themselves a good deal on this occasion; many of them was killed and among the rest four or five officers of the first distinction, which, dispiriting the enemy and throwing them into some confusion, we were encouraged to storm the eminence and angle

[1] i e , the island of Cossimbazar.

of their camp. Both which were attempted at the same time and carried with little or no loss, though the latter was defended, exclusive of blacks, by forty French and two pieces of cannon, and the former by a large body of Foot and Horse. On this a general rout ensued, and we pursued the enemy six miles taking upwards of forty pieces of cannon which they had abandoned. The roads were strewed with *hacarys* and filled with baggage of all kinds. Their loss is computed at about five hundred men. On our side there were twenty-two killed and fifty wounded and those chiefly blacks. Surajah Dowla saved himself on a camel and reached the City early next morning; dispatched away what jewels and treasure he conveniently could, and followed himself at midnight attended only by four or five persons.

During the warmest part of the action we observed a large body of troops hovering on our right, who proved to be our friends, but, as they made no signal by which we could discover them, we frequently fired on them to make them keep their distance. After the action they sent their compliments and encamped that night in our neighbourhood. The next morning Jaffir Ally Cawn paid me a visit and expressed much gratitude for the great services we had done him, assuring us in the most solemn manner that he would faithfully fulfil the treaty he had made with us. He then proceeded to the City which he reached some hours before Surajah Dowla left it. As on his flight Jaffir Ally Cawn was in quiet possession of the palace and City, *I encamped without to prevent ravage and disorder, first at Mandipoor and afterwards at the French Factory at Sydabad.*[1] The 29th I entered the city with only a party of 200 Europeans and 300 *sepoys* and *took up my quarters in a spacious house and garden near the palace.*[1] The same day I waited on Jaffir Ally Cawn who refused seating himself on the *musnud* till placed on it by me, which done he received the homage and congratulations of all the courtiers as Nabob. The next morning he returned the visit and on my recommending to him to consult Jaggat Seat on all occasions, who as the man of the greatest property in the Kingdom, would give him the best advice for its tranquility and security, we agreed to pay him a visit immediately together, at which a firm union was entered into by us three, and Jaggatseat

[1] See note 1, p. 437

engaged to use his influence at Delhi (which is very great) both to get the Nabob confirmed and procure for us such *phirmaunds* as we should have occasion for.

The principal Articles of our treaty with the present Nabob are a confirmation of all grants both in the *Mogul's phirmaund* and the treaty with Surajah Dowla; an alliance offensive and defensive against all enemies, Europeans or country, the delivery of the French and their property into our hands and a perpetual exclusion of them from these provinces; a tract of land extending between the lake and river from Calcutta to Culpee to be given to the Company, also one *crore* of rupees 50 *lack* to the European sufferers at the loss of Calcutta, twenty *lack* to the blacks, seven to the Armenians, and fifty to the army and navy. All the Articles to be fulfilled within one month from his accession to the *Subahship*.

As the sum in the Treasury did not appear enough to satisfy our demand, much less leave a sufficiency for the Nabob to pay his troops, which was indispensably necessary, it was left to Jaggatseat as a mutual friend to settle what we should receive, whose determination was that we should immediately be paid one half, two thirds in money and one third in jewels, plate and goods, and that the other half should be discharged within three years at three equal and annual payments.

I have just had advice of Surajah Dowla's being taken near Rajahmaul in a distressed condition with hardly cloaths to his back, such is the misery he has been reduced to by his injuries to the English and by a general course of folly and wickedness throughout the short time he has reigned. Our victory is very complete, and the present Nabob seems happily settled in his government and with universal approbation. My presence therefore in this quarter I imagine will not be required much longer. When you have thoroughly considered the critical situation the Company's affairs were in on this Establishment after the taking of Chandernagore and the nice and important game that was to be played with the late Nabob, I flatter myself you will alter the sentiments you are pleased to express in your late letters with regard to my having kept the troops here. I cannot at this time reply to those letters, nor even acquaint you what are received, as all my papers are left at Chandernagore.

I am now using my utmost endeavours to secure Monsieur Laws and his party who are still at Patna. The French I spoke of in the action were some fugitives, who had assembled at Sydabad under Monsieur Sinfray, late secretary of Chandernagore, and who advised, and I understand had the principal hand in, burning and destroying Cassimbuzar Factory.

I must acquaint you that some days before I left Chandernagore letters arrived from the Nanna desiring our friendship, for that he would engage to enter the Province with 150,000 Marattas and make good to us double of all the losses we had sustained; that as we were powerful in ships we might keep out the French by sea, and he would take care to do it by land. In answer I have just wrote him of our success, and that Jaffir Ally Cawn is in peaceful possession of the kingdom, and will duly pay him the *chout*.[1]

The late Nabob's spies have hitherto prevented any *cossids* passing through Cuttack, but now I hope they will meet no further impediment. Jaggatseat has promised me to forward this safely to your hands. In a few days I expect to have an opportunity of addressing the Court of Directors by a twenty-gun ship dispatched from hence.

I have, &c. &c, ROBERT CLIVE.

P.S.—Surajah Dowla arrived in the city the 2nd at night and was immediately[2] dispatched having created some commotions in the army by the letters he wrote on the road to the several *jemidars*. Monsieur Laws and his party came as far as Rajamaul to his assistance, and were within three hours' march of him when he was taken. A party of the Nabob's horse and foot, followed by some of our military and *seapoys* are gone after the French, and I hope will give a good account of them. Gouzeoden Cawn and the *Mogul's* son are come down to Halabass and the Nabob of Owde with a numerous army is within seven *coss* of them. It's expected every hour to hear of a battle or compromise.

ROBERT CLIVE.

[1] The tax or blackmail levied by the Marathas

[2] According to other accounts, he was killed on July 4

493. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, and the two Admirals, dated 2 July, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—I have received the letter you did me the honour to write. Whatever merit may be due to me in this affair is overpaid by the notice you have taken of it. I shall not fail to acquaint the officers with your sentiments of their behaviour.

In my last I informed you the Nabob was fully confirmed and proclaimed *Subah* of the three Provinces, and to-day he sends presents to the two Admirals and President.

Surajah Dowlat will be in the City this evening; the Nabob who is a humane, generous and honest Prince, intends only to confine him and to allow him all the indulgence which a prison can admit of.

Yesterday we began to embark the treasure in boats, and in two days shall despatch under a proper guard, 75 *lack*, two-thirds of the sum stipulated to be paid in ready money off hand, 33⅓ belong to the Company, 16⅔ to the navy and army, 16⅔ to the private Europeans, and 9 to the Blacks.

I must therefore request the favour of Admiral Watson to send the boats of the squadron as far as Nudia to escort the treasure to Calcutta, our whole force being necessary here on many occasions; our guard will conduct them as far as that place, and deliver over the charge of the treasure to the commanding officer of the boats as soon as he arrives, each boat contains one *lack* in a large chest, nailed down and sealed.

494. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Select Committee, Fort William, dated Muxadavad, 4 July, 1757.*

GENTLEMEN,—Surajah Dowlat is no more. The Nabob would have spared him, but his son Miran and the great men thought his death necessary for the peace of the country, as on his approach to the city, the *jemidars* grew mutinous. He was publickly buried at Cooshe Baug yesterday morning.

495. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Admiral Watson, dated 7 July,* 1757.

It was fortunate Surajah Dowlat was taken at Rajamaul, for Mr. Laws and his party arrived there a few hours after. The Nabob has sent forces, and I likewise have sent a detachment of military and *seapoys* after him.

496. *Letter from Colonel Clive to M. Jean Law, dated Muxadavad, 9 July,* 1757.

SIR,—As the country people are now all become your enemies, and orders are gone everywhere to intercept your passage, and myself have sent parties in quest of you, and orders are gone to Ramnarain the *Naib* of Patna to seize you if you pursue that road, you must be sensible if you fall into their hands you cannot expect to find them a generous enemy. If, therefore, you have any regard for the men under your command, I would recommend you to treat with us, from whom you may expect the most favourable terms in my power to grant.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

497. *Letter from Select Committee, Fort William, to Secret Committee, London, dated 14 July,* 1757.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—1. We have given you a full account of the state of these Provinces and our transactions to the 26th of March, triplicate of which advices were forwarded by His Majesty's sloop of war, the *King Fisher.*

2. This letter is purposely to acquaint you of a happy revolution in the Government of this kingdom in favour of Jaffir Aly Khan, of the part we took in this affair, and our motives for it, and of the advantages obtained by espousing the present *Subah's* cause and placing the sway in his hands.

3. On the first of May Collonel Clive laid before us two letters he had received from Mr. Watts dated the 26th and 28th of April in which after some observations on the strangeness of the Nabob's behaviour, and that all degrees of people were perswaded he would break with us upon the first favourable opportunity, he proceeds

to inform the Collonel that Jaffir Aly Khan had sent for Coja Petrouse and given him to understand that most of the Nabob's principal officers were tired of his government and ready to desert him and set up another, if we would countenance and support the confederacy with the assistance of our troops; that if we approved of this scheme he desired our demands of what monies, lands, &c. would induce us to engage in the business. In the last of the above mentioned letters Mr. Watts repeats his apprehensions of the Nabob's design to break the treaty he made with us, urges a speedy answer might be sent to Jaffir Aly Khan's proposal, and gives it as his opinion the project was feasible and might be executed without much difficulty.

4. As a proposition of this importance required our most serious consideration, we accordingly debated maturely the consequences of embracing this offer, and whether it should be accepted or declined. After a long consultation in which every reason for and against the scheme was collected and deliberately argued on, it was the unanimous sense of the Committee that a revolution in the Government (whatever hands it fell into) would be advantageous to the English, that there could be no hurt in trying to effect it, as our good understanding with Seraja Dowla was extremely precarious, and a rupture with him universally expected as soon as the squadron and army left us, and that, by joining Jaffir Aly Khan to supplant him, we should obtain in all probability very beneficial terms for the Company as well as live free of any apprehensions from the country government. But as these general reasons would not have justified our embarking the Company in such an undertaking and hazarding a breach with Seraja Dowla after concluding the Peace we did, we think it necessary to recite at large our motives for engaging in a confederacy to change the government, and doubt not they will be esteemed sufficient by our Employers to vindicate our proceedings.

5. First it was evident to us from the whole tenour of the Nabob's behaviour since the Peace, that we could not possibly rely on his friendship, and that the treaty made with him would soon be violated when once he thought himself superior to us in strength. His delay in performing the agreement, many of the Articles being at that time as far from being compleated as at first,

the evasion of giving us any satisfaction for the losses suffered by our inhabitants through Monickchund's means, the small sum of money which was pretended to be given credit for in his *Sircarry* being scarce a tenth part of the loss sustained by the Europeans alone, with several other parts of his conduct were so many convincing proofs that his friendship was unsincere and that he could not abide by his treaty which the exigency of his situation alone inclined him to make.

6. Secondly, there was the greatest reason to imagine he was an utter enemy to the English and privately endeavouring to bring in the French with promises of joining them against us. We were confirmed in this opinion from the great aversion he showed to our molesting the French at Chandernagore, his espousing and protecting Monsieur Law and his party after that place was taken, his keeping them in his pay, and the certain intelligence we have received from all quarters of his writing frequently to Monsieur Boussé, sending him large presents and inviting him to march this way: this was so notorious that it was publickly talked of and known, his *cossids* passing almost daily through Ballasore, and but a few days before some elephants and *seerpaws* arrived at that place within passage to Monsieur Boussé's camp.

7. Lastly, there was great room to think he did not mean well by the orders he had given to fortifye Cutwah, and the removing of Suffras Cawn's family from Dacca into Pooranea; the interruptions our boats and people met with in their way to Cossimbuzar contrary to the treaty of Peace, with many actions of the same nature which put it beyond all doubt that his dislike and jealousie of our nation was rooted, and that he would not miss any opportunity of ruining our affairs and extirpating the English out of his country: it was therefore but common prudence to prevent our own ruin, which could not be done so effectually any other way than by divesting the Nabob of the power of hurting us.

8. Another inducement to undertake this affair was the universal hatred of all sorts and conditions of men to Seraja Dowla, the affection of his army alienated from him by his ill usage of the officers, and a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable it would be attempted (and perhaps successfully) even without our assistance, in which case it would have availed us but little,

whereas by countenancing the confederacy and supporting it with our whole force we might make our own terms, benefit our Employers both by present and future advantages, do a general good, procure some satisfaction to the inhabitants of our Colony for their heavy losses in the capture, establish the tranquillity of the country, and by that means open a greater currency than ever to our business, and lastly cut off the expectation of the French and keep them totally out of these dominions.

9. Motives so interesting and founded upon the prime law of self-preservation determined us to embrace the proposal made by Jaffir Aly Khan, provided adequate terms were granted in consideration of entering into a fresh war with the Nabob, whose consequence must have proved very detrimental to our affairs, if the success of it had not been answerable to our expectations. Accordingly after some consideration the following demands were esteemed equitable and reasonable to be asked, *viz.*, that our *phirmaund* and the priviledges acquired by the treaty with Seraja Dowla be confirmed and punctually complyed with; that restitution be made of the Company's whole loss, and the loss of the European inhabitants of Calcutta; that our bounds be augmented; that we have liberty to fortifye Cossimbuzar; that an offensive and defensive alliance be made against all enemies of both parties, as well Europeans as others, and that the French be not permitted to resettle in these provinces; that the Moors do not fortifye within twenty miles of the river side from Hughly down to Ingellie; and that the revenues of a certain tract of land be made over and assigned to us in consideration of our maintaining a good body of troops. These terms were accordingly transmitted to Mr. Watts to get Jaffir Aly Khan to assent to them.

10. On the 17th May Collonel Clive laid before us a letter from Mr. Watts with such Articles of agreement as Jaffir Aly Khan's confident had assured him would be accepted of, and requesting that if they were approved of by the Admiral and Committee they might be engrossed in cypher, signed and sealed by them, and returned to him to get them executed by Jaffir Aly Khan. As those Articles were greatly more advantageous for the Company than the terms we had demanded there could be no objection to them on our part. They were accordingly approved of and

ordered to be engrossed with some alterations relating to the satisfaction of private sufferers. The substance of them you will find in the translate of the Persian treaty herewith transmitted for your observation.

11. In order to prevent the least suspicion of what we were doing, our troops were ordered into quarters, part of them in Calcutta and part in Chandernagore, and the Nabob wrote to (agreeable to Jaffir Aly Khan's advice) to recall his army encamped at Plassey and Daudpore.

12. Matters being advanced thus far, it was next judged proper to obtain if possible a personal conference between Jaffir Aly Khan and some person of trust and confidence on our part. To effect this without alarming the Nabob's suspicions, it was proposed for the Collonel to send the Nabob a letter by Mr. Scrafton's hands acquainting him that he had an affair of consequence to communicate, by which means Mr. Scrafton might have an opportunity of seeing Jaffir Aly Khan and confer with him on the plan of operations for executing our project, to assure him of our attachment to his interest, and to use his endeavours to get such security as could well be given without discovering the scheme.

13. On the 19th May the treaty being engrossed in the manner Mr. Watts had requested, it was signed and sealed by the Admiral and the members of the Committee.

14. From that time till the 11th June, the Collonel received several letters from Mr. Watts confirming us in the opinion we had conceived of the Nabob's writing to Monsieur Boussé to march this way and extirpate the English. These letters likewise gave a detail of the progress of our negotiation with Jaffir Aly Khan, who on the 5th ultimo signed, sealed, and solemnly swore in the presence of Mr. Watts to abide by the treaty he had made with the English, and to perform punctually the agreement on his part as soon as he was in possession of the *Subahship*.

15. Mirza Omar Beg on the 11th ultimo arrived at the French Gardens where we assembled a Committee and had the treaty in Persian executed by Jaffir Aly Khan delivered us by the above mentioned person, who gave us the greatest assurance of his friendship and esteem for the English; that there would be very little difficulty in effecting a change of government, and that we

might depend upon it, Jaffir Aly Khan would be punctual in performing every Article of his agreement.

16. Mr. Watts his letters all urging the immediate march of our troops towards Muxadavad, and the Committee for many reasons judging it best to lose no time, as this appeared the most favourable conjuncture we could have to succeed in our enterprise, and as a delay might not only produce a discovery of our confederacy and consequently the ruin of our project but would greatly diminish our strength, while the Nabob would have time to augment his army by calling in his troops from all quarters and enlisting others, it was therefore resolved to set out immediately, and on the 13th of June our troops began their march.

17. On the 19th or 20th June Cutwah town and fort (a strong place) was taken by our troops, where the Collonel remained two or three days to get some advice or letter from Jaffir Aly Khan, having received but one in his way up. The 26th June we had the pleasure to receive a letter from him with the news of a compleat victory obtained over Seraja Dowla in the plains of Plassy, his whole army and himself being fled, and we in possession of his camp, ordnance, &c., that Jaffir Aly Khan, Roydoolub and Luttee Cawn had observed a neutrality during the engagement and were with the Collonel at the time of writing of his letter.

18. On the 29th we received the agreeable news of Jaffir Aly Khan's being in possession of the city and *kila* of Muxadavad, that Seraja Dowla had withdrawn privately, but it was not doubted would be soon taken, and that Mohunloll was prisoner at the city. In a letter of the 30th June Collonel Clive acquainted us of his having seated Jaffir Aly Khan in the *mussnud*, and that he had received the homages of his *zemindars* and people as *Subah* of the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa.

19. We now beg leave to congratulate you, Honourable Sirs, and the Company on our success in this important business and the happy change of government established in these dominions so fortunately and speedily. Our loss has been but very trifling, not above twenty Europeans being killed and wounded.

20. The advantages of the treaty made with the present Nabob are too apparent to want any comment, if the terms are punctually complied with which we have not the least reason to doubt. But

we must take the liberty to recommend to your serious consideration, the preservation of the grants and priviledges acquired by this revolution, which can be done only by keeping up a large body of troops in the country. As it is the Company's interest to exert themselves on this occasion, we make no doubt you will immediately enlist and send out a sufficient number of recruits to make a respectable garrison in Bengall, which should consist of a body of two thousand Europeans at least; which expences we think will be overpaid by the advantages of our acquisitions. We flatter ourselves therefore you will not on any account neglect the sending such a body of Europeans as we have mentioned to be necessary. This we are of opinion will be the only method of preventing in future the encroachments of the country government, to make our friendship and alliance courted, to carry on our trade on the securest footing, and to oppose the resettlement of the French in these provinces.

21. Upon examining the Treasury, Roydoolub pretended there was but one *crore*, and fifty *laacks* of rupees in ballance. This obliged Collonel Clive to go to the City himself in order to be near the Nabob. His letter of the 30th ultimo informs us, to put an end to all heart-burnings and jealousies between us and the Nabob, he agreed to refer the affair to Juggutseat's arbitration, that the Nabob and he accordingly went there and after some consideration Juggetseat desired the Collonel would not insist immediately on the full payment of the sums stipulated in the treaty, but that half should be made good without delay in money and jewels, the other half to be paid in three years at three annual and equal payments. These terms the Collonel consented to as they were better than he expected, considering the lowness of the Nabob's Treasury. Since which we learn that one-third in specie of the whole was actually embarking on boats for Calcutta.

22. But as the bad consequences of deferring the payment of any part of the money appeared to us too evident to be allowed of if it could be avoided, we have wrote the Collonel our sentiments thereon and desired the Gentlemen of the Select Committee who are at Muxadavad to use their best endeavours to obtain immediate payment, but, if that is not to be done, to get some good security from the Nabob to abide by his contract; that

tor our parts we should prefer Juggutseat's engaging to see it punctually made good, and next to that security a mortgage of such lands contiguous to Calcutta whose revenues will be equal to the sum to be received by us annually.

23. Having given you, Honourable Sirs, a very particular detail of our transactions since engaging in the confederacy to set up Jaffir Aly Khan, we have reason to flatter ourselves you will approve of our conduct through the whole of this nice but necessary step.

24. Mr. Manningham is gone up to Muxadavad to assist in hastening the completion of the treaty and settling such matters as relate to the mercantile part of it.

25. By a letter from Collonel Clive dated the 30th June late at night, we learnt that Seraja Dowla was taken, and by another letter of the 4th instant, we are informed of his being cut off by Jaffir Aly Khan's son and others.

26. Tranquillity being established by the change we have advised of, people's minds more at ease, and no apprehensions of trouble from the Government remaining, we have begun the purchase of this year's investment by sending money to the different *aurungs*, and hope with the assistance of the goods received from Seraja Dowla at our Subordinates and *aurungs* to be able to send the Company a handsome return from this Presidency.

27. As the sum of money to be received from the Nabob, even if Juggutseat's determination is to stand good, will greatly exceed our demands for the investment, we purpose to advertise that all interest notes will be discharged upon being tendered, and that in case the proprietors do not sue for payment before the 1st day of October next, the interest will cease from that day. This will ease the Company of a very heavy burden, and we hope will prove very agreeable news. In this place we must beg leave to remark that by Juggutseat's determination the Company are to receive for three years successively the sum of sixteen *laacks* and two-thirds of rupees in specie which, with the sale of your annual imports and the amount of bills of exchange that we shall be under a necessity of granting, will be full sufficient, we imagine, for the respective investments of these three years without obliging the

Company to run the risque of any bullion for the supply of the Presidency till that term of years is expired.

28. These advices are dispatched in triplicates to the Select Committee of Bombay to be forwarded to Europe by the quickest conveyances either by shipping or by land. We shall endeavour to send copies to Fort Saint George to be forwarded from thence to Europe, and shall dispatch the *Diligent* schooner about the middle of next month directly home with another copy of this pacquet, by which means we hope the Company will get the intelligence of what has happened in Bengall before the ships of next season leave England.

29. Since writing thus far the money from Muxadavad is arrived.

We are, &c. &c., ROGER DRAKE, RICHARD BECHER.

498. *Extracts from a letter from Admiral Watson to John Cleveland, Esq., dated* 16 *July*, 1757.

By Captain Toby of the *Kingfisher* sloop, I informed you in a letter dated the 14th April of the surrender of the Town and Fort of Chandernagore, and in the same letter I took notice of the great reluctance the Nabob Suraja Dowla shewed to comply with the Articles of the Peace, on which subject many letters passed between us; in most of them he never failed to be very liberal in his promises, but that was all that could be obtained from him. These delays to the final execution of the Peace was in effect the same to the commerce of the kingdom as if none had been concluded, and the leading men at the Nabob's Court knowing his faithless disposition, and perceiving no probability of an established peace in their country while he continued in the Government, began to murmur, and entered into a confideracy to divest him of it. Among these was Jaffier Ally Cawn, who was one of his principal generals and held several other considerable employments, but he having been greatly disgusted at the Nabob's repeated ill treatment became very zealous in the confederacy against him, and communicated the design to Mr. Watts, the second in Council of this place,[1] by whose letters of the 26th and 28th of April, the

[1] i.e., Calcutta or Fort William.

Committee was informed of this affair, which was debated with all the attention and circumspection that was possible, and after maturely examining into the behaviour of the Nabob, who so far from complying with the Articles of the Peace he had so solemnly sworn to observe that he would not permit us to put a garrison into Cossimbuzar, and had given strict orders not to suffer even a pound of powder or ball to pass up the river. These measures added to the certain accounts we received of his having invited Mr. Bussey, the French commanding officer in the province of Golconda to join him with all the troops he could bring, gave us very little reason to believe he had any intention to continue even on peaceable terms with us longer than he thought himself unable to engage in a war against us.

* * * * *

It was therefore judged most advisable to join Jaffier Ally Cawn with our troops, such a step appearing the most effectual way of establishing a Peace in the country, and settling the English on a good and solid foundation. This being resolved on and the inclosed Articles agreed to, our army marched the 13th of last month from Chandernagore towards Cossimbuzar; and in order that Colonel Clive should have as many Europeans with him as possible I agreed to garrison Chandernagore and to send up with him on the expedition, a lieutenant, seven midshipmen, and fifty seamen, to serve as gunners. I also ordered the twenty-gun ship to anchor above Hugley to keep the communications open with the Colonel.

* * * * *

He (the Nawab) was joined by fifty French troops who worked his artillery, and by the most authentick accounts his army consisted of about twenty thousand fighting men, exclusive of those under the command of Jaffier Ally Cawn and Roy Dullub who did not act against us. The number killed in the enemy's camp were few, as they only stood a cannonading. We had about nineteen Europeans killed and wounded, and thirty *seapoys*.

* * * * *

The 30th late at night, a letter came from the Colonel, advising that Suraja Dowla was taken prisoner, and, on the 4th instant,

he acquainted the Committee of his being put privately to death by Jaffier Ally Cawn's son and his party. The Nabob's Treasury was found very short of expectation.

* * * * *

Mr. Law, who was the French Chief at Cossimbuzar, and who had collected near two hundred French European troops, was coming to the assistance of the late Nabob, and was within a few hours' march of him when he was taken prisoner, which Mr. Law hearing of he advanced no further.

499. *Letter from Mr. Ditts to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 22 July, 1757, Friday morning, 10 o'clock.*

Mr. Ditts' compliments to the Duke of Newcastle and has the pleasure of informing His Grace that Admiral Watson has retaken Calcutta, and has also taken Hughley.

500. *Letter from Messrs. Clive &c., to the Secret Committee, London, dated Muxadavad, 25 July, 1757.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—The above letter has been sent us from Calcutta to be forwarded *viâ* Bombay to your Honors. We have little to add thereto further than to explain more fully the nature of our treaty with Jaffier Ally Khan, the Articles of which are *viz.*:

Confirmation of the treaty with Surajud Dowla; that his enemies shall be ours, our enemies his; the French, their Factories and effects shall be delivered up, and they never permitted to settle in these provinces;

For losses sustained by the Company at Calcutta one *crore* of rupees.

——— European inhabitants fifty *laak;*

——— Armenians seven *laak;*

——— Natives and others twenty *laak;*

Tract of land from Calcutta to Culpee to be made over to the Company, they paying the revenues as fixed in the Government's Books;

Lands within the Morattae Ditch and six hundred yards without it to be given up to the Company.

The Moors not to fortify below Hughly.

As the Nabob's treasures have appeared to us to be infinitely

short of what they were reported, and that he could not pay the whole without distressing his affairs, we agreed to refer it to Juggutseat and his brother who decided that one half should be paid down in money and jewels, and the other half in three years at one third each year.

As the Nabob passed his word to us that the state of his treasury would not admit of his paying any more at present, we thought it better to rest satisfyed with the half than to disgust or distress him by insisting on any further part.

The first half we have received. We are settling the remaining Articles of the treaty as expeditiously as we can for the Honourable Company.

We beg leave to congratulate you, Honourable Sirs, and the Company on this happy event, and are with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sirs, &c &c., ROBERT CLIVE, WILLIAM WATTS, C. MANNINGHAM.

501. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Secret Committee, London, dated Muxadávad, 26 July, 1757.*[1]

HONOURABLE SIRS,—By the *Kingsfisher* sloop of war under date 16th April I gave you an account of the taking of Chandernagore. The subject of this address is an event of much higher importance, no less than the entire overthrow of Nabob Suraja Dowla and the placing of Jaffeir Ally Cawn on the throne. I intimated in my last how dilatory Surajah Dowla appeared in fulfilling the Articles of the treaty. This disposition not only continued, but we discovered that he was designing our ruin by a conjunction with the French. To this end, Monsieur Busie was pressingly invited to come into the Province and Monsieur Laws of Cossimbuzar (who before had been privately entertained in his service) was ordered to return from Patna. About this time some of his principal officers made overtures to us for dethroning him. At the head of these was Jaffeir Ally Cawn, then *Buxey* to the army, a man as generally esteemed as the other was detested. As we had reason to believe the disaffection pritty general, we soon entered

[1] This closely resembles Clive's letter to the Select Committee, Fort St. George of July 2

into engagements with Jaffeir Ally Khan to put the crown on his head All necessary preparations being compleated with the utmost secrecy, the army consisting of about 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 *seepoys* with eight pieces of cannon marched from Chandernagore, the 13th June, and arrived the 18th at Cutwaw Fort which was taken without opposition. The 22nd in the evening we crossed the river, and landing on the island,[1] marched straight for Placis Grove where we arrived by one in the morning. At day break we discovered the Nabob's army moving towards us, consisting as we since found of about 15,000 horse and 35,000 foot with upwards of 40 pieces of cannon. They approached apace, and by six began the attack with a number of heavy cannon supported by their whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly for several hours, during which our situation was of the utmost service to us, being lodged in a large grove surrounded with good mud banks. To succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they were planted in a manner round us, and at a considerable distance from each other; we therefore remained quiet in our post in expectation of a successfull attack upon their camp at night. About noon the enemy drew off their artillery and retired into their camp, being the same which Roydulub had left but few days before, and which he had fortified with a good ditch and breastwork. We immediately sent a detachment accompanied with two field pieces to take possession of a Tank with high banks which was advanced about three hundred yards beyond our grove and from whence the enemy had considerably annoyed us with some cannon managed by Frenchmen. This motion brought them out a second time, but, on finding them make no great effort to dislodge us, we proceeded to take possession of one or two more eminences lying very near an angle of their camp; from whence and an adjacent eminence still in their possession they kept a smart fire of musketry upon us. They made several attempts to bring out their cannon, but our advanced field pieces played so warmly and well upon them that they were always drove back. The horse exposing themselves a good deal on this occassion many of them were killed, and among the rest four or five officers of the first distinction, by which the whole army being

[1] i.e , the island of Cossimbazar.

visibly dispirited and thrown into some confusion we were encouraged to storm both the eminence and the angle of their camp, which were carried at the same instant with little or no loss, though the latter was defended (exclusive of blacks) by forty French and two pieces of cannon, and the former by a large body of blacks both foot and horse. On this a general rout ensued and we pursued the enemy six miles, passing upwards of forty pieces of cannon they had abandoned, with an infinite number of *hackaries* and carriages filled with baggage of all kind. Suraja Dowla escaped on a camel, and reaching Muxadavad early the next morning dispatched away what jewels and treasure he conveniently could, and he himself followed at midnight with only two or three attendants.

It's computed there were killed of the enemy about 500. Our loss amounted to only 22 killed and 50 wounded and those chiefly blacks. During the warmest part of the action we observed a large body of troops hovering on our right, who proved to be our friends, but as they never discovered themselves by any signal whatever we frequently fired on them to make them keep their distance. When the battle was over they sent a congratulatory message and encamped in our neighbourhood that night. The next morning Jaffeir Ally Khan paid me a visit and expressed much gratitude for the service done him, assuring me in the most solemn manner that he would faithfully perform his engagements to the English. He then proceeded to the City which he reached some hours before Surajah Dowla left it.

As immediately on Surajah Dowla's flight Jaffeir Ally Khan found himself in peaceable possession of the palace and City, I encamped without to prevent the inhabitants from being plundered or disturbed, first at Maudipoor and afterwards at the French Factory at Sydabad. However I sent forward Messrs. Watts and Walsh to inquire into the state of the Treasury and inform me what was transacting at the palace. By their representations I soon found it necessary for me to be present on many accounts. Accordingly the 29th I entered the city with a guard of 200 Europeans and 300 *seepoys* and took up my quarters in a spacious house and garden near the palace. The same evening I waited on Jaffir Ally Khan, who refused seating himself on the *musnud*

till placed on it by me, which done he received homage as Nabob from all his courtiers. The next morning he returned my visit, when after a good deal of discourse on the situation of his affairs I recommended to him to consult Juggutseat on all occasions, who, as a man of sense and by far of the greatest property among all his subjects, would give him the best advice for settling the Kingdom in peace and security. On this he proposed that we should immediately set out together to visit him, which being complied with, solemn engagements were entered into by the three parties for a strict union and mutual support of each others' interest. Juggutseat then undertook to use his whole interest at Delhi, which is certainly very considerable, to get the Nabob acknowledged by the *Mogul* and our late grants confirmed, likewise procure for us any other *phirmaunds* we might have occasion for.

The substance of the treaty with the present Nabob is, *viz.* :—

1*st.*—Confirmation of the Mint and all other grants and privileges in the treaty with the late Nabob.

2*nd.*—An alliance offensive and defensive against all enemies whatever.

3*rd.*—The French Factories and effects to be delivered up, and they never permitted to resettle in any of the three Provinces.

4*th.*—One hundred *lack* of rupees to be paid to the Company in consideration of their losses at Calcutta and the expences of the campaign.

5*th.*—Fifty *lack* of rupees to be given to the English sufferers at the loss of Calcutta.

6*th.*—Twenty *lack* to *Jentoos*, Moors, &c., black sufferers at the loss of Calcutta.

7*th.*—Seven *lack* to the Armenian sufferers These three last donations to be distributed at the pleasure of the Admiral and the gentlemen of Council including me.

8*th.*—The entire property of all lands within the Morratta Ditch which runs round Calcutta to be vested in the Company, also six hundred yards all round without the said Ditch.

9*th.*—The Company to have the *zemmindarry* of the country to the south of Calcutta lying between the lake[1] and river and reach-

[1] Now known as the Salt Lakes

ing as far as Culpee, they paying the customary rents paid by former *zemmindars* to the Government.

10*th*.—Whenever the assistance of the English troops shall be wanted their extraordinary charges to be paid by the Nabob.

11*th*.—No forts to be erected by the Government on the river side from Hughly downwards.

12*th*.—The foregoing articles to be performed without delay as soon as Jaffeir Ally Khan becomes *Subah*.

On examining the Treasury there were found about 150 *lack* of rupees, which being too little to answer our demands, much less leave a sufficiency for the Nabob's necessary disbursements, it was referred to Juggutseat as a mutual friend to settle what payment should be made to us, who accordingly determined that we should immediately receive one-half of our demand, two-thirds in money and one-third in gold and silver plate, jewels and goods, and that the other half should be discharged in three years, at three equal and annual payments.

The part to be paid in ready money is received and safely arrived at Calcutta, and the goods, jewels, &c., are now delivering over to us; the major part of these will be bought back by the Nabob for ready money, and on the remaining part there will be little or no loss. A large proportion was proposed to have been paid us in jewels, but as they are not a very saleable article we got the amount reduced one-half, and the difference to be made good in money.

It is impossible as yet to form a judgement how much the granted lands will produce you, as the Europeans are quite ignorant of the extent of the country between the river and lake, but in order to give you some idea of the value I will venture to estimate it at 10 *lack* per annum. An officer on the part of the Nabob is already dispatched to Calcutta to begin the survey in company with one of ours.

Surajah Dowla was not discovered till some days after his flight, however he was at last taken in the neighbourhood of Rajahmaul and brought to Muxadavad the 2nd instant late at night. He was immediately cut off by order of the Nabob's son, and as it is said, without the father's knowledge. Next morning the Nabob paid me a visit and thought it necessary to palliate the matter on

motives of policy, for that Surajah Dowla had on the road wrote letters to many of the *zemidars* of the army and occassioned some commotion among them in his favour.

Monsieur Laws and his party came down as far as Rajahmaul to Surajah Dowla's assistance and were within three hours' march of him when he was taken. As soon as they heard of his misfortune they returned by forced marches and by the last advice had passed by Patna on the other side of the river. A party of Europeans and *sepoys* were quickly dispatched after them, but I am doubtful if we shall be able to overtake them before they get out of the Nabob's dominions. Strong letters have been wrote from the Nabob to the *Naib* of Patna to distress them all in his power and take them prisoners if possible, a compliance with which I am in impatient expectation of.

I ought to observe that the French I spoke of in the action were some fugitives from Chandernagore who had assembled at Sydabad. It was by their advices and indeed by their hands that the English Factory at Cossimbuzar was burned and destroyed after our Gentlemen had quitted it on the renewal of the troubles.

The present Nabob has every appearance of being firmly and durably seated on the throne. The whole country has quietly submitted to him, and even the apprehension of an inroad from the side of Delhi is vanished, so that this great revolution, so happily brought about, seems compleat in every respect. I persuade myself the importance of your possessions now in Bengal will determine you to send out not only a large and early supply of troops and good officers, but of capable young gentlemen for the civil branches of your business.

I shall shortly have an opportunity of writing by an express vessel intended to be dispatched from Calcutta, but for fear of accidents I forward these advices by way of Bombay.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

502. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Alamgir Sani, King of Hindostan, 30 July, 1757.*

The English Company were first settled in Bengal by a *phirmaund* from the great Emperor Allamguire, whom God grant a seat in Paradise, and by the favour of his successors the Company

became great merchants, always attending to their trade. The *Subadars*, sensible how much the great wealth brought by us into the country contributed to make the country flourish, and to the increase of the royal revenues, always encouraged and protected them; and this continued till the death of Mahabut Jung[1] and Calcutta was become a great town and *crores* collected in it. He was succeeded by Surajah Dowlat who, even before he had received the royal *phirmaund*, declared war against the English; and, regardless of the representations of Juggut Seat and Maraja Seroop Chund, and of the petition presented him by the English Governor, he marched with a numerous army against Calcutta. The English, who as merchants were destitute of all implements of war, were easily defeated and Surajah Dowlat took and plundered Calcutta the 20th June 1756 and *all the great men and other Englishmen that fell into his hands were by his orders suffocated in one night.* Admiral Charles Watson and myself, both servants to the King of England, came to revenge these injuries with a powerful army. We repossessed ourselves of the ruins of Calcutta and a few days after drove his people from Hughley. Surajah Dowlat priding himself in the number of his troops came down with a great army against Calcutta, which by the blessing of God I defeated the 5th of February 1757. But reflecting how injurious war would be to your Majesty's dominions, and that it was proper to live in love and friendship with the *Subahs* of these Provinces, I made peace with him and agreed to certain Articles in favour of the Company, to the performance of which he swore by God and His Prophet, and a few days after broke his oath and joined with the enemies of the English to destroy them. I marched my forces towards Muxadavad to demand the fulfilling the treaty, and wrote to him several times in a friendly way to desire he would comply with the Articles he had entered into. He scorned my friendship and met me with a numerous army on the plains of Placis, over which I, (by the blessing of God) obtained a compleat victory, the 23rd June 1757. He retreated to the City, nor stopt there, but continued his flight and was killed by his servants who followed him to demand their pay. In the end, by the consent of all the greatest men of the city, Meer Jaffeir Cawn Bahadre

[1] Alivardi Khan

succeeded him, a man just and merciful as his predecessor was wicked and cruel. He therefore beseeches your Majesty that you will grant him a *sunnud* for the *Subaship* of these three provinces. I have joined him with 25,000 matchless *seapoys*, and if it please God there shall be nothing wanting to make the country flourish and the subjects happy. I kept my army out of the City nor permitted them to plunder the least thing. I am always ready with my life to obey your Majesty's commands.

503. *Letter from Colonel Clive to Ghazi-ud-din Khan, Prime Vizier of the Empire, dated* 1 *August*, 1757.

The destruction of Calcutta by Surajah Dowlat and *the cruel death of all our great men* is known to the whole world and has undoubtedly been represented to Your Excellency. To revenge these injuries myself and Admiral Charles Watson, servants of the King of England and commanders of his forces, came into this country with an army and retook the ruins of Calcutta. A few days after we drove Surajah Dowlat's people from Hughly, but I always expressed a strong desire for peace. He priding himself in the number of his troops came down against me, but, by the blessing of God, I defeated his army the 5th February 1757, but reflecting how prejudicial war would be to His Majesty's dominions, and that it was proper to live in friendship with the *Subah*, I made peace with him, and he swore before God and His Prophet to certain Articles in favour of the Company. A few days afterwards he meditated by an union with the enemies of the English to drive them again from his country, and broke his treaty. To procure the execution of the treaty I marched with my forces towards his capital. I wrote him several times on terms of friendship to desire his compliance with it, but he, scorning my friendship, met me on the plains of Placis with a numerous army. There likewise, by the blessing of God, I entirely defeated him. He fled to the City nor stopt there but continuing his flight was killed. In the end Meer Mahmud Jaffeir Cawn was declared his successor with the consent of all the great men, a man good, brave, and merciful as his predecessor was wicked and cruel. He is in hopes by your favour to obtain the *sunnud* for these Provinces. I have joined the Cawn with 25,000 matchless *seapoys*.

By God's blessing there will be no endeavours spared to make the country flourish. My army halted without the City and no one has had cause of complaint. I have wrote these particulars to His Majesty and have hopes Your Excellency, who bears the burden of his affairs, will present my humble address, and that my request will be approved, and that I shall receive a gracious *phirmaund* and *husbulhookum*.

504. *Extract from a letter from Colonel Clive to Mr. Orme, dated 1 August, 1757.*[1]

DEAR ORME,—Probably the news overland will reach you before this, informing you of the great revolution effected in the kingdom of Bengal. This expedition has perfectly satisfied me as to circumstances, and [I] only wait to see everything firmly settled before I steer my course for old England. So far from being a × to your aspiring thoughts, I shall be of great assistance by my interest, which you may depend upon.

I am possessed of volumes of materials for the continuance of your History, in which will appear fighting, tricks, chicanery, intrigues, politics and the Lord knows what. In short, there will be a fine field for you to display your genius in, so I shall certainly call upon the Coast on my way to England. I have many particulars to explain to you relating to this same History which must be published.

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505. *Extract from general letter from Court of Directors to Council, Fort William, dated 3 August, 1757.*

Paragraph 1. On the 4th of June we received by the ships *Edgecote* and *Portfield* from Bombay and the *Chesterfield* from Fort Saint George the melancholly news of the loss of Fort William and the rest of the Company's Settlements in Bengal. On the 22nd of July Mr. Holwell, who arrived at Plymouth in the *Syren* sloop, gave a most agreeable turn to our thoughts by bringing advice of the recapture of Fort William by Admiral Watson's squadron and the forces under the command of Colonel Clive, &c., &c.

[1] For Orme's reply, see letter to Clive, dated October 22, 1757 (Orme MSS., O.V., 293), not included in this Selection

506. *Extracts from a letter from Colonel Clive to the Secret Committee, London, dated Muxadavad, 6 August, 1757.*

Some of Surajah Dowla's letters to the French having fallen into my hands I enclose a translate of them (Paper No. 5)[1] just to show you the necessity we were reduced to of attempting his overthrow. I was fully apprized of all his proceedings by means of Mr. Watts, with whom I kept up a very full correspondence, too voluminous indeed to transmit you a transcript of, at least at this opportunity. I must here do that gentleman the justice to say his services at the *Durbar* have been very great, as well in promoting the ruin of the French as in negotiating the treaty with Jaffeir Ally Cawn; Omichund likewise had merited well while acting in concert with Mr. Watts, but I had reason to think his intriguing disposition was carrying him too far in the pursuit of his private interest, therefore recommended to him a visit of devotion to Malda. He is a person capable of rendering you great services while properly restrained, therefore not to be wholly discarded.

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In the Book of country letters[2] now forwarded are translates of those I have wrote to the Nanna of the Marattoes, Salabud Jung and the *Moghul* (Nos. 189. 200: and 202:). Some days before my setting out on the expedition to Muxadavad arrived letters from the Nanna directed to the Governour, desiring the alliance of the English and that we would enter into no treaty with Surajah Dowla, for that he would engage to enter the Province with 150,000 Marattoes and make good to us double of all the losses we had sustained, that as we were powerful in ships we might keep out the French by sea and he would take care to do it by land. No other use was made of the letter at that time than to send it to Surajah Dowla in order to obtain his confidence and prevail on him to withdraw his army from Placis, where they had been encamped for some time through mistrust of us. You will observe I have wrote to the Nanna of our strict alliance with the present

[1] See Nos 265, 317, 318, 319, 373, 374.

[2] India Office, Home Series, Miscellaneous, 193

Nabob, and that I have engaged his promise that the customary annual *chout* shall be duly paid.

* * * * *

The Gentlemen of Fort Saint George have been very urgent with me for my returning with the troops to the Coast, judging, I apprehend, that after the conclusion of the peace with Surajah Dowla and the reduction of Chandernagore there was little left to be done in Bengal. A sufficient knowledge of Surajah Dowla's disposition must have induced another way of thinking. It was very early visible he bore a deep resentment against the English and that all his compliances sprung solely from fear. To have weakened our force would have been loosing the reins to his malice and insolence. The French Subordinates were still to be destroyed, and, if possible, themselves totally extirpated from his kingdom. Some of the capital points of the treaty were not complied with, such as putting us in possession of the villages, admitting the currency of our *siccas*, and restoring to us such part of the plunder of Calcutta as was brought to account in the *Sircarry* books. These circumstances, without mention of the alarms of Monsieur Bussie's marching this way and being joined by the Nabob, will shew the necessity there was for detaining the troops, and I flatter myself the great event which has since happened will fully justify my conduct both to you and the Gentlemen of Fort Saint George.

* * * * *

I have in all my letters pressed for a large force to be sent to this Settlement, and I don't doubt, Gentlemen, but the importance now of your possessions as well as expectations will induce you to use your utmost efforts to secure them. The Nabob who looks upon us as his chief support is very desirous that we should have a strong fort and garrison near his capital. Our old Factory at Cossimbuzar is improper on many accounts; Mr. Brohier therefore is shortly to come up from Calcutta to pitch on the best spot for a fortification, and to set about raising it with the utmost expedition. I think it necessary to remark that one or more capable engineers should be sent out; was an accident to happen to Mr. Brohier here or Mr. Call at Fort Saint George we should be at an absolute loss to carry on your works at one or the other place.

I have, &c. &c., ROBERT CLIVE.

507. *A general description of the transactions of the English in Bengal from the treaty made with the Nabob Siraj-uddaula to the success at Plassey, by Mr. Watts, a principal actor, to his father in London, in a letter dated Murshedabad,* 13 *August,* 1757.

DEAR SIR,—My last letter to you was in my passage to Muxadavad, where I was ordered to see carried into execution the treaty made with the Nabob.

Before the battle and Peace concluded with the Nabob, we had advice of a war being declared against France. We attempted to engage the French in a neutrality with us within the Ganges, and for Bengal, which they then declined; therefore from the intelligence I had on my way up and arrival at Moorshedabad of the favour shewn the French by returning the money the Nabob had extorted from them the preceding year, granting them the government of the considerable city of Hughly with a large extent of country, I had the greatest reason to apprehend the Nabob would join them to revenge himself on us, whenever they had force sufficient to support them. In his own nature timid to the last degree, I was sensible he would not venture to assist them in their present weak state. I therefore in all my letters to the Select Committee urged the necessity we were under for our own preservation to make use of the present favourable opportunity to attack and take their principal Settlement of Chandernagore and extirpate them out of Bengal I constantly assured them they had nothing but threatenings to apprehend from the Nabob, that he would never require a second battle with us; these assurances with a tacit assent in one of his favourable intervals towards me I got the Nabob to write in his letter to Colonel Clive for the attack of Chandernagore, I flatter myself, had great weight in forwarding that enterprise, which was attended with success by the taking of that place. Even after this success, the Nabob buoyed up by the French with hopes of a large army of theirs arriving from the province of Daccan under the command of Monsieur Bussie to his and their assistance, he delayed under various pretences fulfilling the grand Articles of the treaty with the Company, and besides I had certain intelligence of his breaking the treaty and designing our ruin by a junction with our enemies the French, he having entertained Mr. Law, who was Chief of their Factory at

Cossimbuzar, and his party at 10,000 rupees *per* month and had sent for them from Patna, where they had gone after the loss of Chandernagore. The Nabob likewise wrote to Monsieur Bussie to march to his assistance with all expedition. To avert this impending storm, which portended the destruction of the Company's Settlements and the extirpation of the English out of this Province, I applied to Jaffeir Ally Khan, brother-in-law to the late Nabob, who was under daily apprehensions of treachery from the present. He with great willingness entered into my scheme of complying with and signing any reasonable Articles that should be sent him by our Select Committee on condition of his being made Nabob by our assistance. This I advised Colonel Clive of, and accordingly Articles were sent up, but finding Articles more advantageous could be procured than those demanded, I sent down others for their approval, which they returned with some alterations. As the Nabob was then at variance with Jaffeir Ally Khan and had spies on me I was obliged to go in a covered *dooley*, such as the women are carried in, to his house, where I swore him on the Koran to the articles of agreement which I despatched immediately to Colonel Clive, and a few days afterwards escaped myself on horseback and joined our army about thirty miles on this side of Calcutta. The following is an account of the march of our army and battle at which I was present.

(*Here follows a description of Plassey and of the flight of Siraj-uddaula up to his escape from Murshedabad, taken verbatim from Clive's letter to the Select Committee, Fort St. George, dated 2 July.*)

A few days afterwards he [the Nawab] was taken near Rajamaul in a distressed condition with hardly cloaths to his back, such was the misery he was reduced to by his injuries to the English and by a general course of folly and wickedness throughout the short time he reigned. He was brought to the City, and immediately dispatched, having created some commotions in the army by the letters he wrote on the road to the several *jemmadars*.

The day of the battle we saw a large body of horse hovering to the right of us, who proved to be Jaffier Ally Khan and his party, but as they made no signal by which we could discover them, we frequently fired on them to make them keep their distance. After the action he sent his compliments and next day paid the Colonel

a visit and solemnly assured him he would fulfil the treaty. He then proceeded to the City, from whence a few hours after his arrival Surajut Dowlet fled, when Meer Jaffier Ally took quiet possession of the palace and treasures and was immediately acknowledged Nabob. I was sent the next day in order to quiet the minds of the people and prevent their running away, in which I was in some measure useful. The 29th the Colonel entered the city with a guard of 200 Europeans and 300 *sepoys* and visited the Nabob and seated him on his *musnud* or carpet, where he was again acknowledged Nabob by all parties.

The purport of our treaty with the present Nabob is a confirmation of all grants made by the *Mogole's phirmaund* or Surajut Dowlet, an alliance offensive or defensive against all enemies either Europeans or country, the delivering of the French and their property into our hands, and a perpetual exclusion of them from these Provinces, a tract of land extending between a lake behind Calcutta and the river from Calcutta to Culpee; which is near sixty miles in length, to be given the Company, also ten millions of rupees, five millions to the European sufferers at the loss of Calcutta, two millions to the black sufferers, seven hundred thousand rupees to the Armenians, and five millions to the army and navy.

In a letter from the Governor and Council dated July 19th 1757 they return me thanks in the following words *viz.*:—'In this place we have an opportunity to return Mr. Watts thanks in the name of our Honourable Employers and for ourselves for the advantages obtained to them and the inhabitants in the share he had in bringing to a crisis the late happy revolution in the Government of these Provinces.'

I am now at Muxadavad seeing the Articles of the treaty executed, where I shall continue some time.

I am, dear Sir, your most dutiful and affectionate son,
W. WATTS.

END OF VOL. II.

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